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Abstract 
 
     While the nature of security is transforming, alliances remain at the centre of 
foreign policymaking in the contemporary era. Although such ideas as “the end of 
alliances” and “the end of alliance theories” have been discussed with the emergence 
of a “coalition of willingness”, alliances have continuously evolved in the post-Cold 
War and post-9.11 contexts. The forms of security are transforming by 
comprehending not only the traditional but also non-traditional types, consisting of 
peacekeeping operations (PKO), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
(HA/DR), global commons and energy security. In the face of changing and 
malleable international security surroundings, alliances have been reshaped. Yet, 
alliances remain to be treated as mere military alliances rather than political ones in 
the realm of IR scholarship and a negative perception of the interdependence of 
allies still exists, which may have limited the understanding about alliance 
relationships in the post-Cold War period.  
     This PhD thesis aims to refine the theory of alliance by incorporating the neo-
Gramscian account of hegemony, which is crucial to be taken into consideration. 
This research project is intended to go beyond the military understanding of alliances. 
In light of alliance politics, it is important to explore not only material but also the 
economic and ideational aspects of alliances. In consideration of the current 
circumstances, it seems that it is not only material elements that have bolstered the 
alliance, which underlines the importance of examining other elements such as 
ideology. Although some literature addresses the causes of the continuity of alliances, 
there have not been in-depth investigations about the durability of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, particularly within the International Relations (IR) framework. Furthermore, 
the alliance may have become deeply embedded in Japanese society as the pillar of 
Japanese foreign policy, which is another aspect that shall be examined.
1 
 
Introduction Chapter 
 
“Like Oscar Wilde’s picture of Dorian Gray, an ageing alliance may appear robust and 
healthy so long as its formal institutions continue to operate, even if the basic rationale for the 
arrangement is crumbling” (Walt 1997, p. 67). 
 
Introduction 
     While the nature of security is transforming not only with traditional but also 
non-traditional forms consisting of peacekeeping operations (PKO), humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and energy security, alliances remain at the 
centre of foreign policymaking in the contemporary era. Although such ideas as “the 
end of alliances” and the “end of alliance theories” emerged with the end of the Cold 
War and a “coalition of willingness”, alliances continuously evolved in the post-Cold 
War and post-9.11 contexts. In the face of alternating and malleable international 
security surroundings, alliances have been reshaped and played an important role in 
international politics. Nonetheless, in the realm of IR scholarship, alliances remain to 
be treated as mere military alliances, not necessarily political. Specifically, as 
mainstream alliance theories exhibit, negative perceptions of the interdependence of 
allies still exist, which may have limited the understanding about alliance 
relationships in the post-Cold War period.  
     Regarding the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it has been reconfigured, redefined 
and reinforced with changing regional and global circumstances taking into account 
not only joint military operations and joint intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) activities, but also the values of democracy, the rule of law, 
free and open markets, and respect for human rights. The significance of the U.S.-
Japan alliance was underscored in the wake of the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and 
2 
 
Tsunami in Japan, or “Great East Japan Earthquake”, with the presence of 
“Operation Tomodachi”.1 Conversely, criticism of the alliance remains in the eyes of 
some scholars and activists due to Japan’s continuing dependence on the US and the 
burdens placed on local citizens in the prefectures hosting US bases in Japan 
(McCormack 2007; Magosaki 2012).
2
 Ongoing opposition and critiques against the 
U.S.-Japan alliance put into scrutiny the durability of the alliance in the post-Cold 
War period,
 3
 which can be annulled at any time if both sides agree.
4
. Additionally, 
whilst it has been widely recognised that the increasing importance of the alliance is 
due to the emerging threat from North Korea and China’s rise, it is questionable 
whether these factors are the sole determinants of the endurance of the alliance.
5
 
While the alliance was formed in consideration of the Cold War contexts, US 
alliances have been harnessed despite the discourse on US decline. Especially, in the 
midst of US fiscal austerity, it is questionable that the U.S.-Japan alliance will 
continue to develop (de Koning & Lipscy 2011).
6
  
     This leads us to one major research puzzle: “Why has the U.S.-Japan alliance 
continued to endure and been strengthened”? In order to answer this puzzle, this 
                                                          
1
 This was an assistance operation by the US Armed Forces to support Japan in the realm of 
disaster relief which took place from 12 March to 4 May 2011. 
2
 For example, John Dower, an author of Embracing Defeat, has been one of the activists against 
Japan’s dependence on the US. 
3
 It is also worth noting that it is not only the citizens living nearby US bases but also 
policymakers, especially from the US side, who believe that reducing bases in Japan is in their 
national interest considering financial burdens. For instance, US Admiral Mike Mullen indicated 
that “Our national debt is our biggest national security threat” (Bassett 2010). 
4
 Article 10 “allowed for the abrogation of the treaty if both parties agreed that the United 
Nations has made satisfactory arrangements to provide for the stability of peace and security in 
the Japan area”. 
5
 In the realm of threat productions, Hughes’ (2009) article discusses “supersizing” the North 
Korean threat to Japan which has led to its remilitarisation while such articles as Broomfield’s 
(2003) work examines the theory of China’s threat to other nations. 
6
 de Koning and Lipscy (2011) analyse Japan’s military reemergence in the context of austerity, 
concluding that “Japan’s experience indicates that austerity can serve as a wakeup call for 
defense establishments to reallocate resources more efficiently and reduce waste” (de Koning & 
Lipscy 2011, p. 45). 
3 
 
research project is intended to go beyond the military understanding of alliances. In 
light of the politics of alliances, it is important to explore not only material but also 
economic and ideational aspects of alliances that are interrelated. In consideration of 
the current circumstances, it seems that it is not only material elements that have 
bolstered the alliance and this underlines the importance of examining other 
elements, such as ideology. Although some literature addresses the causes of the 
continuity of alliances (Walt 1997), in-depth investigations on the durability of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance have not been made particularly within the International 
Relations (IR) framework. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, with regard to the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, the alliance may have become deeply embedded in Japanese 
society as the pillar of Japanese foreign policy which is another aspect that shall be 
examined.
7
  
     The aforementioned circumstances demonstrate the significance of examining the 
nature of the alliance relationship between the US and Japan by exploring the 
persistence of the U.S.-Japan alliance under these manifold conditions, which have 
not been closely examined in the IR field. My Introduction Chapter elucidates the 
importance of adopting the neo-Gramscian framework to alliance theory and the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, underlining the relevance of this research project. Prior to the 
literature review for this research project, which is fully explored in Chapter One, 
this chapter presents the following sections: first, the aim and purposes of this 
research project are illustrated by taking into account the features of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and existing relevant literature. Second, original contributions to the 
background knowledge for this research project are addressed by underscoring the 
importance of this research project in the discipline of IR. Third, research questions 
                                                          
7
 This is clearly listed in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) document (2013). 
4 
 
consisting of my central research question and sub-research questions are presented, 
which are answered in subsequent chapters. The central research question and sub-
research questions are closely examined to display the relationship with the 
subsequent chapters of the research project. Fourth, prior to the concluding section, 
the structure of the research project is presented in line with the sub-research 
questions.  
 
Research Aim 
     The major aim of this research project is to refine alliance theory by taking an 
alternative IR approach to exemplify the alliance system in the post-Cold War era. 
Since alliances are often treated merely as military alliances in the field of the IR 
scholarship,
8
 this research project is intended to go beyond a military understanding 
of alliances and encapsulate the political dimensions of alliances. Although some 
research recognises and provides explanations about the continuity of alliances, the 
durability of alliances including the U.S.-Japan alliance is not sufficiently examined 
in depth. In addition, although the U.S.-Japan alliance is seen as indispensable for 
Japanese foreign policymaking especially from the Japanese perspective, this aspect 
of the alliance politics has not been fully explored. In a similar vein, whilst it has 
been commonly acknowledged that the salience of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 
post-Cold War era is enhanced by the threat generated from North Korea and China, 
some literature illustrates that threats can be created based on the security interests of 
the states (Broomfield 2003; Hughes 2009) which may not comprehend the logic of 
persisting alliance system in the contemporary periods. Considering these existing 
                                                          
8
 Although some scholars (Inoguchi, Ikenberry & Sato 2011) treat alliances as political, it is 
rarely analysed in this way. 
5 
 
viewpoints and the changing features of international security environments, it is 
important to explore the political relevance of alliances from the alternative IR 
perspectives by closely examining alliance relationships.  
 
Neo-Gramscianism as an Analytical Framework 
     In this regard, in order to embellish alliance theory, this research project critically 
investigates the features of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era by 
adopting the neo-Gramscian perspectives. This theoretical framework has not been 
used previously in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance and not even in the 
scholarship of alliance theory and security studies. One of the prominent 
characteristics of this IR theoretical framework that should be noted is its viewpoint 
on hegemony by taking into account both coercive and consensual roles of 
hegemony, which is further explained in Chapters One and Two. The neo-Gramscian 
standpoint on hegemony is crucial to be considered in understanding the power 
dynamism in the context of the current alliance system in the post-Cold War periods. 
Additionally, unlike other mainstream IR theoretical approaches to the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, which are further exemplified in Chapter One, another feature of neo-
Gramscianism is its comprehension of not only material but also ideological 
dimensions of hegemony that may have played a larger role in the post-Cold War era. 
In this regard, it can be argued that the US-led hegemony, or “historic bloc” in the 
neo-Gramscian terms, has been bolstered with US-led liberal ideas such as 
democracy and liberalism in the context of the Asia-Pacific region.  
     In order to investigate what unites these allies, neo-Gramscianism, especially in 
consideration of its concept of hegemony, is a crucial theoretical framework to 
understand the alliance relationship between the US and Japan. In doing so, another 
6 
 
major purpose of this research is to embellish neo-Gramscianism in the IR field and 
alliance theory since this theoretical notion of hegemony may be applicable not only 
to the alliance between the US and Japan but also to other US-led alliances in the 
Asia-Pacific region. In fact, as is further exemplified in Chapter Two, neo-
Gramscian perspectives can be considered difficult to be operationalised regardless 
of its insightful perspective on hegemony. Yet, in an attempt to overcome this hurdle, 
this research project aims at developing this IR theoretical framework as a useful 
analytical tool by elucidating the strengths of neo-Gramscianism, particularly in 
comprehending the sustainability of asymmetrical power relationships. As is noted in 
the later section, the key notions of neo-Gramscianism are illuminated in Chapter 
Two to evolve into a research method in the field of IR. 
 
Original Contributions 
     With regard to the research aims of this project, the original contributions to the 
background knowledge are as follows: the first contribution is the application of the 
neo-Gramscian theory to the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The IR literature 
on the U.S.-Japan alliance has been primarily examined from mainstream realist, 
liberal and constructivist perspectives which are further scrutinised in Chapter One. 
Whilst the explanations that have developed within these theories can remain 
valuable in comprehending the alliance mechanism in the post-Cold War period, the 
neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony is useful in articulating the power relationship 
between the US and Japan, which has not been explored in depth in the existing 
literature. In particular, in consideration of the characteristics of the postwar regime 
crafted by the US after the Second World War, there are some recognitions about the 
relationship between the US and Japan which can be characterised as a paternalistic 
7 
 
relationship (McCormack 2007; Shibusawa 2010) but no IR theory explains the 
mechanism of this power relationship, which can be illuminated through the neo-
Gramscian lenses. 
     The second contribution to knowledge is the implementation of the neo-
Gramscian theories not only to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance but also to alliance 
theory which so far has been predominantly studied from neorealist perspectives in 
the realm of IR scholarship. As is exemplified further in Chapter One, much 
literature on alliances relies on the concept of “alliance dilemma”, which perceives 
dependence on allies as negative. In this regard, it is important to move away from 
this negative perception since alliances remain functioning as the main component of 
diplomacy even in the contemporary era since the features of alliances can be 
transforming from the ones prior to the First World War. Although there are various 
theories of alliance, the power relationship among allies is rarely discussed. In this 
respect, the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony is able to shed light on the power 
in the alliance mechanism. Since the purpose of this research project is to refine 
alliance theory, the incorporation of the neo-Gramscian perspective of hegemony is 
one of the visible contributions to this research aim. Alliance relationships can be 
understood not only in material but also in economic and ideational senses which are 
further explored in the later chapters. Application of this theoretical framework to 
the scholarship of alliance theory enables us to explain the dynamism of alliance 
politics which can be useful in the post-Cold War or post-9.11 contexts where non-
traditional forms of security are seen as relevant. 
     And, lastly, the third contribution is the applicability of the neo-Gramscian theory 
to political discourse in the realm of policymaking, taking into consideration not 
merely the strategies of hegemonic states but those of non-hegemonic states, which 
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are important factors to be taken into account in the IR field. With regard to 
hegemonic discourse, less attention is paid to the role of non-hegemonic states. The 
political strategy of non-hegemonic states cannot be ignored in understanding not 
only in academic terms but also policymaking terms, which may have been already 
acknowledged but rarely discussed. In this sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance is one of 
the proper examples for understanding policymaking in the alliance contexts. In the 
case of the US-led alliances, not only the US perspective but also those of US allies 
are crucial for understanding the sustainability of hegemony. This research project is 
also aimed at underscoring the dynamic nature of hegemony at a practical level in 
alternating international environments by adopting the concepts of neo-
Gramscianism. 
 
Research Questions 
     In this research project, the central research question is based on the main 
research puzzle that is indicated earlier: “Why has the U.S.-Japan alliance continued 
to endure and been strengthened”? As is elaborated previously, few studies scrutinise 
the durability of this alliance, which has not been deeply investigated regardless of 
the condition that it can be annulled based upon the agreement between the allies 
according to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which is the foundation of the U.S.-
Japan alliance. As the alliance is regarded as the centre of Japanese foreign 
policymaking, it is essential to unravel this feature of its diplomacy, especially in the 
surrounding and transforming regional security environments with the decline of the 
US and the rise of China. In order to provide the answer to this central research 
question, my research employs a neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony and its 
other relevant key concepts.  
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     Stemming from this main question, the sub-research questions can be drawn in 
the following ways. The first sub-research question is: “In what ways has the U.S.-
Japan alliance been developed?” This research question intends to explore in what 
ways the alliance relationship between the US and Japan has been evolving. This is 
closely examined in Chapter Three by illustrating the historical trajectory of the 
alliance relationship between the two countries and elucidating not only the 
hegemonic but also non-hegemonic viewpoints of the alliance. While some literature 
discusses how the U.S.-Japan alliance has been or should be functioning (see 
Chapter One), there are few explanations about in what ways the alliance may have 
evolved. In an attempt to demonstrate this development, which is rarely considered 
in the context of alliance theory, Chapter Three attempts to illuminate the 
interactions between the US and Japan within the neo-Gramscian framework. 
     The second sub-research question is: “How has Japan increasingly come to accept 
US foreign policies?” (see Chapter Four). Japan has had difficulty in contributing 
militarily to international security in the past due to its constitutional restraints and 
the “Yoshida Doctrine”. For instance, the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated when a sole 
financial contribution could be made instead of sending Japanese troops to the 
conflict area. However, the roles of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) are 
alternating with a wider range of activities by encompassing humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistances (see Chapter Three), specifically in the post-Cold War 
period. Indeed, while more discussions on the significance of liberal or common 
values of the alliance have emerged (see Chapter One), few critical analyses have 
been made regarding its roles in the alliance structure with the use of ideology. 
While “alliance dilemma” features prominently in IR scholarship (see Chapter One), 
the ideological component of power is seldom taken into consideration, which can be 
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provided by adopting neo-Gramscianism. Additionally, the Japanese National 
Security Council (NSC) displays the influence of US foreign policymaking.  
     The third sub-research question is: “Are changing features of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance leading to a consolidation of a ‘US-led transnational hegemony’?” This 
question implies the hypothesis that US liberal ideologies such as democracy and 
market economy have been integrated into the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese 
foreign policymaking. In this regard, the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony, 
specifically “historic bloc”, is considerably explored taking into account the 
ideational dimension of power which is examined in Chapter Five. In line with this, 
a related question emerges: “how does ideology consisting of liberal values influence 
the alliance”. Whilst it has been discussed whether the alliance has become 
weakened or not, some scholars including the participants of “the Future of the 
Japan-U.S. Alliance”, who can be regarded as “organic intellectuals” in neo-
Gramscian terms (see Chapter Two), argue that the U.S.-Japan alliance should be 
renewed to bolster the alliance relationship between the US and Japan (Study Group 
on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance 2010). In this sense, it is important to look 
into not only bilateral but also multilateral dimensions of the alliance at the regional 
level (see Chapter Five). 
     Lastly, the fourth sub-research question is: “Has the U.S.-Japan alliance become 
common sense?” which is fully explored in Chapter Six. As indicated earlier, the 
idea that the alliance is the pillar of Japanese foreign policymaking may have 
become deeply rooted in the Japanese society. Considering the recent trends of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance including the 3.11 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami and other 
SDF activities relating to PKOs and HA/DR activities, the perception of the alliance 
relationship has become more positive (see Chapter Six). One of the evident changes 
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is the increasing usage of the term the “U.S.-Japan alliance” in the media, academia 
and the public domain with regard to Japanese security issues, particularly after the 
end of the Cold War, which is clearly described in Chapter Three. Using the research 
method which is introduced in Chapter Two, this sub-research question is closely 
scrutinised within the neo-Gramscian framework which is in support of the central 
research question. 
 
Arguments 
     This thesis is based upon the hypothesis that the U.S.-Japan alliance has 
developed, which has also harnessed the US-led historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Within the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance, not only to the military but also 
economy and other elements of politics are related to this development, which may 
have overlooked the durability in the contemporary era. This hypothesis is supported 
by the arguments provided in subsequent chapters as follows. Firstly, since the 
postwar period, it is clear that the U.S.-Japan alliance has developed through the 
interplay of coercion and consensus, and the roles of “organic intellectuals” through 
the neo-Gramscian lenses. This can be observed in the influences of the “Yoshida 
Doctrine” on the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese foreign policymaking, which is 
explored in Chapter Three. Secondly, in the realm of force interoperability and 
military-industrial relations, Japan has come to accept US foreign policymaking in 
the post-Cold War period.  Thirdly, from the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, the U.S.-
Japan alliance has harnessed the US-led historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific. The second 
and third arguments are examined by using “social forces analysis”, which is 
explained in Chapter Two. Lastly, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance has 
become common sense for Japanese foreign policymaking. Furthermore, in 
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consideration of the aforementioned arguments, this research lies in the assumption 
that the U.S.-Japan alliance is already “entrapped” or “entangled”.  While the 
existing theory of alliance is reviewed in the subsequent chapter, this thesis argues 
that the neorealist understanding of alliance cannot explain the durability of alliances, 
specifically in the post-Cold War period. 
 
Structure of the Research Project 
     Regarding the central research question and sub-research questions, the 
subsequent chapters are structured in the following ways. Chapter One reviews the 
literature, which is relevant to exhibit the gaps in the existing literature and to 
substantiate the role of neo-Gramscianism to fill these gaps. In particular, IR 
literature on the U.S.-Japan alliance, alliance theory, the theory of hegemony and 
neo-Gramscianism are re-examined in this chapter with rigorous scrutiny by 
underlining the importance of dealing with the aforementioned research questions 
regarding the features of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the contemporary era. Chapter 
One is aimed at bridging alliances and hegemony by comprehending existing 
arguments and analysis of the relevant literature. In terms of Introduction Chapter 
that illustrates the relevance of this research project, Chapter One elucidates in what 
ways neo-Gramscianism is contributable for alliance theory, which is part of original 
contributions to knowledge. 
     Chapter Two explicates the theory of neo-Gramscianism and demonstrates the 
research methods used as the analytical tools for the remaining chapters of my thesis. 
More precisely, as one of the original contributions, this chapter closely examines 
neo-Gramscianism to underscore its key elements of hegemony in an attempt to 
develop it as a research method. In doing so, the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance is 
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established by articulating the main concepts within this theoretical framework that 
are applied to the rest of the chapters while taking into account the existing literature 
of this IR theoretical framework. Chapter Two exemplifies the research method 
founded upon neo-Gramscianism and exhibits in what ways this theoretical 
framework can be adopted to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance and alliance theory.  
     Chapter Three entails the historical trajectory from the postwar until the early 
post-Cold War periods in order to illustrate the neo-Gramscian account of the U.S.-
Japan alliance that is supportive for the first sub-research question. This theoretical 
understanding of hegemony, which is further clarified in Chapter Two, is deployed 
to this chapter to illustrate the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In particular, 
within this theoretical framework, Chapter Three intends to show in what ways US 
hegemony, or “US-led historic bloc”, has been reinforced by means of the U.S.-
Japan alliance. Using these theoretical concepts which have not been explicitly 
explained in the existing literature neither in English nor Japanese, this chapter 
elucidates the development of the alliance through the lenses of neo-Gramscianism. 
     Chapter Four and Chapter Five employ Robert W. Cox’s “social forces analysis,” 
which is one of the analytical tools for neo-Gramscianism (see Chapter Two). While 
Chapter Four closely investigates the bilateral cooperation of the US and Japan in the 
alliance context, Chapter Five explores economic and ideational aspects of the 
alliance, which are closely related to regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. In an attempt to 
answer the second sub-research question, Chapter Four explores the influences of US 
foreign policymaking on Japanese foreign policymaking at the bilateral level. 
Chapter Five demonstrates the way the alliance has evolved not only in the military 
but also economic and ideational terms to answer the third sub-research question. 
This chapter relates to the issues of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, which are 
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relevant to be taken into consideration regarding the sub-research question and the 
neo-Gramscian view on US-led historic bloc and are crucial for the central research 
question. 
     Chapter Six, which addresses the fourth sub-research question, uses the neo-
Gramscian discourse analysis of the U.S.-Japan alliance by displaying in what ways 
the U.S.-Japan alliance has become “common sense”. The chapter closely 
investigates both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses of the alliance by 
using the concepts of “rhetorical strategies” and “rhetorically marginalised” (Rupert 
1995; 2000) (see Chapter Two and Six). Furthermore, Chapter Six also looks closely 
into the features of the alliance as common sense by taking into account the existing 
arguments about it. This chapter is crucially important to display the neo-Gramscian 
viewpoint on the formulation of the historic bloc through the interaction of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses. 
     My Conclusion Chapter summarises the research project by underlining the 
features of alliances in the contemporary era. Based on the analyses that constitute 
from Chapter Three to Chapter Six, this chapter provides the answers to the four sub-
research questions. Subsequently, it addresses the central research question by 
linking these answers to the concepts of neo-Gramscianism. Furthermore, in 
consideration of alternating international security environments and the coexistence 
of both traditional and non-traditional forms of security, my Conclusion Chapter also 
reemphasises the significance of refining alliance theory by adopting the neo-
Gramscian framework. It takes into consideration the insights presented in the 
previous chapters and suggests the alternative usage of the neo-Gramscian theory of 
alliance to other case studies in the realm of the studies of alliance politics which is 
an essential step to enrich the scholarship of security studies and IR. 
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Conclusion 
      This chapter lays out the relevance of applying neo-Gramscianism as an 
alternative IR framework for alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance. The neo-
Gramscian approach to hegemony, which is further exemplified in Chapter Two, 
enables us to understand the current features of the U.S.-Japan alliance and other 
alliances, which may provide a more holistic picture of the alliance system in the 
contemporary period. Moreover, while security landscapes in the Asia-Pacific region 
have been transforming, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been bolstered with US-led 
liberal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In 
order to achieve the research aims listed in this chapter and to contribute original 
perspectives on this issue, the subsequent chapters are provided to demonstrate the 
neo-Gramscian perspective on alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance. The 
central research question and the supporting sub-research questions, which support 
the central question, are answered in the following chapters through the neo-
Gramscian lenses.  
     The next chapter presents the review of the literature of IR theories, alliance 
theory and the theory of hegemony to elucidate the suitability of the neo-Gramscian 
framework for alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance to answer the research 
questions that are presented in this chapter. Showing the gaps among the existing 
literature with rigorous investigations, Chapter One is intended to provide the 
possible insights on alliances including the U.S.-Japan alliance on the grounds of 
neo-Gramscianism, which has not previously been used in the existing literature. 
While this theoretical framework has been acknowledged as one of the IR theoretical 
paradigms, it is rarely used in the realm of security studies and diplomacy. The 
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subsequent chapters deal with the sub-research questions within the neo-Gramscian 
framework, followed by the concluding comments. 
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
     The Introduction Chapter underscores the significance of using the neo-
Gramscian framework for the analysis of the U.S.-Japan alliance by presenting 
research purposes, original contributions of the literature of relevant studies for the 
U.S.-Japan alliance and alliance theory, and the central research question and sub-
research questions. Chapter One examines not only the literature on the U.S.-Japan 
alliance but also the theories of alliance and hegemony. It is important to scrutinise 
this literature due to their reductionist or mechanical considerations and lack of 
understanding about the non-hegemonic role of the allies which is not fully explored. 
In this respect, this chapter underlines the relevance of adopting a neo-Gramscian 
framework to alliance theory and the specific case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
Chapter One explicates this theoretical framework to show in what ways it may be 
able to bridge the gap among the existing literature. Taking into consideration of the 
neo-Gramscian account of hegemony, this chapter displays the applicability of it to 
the International Relations (IR) framework in the study of both alliance theory and 
the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
     The chapter is composed as follows: first, a review of the existing literature 
regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance is explored, exemplifying its mainstream realist, 
liberal and constructivist approach to the U.S.-Japan alliance and, in doing so, 
highlighting the gap between previous arguments and viewpoints set out in later 
sections of my thesis. Second, the literature review provides a framework from 
which to consider the existing IR analyses of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This section 
clarifies the definition of alliances which may have been altered in the contemporary 
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era, while closely examining the existing theories of alliance. Furthermore, before 
scrutinising the theory of hegemony, the linkage between alliances and hegemony is 
elaborated which is crucial to be taken into account. Third, the theory of hegemony 
is revisited by underscoring the gaps in the current literature. In particular, the theory 
of hegemonic stability is scrutinised to signify that the previous literature has been 
dependent on this theory in investigating alliance relationships which may have 
undervalued the non-hegemonic roles of the states. Additionally, the neo-Gramscian 
concept of hegemony, particularly the “consent and coercion” dimensions of 
hegemony, is rigorously examined. Fourth, stressing the key elements of this theory, 
the final section of the chapter crystallises the connection between neo-
Gramscianism and the U.S.-Japan alliance by exhibiting the potential explanations 
about the alliance from this IR theoretical viewpoint.  
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IR Literature of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     This section explores the IR
9
 explanations of the U.S.-Japan alliance that have 
been pervasively approached from mainstream realist, liberal and constructivist 
perspectives. Moreover, while these viewpoints are respectively investigated, 
“analytical eclecticism”, which is suggested by some scholars as one of the research 
methods to fill the gap in existing IR theories, is also exemplified in order to exhibit 
the limitations of these existing IR explanations. 
 
a)  Realism 
     There are various realist interpretations of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Among 
neorealists or structural realists, there are basically two different viewpoints on the 
international system: balance-of-power theory and balance-of-threat theory. Balance-
of-power theorists generally assume that rising states, or “rising powers”, which is 
the common term in the contemporary world, would seek power when it is 
empowered materially. Within this theory, it was recognised that Japan would seek 
strategic independence while reducing its dependence on the US in the context of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. For instance, Waltz (1993) foresaw that Japan would obtain 
nuclear weapons soon and seek for strategic independence to reduce its vulnerability 
to US power. He also warns that the potential great powers, including Japan, would 
make an attempt to challenge the US due to its growing economic power (Waltz 
1993).  
     In a similar vein, Layne (1993) argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance would be 
terminated as Japan would start balancing its power against the US according to 
                                                          
9
 Indeed, it is said that IR has committed a negation of political theory (Walker 1993). This issue 
has been discussed in Bieler and Morton’s (2007) book. 
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balancing logic. In this regard, he suggested the concept of “the strategy of 
preponderance”, explicating that the US adopted this strategy by incorporating other 
great powers into its alliance system after the Second World War. However, Layne 
(2003; 2006) also proposes an “offshore balancing” strategy to disengage US 
military commitments to other countries by decreasing the size of its ground forces 
in other regions which is less expensive than the strategy of preponderance. Waltz 
(1993) also exemplifies the aspect of US hegemony, stating that “hegemony leads to 
balance…That is now happening, but haltingly so because the United States still has 
benefits to offer and many other countries have become accustomed to their easy 
lives with the United States bearing many of their burdens” (Waltz 1993, p. 77). In 
addition, neorealists have been critical of hegemonic stability theorists, as is 
exemplified in this chapter about the theory of hegemony, who believe that “benign 
hegemon” including alliance formations is the most efficient system of stability in 
the international system since other potential great powers would balance against the 
hegemon, which is precarious (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Layne 2006). 
     Conversely, defensive realists provide different insights from balance-of-power 
theorists taking into consideration certain social elements. Midford (2000) argues 
that the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more important for Japan’s “reassurance 
strategy” than the military balance of power. In particular, according to him, Japan’s 
“pacifist outlier strategy” has been designed to reassure its neighbours, who remain 
deeply suspicious due to its experience of Japan’s invasion and occupation during 
the imperial period (Midford 2000). He incorporates the notion of “reassurance” into 
a balance-of-threat theory based upon the assumption that Japan avoids aggressive 
policies due to its awareness of the perceptions of other Asian countries stemming 
from the period of Japanese colonialism. In the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, he is 
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critical of the explanations about the balance-of-power theory because of its 
combination of a significant underproduction of military security and its extreme 
dependence on the US (Midford 2002). Midford (2002) clarifies that the U.S.-Japan 
alliance is regarded as an “expanding bottle” with its participation in regional 
security and as a way to build up security contacts with other Asian states. This 
perspective seems to be relevant in explaining in which ways Japan has adapted its 
policy to regain the trust from other Asian countries. Twomey (2000) claims that the 
U.S.-Japan alliance has worked as part of “circumscribed balancing” which contains 
a socialisation-against-aggression effect and forces Japan to engage in restrained 
behaviours. His argument is that Japan has been socialised against aggressive 
defence policies after the Second World War (Twomey 2000). According to him, 
“circumscribed balancers” are less concerned about the peripheral areas and issues 
but are rather concerned about the bilateral military balance (Twomey 2000). 
Midford and Twomey have elaborated their insights by taking into account social 
influences on security policies. Lind (2004), however, explains that Japan’s postwar 
security policy is consistent with a “buck-passing strategy,” which involves a closer 
military cooperation with the US, US bases in Japan and the creation of a world-
class military force. According to her, whilst Japan has become capable of enhancing 
its military power and expanded its military roles,
10
 it is only when allies fail at 
responding to growing threats that it needs to do so (Lind 2004).  
     Aside from these explanations, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been examined on the 
basis of realist logic using different theories. For instance, “mercantile realism” was 
                                                          
10
 Some examples are given such as a series of joint studies on sea-lane defence by the US and 
Japan, joint operations, and interoperability, and joint military training of the two countries (Lind 
2004). However, Hanami (1993) also argues that “A substantial military budget does not easily 
translate into a substantial fighting force” (Hanami 1993, p. 595). 
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developed by Heginbotham and Samuels
11
 (1998) assuming that states balance not 
only with military growths but also with technical or economic gains. They argue 
that Japan was able to enjoy a cheap ride in defence spending and ignore regional 
military threats by balancing with the US in techno-economic terms (Heginbotham 
& Samuels 1998). The concept of “reluctant realism” emerged from Green’s (2001) 
idea that Japan must take more assertive steps to preserve its international status 
considering that the U.S.-Japan alliance is still not a fully operational military 
alliance. According to him, Japan has moved towards a greater realism in regards to 
national security and identity and the demise of idealism (Green 2001). However, 
Heginbotham and Samuels (1998) fail to take into account the changing defence 
posture of Japan which has become more aware of regional threats such as North 
Korea and China.
12
 The country has become concerned about its military capabilities, 
by increasing its military cooperation with the US as the recent continuous changes 
in the National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) show, which is further 
exemplified in Chapter Four. Furthermore, they were not aware of the changing 
security environment and material capabilities of Japan. Japan does not only consider 
the economic aspects of its policies but also military aspects so it is not solely about 
technocratic competitiveness.  
     Regarding these existing realist frameworks of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the 
alliance mechanism has been thoroughly examined with regard to the balancing logic 
although understanding about the durability of the alliance is limited because of the 
                                                          
11
 Samuels (2007) also explains Japanese foreign policies by elaborating the concept of 
“Goldilocks consensus”, locating Japan “not too close and not too far from the hegemon-
protector, that makes it stronger but not threatening, and that provides new and comprehensive 
options” (Samuels 2007, p. 198). 
12
 Additionally, Midford (2002) also argues that Japan should have spent more on defence and 
have exported weapons if she was really pursuing a mercantilist strategy to maximise its 
technoeconomic competitiveness (Midford 2002, p. 17). 
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following reasons. First, while realist scholars have investigated the U.S.-Japan 
alliance in consideration of power balancing and the states’ material capabilities, 
these insights are likely to be abstractive which may overlook some other elements. 
For instance, with regard to the notion of “balancing”, Twomey acknowledges that 
“balancing is an imprecise concept” (Twomey 2000, p. 170). Realist scholars have 
rarely looked into the history of the relationship between the states, which may not 
be explainable in balancing logic. In addition, although some defensive realists 
consider social or perceptual influences on foreign policymaking, realists’ ideas are 
based on purely international systemic factors with a focus on regional instability in 
East Asia and changing distribution of power with the US that may not sufficiently 
explain the continuity of the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region.  
     Second, realist assumptions on alliance and hegemony are exclusively based on 
the material capabilities of states such as military spending. Lind (2004) discusses 
Japan’s military expenditure but the total expense does not explain the security 
policy itself and the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Her analysis focuses on 
the material component of the alliance. Moreover, regarding the concept of 
hegemony, neorealists tend to base their argument on the theory of hegemonic 
stability to explain US strategy towards Japan, which is firmly based on material 
capabilities. In consideration of these features of realist explanations about the U.S.-
Japan alliance, the strengthening alliance relationship between Japan and the US and 
the implications of the evolving features of the alliance system are seldom discussed.  
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b)  Liberalism 
     Liberal explanations on the U.S.-Japan alliance look into the role of ideas and 
institutions in creating the US-led liberal order in the Asia-Pacific. Unlike some 
neorealists, who view the alliance formations negatively, most liberals agree that 
liberal values are the indispensable factors to sustain the U.S.-Japan alliance for 
regional stability, which are predominantly observable in the post-Cold War period. 
Different from the realists’ focus on material capabilities, liberals give a greater role 
to the concept of shared ideas. One of the basic liberal assumptions is that the shared 
values of the regional future and liberal political order stabilise the region. For 
example, Mochizuki and O’Hanlon (1998) argue that the U.S.-Japan alliance should 
be supported by democratic principles and shared political values since the systems 
based on liberalism are far more stable than an anarchical international environment 
in a way realists assume. According to them, liberal notions can resolve international 
conflicts through peacekeeping, sea operations or freedom of navigations, 
minesweeping and modest size units for land operations (Mochizuki & O’Hanlon 
1998).  
     In a similar vein, O’Hanlon (2007) clarifies that Japan has changed its defence 
posture for the purpose of multilateral security missions including humanitarian 
relief, or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). In his account, despite 
its military capabilities, Japan is unlikely to become aggressive because of its interest 
in liberalism or multilateralism (O’Hanlon 2007). O’Hanlon (2007) also explicates 
that “the same liberal and moral values that influence many pacifists can lead to a 
strong argument in favour of Japan’s doing its fair share to help with global security 
problems that are likely to remain prevalent and to put many innocent lives at risk in 
the future” (O’Hanlon 2007, pp. 101-102).  
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     Neoliberal institutionalism explores the institutional mechanism of hegemony 
which is at the centre of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Ikenberry (1998) exemplifies the 
liberal feature of US hegemony which locates the US at the centre of an expanding 
institutionalised and legitimate political order. He argues that liberal order functions 
as a strategic restraint by reassuring partners and facilitating cooperation because of 
the phenomenon of increasing returns that provides institutions with a “lock-in effect” 
(Ikenberry 1998). He elucidates that alliances are not simply an aggregate of power 
for balancing against external threats as realists argue, but rather the alliance 
mechanism allows alliance partners to restrain each other and manage joint relations 
(Ikenberry 1998). Regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, he notes that: “The U.S.-Japan 
security alliance also had a similar ‘dual containment’ character. These institutions 
not only served as alliances in the ordinary sense of organized efforts to balance 
against external threats, but they also provided mechanisms and venues to build 
political relations, conduct business, and regulate conflict” (Ikenberry 1998, p. 69).    
     Furthermore, he contends that this strategy has long been a part of US foreign 
policymaking which ripens economic interdependence and institutional cooperation 
(Ikenberry 1998). Ikenberry (2002) points out that the US’ involvements in East Asia 
after the Cold War were developed with the “East Asia Strategic Report (EASR)”, or 
the so-called “Nye Report”, in 1995. This report indicates that the US’ military 
umbrella in the Asia-Pacific region has important outcomes for the stability and 
functioning of regional political and economic relations and on the success of the US’ 
economic, political and security goals such as non-proliferation such as “security is 
like oxygen”. In this report, Nye (1995) elaborates that US strategy of “deep 
engagement” has consolidated the hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific region. This 
report also emphasises that the US’ military umbrella in the region has significant 
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outcomes for the stability and functioning of political and economic relations in the 
region (Nye 1995).
13
 
     In addition, on the basis of a neoliberal institutional framework, Ikenberry and 
Inoguchi (2003) argue that the U.S.-Japan alliance is not merely a military pact but 
“a political partnership” with an institutional mechanism. They maintain that the 
U.S.-Japan alliance is a crucial mechanism, which restrains the use of power and 
allows Japan to solve its security issues without becoming a militarised great power 
(Ikenberry & Inoguchi 2003). They also indicate that such liberal ideas as economic 
interdependence have also strengthened the alliance, saying that “free trade helped 
cement the alliance and in turn the alliance helped settle economic disputes” 
(Ikenberry & Inoguchi 2003, p.23). Ikenberry and Inoguchi (2007) also make their 
arguments that with a bilateral alliance system, the US bonded its partner states 
together and reduced uncertainty and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific region. They 
clarify that bilateral security can be regarded as political logic, providing Japan and 
other countries with security protection and access to the markets, technology and 
supplies within an open world economy, while Japan and other countries would 
become stable partners providing diplomatic, economic and logistical support for the 
US (Ikenberry & Inoguchi 2007). 
     Taking into account these perspectives, it seems that an increasing role of liberal 
norms in the U.S.-Japan alliance has been strongly supported by policymakers. 
Particularly, US policymakers such as Joseph S. Nye
14
 and Richard L. Armitage 
have stressed the liberal features of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Likewise, as already 
                                                          
13
 Even in his review of this report which was released six years later, he stresses the significance 
of liberal and democratic norms within the alliance system (Nye 2001). 
14
 Nye (1990) argues that soft power is “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that 
other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its owns,” 
(Nye 1990, p. 168) which stems from cultural and ideological attraction as well as rules and 
institutions. 
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indicated in my Introduction Chapter, the study group of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
remarks that the alliance should be strengthened with liberal norms (Study Group on 
the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance 2010). The report is also noted that, while 
redefining the traditional alliance, the new forms should be incorporated to develop 
the alliance.
15
 The role of these actors is exemplified further in Chapter Two in 
relation to the neo-Gramscian concepts and it is observable that the role of ideas has 
played a bigger role in policymaking. 
     Yet, although liberals examine the institutional mechanism of the US-led liberal 
grand strategy, their analysis may not be sufficient to comprehend the alliance 
mechanism between the US and Japan for the following reasons. First, liberal norms 
used by the governments and their intentions are not critically examined. Liberals 
rarely investigate how the concept of liberal values has been transformed in the 
context of the alliance. Their less critical views on the roles of liberal values seldom 
consider possible maladaptation of US foreign policies to Japanese policies in terms 
of constitutional, legal and normative constraints. Second, when examining liberal 
grand strategies, US foreign policies are narrowly focused and seldom investigate the 
perspectives of other states including Japan. It is significant to consider the 
pervasiveness of economic interdependence as a gradual, not a rapid, process, so it is 
worthwhile to look into the intentions of Japanese policymakers to explain an 
expanding role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the region.  
     Third, although liberals attempt to overcome a reductionist neorealist analysis, 
liberals may have failed in doing so indeed. Liberals differentiate themselves from 
realists as they focus not only on the distribution of material capabilities but also on 
international institutions, processes and politics. For instance, Ikenberry (1998) 
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 The “green alliance” emerged to underscore the relevance of environmental cooperation. 
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criticises neorealism for overlooking the liberal character of US hegemony and the 
importance of international institutions in facilitating cooperation and overcoming 
fears of domination or exploitation. Nonetheless, as Nye argues, “When ideals are an 
important source of power, the classic distinction between realpolitik and liberalism 
becomes blurred” (Nye 1990, p. 170). With regard to power relationships, it seems 
that realists and liberals may share the same reductionist notion of power and liberals 
may not adequately explain both the durability of Western order and its features. 
 
c)  Constructivism 
     Unlike realists and liberals, constructivists do not focus on the power relationship 
between the two countries, but rather focus on the influences of domestic norms on 
institutions. In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it has often been explained that 
the existing pacifist norms have prevented Japan from expanding its military 
capabilities and roles. Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) contend that Japanese 
security policies are shaped by the domestic governmental structure and the 
interaction between social and legal norms. According to them, these are the factors 
of Japan’s mixture of policy flexibility and rigidity in the face of changing 
environments (Katzenstein & Okawara 1993). They clarify that “The normative 
consensus that embraces Japanese security policy is shaped by the historical lessons 
of World War II and the reemergence of Japan as a peaceful and prosperous actor in 
world politics since 1945” (Katzenstein & Okawara 1993, p. 104).  
     The concept of “the culture of antimilitarism” is regarded as one of the prominent 
features of Japanese diplomacy in which Japan’s experience of the defeat came to be 
interpreted and institutionalised in its political system and defence policy (Berger 
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1993). Regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, Berger (1993) argues that, in spite of its 
capability of developing a formidable military-industrial base independent of the US, 
Japan remains dependent upon the US for its military security. He explains that 
“With the assistance of the United States, Japan should seek to create a diverse 
network of institutional security ties centring on, but not relying exclusively on, the 
present Mutual Security Treaty with the United States” (Berger 1993, p. 121). Berger 
(1999) indicates that military-related initiatives are likely to have the greatest chance 
of success to induce Japan to expand its military and security roles which do not 
counter Japan’s antimilitaristic culture. He further explains that the Japanese public 
is more aware of the dangers of the overly strong state which led to the decentralised 
police force and the overconcentration of power of one single government (Berger 
1999).  
     In addition, Berger (2007) elaborates a “liberal adaptive state” model to describe 
Japan’s greater flexibility in policymaking and the process of adaptation in foreign 
policy, defence and national security policy. Emphasising the role of the norms, 
Berger (2007) argues that liberal values have gradually moulded Japanese foreign 
policy over the past two or three decades. Notwithstanding, he also acknowledges 
that liberal values are not the sole determinant for the alliance considering terrorists 
threats with its purpose to disrupt terrorist networks internationally and engaging in 
preventive attacks on states in fear of terrorists’ purchase of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) (Berger 2007). Furthermore, Singh (2008) updated the existing 
constructivist analysis, which is based on the continued use of Japan’s peace-state 
identity. He argues that “the peace-state conception no longer captures the nature of 
Japanese post-Cold War security policy. Instead, the current trajectory is better 
captured by the international-state label” (Singh 2008, p. 304). The aforementioned 
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constructivist analysis provides the central role of ideas in shaping foreign 
policymaking which is primarily examined in the context of Japanese foreign 
policymaking and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Within a constructivist framework, 
domestic norms exert influences on institutions which have prevented Japan from 
expanding its military capabilities and roles.  
     However, constructivist explanations may not sufficiently explain the duration of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance since the changing nature of the alliance cannot be explained 
by only taking into account normative constraints. Constructivists are inclined to 
disregard the elasticity of norms in response to the changing environments, which is 
difficult to display that norms actually constrain the security policies. Moreover, 
constructivist views are inclined to focus less on the impact of international variables 
on Japan’s security policies. By emphasising the role of domestic factors, 
constructivists seldom consider the role of the international environment which has 
the potential to influence and shape Japan’s postwar norms, institutions and “culture 
of antimilitarism”. In addition, the significance of domestic norms, institutions and 
political culture as a constraint on Japanese security strategy have been declining. 
For instance, Midford (2002) argues that there is no evidence that pacifist norms or 
antimilitarism has played a role in the case of Self-Defence Force’s (SDF) attempts 
to fund the acquisition of in-air refuelling tankers which were repeatedly blocked. In 
this regard, we can see the limited explanations about the continuous development of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance from the viewpoint of constructivism. 
 
“Analytical Eclecticism” as the Means to Bridge the Gap in IR Theories? 
     Although realist, liberal and constructivist frameworks respectively provide some 
explanations about the U.S.-Japan alliance, they have not elaborated the durability of 
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the alliance, which may have missed some elements that should be considered 
although it may not be adequately explained in each IR framework respectively. 
Nonetheless, some recognises the valuable insights provided by each IR theory in an 
integrated way. Barany and Rauchhaus’ (2011) study on the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) “evaluates the utility of IR theory[, presenting] the logic of, 
and deduce hypotheses from, the three leading approaches to IR: neorealism, neo-
liberal institutionalism, and constructivism…these IR theories can offer a coherent 
explanation for the alliance’s enlargement and the development of out-of-area 
operations” (Barany & Rauchhaus 2011, p. 287).  
     Considering these features of the existing IR theories, the research method called 
“analytical eclecticism” was proposed as an alternative IR approach to bridge the 
gaps between realism, liberalism and constructivism. In order to overcome the gap in 
existing IR theories of the U.S.-Japan alliance, analytical eclecticism has been 
recognised as a potential method to substantiate the weaknesses of each theory. 
According to Sil and Katzenstein (2010), going beyond the paradigm, or research 
traditions, does not mean ignoring the existing paradigms but to “explore substantive 
relationships and revealing hidden connections among elements of seemingly 
incommensurable paradigm-bound theories, with an eye to generating novel insights 
that bear on policy debates and practical dilemma” (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p. 2).   
     Regarding cases in the Asia-Pacific region, it is argued that “Japan’s and Asia-
Pacific’s security policies are not shaped solely by power, interests, or identity but 
by their combination. Adequate understanding requires analytical eclecticism, not 
parsimony” (Katzenstein & Okawara 2001/02, p. 167). Developing an “eclectic 
approach”, Katzenstein and Okawara (2001) contend that Japanese security policies 
have been influenced by normative structures and institutions. They remark that “an 
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eclectic theoretical approach finds that there is nothing ‘natural’ about a multipolar 
world with US primacy and nothing that is ‘normal’ about a Japan without the 
institutional legacy of Hiroshima and defeat in World War II (Katzenstein & 
Okawara 2001, p. 155). Combining the elements of each of these IR theories was 
seen as the strength of utilising this particular research method. For example, 
Izumikawa (2010) adopts this method to examine features of the U.S.-Japan alliance, 
by merging realist viewpoints on “entrapment” and constructivist’s “antimilitarist 
culture”. 
      Nonetheless, there are the downsides of making use of analytical eclecticism as a 
research method. Miyashita (2007) claims that “he [Katzenstein] does not fully 
elaborate his point by specifying how exactly different perspectives can be combined, 
or how power, interests, and identity interact with one another to shape policies” 
(Miyashita 2007, p. 107). Analytical eclecticism can be a usable method to consider 
all power, interests and identity as the elements of foreign policymaking yet it is not 
an adequate guide as a research method. The strength of this method can be its 
capability in taking into consideration useful elements within existing IR theories 
which may be able to bridge the gaps between the existing IR approaches in 
examining the U.S.-Japan alliance. Conversely, this research method may be difficult 
to use due to its lack of guidance and a requirement of a highly discerning ability in 
selecting the elements of existing IR theories. Furthermore, using analytical 
eclecticism does not necessarily help to underscore the features of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance relationship which is one of the aims this research project is intended to 
attain. While it may be possible to select realist, liberal or constructivist perspectives 
on its alliance relationship, it does not reach the point of exemplifying the 
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relationship between the US and Japan in consideration of the postwar experiences 
and the progress of alliance solidification.  
     This opening section has fully explored the IR literature on the U.S.-Japan 
alliance by discussing the gulf which exists among these theories. Even though these 
three theoretical approaches may possibly supplement each other by means of 
analytical eclecticism, it is suggested to use an alternative IR framework in 
explaining the alliance. Moreover, this section also shows that a single IR theory 
may not be able to address all aspects of alliances such as the asymmetrical power 
relationship between the US and Japan in relation to hegemony which is a crucial 
insight to be considered in understanding the durability of the alliance system. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore different IR theory approaches to the U.S.-
Japan alliance. In the subsequent sections, prior to exemplifying an alternative IR 
theory, the theories of alliance and hegemony are re-examined in order to elucidate 
the aspects that shall be substantiated by an alternative IR theory. 
 
Theories of Alliances and Hegemony 
     The following sections explore the existing theories of alliances and hegemony. It 
is relevant to scrutinise the theory of alliance and hegemony since the problem in 
understanding the durability of the U.S.-Japan alliance seems to be not only due to 
the gap in the aforementioned IR theories but the assumptions about alliance and 
hegemony to begin with. Reductionistic or mechanical viewpoints on these concepts 
have tended to be used in the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which are likely 
to fail in explaining the transforming nature of the alliance and the sustainability of 
the alliance system. Moreover, the mainstream theories of alliance and hegemony are 
inclined to overlook the non-hegemonic role of the allies. It is hegemonic power that 
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has been focused on in the existing theories. In order to examine the changing 
features of the alliance system, investigating alliance theory and hegemony is an 
essential step to encapsulate the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-
Cold War period.  
     The literature review on theories of alliance and hegemony aims to illustrate the 
lacking insights of these viewpoints, which can be filled with the neo-Gramscian 
standpoint of hegemony. As analytical eclecticism may not be a sufficient method to 
provide the answer for the research question presented in the Introduction Chapter in 
addition to the difficulty in applying this method as recognised by other scholars, it 
is worth adopting an alternative IR framework to elucidate the features of the 
alliance relationship in the contemporary era. As is exemplified earlier, the thoughts 
based upon realist, liberal and constructivist framework are limited in their capacity 
to take into account the non-hegemonic role of the states in consideration of alliance 
relations. Although each IR approach has strength in providing certain views on 
alliances, neo-Gramscianism can be a more comprehensible theoretical framework in 
terms of material, institutional and ideational aspects of power. This point will be 
would be further explored in the later section of this chapter.  
 
Literature of Alliances 
     The following sections investigate the concept of alliances and alliance theory 
since there is limited recognition about the linkage between alliances and hegemony, 
while alliance theory has been used in comprehending the dynamic of alliances in 
the contemporary era. Hui (2004) underscores the importance of adopting a dynamic 
view of alliance politics and the impact of alliance statecraft on alliance formation 
and dissolution. While some scholars including Morrow (1991) acknowledge that 
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alliances are a tool for hegemonic states, closer examination of the association 
between alliances and hegemony is needed to comprehend the alliance power 
dynamics in the contemporary periods. Moreover, much literature of alliances 
frequently used quantitative methods which may be useful to generalise the tendency 
of alliance formations, particularly in the realm of comparative politics, but may not 
be able to explain the durability of alliance systems without an in-depth investigation 
of alliance relationships. As this section shows, there can be a restricted 
understanding about the durability of the alliance.  
     In this section, the various viewpoints on alliances and alliance theories are 
explored by identifying the issues regarding the difficulty in understanding the trend 
of alliances in the contemporary world, particularly in the post-Cold War era. Firstly, 
the discussions about alliance, whether it is diminished or redefined, are presented in 
order to illustrate how the notion of alliances may have become fuzzier. Unlike the 
Cold War when US-led alliances played a greater role in countering Soviet Union-
backed communist expansion, the purposes of alliances after the Cold War seem to 
have become more flexible while the functions have been evolving with emerging 
threats including non-traditional forms such as terrorism, climate change and natural 
disasters. Secondly, the existing theories of alliance, which have mostly adopted a 
quantitative approach, are closely scrutinised. While “alliance dilemma” has become 
a predominant theory in the discipline of IR for the examination of alliance 
relationships, other theories of alliance such as “autonomy-security trade off model”, 
“economic theory of alliance”, “alliance cohesion” and “wedging strategy” are 
rigorously investigated.  
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“End of Alliances”, the “End of Alliance Theories” or Alliances to be Redefined? 
     There is little literature on the “end of alliances” debate which does not 
distinguish between the different levels of the changes (Sandler 1993; Neuman 2001; 
Menon 2003; Weitsman 2003; Tetrais 2004). Some scholars argue that the concept 
of alliances is dead and has been replaced by different concepts such as international 
coalitions (Menon 2003). In Menon’s (2003) account, “the new world threatens to 
render that system of alliances superfluous, not because of the shortcomings and 
errors of particular U.S. leaders, but on account of deeper global changes that 
transcend the comings and goings of presidents, prime ministers, and foreign 
ministers” (Menon 2003, p. 3). Contrary to this perspective, there are those who 
argue that dealing with contemporary security threats take place in both the form of 
formal partnerships and ad hoc coalitions (Norris 2003), or that ad hoc coalitions 
and bilateral alliances gains territory at the expense of permanent and multilateral 
alliances (Tetrais 2003). Tetrais (2003) exemplifies that “Permanent alliances will 
survive, but only as long as they demonstrably serve common strategic and political 
interests. Some alliances created to combat communism have proven useful for other 
purposes” (Tetrais 2003, p. 142). 
     Alternatively, others argue that the concept of alliances is not dying but changing 
(Campbell 2004). In the case of the US alliance system, it is neither dead nor 
necessarily in decline, but rather, its nature and purpose are being altered in response 
to the challenges of a new era. According to Campbell (2004), the current US 
alliance system, which was constructed in part from the legacy of post-World War II 
alliances, is predictably quite different from what it was during the Cold War. He 
argues that: “The reality is that we are currently seeing a change in U.S. alliances or, 
more precisely, a change in emphasis among the many alliances. In the face of new 
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kinds of security concerns, the United States has in fact given more value to those 
alliances that can reliably support U.S. interests in the war on terrorism and 
participate decisively in coalitions of the willing” (Campbell 2004, p. 158). While 
the alliances are seen as relevant, the components of the alliance are expanding and 
its role is diversifying. In this regard, alliances itself have not come to an end, but 
rather have been reshaped. With regard to the development of the US-led alliance 
system in the Asia-Pacific region, which is explored in Chapter Five, alliances are 
one of the important aspects of US hegemony. Furthermore, alliances have 
traditionally been regarded as short-lived. According to Leeds and Savun (2007), 
they found that the average lifespan of 304 alliances formed between 1815 and 1989 
is 9.3 years. Nonetheless, some alliances do endure, for example the U.S.-Japan 
alliance which has been in existence for more than sixty years and NATO has lasted 
far longer than any alliances indicated in Singer and Small’s (1966) quantitative 
study of alliances (Kreps 2010).  
     The problem of understanding alliances, particularly in the contemporary era, is 
the existence of the “asymmetrical” nature of the alliances. Without an attention to 
this feature, this may lead to lack of consideration of the non-hegemonic role of the 
states. For instance, Leeds, Ashley, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long (2002)
16
 define 
alliances as “written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two 
independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military 
conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict 
with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that 
create a potential for military conflict” (Leeds, Ashley, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 
2002, p. 238). However, with regard to the degree of the independence of states, this 
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 They created the database on alliances called “The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions 
Project (ATOP)”. See http://atop.rice.edu/data. 
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may not be adaptable to US-led alliances including the U.S.-Japan alliance where 
autonomy and security were exchanged (Morrow 1991). In this respect, both 
asymmetric and symmetric aspects of alliances have rarely been taken into account 
within theories of alliance. In order to take into account the asymmetric relationship 
between allies, the concept of hegemony is essential to be taken into account, which 
should be re-examined. 
     In consideration of the traditional account of alliance theory, the problem of 
examining alliances in the contemporary era can be its limited understanding about 
alliances. Much research on alliance is restricted to a military context. The 
redefinition of the alliance should be made with regard to the contemporary world 
not simply interpreting it as military compact or mutual defence cooperation but how 
the alliance has transformed and developed throughout different historical periods 
with variant aspects of security. According to Tetrais (2003), the concept of “alliance” 
has become unclear, which can be a potential source of misunderstanding. According 
to him, the term “ally” has become broadly applied and “[w]hile any country that has 
offered support since September 11 to the global war on terrorism has been called an 
ally, only 23 countries are formally obligated by treaty to defend the United States 
from an armed attack” (Tetrais 2003, p. 148). In fact, the very term of “alliance” may 
be a growing source of strategic confusion and, as is indicated in Chapter Five in 
terms of “political alliances”, it may be relevant to consider political aspects of 
alliances in order to understand the features of the contemporary alliance system.  
 
Theories of Alliances 
     This section reviews the existing literature on the theory of alliance including 
“alliance dilemma,” which has been predominantly utilised within the IR theory by 
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laying out some points which previous research has not covered regarding the 
analysis of alliances. 
 
a) Alliance Dilemma 
     As indicated earlier, “alliance dilemma” has been a useful concept in explaining 
alliance relationships in the IR literature. Christensen and Snyder (1990) analyse 
alliance patterns in the multipolar system focusing on the roles of security dilemma 
and perceptual variables. They use the concepts of “chain-ganging” and “buck-
passing” to describe the alliance game in the multipolar world (Christensen & 
Snyder 1990). While their study is based on the European contexts before the Second 
World War, they argue that offensive military advantage was associated with chain-
ganging whereas defensive advantages were linked with buck-passing.  
     Snyder (1984) further examines the dynamics of the security dilemma of the 
alliance game, explicating out that “security dilemma” emerges during the formation 
of the alliance He describes the condition after the formation of the alliance as 
“alliance dilemma” using entrapment and abandonment as the two factors of the 
dilemma (Snyder 1984). According to him, “the principal ‘bads’ are ‘abandonment’ 
and ‘entrapment,’ and the principal ‘goods’ are a reduction in the risks of being 
abandoned or entrapped by the ally (Snyder 1984, p. 466). His assumption is based 
on the idea that the alliance formation and duration are greatly affected by the 
international system (Snyder 1984). Snyder (1990) characterises the alliance 
endurance as management, or rather “intra-alliance politics” or “bargaining” in his 
terms, which entails the coordination of foreign policies and military plans, and the 
allocation of burdens or division of labours. He defines the post-formation of 
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alliance as a continuing bargaining process for allies to maximise their benefits while 
minimising their risks and costs (Snyder 1990).  
     Realists’ notion of alliance dilemma, or “entrapment and abandonment”, has been 
adopted to the studies of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Hughes 2001; Hughes 2004; 
Hughes & Fukushima 2004; Hughes 2007). Samuels exemplifies that “Fears of 
entrapment and of abandonment have propelled Japan into a perpetual ‘hedging 
cycle’ vis-à-vis its alliance partner” (Samuels 2007, p. 199). In addition, Hughes and 
Krauss (2007) point out the possibility for the US, a hegemonic state, to be 
entrapped in regional crises in the Asia-Pacific.
17
 
     Walt develops the theory of balance of threat, arguing that the alliances are 
formed as the response to a threat (Walt 1985; Walt 1987; Walt 1997; Walt 2009). 
He stresses the role of intention or perceptions of the states, claiming that “Intentions, 
not power, are crucial” (Walt 1985, p. 13). According to him, it is not only power but 
threats, which tend to make states ally with or against the foreign power (Walt 1985; 
Walt 1987). With regard to the duration of the alliance, he claims that the alliance 
may endure if hegemonic power by a strong alliance leader exists, or if they have 
become the symbols of credibility (Walt 1997). Walt (2009) argues that “weaker 
clients have to worry more about abandonment—because the unipole needs them 
less—and the unipole will be less likely to be dragged into conflict by reckless or 
adventuristic allies” (Walt 2009, p. 98). While criticising the fact that previous 
analyses of alliance studies only consider bipolar and multipolar systems, he 
develops his argument with regard to the role of the US in the unipolar system. 
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 A similar comment was made that the US had the danger of being entrapped unlike Japan’s 
situations during the Iraq War in 2003 (Interview with Tsuyoshi Sunohara, 19
th
 April 2013). 
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However, like other neorealists, he regards that the international environment is an 
important factor in influencing the attitudes of the states. 
     Conversely, Schweller (1994) criticises Walt’s balance of threat theory since he 
views the formation of alliance as the expectation of gains or profits. According to 
him, “Balance-of-threat theory is designed to consider only cases in which the goal 
of alignment is security, and so it systematically excludes alliances driven by profit” 
(Schweller 1994, p. 79). Arguing that balancing merely considers security, Schweller 
develops the theory of bandwagoning for profit. Schweller (1994) explicates that 
alliance formations are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger. 
With his claim that power, not threat, drives the state choices, he focuses on the 
positive inducements of power. He makes his argument that bandwagoning basically 
involves the expectations of gains, regarding alliance politics as a positive sum game 
for the allies (Schweller 1994). 
 
b) Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model 
     Within an autonomy-security trade-off model, asymmetric alliances are 
acknowledged. Morrow’s (1991) autonomy-security trade-off model explains both 
symmetric, where both allies obtain security or autonomy benefits, and asymmetric, 
where one ally gains security and the other autonomy, alliances and the conditions 
under which each type occurs (Morrow 1991, p. 905).
18
 According to him, the 
critical test of this model is whether asymmetric alliances are more common and last 
longer than symmetric alliances. The model shows why alliances are more likely to 
break when the allies’ capabilities change (Berkowitz 1983; Morrow 1991, pp. 905-
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 Morrow’s (1991) autonomy-security trade-off model implies that asymmetric alliances are 
easier to form and to maintain than symmetric alliances. 
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906). Morrow (1991) explains that “Asymmetric alliances should be easier to form 
because each side receives different benefits, and both sides can deliver their end of 
the bargain. Assuming there are an equal number of opportunities to form both types 
of alliances, we should expect to see more asymmetric than symmetric alliances and 
more allies that are unequal in power than allies that are equal” (Morrow 1991, p. 
915).  
     Morrow (1991) also argues that asymmetric alliances are one of the tools 
hegemons use to extend their control over the international system and provides its 
allies with security from their neighbours. With regard to US-led alliances and the 
British Empire, he clarifies that the US is the best example to use of the strategy for 
extending hegemony through a network of asymmetric alliances, which was 
established after World War II (Morrow 1991). In his account, “These alliances both 
protected U.S. allies and provided the United States with bases for the projection of 
power and the position to intervene on behalf of ‘friendly’ governments. Great 
Britain depended on its empire to extend its control during the Pax Britannica, but it 
also extended its control of India through asymmetric alliances with native princes” 
(Morrow 1991, pp. 929 - 930). Yet, he also argues that “alliances in a balance of 
power system should be non-ideological and last as long as the immediate threat 
[capability-aggression],” (Morrow 1991, p. 926) which show less consideration 
about ideational roles of alliances. 
  
c) Economic Theory of Alliance 
     Economic perspectives on alliances have also been taken into account in the 
scholarship of alliances, particularly in relation to burden-sharing among states. 
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According to Theis (1987), “the economic theory of alliances is a useful and 
appropriate tool for understanding how alliance members will deal with each other 
on important issues such as sharing the burdens of defense” (Theis 1987, p. 328). He 
maintains that “An understanding of the way in which substitution possibilities can 
be affected by factors such as transportation networks and weapons technology can 
be also useful in clarifying in burden sharing and suboptimality in the provision of 
the collective good in a post-1945 alliances such as NATO” (Theis 1987, p. 325). 
Gowa and Manfield (2004) claim that “alliances are particularly likely to stimulate 
trade when the conditions of the new trade theory hold” (Gowa & Manfield 2004, p. 
776). Moreover, Fordham (2010) presents the evidence that international trade helps 
explain these alliances. According to him, “Empirical analysis indicates that trade 
increases the probability of alliance formation in major power–minor power dyads 
and decreases the chance that alliances will dissolve” (Fordham 2010, p. 685).  
     The “free-rider” theory has been seen to be useful in discussing burden-sharing 
among allies based upon Olson and Zeckhauser’s (1966) work. They argue that some 
allies become “free-riders” at the other ally’s expense once an alliance is formed 
since the decisions about how the common burden is to be shared are not specified in 
the alliance treaty. According to them, “Often the smaller and weaker nations gain 
relatively more from the existence of an alliance than do the larger and stronger 
powers, and once an alliance treaty has been signed the larger powers are 
immediately deprived of their strongest bargaining weapon - the threat that they will 
not help to defend the recalcitrant smaller powers in any negotiations about the 
sharing of the common burden” (Olson & Zeckhauser 1966, p. 273). Their study 
closely examines the logic of free-riders in the alliance mechanism although does not 
look into the sustainability of the alliance system. 
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     Contrary to their argument, the model presented by Boyer (1989) illustrates that 
“small nations may well make contributions to the alliance effort that are 
commensurate to their size and in accordance with the comparative advantages they 
possess in the production of certain goods (Boyer 1989, p. 712). He also argues that 
“one should recognize that both military expenditure and foreign aid yield an 
externality that enhances alliance security…they exhibit varying degrees of 
‘publicness’ similar to the types of goods” (Russett 1970; Sandler 1977; Boyer 1989, 
p. 713). According to him, “if one disaggregates the Western alliance system and 
analyses military expenditures from the perspective of a bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance 
and multilateral NATO…Japanese behaviours fits with the Olson and Zeckhauser 
model” (Boyer 1989, p. 716). Boyer’s (1989) study shows that “although a nation 
may appear to be free riding on the security contributions of other alliance members 
with reference to a particular type of alliance contribution, this should not lead one to 
assume that this same nation will be free riding in all categories” (Boyer 1989, p. 
723). He also further argues that the question about free-riding logic should lead the 
researcher to examine other types of alliance contributions to explore the continuity 
of alliance relationships (Boyer 1989). 
 
d) Alliance Cohesion 
     “Alliance cohesion” is another theoretical concept to understand alliance 
mechanisms. Kim (2011) examines alliance cohesion in consideration of goals, 
threat perception, strategic compatibility and command structure based upon Holsti, 
Hopmann and Sullivan’s (1973) definition. This notion is defined as “the ability of 
alliance partners to agree upon goals, strategy, and tactics and to coordinate activities 
directed towards those ends” (Holsti, Hopmann & Sullivan 1973, p. 16). In the 
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context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Kim (2011) exemplifies that “This strengthened 
relationship [between the US and Japan] has been investigated through four 
operational indicators of alliance cohesion: homogeneity in goals, threat perception, 
strategic compatibility and command structure” (Kim 2011, p. 356). He also argues 
that, in the post-Cold War era, Japan has changed its defence posture owing to more 
imminent threats from North Korea and the rise of China which has led the US-Japan 
alliance to become more cohesive (Kim 2011). 
    Alliance cohesion is also referred to as “the degree of convergence among 
member states’ commitments to the alliance. The key indicator is whether states 
defect – remove or reduce troops – prior to the end of hostilities” (Weitsman 2003 p.  
85; Weitsman 2004, p. 24; Kreps 2010, p. 191). Weitsman’s (2003) study on the 
Central Powers and Triple Entente illuminate numerous facets of alliance politics. 
According to her, “each alliance had a complex and long lived peacetime history 
with repeated challenges and crises, and each alliance endured to prosecute the war” 
(Weitsman 2003, p. 80). Furthermore, Kreps (2010) further points out that elite 
consensus can be regarded as a determinant of alliance cohesion and has limited the 
influence of public opinion. She claims that the revisionist view of public opinion—
that public opinion has a bottom–up effect on foreign policies —may be in need of a 
revision” (Kreps 2010, p. 194). According to her, “elite consensus” “refers to the 
absence of a coherent opposition to the government’s basic foreign policy” (Kreps 
2010, p. 198). 
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e) “Wedging Strategy” 
     Adopting wedging strategy to alliance theory, Izumikawa’s (2013) work attempts 
to fill the gap by developing a theory of wedge strategy, which is defined by 
Crawford (2011) as “a state’s attempt to prevent, break up, or weaken a threatening 
or blocking alliance at an acceptable cost” (Crawford 2011, p. 156). In response to 
Crawford’s viewpoint, Izumikawa (2013) argues that, with regard to the policies of 
former US President Eisenhower, “It is also worth emphasizing that the outcome of 
the Eisenhower administration’s policy illustrates the utilities of coercive wedging, 
despite Crawford’s dismissal of the strategy” (Izumikawa 2013, p. 528). Izumikawa 
(2013) develops a theory of wedge strategy that explains when a state is likely to use 
coercive or reward wedging for security. According to him, “the two basic factors—
the law of diminishing return and the cost of obtaining security—apply to this theory. 
These factors govern all kinds of goods, including security, but IR scholars rarely 
accept them explicitly” (Izumikawa 2013, p.  506). This theoretical adoption is 
aimed at refining alliance theory although it is not concerned with the asymmetrical 
or symmetrical relationship of alliances when examining case studies. 
 
Analysis of Existing Theories of Alliance 
     Each alliance theory has explored their mechanisms in various ways. However, 
among these theories, the strengthening relationship of the allies has not been fully 
explored. More precisely, within IR literature, although alliance theory developed by 
realists has been used to analyse the U.S-Japan alliance, this type of alliance theory 
may be overly reductionist and mechanical. Alliance theories are mostly analysed 
from realist perspectives, which assume that an alliance dilemma exists because of 
its anarchic international environment. Snyder (1984) regards alliance formation as 
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one of the means for states to accumulate power while realists rely heavily on the 
logic of balance among the states. Furthermore, alliance theorists seldom examine 
the strengthening ties between the allies. Although the theories of balancing or 
security dilemma have been useful, they do not illustrate the on-going security 
discussions particularly after the Cold War. As Snyder (1990) admits, the 
significance of balancing, or the “global balance” in his term, varies among regions. 
In the case of alliance dilemma literature, there are more discussions on how to avoid 
the alliance dilemma. Realists’ negative assumption of alliance dilemma may have 
limited the observations of the relationships between or among the allies in the 
contemporary era. 
     Additionally, as realists view being caught in either entrapment or abandonment 
negatively, they rarely examine the continuity of the alliance. For instance, 
“dependence” has also been acknowledged as a factor by alliance theorists although 
it is viewed negatively. Snyder regards dependence as negative, arguing that “the 
greater one’s dependence on the alliance and the stronger one’s commitment to the 
ally, the higher the risk of entrapment” (Snyder 1984, p. 467). He also discusses the 
“balance of dependence”, describing it as a “relative bargaining power” (or intra-
alliance leverage) where it may shift due to the changes in security environments and 
their perceptions of it (Snyder 1984). In realist terms, the interdependence of the 
allies is considered to be negative, a form of “entrapment”. While there are further 
considerations of dependence in the literature, interdependence has not been closely 
investigated due to its negative perception of over-dependence. 
      Walt (1997) examines alliance endurance but he explains how to escape from the 
alliance dilemma instead of seeing the possibilities of the transforming nature of the 
alliance. He acknowledges that a source of alliance durability can be hegemonic 
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power, which is led by a strong alliance leader. He mentions that alliances are likely 
to persist when there is a large asymmetry of power, shared political values, and 
highly institutionalised mechanisms (Walt 1997). In the context of Asia where 
historical antagonism still remains and multilateral institutions are weak, he explains 
that it is unlikely for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to abandon the US alliance 
since the alliance hinders regional competition and hedges against the rising power 
of China (Walt 1997). Walt (2009) also elaborates alliance theory by taking into 
account a unipolar arrangement by the US, indicating that unipolarity may change 
the tension between abandonment and entrapment. It is also suggested that the US 
military presence is a form of “insurance policy” (Walt 2009). 
     Alliance theory based upon the neorealist account may have been useful (for the 
cases of the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Island, for instance) yet this aspect of 
alliance theory has not dealt with the durability aspect of alliances, which can be 
used for political means. There is less focus on the interdependence of alliances 
although there are more studies on the strategic usages of alliances. As the core 
realist assumption is the importance of state autonomy, they view entrapment as a 
negative phenomenon. Indeed, it is relevant to examine the interactions between the 
allies in depth in this regard, particularly in peacetime when there is less emphasis on 
military build-up and more emphasis on international cooperation. Additionally, 
Russett (1968) points out that there are two major conflicting theories with regard to 
the alliance formations: one derived from game theory and the one applicable to the 
post-1945 international system, or the Cold War system, which focuses on the role of 
ideology. In this respect, the research on “alliance cohesiveness” may have 
contributed to understanding the sustainability of alliances, taking into account the 
threat variable. However, the cohesiveness of the alliance does not consider the 
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power dimensions of allies. Instead of using dependence or interdependence, alliance 
cohesion theory considers the material capabilities of the states, not the economic or 
ideational dimensions. “Free-rider” theory has taken into account the way smaller 
states may act; however, power has not been considered as well. 
     Furthermore, rigid assumptions of alliances may mislead any prediction of the 
security arrangement. For instance, Layne foresaw that Japan would become 
strategically independent according to its growing material capabilities, particularly 
economic growth, and abandon the alliance. Yet, the U.S.-Japan alliance still persists 
today and is strengthening. Baker and Glosserman (2013) also recognise that the 
traditional realist viewpoint on alliances may have been problematic because of the 
tendency to see alliances as a response to a military threat. They also note about the 
problem of viewing China’s rise as a common threat in the Asia-Pacific region by 
focusing on its anti-access/area denial (A2AD) military strategy and the territorial 
disputes between China and its neighbours (Baker & Glosserman 2013). According 
to them,  
More broadly, there is general recognition that to remain relevant the alliances must 
emphasize shared interests and demonstrate their centrality to the maintenance of regional 
stability... Ultimately, the question of sustainability of the system will be driven by the 
development of a sustained sense of shared values and a perception that the system of 
alliances contributes to the regional public good, however that good comes to be defined by 
the alliance partners as well as all the other nations in the region (Baker & Glosserman 2013, 
p. 16).  
This observation shows the relevance of scrutinising not only military but also 
economic and ideational facets of alliances in order to understand the contemporary 
alliance system. 
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Linking Alliances to Hegemony 
     Among these studies of alliance, there is no consensus on the theory of alliance 
although each perspective may substantiate the other. The difficulty in explaining the 
durability of the alliances perhaps lies in scarce recognition of the relationship 
between hegemony and alliances, which is intimately associated with the concept of 
power. The linkage between hegemony and alliances has rarely been highlighted in 
these studies yet the concept of hegemony should be taken into account to exemplify 
the durability of the alliance in consideration of power. As has been recognised by 
such scholars as Morrow (1991), the distinction between symmetrical and 
asymmetrical alliance relationship is seldom highlighted in the literature of alliances. 
In the context of asymmetric alliances, the notion of hegemony cannot be ignored in 
consideration of the process of formulating alliances. In addition, the literature 
regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance and other alliance tend to focus on the alliances 
itself, and is unable to comprehend and elucidate the power balance between or 
among allies that is also crucial to comprehend the power relationship between the 
allies. Alliance theory has been based upon rational choice theory, which barely 
takes into account the complicated relationship among allies, not only in defence but 
also in economic and ideational factors. 
     In this regard, it is important to scrutinise not only the theory of alliance but also 
that of hegemony since an obstacle in understanding the durability of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance seems to be not only the gaps in these IR theories but the way alliance and 
hegemony have been understood. Reductionistic or mechanical viewpoints on these 
concepts tend to be used in the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which are 
likely to fail in explaining the transforming nature of the alliance. Moreover, the 
mainstream theories of alliance and hegemony are inclined to focus on the 
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hegemonic role of the states rather than the non-hegemonic role of the allies. In order 
to explore the changing features of the alliance system, investigating alliance theory 
and hegemony is an essential step to comprehend the characteristics of the U.S.-
Japan alliance in the post-Cold War period.  
     The neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony is useful in investigating the 
interdependence of the allies in the alliance contexts. Even though Walt is aware of 
the hegemonic feature of the US in the Asian region, he solely focuses on the US 
role. Closer examinations of the hegemon and non-hegemon states can be made 
through the neo-Gramscian lenses instead of relying on the theory of hegemonic 
stability. Considering broadening definitions of security with non-territorial concerns, 
going beyond a traditional understanding of alliance theory is necessary, which has 
not taken into account the political features of the U.S.-Japan alliance and embraces 
not only military but also economic and ideational considerations. In this regard, the 
neo-Gramscian framework is useful in comprehending both alliance and hegemony 
since it acknowledges a close linkage between hegemony and alliances. In order to 
underscore the connection between alliances and hegemony, the next section 
explores the theories of hegemony, specifically hegemonic stability theory, which 
has been predominantly used in the IR field, and the neo-Gramscian theory of 
hegemony, which is later to be applied to alliance theory. 
 
Theories of Hegemony 
     This section looks into hegemonic stability theory, which has been influential in 
the study of alliances, and the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony. In examining 
hegemonic stability theory, the section underlines some weaknesses that can be 
overcome by adopting a neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony.  
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Hegemonic Stability Theory 
     Like alliance theory, hegemony is often treated as a structural variable within 
hegemonic stability theory, which has been elaborated by neorealism or neoliberal 
institutionalism. Hegemonic stability theory was first illustrated by Kindleberger 
using game theory, or “the logic of collective goods” in his terms. He argues that 
only a hegemonic state has sufficient power to provide the public good of 
international economic stability (Kindleberger 1973). Kindleberger summarises in 
his book that “for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one 
stabilizer” (Kindleberger 1973, p. 305). Neorealists such as Gilpin and Krasner 
develop the theory of hegemonic stability although their approaches differ from 
Kindleberger’s. Gilpin (1981) argues that the presence of a hegemonic power is at 
the centre of preserving stability in the international system. He mainly discusses 
hegemonic struggle which is defined as the international hierarchy of prestige where 
states that will govern are determined (Gilpin 1981). Gilpin (1981) elucidates the 
cyclical nature of hegemonic powers, saying that “the conclusion of one hegemonic 
way is the beginning of another cycle of growth, expansion, and eventual decline” 
(Gilpin 1981, p. 210).  
     From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, Krasner (1982) investigates the 
hegemonic leadership and considers the roles of the international regime in forming 
hegemonic stability (Krasner 1982). Webb and Krasner (1989) argue that the theory 
of hegemonic stability, which focuses on security aspects, better explains 
developments within the western bloc and between the East and the West than 
analyses that ignore the implications of international economic transactions. They 
also argue that the security version of hegemonic stability theory developed by 
Krasner and Gilpin (1989) is different from Kindleberger’s (1973) assumption as it 
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does not assume that states have a common interest in international economic 
liberalisation and stability (Webb & Krasner 1989). 
     In neorealist terms, the theory of hegemonic stability is taken into account in 
explaining the U.S.-Japan alliance although it is criticised as well. Layne (1993) 
discusses the hegemonic stability theory, arguing that US “strategy of 
preponderance”, which incorporates Western Europe, Germany and Japan into US-
led alliances by creating an open global economy and international environments, is 
not effective. He also criticises Webb and Krasner’s (1989) presumptions on 
hegemonic stability theory as being a form of “benign hegemon”, claiming that a 
strategy of preponderance will fail because it is not coercive enough to prevent Japan 
and Germany from becoming great powers, but it is coercive enough to antagonise 
them (Layne 1993). Ikenberry (1998) who developed the theory of US liberal grand 
strategy claims that the neorealist version of hegemony does not examine the liberal 
characteristics. Snidal argues that hegemonic stability theory ignores strategic 
interaction, saying that “the theory ignores the impact of bargaining, negotiation, 
strategic rationality, and, of course, cooperation through collective action” (Snidal 
1985, p.600). He also points out that different issues will pose different degrees of 
publicness or even fundamentally different strategic structures which are not 
addressed in hegemonic stability theory (Snidal 1985). In addition, regarding the 
discussions about the US declining hegemonic power during the 1970s, Strange 
(1987) argues that structural power decides outcomes, in both positive and negative 
senses, much more than relational power does, and the US structural power has 
increased. 
     Keohane (1984) elaborates a refined version of hegemonic stability theory, 
drawing upon the institutionalist tradition. According to him, cooperation can 
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develop on the basis of interests whereas institutions can affect the patterns of 
cooperation (Keohane 1984). Keohane is sceptical of a deterministic version of 
hegemonic stability theory, which relies on the realist concepts of interests and 
power since he hardly believes that hegemony is either a necessary or a sufficient 
condition for the emergence of cooperation (Keohane 1984). He assumes that 
“international regimes depend on the existence of patterns of common or 
complementary interest that are perceived or capable of being perceived by political 
actors regardless of hegemon’s presence” (Keohane 1984, p. 78). His refined version 
of hegemonic stability theory does not only assert a direct linkage between power 
and leadership but also considers domestic attitudes, political structures and 
decision- making processes (Keohane 1984).  
     Moreover, Keohane and Nye (1989) clarify both the positive and negative roles of 
the hegemon, saying that “A hegemonial power can change the rules rather than 
adapt its policies to the existing rules...When the hegemonial power does not seek to 
conquer other states, but merely to protect its favored position, other states may 
benefit well” (Keohane & Nye 1989, pp. 44-45). While they see the coercive nature 
of hegemony, they also recognise the consensual aspect of hegemony. Based on the 
liberal viewpoints, Russett (2011) describes hegemony as “the in-between sense of 
something less formal and perhaps less oppressive than empire, but with more 
emphasis on expecting cooperative behaviour than the mere distribution of unipolar 
power may carry” (Russett 2011, p. 2). He indicates the role of soft power which is 
the ability to attract others instead of using coercion (Russett 2011). 
     The theory of hegemony has been elaborated by neorealists and neoliberal 
institutionalists although they do not necessarily discuss the perspectives of non-
hegemonic states; their observations emphasise more on the role of hegemonic 
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leadership. Grunberg (1990) indicates that “The theory of hegemonic stability is of 
American origin and is quite strongly biased in favor of the United States” 
(Grunberg 1990, p. 444). The ethnocentric appeal of the theory has been pointed out 
by Russett (2011), which also exhibits the lack of weakness of the consensual aspect 
of hegemony. Although some theorists, including Krasner and other liberal theorists, 
acknowledge the role of non-hegemonic states, they do not elaborate it sufficiently. 
Krasner (1982) acknowledges that “consensual knowledge can greatly facilitate 
agreement on the development of an international regime” (Krasner 1982, p. 204). 
Keohane (1984) mentions that the hegemon power seeks to persuade other states to 
conform to its vision of world order, indicating that “Such acceptance rested, in turn, 
on the belief of leaders of secondary states that were benefiting from the structure of 
order that was being created” (Keohane 1984, p. 137). Worth (2011) also notes that 
the orthodox IR theory of hegemony tends to focus on the roles of the dominant 
states. 
     This may be an implication that the consensual aspect of hegemony plays its role 
in formulating hegemony but the overall analysis is merely focused on the role of 
hegemonic power. Although it is acknowledged, little attention is paid to the 
consensual aspect of hegemony especially when discussing the relationships between 
the allied states. The issue that has rarely been brought up is what makes the non-
hegemonic states entrench their laws throughout the interactions with the hegemon 
state. Furthermore, as Howson and Smith (2008) point out, “while the operation of 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region has attracted investigation and discussion, most 
of this work presents a picture of regional economic, social, and political operations 
as becoming ossified to Occidental or, more specifically, US domination within a 
zero-sum game” (Howson & Smith 2008, p. 1), which may have obfuscated many 
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socio-historical antagonisms throughout the hegemonic process. In this sense, the 
role of consensual aspect of the hegemony should be examined more profoundly to 
understand the formation and strengthening of hegemony with the presence of 
alliances. This is also an attempt to overcome the ethnocentric viewpoint
19
 of 
hegemony by considering the non-hegemonic role of the states which still play, 
perhaps more importantly, an essential role in sustaining existing hegemony in the 
international system. 
 
Neo-Gramscian Theory of Hegemony20 
     In order to re-investigate both alliance theory and the theory of hegemony in the 
context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, a neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony is 
adopted to explain the continuity of the alliance. This theoretical framework is able 
to illuminate the transforming nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance since it embraces 
both the hegemonic and non-hegemonic roles of the allies. From this IR theoretical 
approach, not only the coercive role of the hegemonic state is considered, but also 
the interplay of consent and coercion is explored to underscore the interdependence 
of the two countries. Additionally, this theoretical approach allows the investigation 
of state’s material capabilities and how ideology is used to construct and to 
legitimatise a hegemonic order. Since this approach has not previously been applied 
to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is relevant to adopt this viewpoint to 
understand the formation and firmness of US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. 
                                                          
19
 Indeed, it is arguable that IR itself can be regarded as ethnocentric or Western-centric approach 
(Hobson 2007). Still, I believe that Gramscianism/neo-Gramscianism is not purely ethnocentric 
since it considers the counter-hegemonic and non-hegemonic roles of the actors. 
20
 Worth (2011) argues the need to reconsider the concept of hegemony. He indicates that “The 
move – or what has often been called the ‘critical’ or ‘neo-Gramscian turn’ – in IR towards 
widening the understanding of hegemony in global politics should not…be underestimated” 
(Worth 2011, p. 374). 
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     Cox (1987) defines hegemony as a form of dominance where the dominant state 
creates an order based ideologically on consensus, and ensures the supremacy of the 
leading state or states and leading social classes and offer satisfaction to the less 
powerful actors. Coercion is not a sufficient condition of hegemony but when the 
consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails (Cox 1981). He 
also acknowledges the complexity of a particular social formation since counter-
hegemonic forces will come to challenge the prevailing institutional and political 
arrangements (Cox 1987). Cox (1993) exemplifies that hegemony at the international 
level is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which 
penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. In 
particular, he argues that hegemony arises from “a coherent conjunction or fit 
between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world 
order (including a certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order 
with a certain semblances of the universe” (Cox 1981, p. 5). Cox (1981) emphasises 
that hegemony is based on a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective 
image of world order and a set of institutions.  
     Neo-Gramscianism is in contrast to neo-realism which possesses the abstractive 
and reductionistic nature.
21
 Cox (1981) raised the issue of the false assumption made 
by problem-solving theory consisting of neorealism and game theories, arguing that 
the social and political order is not fixed but, at least in the long term, is changing. 
Gill (1993b) argues that a mechanical theory such as the neo-realism’s Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, which led to the creation of alliance dilemma, and hegemonic stability 
theory have limited scientific validity in explaining complex social transformations 
                                                          
21
 It is also noted that “Notably, it challenges a conception of the social universe understood in 
terms of abstract individualism, whereby primordial units…compete for relative shares of 
wealth- and power-conferring resources” (Germain & Kenny 1998; Ayers 2008, p. 4). 
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and the constituents of world orders. He also explains that the neorealist’s 
theorisation has been centred on historical cycles of hegemony or the rise and fall of 
great powers, in which the “historical forces” are likely to be misinterpreted (Gill 
2003). As Gill explains, “the concept of mechanical causality is inconsistent with 
historicism, since historicism is concerned with explanation, rather than causality” 
(Gill 1993b, p. 27).  It is worth noting that, although Gramsci accepts Marx’s 
analysis of the structure and dynamics of capitalism, he was unwilling “to embrace 
the more mechanical and economistic interpretations of Marx” (Rupert 2007, p. 93). 
Worth (2011) also argues that, from the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, hegemony should 
focus on how relationships of consent are constructed and deconstructed at every 
level of interactions (Worth 2011, p. 383). Hence, it is worth acknowledging a less 
rigid nature of hegemony that can be seen through the neo-Gramscian lenses. 
     The neo-Gramscian’s hegemony draws upon the historic process of consensus 
formation. According to Gill (2003), this approach, called “transnational historical 
materialism”, attempts to illustrate the dynamics of the contemporary era of global 
capitalism. From this perspective, “structural changes in the capitalist system require 
a more flexible analytical approach, one which allows for the possibility of the 
analysis of transnational social forces, including the interplay between different 
interests within each state” (Gill 1990, p. 46). The strength of the neo-Gramscian 
approach is its deliberation of constructive dialogue with the different perspectives 
including the hegemonic theorisation in International Political Economy (IPE) and 
IR studies (Gill & Law 1988; Gill 1993a). It is worth noting that neo-Gramscianism 
has been predominantly located within the sub-disciplines of IPE. However, as 
Worth (2011) notes, “if IPE is to delve into the study of social and cultural 
movements within global society, then broader studies within IR would also benefit 
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from a Hall-spired understanding of hegemony for a theoretical departure point” 
(Worth 2011, p. 387). Also, the attempt at bringing political theory and IR together 
is made (Bieler & Morton 2007). Hence, as is explained in the Introduction Chapter, 
this thesis is aimed at embellishing the neo-Gramscian framework in the IR 
discipline. 
     According to Gill, “History is always in the making, in a complex and dialectical 
interplay between agency, structure, consciousness, and action” (Gill 1993a, pp. 8-9). 
This relies on the perspective of Worth (2011) on “the complex and contradictory 
relationship between structure and agency” (Worth 2011, p. 384). Bieler (2005) also 
emphasises the strength of neo-Gramscianism for its “dialectical understanding of 
structure and agency” (Bieler 2005, p. 517). With regard to the rise and decline of 
hegemonies and balances of power in the inter-state system, historical materialists 
argue that this structure is a particular configuration of states and social forces. Cox 
(1987) argues that a neo-Gramscian perspective on structure is flexible as 
“Structures are not ‘givens’ (data), they are ‘mades’ (facts) – made by collective 
human action and transformable by collective human action” (Cox 1987, p. 395). 
      From this theoretical viewpoint, hegemony is exercised within a wider social 
constellation of forces, or “historic bloc”, which refers to a historical congruence 
between material forces, institutions and ideologies (Cox 1981). “Historic bloc” is 
one of the important key concepts of neo-Gramscianism. In neo-Gramscian terms, 
historic bloc is “a dialectical concept in the sense that its interacting elements create 
a larger entity” (Cox 1993, p. 56). It is the organic linkage between political and civil 
society, a fusion of material, institutional, inter-subjective, theoretical and 
ideological capacities (Gramsci 1971; Gill & Law 1993). The concept of an 
international historic bloc implies that when elements of more than one class are 
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involved, its basis is more organic and rooted in material and normative structures of 
society (Gill & Law 1993). Cox (1987) explains that the state itself and the forms of 
state action are themselves differentially constituted in complex ways by blocs of 
socio-economic and political forces which operate within the limits of a given 
historical necessity.  
     Gill defines hegemony as “not a relation of coercive force as such (as it is viewed 
in realist theory), but rather primarily one of consent gained through ‘intellectual and 
moral leadership’” (Gill 1990, p. 42) For instance, the Trilateral Commission can be 
seen as an example of forming a historic bloc. Gill (1990) closely investigates the 
Trilateral Commission, which is seen as the construction of international networks of 
identity, interest and ideas, and similar US-sponsored private international relations 
councils are seen as indicative of the internationalism of civil society or 
“transnationalisation of the state” which correlates with a changing landscape of 
global political economy. Gill (1990) argues that alliance is crucial in the ongoing 
process of dependency bound up with a dialectical conflict between transnational 
capital and socialist forces or trasformismo (co-optation of elites) in Gramsci’s terms. 
Focusing on the role of political elites, he elaborates that “Intellectuals are not 
simply producers of ideology, they are also the ‘organisers of hegemony’, that is, 
they theorise the ways in which hegemony can be developed or maintained” (Gill 
1990, p. 52). Regarding the consensual aspect of hegemony, some claims that “If 
hegemony is understood as an ‘opinion-moulding activity’, rather than brute force or 
dominance, then consideration has to turn to how a hegemonic social or world order 
is based on values and understandings that permeate the nature of that order” (Cox 
1992/1996, p. 151; Morton 2003; Bieler & Morton 2004, p. 87). 
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     Coercion and consent can be examined in the context of alliances through the 
lenses of neo-Gramscianism. Gramsci took over Niccolò Machiavelli’s image of 
power as a centaur: half man, half beast which is a necessary combination of consent 
and coercion (Cox 1993). Gramsci also reconstructed Marx’s radicalised social 
ontology and developed a dual perspective on social politics encompassing coercive 
and consensual forms of power (Rupert 1993). Rupert (1998) also indicates that “as 
directing us toward the relations of coercion/consent at play in various historical 
social forms, none of which are wholly understandable in abstraction from their 
relation to capitalism and its peculiar forms of social organization” (Rupert 1998, p. 
433). A neo-Gramscian notion of the “coercion and consent” dimensions of 
hegemony is able to explain the consolidating relationship of allies. 
     The transformation from coercion to consent is considered in the neo-Gramscian 
framework. Gill (1993b) discusses the British Commonwealth as an example of 
hegemonic formation that is embedded in the history of British imperialism and 
colonialism yet currently represents the transformation from coercion into consent 
and an informal regulation of inter-state relations at the international level. Gill and 
Law (1988) clarify that with time, the coercive use of power may become less 
necessary as consensus builds up on the basis of shared values, ideas and material 
interests. Throughout this process, a hegemonic structure of thought and action 
emerges (Gill & Law 1988). They also argue that the developed countries today do 
not necessarily need to exert military and diplomatic pressure on these developing 
countries to ensure that they will supply primary products (Gill & Law 1988).
22
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 It is also worth noting that Gramsci’s concept of the “integral State” is closely related to the 
idea of hegemony. That is, he regards the integral state as a “dialectical unity of the moments of 
civil society and political society” (Thomas 2009, p. 137), viewing the interaction of “political 
society” and “civil society” within a unified state-form.  
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     What is important in this process is that such ideas become implanted in the 
frameworks of thought of the politically and economically significant parts of the 
population (Gill & Law 1988). Considering the consensual aspect of hegemony, Cox 
(1987) argues that consensus formation is important for internationalising the state. 
He explains that “It was a power structure in which the components sought to 
maintain consensus through bargaining and one in which the bargaining units were 
bureaucratic fragments of states” (Cox 1987, p. 256). He also indicates that 
international institutions are particularly important in defining the ideological basis 
of consensus, the principles and goals (Cox 1987). 
 
Neo-Gramscianism and Alliance Theory 
Neo-Gramscian Theory of Alliance 
     Since most of the studies of alliance are based on neo-realist or game theorists’ 
ideas, this research project intends to refine alliance theory in order to explain the 
continuing relationship of the allies with the application of the neo-Gramscian theory 
of hegemony. While existing alliance theories might help to understand alliances in 
traditional terms, it is difficult to say that these analyses are sufficient to comprehend 
the contemporary era. Walt (1997) argues that “Like Oscar Wilde’s picture of Dorian 
Gray, an ageing alliance may appear robust and healthy so long as its formal 
institutions continue to operate, even if the basic rationale for the arrangement is 
crumbling” (Walt 1997, p. 167). While Walt (1997) is aware of the hegemonic role 
of the US in the Asia-Pacific region, he focuses on the US role; thus close 
investigations in hegemon and non-hegemon can be conducted by taking the neo-
Gramscian approach. The redefinition of the alliance should be made with regard to 
the contemporary world by not simply interpreting it as a military compact or mutual 
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defence cooperation, but understanding how the alliance has been transformed and 
developed throughout the different historical periods.  
      The neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony is appropriate in investigating 
strengthening ties of the allies not only in tactical terms but in organic terms. The 
mechanism of the alliance is not merely about alliance game or alliance dilemma but 
also the consolidating relationships between the allies. The neo-Gramscian account 
of hegemony allows exploring the linkage between alliance and hegemony. As was 
pointed out in Morrow’s (1991) research, alliances can be treated as the tool of 
extending hegemonic power from the viewpoint of hegemon states. The continuity of 
the alliance itself also poses questions about its current functions and its relevance in 
the post-Cold War period. Gill (1993) mentions that world order is likely to undergo 
a triple crisis in economic, political and socio-cultural terms (Gill 1993a; 1993b). 
According to him, “what may be the most important aspect of the current epoch is 
the fact that social relations and social structure are in a period of the extended and 
deep-seated transformation or crisis, on a global scale” (Gill 1993b, p.34). The 
changing nature of alliances can be a part of this process as well. Applying the neo-
Gramscian theory of hegemony to alliance theory may clearly explain the existing 
alliance systems including those led by the US. The neo-Gramscian theory of 
alliance is fully developed in Chapter Two. 
  
The U.S.-Japan Alliance as a Case Study 
     The neo-Gramscian theory of alliance is important for the scholarship of the U.S.-
Japan alliance by shedding light on the features of US hegemony in the postwar era, 
The post-war hegemony, or Pax Americana, is more rigidly institutionalised than the 
Pax Britannica, taking the form of alliances created for the containment of the Soviet 
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Union (Cox 1981). Cox (1987) argues that the neoliberal state sought its security as a 
member of a stable alliance system and its economic growth as a participant of an 
open world economy. According to him, the Marshall Plan
23
 and extensive military 
expenditures abroad are seen as US hegemonic actions as exemplified in the case of 
the conflicts in Korea and the Persian Gulf (Cox 1987). Cox (1987) also emphasises 
that “U.S. initiatives, based on that country’s economic and military preponderance, 
thus led the Western European countries and Japan toward a world economy with 
free access to raw materials; free movement of goods, capital, and technology; and 
the elimination of discrimination in economic relations” (Cox 1987, p. 216).  
     Gill and Law (1993) explain that the key international factors in a new 
“international historic bloc” of social forces are a US-centred economic, security and 
political structure for the non-communist world and a forum for the congruence of 
ideas, institutions and policies among the leading capitalist nations. According to 
them, this international historic bloc became the centre of the post-war organic 
alliance in the West by internationalising New Deal and Fordist capital-intensive 
policies, mass-consumption accumulation, and the extension for exports and/or 
foreign direct investment (FDI) (Gill & Law 1993). According to Rupert (2000), 
Fordism is “a set of institutionalized relationships between the social organization of 
production on the one hand, and social self-understandings and political 
organizations on the other” (Rupert 2000, p. 24) in terms of a socio-political regime. 
Gramsci (1971) defines it as “an ultra-modern form of production and of working 
methods - such as is offered by the most advanced American variety, the industry of 
Henry Ford” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 280-1). Rupert (2003) explains that US world-
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 The Marshall Plan was the major policy initiative of the US, which was designed to foster 
capitalist prosperity within the “free world” for its political stability, unity, and integration into 
the capitalist world order (Rupert 2000) 
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order policy or market-oriented liberal vision is seen as the product of the global 
assertion of unilateral US power, especially its military power. 
     It is important to note that neo-Gramscian theorists have stressed the organic 
nature of the alliances after the Second World War. Gill and Law (1988) explain that 
since 1945 the development of capitalist democracies in Japan and Western Europe 
have become more “organic” than tactical allies of the US. They observe that “it was 
significant that, at a time of rising Western and Japanese military expenditures after 
1979…some Japanese leaders increasingly began to portray the issues of 
international security in Cold War terms, aligning Japan more closely with American 
position” (Gill & Law 1988, p. 351). Gill (1990) further argues that the metaphor of 
an “organic alliance” helps to capture the quality of US relations with Western 
Europe and Japan. In this regard, this neo-Gramscian viewpoint of the organic nature 
of the alliances can be used to characterise the post-1945 regime of Pax Americana 
including the U.S.-Japan alliance. In addition, based on the example of the British 
Commonwealth, the transformation from coercion to consent can be examined in the 
case of the U.S.-Japan alliance by looking into the strengthening liberal features of 
this alliance. The following chapters, which adopt the neo-Gramscian framework to 
the U.S.-Japan alliance, illustrate how US foreign policies have influenced Japanese 
foreign policies and how Japan has contributed to play its consensual role in 
strengthening US hegemony. 
 
Conclusion 
      While the nature of the alliances has been broadened and redefined in accordance 
with the current security environment, this chapter has discussed the duration and 
changing features of alliances which can be understood with the adoption of the neo-
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Gramscian theory of hegemony by taking into consideration the non-hegemonic 
policymaking of states. The neo-Gramscian’s “consensus and coercion” dimensions 
of hegemony are useful for studying the U.S.-Japan alliance to encapsulate not only 
the perception of the US, but also Japan. As a theoretical framework of consent and 
coercion has not been used for alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is worth 
adopting this theory of hegemony by developing the neo-Gramscian theory of 
alliance in order to understand the consolidation of US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific 
region. As has been exemplified in the earlier sections, alliance theory and the theory 
of hegemony have been dominated by a reductionistic or mechanical understanding 
of power so it is important to reinvestigate the US-led alliance system and hegemony 
with a focus on the consensual aspect of hegemony to comprehend the US role in the 
Asia-Pacific region and future regional arrangements. 
     Furthermore, the transforming nature of alliance systems in the post-Cold War 
period shall be examined not only in material but also in ideological terms. In order 
to articulate the nature of the US-led hegemony, or historic bloc, and its role in the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, the relationship between the U.S.-Japan alliance and liberal 
ideology should be closely scrutinised. It has become difficult to characterise the 
alliance system with a sole focus on the balance of power since the role of liberal 
ideology has increasingly come into play. It is observable that, as the characteristics 
of alliance are gradually transforming with a more emphasis on liberal ideology and 
the flexibility of liberal notions, this has enabled the U.S.-Japan alliance to become 
stronger. Therefore, the ideological aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance and other US-
led alliances need to be examined in neo-Gramscian terms providing a better 
understanding of the features of hegemony in the contemporary period. The next 
chapter is intended to clarify in what terms the neo-Gramscian framework can be 
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applicable to the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance on its key concepts and 
crystallising the interaction of material, institutional and ideational components in 
bolstering hegemony. It not only looks into neo-Gramscianism in a general sense but 
also highlights the insights which may be relevant for Japanese foreign security 
policies in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
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Chapter Two: Neo-Gramscianism (Theory and Research Method) 
 
Introduction 
     While Chapter One presents the literature review of the U.S.-Japan alliance and 
theories of alliance and hegemony, Chapter Two exemplifies neo-Gramscianism as a 
research method in order to adopt it for to alliance theory and the case of the U.S.-
Japan alliance. As is exemplified in the previous chapter, there is a gulf among IR 
theories (realism, liberalism and constructivism) in the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. The power relationship between the US and Japan in alliance contexts has 
inadequately been examined within the IR theoretical frameworks. Whilst alternative 
research methods including analytical eclecticism are proposed as the means to fill 
the gaps among these IR theories, the power relationship in the alliance contexts has 
not been taken into account, which is explainable by using the neo-Gramscian 
concept of hegemony. As is exemplified in Chapter One, the presence of US 
hegemony cannot be entirely ignored in the discussions of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
taking into consideration the trajectory of alliance formations and development, and 
US engagements in the Asia-Pacific region, which have also influenced Japanese 
foreign policymaking. Regarding this historical background, neo-Gramscianism 
would be a useful IR paradigm to scrutinise recent trends in the U.S.-Japan alliance 
in reflection of its historical development and transformations in the face of 
emerging security challenges.  
     In this chapter, neo-Gramscianism is anatomised and developed as a research 
method for alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance. The neo-Gramscian concept 
of hegemony is closely examined taking into consideration the postwar era period 
constituting the Cold Wars. One of the aims of adopting neo-Gramscianism is to 
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channel it between theory and practice. In doing so, the neo-Gramscian concepts are 
internalised to alliance theory, which can be regarded as the neo-Gramscian theory 
of alliance. Alongside this, the U.S.-Japan alliance is used as a case study by 
incorporating Japanese concepts such as gaiatsu (which means “external pressures”, 
or “US pressure”, in Japanese) to apprehend this theoretical standpoint of the U.S.-
Japan alliance relationship. Since this theoretical framework has not been used in the 
scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the existing literature of neo-Gramscianism is 
rigorously scrutinised. In this regard, the neo-Gramscian notions comprising 
“historic bloc”, “coercion/consensus”, “common sense” and “organic intellectuals” 
are taken into account.  
     Indeed, it is also important to note that operationalising the neo-Gramscian 
framework has been challenging in the field of IR. Worth (2011) argues that the 
deployment of Gramsci within IR is underdeveloped since 1) it has largely been 
shaped by the principles of World Order and the transnational capitalist class, and 2) 
neo-Gramscian accounts have generally been rooted within IPE.
24
 However, 
although it is often claimed that it is hardly operationalised (Cerny 2006; Russett 
2011), the usefulness of this IR framework is recognised. Russett (2011) indicates 
the significance of Gramsci’s insight, saying that “they should not be dismissed” 
(Russett 2011, p. 64). It is remarked that “The plural emphasis on neo-Gramscian 
perspectives provides the chance to intersect with similar as well as diverse forms of 
thought and action across different disciplines, whilst engaging with concrete agents 
and sites of change” (Bieler & Morton, 2001a; Bieler and Morton 2001b, p. 27). In 
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 It is also worthwhile to remark that “one of the problems with the many neo-Gramscians is 
their reluctance to engage with some of the more complex areas of the superstructure” (Worth 
2011). The similar argument regarding neo-Gramscian’s less engagement with actual Gramsci’s 
thinking is also pointed out by Germain and Kenny (1998). Yet, in response to their critiques of 
neo-Gramscianism, Rupert (1998) stresses the importance of both using the neo-Gramscian 
theory with continuing engagement with reading and re-reading Gramsci (Rupert 1998, p. 434). 
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this regard, although operationalising neo-Gramscianism can be a difficult task, the 
chapter elucidates the relevant concepts within this theoretical framework. This 
paper aims to develop neo-Gramscianism as a research method, which may be one of 
the original contributions to scholarship. To fulfil the purpose of Chapter Two to 
embellish this IR theory as a research method, it is intended to overcome the 
challenges that have been faced.  
     This chapter is structured as follows: first, the concept of hegemony is examined 
in consideration of the neo-Gramscian perspective of hegemony that is at the centre 
of understanding the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. In this section, differentiating 
empire from hegemony, the section introduces the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance 
by comprehending its features. Second, its key concepts are closely examined. 
Additionally, as a research method, neo-Gramscianism is exemplified by taking into 
account Robert W. Cox’s “social forces analysis”, and discourse analysis considering 
the neo-Gramscian notions of “common sense” and “organic intellectuals”. These 
methods are prominently adopted in analysing the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-
Cold War era especially in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Third, prior to the 
conclusion section in order to exhibit the applicability in the case of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, the neo-Gramscian concepts are adopted to Japanese foreign security 
policies by highlighting the roles of involving actors, institutions and ideas. 
 
The (Re)conceptualisation of Hegemony 
     This section examines the concept of hegemony in relation to Pax Americana that 
has been crafted after the Second World War from the neo-Gramscian perspectives. 
In fact, there have been ongoing discussions whether Pax Americana should be 
regarded as “hegemony” or “empire”. In the light of this, after differentiating the 
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notion of hegemony from that of empire, the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony is 
explored by underscoring its key concepts. Thereafter, this theoretical framework is 
closely scrutinised as a research method and adopted to alliance theory and the case 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As is clarified in Chapter One, neo-Gramscianism has not 
yet been applied to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As the aim of this research 
project is to present not only the US but also the Japanese perspectives, such notions 
as gaiatsu (external pressures) are considered in the neo-Gramscian framework. 
 
Hegemony25 or Empire? 
     It has been discussed whether US power or Pax Americana should be considered 
hegemonic or imperialist. Particularly, the idea of US empire may prominently be 
reflected by US actions during the George W. Bush Jr. administration which was 
seen as exhibiting imperialist behaviours by the international community
26
 while a 
large amount of literature has discussed whether the US is in “decline” (Strange 
1998) or “revivalist”.27 Alternatively, some scholars argue that the US should be 
viewed as a hegemon rather than an empire. Beeson (2004) explains that US power 
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 While there are various types of hegemony such as “benevolent hegemony”, “coalitional 
hegemony” (Clark 2011), “cooperative hegemony” (Pedersen 2002), “infrastructural hegemony” 
(Cerny 2006), “network hegemony” (Tsuchiya 2011) and “integrative concept of hegemony” 
(Prys & Robel 2011), this research primarily focuses on the neo-Gramscian insights of hegemony 
since its key elements are important for analysing the U.S.-Japan alliance and US hegemony in 
the Asia-Pacific region. This is clarified in the later sections of this chapter. 
26
 For instance, the Iraq War in 2003 is one example where the US can be viewed as imperialistic 
with its initiatives towards the invasion of Iraq in the face of the opposition from other countries 
including France and Germany. It is worth identifying two types of US foreign policymaking: 
“internationalism” and “isolationism”. The former one is closely related to multilateralism under 
the Clinton administration and Nye’s “multilateralist-civil power model”, while the latter one is 
associated with neo-conservatism under the Bush administration especially in the post-9.11 era. 
The difference is the means rather than ends (Cox 2001, p. 44; Anderson 2003). 
27
 The “revivalists”, which predicted the renewal of US power in the 1990s, is the concept used 
against declinist theories which predict the US decline. Cox (2001) analyses the features of “new 
American hegemony” and contends that US hegemony seems secure in the post-Cold War era. 
He also poses relevant questions which are “can this hegemony continue, and, if it does, what 
then are the implications for the future” (Cox 2001, p. 333). 
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has been hegemonic rather than imperialistic since it has empowered itself “through 
the more diffuse mechanisms of the international political economy and a system of 
strategic alliances and security relations that vest formal authority and autonomy in 
sovereign states” (Beeson 2004, p. 6). Intricate power dynamism has been aware by 
differentiating powers that can be military, economic or ideational. Agnew (2003) 
also underscores the difference between hegemony and empire, explaining that, with 
regard to the concept of hegemony, “its reliance, to some degree, on persuading or 
rewarding subordinates rather than immediately coercing them” (Agnew 2003, p. 
876). While he also contends that a pure coercive measure is not sufficient, the 
consensual aspects are relevant in forming hegemony (Agnew 2003). Indeed, the 
difference between empire and hegemony may not be clear yet it is observable that 
the concept of empire tends to focus on the element of coercion rather than 
consensus. The explanation about the US as empire does not adequately focus on the 
role of consensus which can possibly be explained with regard to hegemony.
28
  
     By the same token, rather than the notion of empire, that of hegemony is useful in 
understanding states relations and their binding relationships. Haugaard (2006) 
argues that “hegemony as an alliance and as integral hegemony is a consensual view 
of hegemony” (Haugaard 2006, p.10) where conflict and consensus are combined. 
He also notes that “The Classical and Gramscian views of hegemony suggest that 
power should not be perceived as purely coercive” (Haugaard 2006, p. 9).29 Prys and 
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 Interestingly, Lentner (2005) develops the notion of “consensual empire”, arguing that US 
power can be characterised as “consensual empire”. According to him, “Both the Roman empire 
and the cold war system of alliances headed by the United States have been characterized…as 
consensual empires” (Lentner 2005, pp. 737-738). 
29
 He categorises into four types of “hegemony”: 1) classical imperial/negative, 2) classical 
hegemonic/positive, 3) Gramscian hegemonic/negative and 4) Gramscian hegemony/positive 
(Haugaard 2006, pp. 8-9). Especially for the third type, consensus does not represent true interest 
and/or it constitutes an affirmation of discourse which is essentially alien to their social practices 
(Haugaard 2006, p. 8). 
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Robel (2011) emphasise the usefulness of treating US power as hegemonic in order 
to investigate its role in the international system. According to them, “the concept of 
hegemony…is suggested as the more useful and analytically valuable alternative for 
the description of the US’ role in the international system” (Prys & Robel 2011, pp. 
248-249). In their accounts, “Its appropriateness for application in both academic 
and policy discourses depends…on a clear understanding of what we mean by 
hegemony and its constitutive elements” (Prys & Robel 2011, pp. 248-249). They 
also focus on the significance of understanding hegemony and its elements. Beeson 
(2009) also clarifies that the nature of hegemonic competition and transition is more 
uncertain and complex than other influential theoretical understandings of hegemony. 
While “hegemony” is seen as an appropriate concept to be examined to comprehend 
the contemporary era, he argues that the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony is 
applicable for such discussions as whether the US is in decline or not, and whether 
China is on the rise or not (Beeson 2009). Compared with hegemonic stability theory 
that has already been examined in Chapter One, the neo-Gramscian account of 
hegemony is able to comprehend the power dynamism and intricate nature of 
hegemony.  
 
The Neo-Gramscian Concept of Hegemony 
     While it is briefly introduced in Chapter One, the neo-Gramscian view of 
hegemony is exemplified in this section. Neo-Gramscianism has been formulated by 
Robert W. Cox, Stephen R. Gill and Mark Rupert on the foundation of the ideas of 
an Italian Marxist linguist, Antonio Gramsci and his written books including Prison 
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Notebooks
30
 have been the groundwork for both Gramscianism
31
 and neo-
Gramscianism.
32
 Femia (1975) explains that “For Gramsci, ideas had consequences 
which could not be dismissed or reduced to a more ‘real’ world of social and 
economic phenomena. Herein lies the fundamental assumption behind his elusive 
and remarkably underanalysed concept of hegemony (egemonia), the unifying idea 
of his mature writings (Femia 1975, p. 29). It is also remarked by Burnham (1991) 
that, within the neo-Gramscian framework, the focus is shifted to the question of 
how a ruling class fraction can articulate an ideology to win the hearts and minds of 
other capital fractions, the working class and key state personel (Burnham 1991, p. 
50). It is evident that neo-Gramscianism has been used for understanding the 
dynamism of the power relationship among actors not only in material but also 
economic and ideational terms.  
     In neo-Gramscian terms, hegemony is understood not only as rule in the interest 
of the ruled, but also as a system of alliances, of groups or of states. According to 
Fontana (2000), “the construction of a structured network of alliances founded upon 
the consent of the constituent members presupposes a universality, or at least a 
potential mutuality, of interests and values” (Fontana 2000, p. 320). It is more than a 
simple political alliance between social forces represented by classes or fractions of 
classes. It is indicated that the combination of a variety of different class interests 
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 In fact, these books are “a work not carried to completion in any of its segments” (Thomas 
2009, p. 116). Yet, it is argued that the book is “the reconstruction of the ‘internal history’ of 
Gramsci’s ‘discourse’” (Thomas 2009, p. 116). As Thomas (2009) argues, the fragmentary nature 
of the notebooks enables its principle to embody “living philology” using Gramsci’s word 
(Thomas 2009, p. 126). 
31
 It is understood that Mouffe created the shift to Gramscianism in response to the 
Althusserianism in the 1970s (Thomas 2009, p. 11). Also, Laclau and Mouffe’ establish a post-
Marxist image of Gramsci centring on a discursive aspect of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; 
Thomas 2009). 
32
 Neo-Gramscianism is different from Gramscianism due to its consideration of the transnational 
sphere. Acknowledging the underdevelopment of neo-Gramscianism as a theoretical framework, 
this thesis attempts to enrich this theory by comprehending Gramsci’s core ideas of hegemony. 
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that are propagated throughout society “bringing about not only a unison of 
economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity…on a ‘universal’ 
plane” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 181-2; Morton 2003, p. 157).  
     Indeed, neo-Gramscianism and neoliberal institutionalism share the similar 
insights toward the role of institutions in the realm of materials and ideas although 
the latter theory heavily focuses on the perspectives of hegemonic rather than non-
hegemonic states. Gill (1998) acknowledges that, like liberals, neo-Gramscianism 
recognises that institutions have in ‘locking-in’ particular ideas and practices as part 
of a constitutionalised world order. Beeson (2009) also argues that “Neo-Gramscian 
scholars have usefully drawn attention to the intersection of material power and ideas, 
and their crystallisation in formal and informal institutions” (Beeson 2009, p. 99). 
Not only comprehending institutions but also other element including ideas, neo-
Gramscianism is competent in exhibiting the interactions of material, institutional 
and ideational components of power. 
 
Historic Bloc  
     Hegemony is exercised within a wider social constellation of forces, or “historic 
bloc” which refers to a historical congruence between material forces, institutions 
and ideologies (Cox 1981). Historic bloc is an embodiment of the organic linkage 
between political and civil society, a fusion of material, institutional, inter-subjective, 
theoretical and ideological capacities (Gramsci 1971; Gill & Law 1993). It is 
regarded as an congregation of various actors and factors which establish hegemony 
this can be similar to the image of the Leviathan from the Hobbes viewpoint 
(Litowitz 2000) except for the fact that historic bloc is not rigidly structured in the 
way Hobbes regarded the state and society relationship. Unlike a deterministic 
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causality of structure and superstructure of Marx and Lenin,
33
 Gramsci introduced 
the historic bloc to designate a situation where elements of the base and 
superstructure are united in a single way of life and where the elements reflect and 
build off each other (Litowitz 2000, p. 528). It is a more complicated entity grounded 
on the power relationship which is developed into a firmer one through the 
interaction among state and society and material and ideational factors. In Saull’s 
(2012) account, “Historical bloc...is a relational concept where hegemony is most 
clearly evident and realized during those moments of complimentarity. Simply put, 
when the socioeconomic, political, ideational, and institutional arrangements of the 
historical bloc are synchronized with and embedded within the logic of (uneven) 
capitalist accumulation at that particular historical moment” (Saull 2012, p. 330).  
     Clearly, historic bloc has been one of the important concepts in neo-
Gramscianism. This notion has not discriminated any certain actors in order to 
examine the power dynamism, which is also one of the strengths to be used in the IR 
field. The postwar historic bloc that developed under US leadership after 1945 
considers the incorporation of allied states and societies, centred on Western Europe, 
including the working classes into an anti-communist bloc organised around a 
Fordist or mass-production mode of capital accumulation (Rupert 1995; 2000). 
While US strategic power was an important factor in securing US hegemony through 
security guarantees it has provided to Western European and other states, it was the 
ideological glue of anti-communism and the co-opting and support of dominant 
social forces alongside the realisation of some not insignificant socioeconomic gains 
for the majority of people within these states that realised US hegemony.  
                                                          
33
 This is also pointed out by Worth (2011), arguing that hegemony should be seen as “a concept 
that is more-open and less rigid in its understanding of the relationship between capital and 
production and the highly complex issues of culture, identity and class that are played out at 
different levels within international society” (Worth 2011, p. 381). 
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     Furthermore, the driving force in determining the shape and direction of the 
international capitalist economy derived from the production methods sponsored by 
the US capitalist class and the externalisation of these techniques into the domestic 
societies of other capitalist states especially in the postwar era (Rupert 1995; Panitch 
and Gindin 2003). Zahran and Ramos (2010) explains that the global historic bloc 
emerged in the 1970s when a series of economic crisis accumulated with the end of 
the Bretton Woods system which can also be seen as a reformulation of the global 
capitalist order. They also indicated that “The universalization of liberal ideas and 
values, deeply embedded in the US society, is in fact one of the characteristics of the 
globalist historic bloc’s hegemony” (Zahran & Ramos 2010, p. 28).  
 
Neo-Gramscian Theory of Alliance 
     In consideration of these key characteristics, the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance 
is developed with the purpose of adopting if for the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
In line with the neo-Gramscian notion of alliance and hegemony, the aim of doing so 
is to further elaborate the theory of alliance, which concerns not only military but 
also economic and ideational aspects of alliances. This theoretical framework 
enables alliance theory to crystallise all facets of alliances, which other existing 
theories are not able to demonstrate. Within this theoretical framework, it is based 
upon the assumption that alliance is part of hegemony have been recognised by some 
scholars (Walt 1987; Morrow 1991). The neo-Gramscian theory of alliance focuses 
on the roles of social forces and common sense which are used as the research 
method. In particular, the elements of material capabilities, institutions and ideas are 
considered in social forces analysis whereas the role of organic intellectuals is taken 
into account in investigating “common sense”. 
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a) Dual Sides of Hegemony: Coercion and Consensus 
     The two facets of hegemony: coercion and consensus is an important element of 
the neo-Gramscian idea of hegemony.
34
 Coercion consists of domination, command, 
or physical force whereas consensus entails intellectual leadership that can be 
internalised through schools, churches, institutions, scholarly exchanges, and popular 
culture.
35
 Especially for the latter concept, it “involves subduing and co-opting 
dissenting voices through subtle dissemination of the dominant group’s perspective 
as universal and natural, to the point where the dominant beliefs and practices 
become an intractable component of common sense which are more insidious and 
complicated processes” (Litowitz 2000, p. 519). It is also significant to note that 
coercion is not necessarily physical. Litowitz (2000) explains that coercion is not 
merely physical but also symbolic through art, media, and communication (Litowitz 
2000, p. 523). The mechanisms of universalisation, naturalisation, and rationalisation 
can be regarded as a means to establish a ruling viewpoint.
36
  
     As is indicated earlier, the notions of coercion and consensus are based on 
Machiavelli’s perception of power as a centaur that is regarded as the combination of 
consent and coercion (Gramsci 1971; Cox 1993). It is also explicated that “A socio-
cultural order – what Gramsci calls the ‘integral State’ – is characterised by a 
hegemonic equilibrium based on a combination of force and consent, which are 
                                                          
34
 While there are studies about “coercion and consensus” theories in sociological discipline, this 
paper would develop in a different way from these theories although it is worth taking into 
account of some aspects of the viewpoints on coercion and consensus at societal level. 
35
 In the realm of popular culture, Gramsci’s idea of hegemony has influenced cultural studies, 
which involves the analysis of popular codes and symbol-systems such as advertising, clothes, 
and movies. 
36
 This aspect is similar to Althusser’s (1971) concept of the “ideological state apparatuses” 
which is distinguishable from “repressive state apparatus” which also has common with 
Gramsci’s ideas of force and hegemony as the two poles of domination. Indeed, it is also noted 
that, while Althusser criticises Gramsci’s analysis, he also saluted Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. 
Further investigations of Althusser’s critiques on Gramsci are elaborated in Thomas’ (2009) book 
(Chapter One). 
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balanced in varying proportions, without force prevailing too greatly over consent 
(Gramsci 1971; Fontana 1993, p. 141). According to Cunningham (2004), “One of 
the key aspects of the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony is the idea that leading 
groups engender consent by a combination of some level of incorporation of 
subordinate interests and the promotion of particular or sectional interests as 
universal or general” (Cunningham 2004, p. 559).  The language of consensus is a 
language of common interest which is expressed in universalistic terms, although the 
structure of power underlying it is skewed in favour of the dominant groups (Cox 
1977, p. 387; Beyer 2009, p. 34). In this regard, both coercive and consensual 
aspects of hegemony in the neo-Gramscian terms can be illustrated in the U.S.-Japan 
alliance relationship in the postwar era which is explored in Chapter Three.  
     The consensual aspect of hegemony has been recognised within the neo-
Gramscian framework. Maier (1977) indicates that “Perhaps the best term for the 
postwar Western economy would be that of consensual American hegemony. 
‘Consensual’ can be used because European leaders accepted Washington’s 
leadership in view of their needs for economic and security assistance” (Maier 1977, 
p. 25). With regard to US postwar hegemony, Beeson and Higgott (2005) point out 
that “Despite the arguments of critics who claim the PWIO [post-war international 
order] that the USA created was designed primarily to further the interests of US 
capital, it was widely accepted as functionally necessary and ideologically legitimate” 
(Beeson & Higgott 2005, p. 1175). Moreover, Fontana (1993) explicates that 
“Hegemony is…conceived as the vehicle whereby the dominant social groups 
establish a system of ‘permanent consent’ that legitimates a prevailing social order 
by encompassing a complex network of mutually reinforcing and interwoven ideas 
affirmed and articulated by intellectuals” (Fontana 1993, p. 141). This illustrates an 
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imperative role of consensus in formulating hegemony, or historic bloc, from the 
neo-Gramscian standpoint. 
     We can see the role of consensus is significant in creating hegemony within the 
influx of material and ideational components of power. As Fiori (1970) notes,  
Gramsci’s originality as a Marxist lay…in his argument that the system’s real strength does 
not lie in the violence of the ruling class or the coercive power of its state apparatus, but in 
the acceptance by the ruled of a conception of the world which belongs to the rulers. The 
philosophy of the ruling class passes through a whole tissue of complex vulgarizations to 
emerge as common sense: that is, the philosophy of the masses, who accept the morality, the 
customs, the institutionalized rules of behaviour of the society they live in” (Fiori 1970, p. 
238; Litowitz 2000, p. 527).  
Haugaard (2006) also elaborates that “If we consider hegemony as only conflictual 
and coercive we are claiming that the key resources are solely material. However, if 
we take a Gramscian view, we are arguing for social resources as a basis for power 
and, in combination, these two types of resources set up a dynamic which is inverse 
and affects autonomy” (Haugaard 2006, pp. 10-11). Taylor (1994) discusses the 
relationship between “emulation” and “consensus”, saying that “The hegemonic state 
is successful to the degree that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the 
consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project. Given the territorial form of 
this hegemony, emulation has two dimensions: inter-state economic relations and 
intra-state political relations” (Taylor 1994, p. 364). 
     In this vein, the aspect of “a strategy of co-optation” can be considered in the 
context of hegemony. According to Gill (1998), “as neo-liberalism has both coercive 
and consensual dimensions, it can also be identified with the necessity, in a more 
formally democratic world order in which the pressure for recognition and 
representation is significant, with a strategy of cooptation of opposition—particularly 
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in nations where an external model of change is imposed by the state before the 
bourgeois classes have formed a hegemonic ruling bloc” (Gill 1998, p. 27). Bieler 
and  Morton (2004) also notes that neo-Gramscian hegemony appears as an, 
“expression of broadly based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas and 
supported by material resources and institutions, which is initially established by 
social forces occupying a leading role within a state, but then projected outwards on 
a world scale” (Bieler & Morton 2004, p. 87).  
     Indeed, “an integrative concept of hegemony”, which was developed by Prys and 
Robel (2011), possesses the similar insights towards hegemony in regard to the two 
dimensions of hegemony: coercion and consensus. They argue that hegemony is the 
concept consisting of the two conceptual negative poles of domination, or even 
empire, on the one hand and a lack of control on the other hand. In their account, 
“Hegemony is therefore seen as a point in a continuum between these two extremes. 
Hegemony is thus a difficult role to assume for a state, as it requires the constant 
maintenance of a balance between benevolence and force” (Prys & Robel 2011, 
p.258). This is similar to the way Gramsci’s view on coercive and consensual aspects 
of hegemony, which also exhibits the relevance of using coercive and consensual 
dimensions of hegemony through the neo-Gramscian lenses. This theoretical 
viewpoint of hegemony is developed by highlighting the interplay of coercion and 
consensus. 
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b) Common Sense37 
     “Common sense” is produced in the limited intellectual community in the neo-
Gramscian terms. According to Gramsci (1971), “every philosophy has a tendency to 
become the common sense of a fairly limited environment (that of all the 
intellectuals)” (Gramsci 1971, p. 330). It is also remarked that common sense is 
produced through everyday living. Dodge (2009) explicates that “Common Sense is 
the structure of everyday thinking through which the majority of any population live 
the greater part of their lives. It is within Common Sense that the hegemonic 
ideology exists in symbiotic dominance with its vanquished predecessor, securing its 
own influence by assimilating the more salient parts of the other (Dodge 2009, p. 
258). Nonetheless, it is also crucial to point out that “Common sense is antithetical to 
‘critical elaboration’ since only critique enables coherency and, ultimately, unity” 
(Gramsci 1971, p. 324; Howson & Smith 2008, p. 4). Arguably, the concept of 
common sense is distinguished from “good sense” which is based on critical 
investigation.
38
  
     In the light of common sense, it is important to underscore the difference between 
“rhetorical strategies” and “rhetorically marginalised”. Rupert (1997) scrutinises “the 
hegemony of liberal individualism” by looking into the role of a broad middle class 
industrial workers in the postwar era in the way of being “brought into an historic 
bloc which promoted the transnational hegemony of liberal capitalism while seeking 
                                                          
37
 It is also indicated that “there is hardly any the idea of the philosophy of consciousness that 
has so thoroughly entered into senso commune as a ‘matter of fact’ than the idea of an ‘inner’ to 
which corresponds an ‘outer’” (Thomas 2009, p. 303) 
38
 According to Howson and Smith (2008), “subalternity as an identity and practice has 
inherently the potential to critical elaboration and, therefore, the progression from common sense 
to good sense, from disunity to unity, and from hegemony marked in the final analysis by dogma 
and coercion to hegemony marked in the final analysis by openness and consensus” (Howson & 
Smith 2008, pp. 4-5). Presumably, this can be applicable to the different discourses between the 
mainland Japan and Okinawa. 
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to contain the putative menace of expansionist communism” (Rupert 1997, p. 105). 
His study on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) illustrates how 
NAFTA pro and con sides differ by categorising them “rhetorical strategies” and 
“rhetorically marginalised” (Rupert 1995; 2000). According to him, “In the months 
and days before the final Congressional votes, academic, corporate, political and 
media supporters of the treaty used a number of rhetorical strategies to bolster their 
own position and to marginalize the treaty [NAFTA]’s opponents” (Rupert 1995, 
p.682; Rupert 2000, p. 58). He also notes that “common sense was understood to be 
a syncretic historical residue, fragmentary and contradictory, open to multiple 
interpretations and potentially supportive of very different kinds of social visions and 
political projects” (Rupert 2000, p. 11). 
      Furthermore, Dodge (2009) examines “liberal common sense”, which has 
increasingly been influential from the 1980s onwards in the realm of US foreign 
policymaking. He argues that the “Bush doctrine”, which marked the prominent role 
of liberal values, was not a watershed in international relations but rather there were 
already influential dynamics within the post-Cold War system. According to him, 
“The Bush doctrine’s aim was to recognize, institutionalize and expand the political 
effects of attacks on economic sovereignty that had taken place under the 
Washington Consensus of the 1980s and demands for Liberal good governance in 
the 1990s” (Dodge 2009, p. 255). He also exemplifies that “organic ideology” is “a 
synthesis of differing interests and concepts within society, cemented together or 
given coherence by the dominant class and their ideological aims and objectives. So 
the consciousness of individuals within society is not given but constructed by the 
dominant ideological system the individual exists within” (Dodge 2009, p. 257). In 
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this sense, it is important to closely investigate the discourses in relation to liberal 
values, which is explored in Chapter Six in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
 
c) Organic Intellectuals39 
     In the light of the consensual aspect of hegemony, the role of intellectuals cannot 
be dismissed. Morton (2003) explains that “the function of intellectual activity across 
state/civil society relations and the role of consent as a necessary form of hegemony 
should not be overlooked” (Morton 2003, p. 168). Hegemony is regarded as 
consensus gained through “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gill 1990, p. 42). In 
the neo-Gramscian account, intellectual and moral leadership (direzione), whose 
principal constituting elements, are consent and persuasion (Gramsci 1971). Gramsci 
called these actors “organic intellectuals” who are not simply producers of ideology 
but also the “organisers of hegemony” (Gramsci 1971; Gill 1990, p. 52). According 
to Zahran and Ramos (2010), “[O]rganic intellectuals provide cohesion and guidance 
to hegemony” (Zahran & Ramos 2010, p. 28). Fontana (1993) also explains that “A 
social group or class can be said to assume a hegemonic role to the extent that it 
articulates and proliferates throughout society cultural and ideological belief systems 
whose teachings are accepted as universally valid by the general population” 
(Fontana 1993, p. 140). When using the concept of “organic intellectuals” in this 
research project, such actors as policymakers, scholars and policy intellectuals will 
be closely examined.  
                                                          
39
 The concept of “organic intellectuals” can be similar to Kreps’s (2010) notion of elite 
consensus yet, while Kreps (2010) considers the absence of a coherent opposition to the 
government’s basic foreign policy, the existence of organic intellectuals does not indicate the 
absence of counter-hegemonic forces. 
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     Indeed, defining intellectuals is not as precise as it seems. It should be noted here 
that “Gramsci defines ‘intellectual’ in a broad sense to include all those who exercise 
directive or high level technical capacities in society, ‘whether in the field of 
production, in that of culture or in that of politics administration….’ Within this 
group he distinguishes between ‘organic’ and ‘traditional’ intellectuals” (Gramsci 
1971; Femia 1987, pp. 38-39). The capacity of the “organic intellectual” to be 
entrepreneurial in character and politically organise the masses provides them with 
the ability to reproduce and transmit particular conceptions of the world (D’Atomma 
2011). Furthermore, in consideration of “organic intellectuals”, it should be borne in 
mind that policymakers craft new policies in order to improve the existing unsolved 
issues or to bolster current policies. This innovative nature of these intellectuals and 
outcomes of their actions shall not be ignored to measure the pervasiveness of its 
policymaking in regard to democratic states. 
     Conversely, unlike organic intellectuals, “traditional intellectual” is regarded as 
the intellectuals that have pre-existent structural ties to the dominant group. They are 
essentially the social glue, which holds together the ideological worldview of the 
dominant class with the “common sense” of the subordinate class. In this regard, it 
can be argued that particularly policymakers are “traditional intellectuals” if they 
maintain its power yet that is not true since their maintenance of its influence 
depends on the responses of the people in the public. It is also remarked that 
traditional intellectuals “could be ‘immanent’ to the life of the people only by means 
of the institutions of a transcendent state, which claimed to organise society from 
within, but only on condition of being above it” (Thomas 2009, p. 346).40  
                                                          
40
 Thomas (2009) also remarks that the concept of “immanence” is important for Gramsci’ 
thinking.   
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     It is noted that the internationalisation of the state and the role of transnational 
elites, or a nebuleuse, in forging consensus within this process remains to be fully 
deciphered and needs much more study (Cox 1992, pp. 30-1; 2002, p. 33; Bieler & 
Morton 2004, p. 102). This is similar to Nye’s (2011) idea of “contextual 
intelligence”. According to Nye (2011), contextual intelligence ability is becoming a 
crucial skill for leaders to conceal power resources into successful strategies by 
comprehending evolving environments. He also argues that, with regard to US 
foreign policymaking, contextual intelligence is needed and also has to recognise the 
relevance of other’s supports which are required to achieve its aims (Nye 2011). This 
is the similar logic to Gramsci’s understanding of the formation of hegemony which 
needs not only the coercive but consensual facets of power. It is worth examining the 
role of intellectuals particularly in the realm of ideas when analysing the changing 
nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance. According to Bieler (2001), “Only those ideas, 
which are disseminated through or rooted in such structures, linked to a particular 
constellation of social forces engaged in an ideological struggle for hegemony are 
considered to be ‘organic ideas’” (Bieler 2001, p. 98). In Gramsci’s own words, only 
those ideas can be regarded as “organic” that “organise human masses, and create the 
terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. 
These are contrasted with ideas that are merely ‘arbitrary, rationalistic, or “willed”, 
based on extemporary polemics” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 376-7; Bieler & Morton 2004, 
p. 101).  
     Zahran and Ramos (2010) argues that Joseph S. Nye can be regarded as an 
example of organic intellectuals through neo-Gramscian lenses, playing his role in 
creating of ideas and mental images that give support and conscience to the US 
historic bloc. In their account, “For Gramscian organic intellectuals provide cohesion 
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and guidance to hegemony…we would all agree that Nye is an exemplar intellectual 
and that his work was passionately devoted to provide good, genuine and cautious 
advice to US foreign policy” (Zahran & Ramos 2010, p. 28). Zahran and Ramos’ 
(2010) work closely examines Nye’s contribution to US foreign policymaking by 
promoting soft power. They also remark that “As long as one believes in the 
righteousness of his principles and values, being an organic intellectual turns out to 
be quite a noble job” (Zahran & Ramos 2010, p. 28). In this regard, it is crucial to 
take into account the role of organic intellectuals in order to understand the 
formation of historic bloc in neo-Gramscian terms. 
 
Research Method 
     While the neo-Gramscian key concepts are presented in the earlier section, this 
section elaborates neo-Gramscianism as a research method that can be applied to the 
U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War period. Prior to explaining how the 
methods are used in the case of the alliance, the research method itself is exemplified 
by underscoring the elements of neo-Gramscianism. Within this theoretical 
framework, the two main methods, social forces analysis and discourse analysis, are 
deployed to the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. Whilst Robert W. Cox’s “social 
forces analysis” is used to explore the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance in both 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five in regard to discourse analysis, the neo-Gramscian 
concept, “common sense”, is adopted in the U.S.-Japan alliance context which will 
be fully explored in Chapter Six. 
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a) Social Forces Analysis: Exploring the Interaction between Coercion and 
Consensus 
     By comprehending consensus and coercion dimensions of hegemony, social 
forces analysis, which is developed by Robert W. Cox,
41
 is used that considers 
material, institutional and ideological aspects of power. Bieler and Morton (2004) 
explicate that “it is specifically critical in the sense of asking how existing social or 
world orders have come into being, how norms, institutions or practices therefore 
emerge, and what forces may have the emancipatory potential to change or transform 
the prevailing order” (Bieler & Morton 2004, p. 87). However, when using this 
analysis, it may be important to understand that material and ideational factors are 
not necessarily separate. Beyer (2009) indicates that “The opposition between the 
‘material’ and the ‘ideational’, however, is a false one: human affairs are structured 
by both; each is ‘real’, ‘true’ and ‘important’. One can regard the material and the 
ideational as quite distinct; they are, however, closely interrelated and partly 
interdependent” (Beyer 2009, p. 30). In this regard, in the case of the transforming 
nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, we should focus not only on either the material or 
ideational facet but interrelated relationships among material, institutional and 
ideational factors. 
      Social forces analysis is an important method in investigating the formulation of 
hegemonic liberal discourse of the alliance in Japanese foreign policymaking. As 
Cox (1977) states, he used Gramsci’s ideas to describe the leading role of the US in 
both material and ideational dimensions, saying that “Antonio Gramsci used the 
concept of hegemony to express a unity between objective material forces and 
ethico-political ideas – in Marxian terms, a unity of structure and superstructure – in 
                                                          
41
 It is worth remarking that Cox was influenced by Vico’s ideas (Lima, Nunes & Brincat 2012). 
Also, he does not locate himself within any particular school (Germain & Kenny 1998, p. 4).  
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which power based on dominance over production is rationalized through an 
ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate 
groups” (Cox 1977, p. 387; Beyer 2009, p. 34). Moreover, Beyer (2009) understands 
the complexity of power in both material and ideational sense may be likely to 
strengthen hegemony. Since both material and ideological dimension of powers are 
considered, it is worth apprehending multiple dimensions of power.  
 
b) Discourse Analysis: Common Sense and Organic Intellectuals 
     Discourse analysis is another research method to be used in analysing the U.S.-
Japan alliance with a particular focus on common sense in neo-Gramscian terms. In 
Ives’s (2005) account, it is acknowledged that language lies at the centre of 
Gramsci’s understanding of the relationship between coercion and consensus. From 
this theoretical standpoint, discourse analysis focuses on the constitution and 
transformation of social meanings and identity which is able to capture the complex 
features of all social relations and practices (Howarth 2010). With regard to the 
notion of hegemony, Ives (2005) explicates that “language is central to Gramsci’s 
historical materialism and that he does not oppose it to materiality. It argues that 
Gramsci adopted the very term hegemony substantially from his university studies in 
linguistics” (Ives 2005, p. 455). He also exemplifies that Gramsci pays a great 
attention to language as a political issue such as government policy around language, 
educational language curricula and everyday language practices (Gramsci 1971; Ives 
2004). He clarifies that “Gramsci combines with the rich metaphorical power of 
linguistic concepts as tools to help analyse political circumstances, specifically the 
90 
 
role of culture in shaping people’s beliefs, behaviours and even their voting patterns” 
(Ives 2004, p. 5).
42
  
     In the light of the relationship between discourse analysis and neo-Gramscianism, 
discourse analysis is an appropriate research tool when investigating the 
transforming meanings and functions of alliances taking into account changing 
discourses within the neo-Gramscian framework. According to Ives (2005), “One of 
many reasons why Gramsci’s writings are still very relevant for us now is that they 
help us rethink the often presumed opposition between language and the economy, 
or ‘matter’ more generally” (Ives 2005, p. 458). Howarth (2010) also explicates that 
“Institutions like states, markets or governance networks can be conceptualized as 
more or less sedimented systems of discourse, that is, partially fixed systems of rules, 
norms, resources, practices and subjectivities that are linked together in particular 
ways” (Howarth 2010, p. 312). Fontana (1993) also remarks that “Gramsci’s 
political theory…is a discourse on the genesis and formation of the historical subject. 
It is precisely this view of ‘political agents’ who posit themselves and create 
themselves in and through historical action that led Gramsci to reject contemporary 
interpretations of Marxism, which he criticized as mechanistic and deterministic” 
(Fontana 1993, p. 1).  
     Underscoring the linkage between language and hegemony, discourse analysis in 
neo-Gramscian terms is used by closely examining the discourse of governmental 
documents, policy papers and the media that are created in the hand of organic 
intellectuals, who have contributed to the formulation of a historic bloc. Specifically, 
while the role of these actors is explored in Chapter Three, their roles are taken into 
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 Ives (2004) also notes that institutional resources including the existence of grammar books 
and dictionaries, government-sponsored training of teachers and many other policies that affect 
language use are clearly influential. 
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account in the construction of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as “common sense” 
which is rigorously explored in Chapter Six with a closer examination of the 
discursive transformation of the alliance. In the following sections, the neo-
Gramscian concepts and research method are adopted to the case of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. 
 
The U.S.-Japan Alliance through the Neo-Gramscian Lenses 
    On the foundation of neo-Gramscianism, Cox’s social forces analysis and 
discourse analysis are adopted in investigating the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold 
War. Whilst the research focuses on the post-Cold War era, it also considers the 
historical developments of the U.S.-Japan alliance and its transforming features in 
the postwar period that are closely examined in Chapter Three. The subsequent 
sections illustrate coercion and consensus dimensions of hegemony in the context of 
Japanese foreign policymaking and the U.S-Japan alliance. Specifically, it is crucial 
to recognise the Japanese perspective in order to demonstrate the consensual aspect 
of US hegemony in the Asia Pacific region. Additionally, as is elaborated in the next 
section, the distinction between coercion and consensus may not be clear-cut but 
rather overlapping. In consideration of the Japanese political climate, the following 
sections exhibit how the research method that is illustrated earlier is used from 
Chapter Three to Chapter Six. 
 
Gaiatsu (External Pressures) and its Internalisation 
     As is explicated in the previous section, separating coercion from consensus can 
be challenging. Nonetheless, in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship, US 
pressure is regarded as the coercive aspect of hegemony while Japan’s consent to US 
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offers is seen as the consensual aspect of hegemony. In terms of the Japanese context, 
gaiatsu is considered which has been acknowledged by Calder (1988) and also 
elaborated by Schoppa (1997) in the case of US-Japan trade negotiations during the 
George W. Bush, Jr. and the William Clinton administrations. These scholars base 
their arguments on Putnam’s (1988) “two-level game” analysis which examines the 
dynamics of bargaining between governments. Putnam (1988) explains that “the two 
level conceptual framework could in principle be married to such diverse 
perspectives as Marxism, interest group pluralism, bureaucratic politics, and neo-
corporatism” (Putnam 1988, p. 442). Schoppa (1997) argues that “gaiatsu indeed has 
the power to influence Japanese policy outcomes and that its influence is greatest 
when the Japanese domestic political arena offers opportunities for employing 
synergistic strategies
43
 that take advantage of divisions of opinion and interest on the 
Japanese side” (Schoppa 1997, pp. 6-7). 
     Gaiatsu can be regarded as part of coercion in neo-Gramscian terms which is 
understood as the beneficial influence of outside pressure that goes beyond the 
central government in order to push through reforms that would have been 
impossible under its consensus system. Pyle (1992) defines gaiatsu as “another 
dimension of Japan’s reactive stance in international affairs. One of the greatest 
handicaps to the new internationalism is that Japan has usually not been able to 
respond institutionally, even in its own best interest, without the intervention of 
forces outside its system. Gaiatsu has become a dynamic of the change, reform, and 
liberalisation that is essential to the agenda of the new internationalism” (Pyle 1992, 
p. 111). Inoguchi (1987) exemplifies the necessity for foreign pressure, specifically 
US pressure, to “transcend the framework of Diet operations, strike down the vested 
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 This consists of synergistic linkage, reverberation, participation expansion and alternative 
specification (Schoppa 1997). 
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interests syndicate, and remodel Japan into a country committed to a fair society and 
eager to contribute to the international community” (Inoguchi 1987, p. 58).44 
     However, an excessive focus on gaiatsu, or the coercive aspect of hegemony, 
may fail to notice the Japanese intentions in its foreign policymaking. Some argue 
that the forms of coercion were reluctantly used during the George W. Bush, Jr. 
administration. The early statements made by the economic policy expert under this 
administration, Larry Lindsey, who criticised the Clinton administration’s usage of 
gaiatsu, suggested that gaiatsu now plays a minimal role in policy discussions 
between the US and Japan (Lindsey 2000). Moreover, although such expressions as 
“show the flag” and “boots on the ground” by Richard L. Armitage, who was also 
called “Mr. Gaiatsu”, raised so many controversies in the Japanese media as a form 
of gaiatsu, it is argued that the etymology of “show the flag” deviates from any 
traditional idea of gaiatsu (Kliman 2006).  
     Arase (2007) further notes that “In contrast to earlier periods…in the new 
circumstances it is conceivable that Japan’s security role may expand even without 
U.S. pressure” (Arase 2007, p. 561). While the role of gaiatsu shall not be wholly 
ignored which may be still be in effect in policymaking between the US and Japan, it 
is worthwhile to explore a consensual aspect of hegemony which strengthens 
hegemony from the neo-Gramscian viewpoint. Additionally, rather it is also argued 
that gaiatsu can be possibly internalised by the Japanese side. Kliman (2006) notes 
that during the Koizumi administrations, gaiatsu was internalised in order to 
legislate some laws which were unlikely to be enacted without US pressures. As is 
                                                          
44
 In addition, policy recommendations such as the “Higuchi Report”, which was relatively 
formulated without the government intervention, had an influence on the US sides (Fukuda 
2006). Later on, Patrick Cronin and Michael Green who were involved in the U.S.-Japan alliance 
management, criticised the report and claimed a need to redefine the U.S.-Japan alliance. Green 
argued that the criticism in the Higuchi Report was due to the use of gaiatsu (Akiyama 2002). 
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noted earlier, it can be a blurry distinction between coercion and consensus although 
this can be seen also as part of consensus. Hence, the two dimensions of hegemony 
can be overlapped as follows. 
 
Diagram 1: Neo-Gramscian Dimensions of Hegemony 
 
                                          Source: Gramsci (1971); Author 
 
     The internalisation of gaiatsu can fit into the intersecting part of the diagram.
45
 A 
diminishing usage of gaiatsu may signify that the consensual role of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance has become more important to establish US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific 
region.
46
 The consensual aspect of hegemony may have become more prevalent in 
the discussions of the alliance. For example, due to the Iraq War in 2003 and the 
“war of terrorism”, the two Japanese Diet bills, “Special Anti-Terrorism Measures 
Law” and “Amendment to the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) Law” were enacted on 
29th Oct 2001 under the Junichiro Koizumi premiership. The Anti-Terrorism Special 
                                                          
45
 It is also noted that “gaiatsu” can be a tool for some bureaus depending on the context. One 
example is the U.S.-Japan trade deal for rice in the 1980s (Interview with Akitoshi Miyashita, 
14
th
 December 2012). 
46
 It is remarked that the US decreasingly uses gaiatsu unlike during the Gulf War in 1991 
(Interview with Shotaro Yachi, 22
nd
 April 2013). 
Coercion Consensus 
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Measures Law strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance with its SDF’s expanded 
operational capabilities, which enables SDF to become an integral part of US 
strategic planning (Southgate 2003). Furthermore, such legislations as Armed Attack 
Contingency Law in 2004 are based on Japan’s willingness to widen the scope of 
SDF activities in support of US troops. Kliman (2006) also elaborates the 
internalisation of gaiatsu in the case of Japan’s support for the minesweeping in the 
Indian Ocean due to its lesson of failing to respond to US pressure which can be seen 
as a form of consensus. 
     Consensus formulation is seen as pervasive in Japanese politics. Yeo (2011) notes 
that “The use of consensus as an analytical concept is most appropriate in Japan 
because security politics are often dictated by the dominant consensus held by 
powerful political elites” (Yeo 2011, p. 70). In his account, the postwar consensus 
takes into account Japan’s comprehensive approach to security, encompassing 
economic and political dimensions of security and reflects Japan’s staunch support 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance in its national defence strategy. This is applicable to the 
so-called “Yoshida Doctrine” which has existed since the postwar era that has been 
supported by Japanese elites and is further exemplified in Chapter Three. Yeo (2011) 
also argues that “an elite consensus is shaped not only by material-based threat 
perceptions but by existing ideology, norms and institutions (Yeo 2011, p. 9). In this 
regard, the neo-Gramscian framework is able to comprehend the way elites 
formulate the consensus through a combination of material, institutional and 
ideational factors. 
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Social Forces Analysis in the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     Comprehending this power dynamism, with regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance, 
these three elements can interact as the following table displays. 
 
Table 1: Cox’s Social Forces Analysis in the Context of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
Material 
capabilities 
Military capabilities (e.g., military transformation, 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)), trade (e.g. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)), Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) 
Institutions Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of 
Defence (MOD), Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI), Keidanren, US government (e.g., US 
State of Department), US-Japan Business Council 
(USJBC) 
Ideas Universal values, democracy, market economy, rules of 
law, freedom and prosperity, liberalism 
Source: Cox (1987); Author 
 
a) Material Capabilities 
     Since the focus of this research is not only on the coercive but consensual aspects 
of US hegemony with regard to US-Japan relationship, the Japanese perspective will 
be closely examined to underline the consensual facet of hegemony which has been 
hardly comprehended. Also, US foreign policymaking is investigated to examine 
how US strategic planning has influenced Japanese policymaking. Such relevant 
reports as the East Asia Strategy Report (EASR), or the Nye Report, are scrutinised 
to see how the discourse of the US government has changed and also exerted an 
influence on Japanese foreign policymaking. With regard to material capabilities, 
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both the US and Japanese foreign policymaking relating to the alliance are closely 
examined such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and military 
transformation. There have been improvements in joint operations between the US 
and Japan. Additionally, based on the preservation of “global commons”, such issues 
as maritime security, space policies, and cyber security have raised the importance of 
the cooperation between the US and Japan. Not only the military dimension but also 
economic aspects including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are scrutinised as 
the capitalist economy is one of the factors that has been considered in the U.S.-
Japan alliance.  
 
b) Institutions 
     With regard to institutions, it is worth paying attention to the following ministries 
in Japan since they have different interests in the different issues. It is also important 
to note the features of bureaucracy in Japan, which have been studied previously. 
Najita (1974) clarified the characteristics of Japan’s “bureaucratism”47 and Campbell 
(1989) characterises the features of Japanese bureaucracy as “bureaucratic primacy”. 
While the influential role of Japanese bureaucracy was put into question during the 
Hatoyama administration in 2009,
48
 bureaucrats in Japan have influenced Japanese 
foreign policymaking. Hence, it is crucial to look into the roles of these actors in the 
context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
 
 
                                                          
47
 Johnson (1982) examines the influential role of the MITI in economic policy in Japan. 
48
 It is pointed out that the difference between the LDP and DPJ is the role of bureaucrats 
(Interview with Tetsuya Kotani, 8
th
 March 2013). 
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
     The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is one of the oldest ministries in Japan. 
In the postwar era, the MOFA has played a dominant role in shaping Japan’s security 
policy rather than the Japan Defence Agency (JDA), which was upgraded to the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) in 2007. More particularly, the North American Affairs 
Bureau has played an important role in alliance management with the US with its 
two divisions in the Bureau: the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Division and the Status 
of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) Division. Miyashita (1999) exemplifies that 
“Although governmental agencies and private sectors had their own organisational 
interests, Tokyo was largely unified under the leadership of the MOFA. It appears 
that the high costs of foregoing the bilateral relations stemming from the asymmetric 
dependence made Japan reluctant to pursue a defiant policy vis-à-vis the United 
States” (Miyashita 1999; Miyashita 2003, p. 180). Mochizuki’s (1998) analysis 
illustrates how the primacy of the US in the MOFA’s overall policy priorities can 
influence defence and security policies.
49
 For instance, it is observed that “the 
decision to withdraw the original AMF [Asian Monetary Fund] proposal may have 
been due to the MOFA’s objections that it worked too explicitly towards excluding 
the US” (Hook, Gilson, Hughes & Dobson 2002, p. 190). 
     However, after the Cold War, some changes occurred regarding its influence. 
Firstly, as is noted earlier, after the MOD was newly founded, the MOFA has faced a 
challenge to deal with Japanese security issues primarily. Secondly, the Foreign 
Policy Bureau (Sogo Gaiko Seisaku Kyoku) was established in 1993 that changed the 
                                                          
49
 Routine bilateral security consultations, the stationing of US forces in Japan, bilateral 
technology transfers, and development programs are among the areas that ultimately have their 
justification in the security treaty and therefore also justify the MOFA’s lead role in discussion 
(Mochizuki 1998). 
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dynamics within the MOFA. It is noted that “the dominance of bilateralism in the 
MOFA has also been challenged by the increasing influence of Asianist norms and 
the China and ASEAN ‘factions’ of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau” (Hook, 
Gilson, Hughes & Dobson 2002, p. 190). Whenever the MOFA discussed 
reorganisation to enhance its policymaking capability, the enhancement of the 
Foreign Policy Bureau was included and the National Security Policy Division in the 
Foreign Policy Bureau was seen as the lead division in creating Japan’s national 
security policy which took effect in August 2004. For instance, the National Security 
Policy Division played a primary role in the process leading up to Japan’s dispatch 
of JSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) in 2001, and its dispatch of JSDF ground troops to Iraq in 2004 (Oros & 
Tatsumi 2010, p. 30).
50
 This gradual change shows the importance of looking into 
different actors especially in a changing international security environment. 
 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
     The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has a history that has played very little role in 
shaping Japan’s national security policy since July 1954 because of strict civilian 
controls as a means of preempting military officers from garnering undue influence 
over Japanese foreign policymaking. It was confined to the management of the 
Japanese SDF and coordination with the local governments that host US forces in 
Japan and the SDF facilities on issues arising from hosting these forces. The JDA 
has been called as a “management agency” (kanri kancho) in this regard or, in 
                                                          
50
 According to Oros and Tatsumi (2010), the role of the NPA in Japan’s security policymaking 
has played a bigger role in the future since law enforcement issues such as smuggling of illegal 
materials and terrorism are increasingly regarded as national security problems in especially in 
the post-9.11 world. 
100 
 
Keddell’s (1993) words, “the JDA Director was viewed more as the person 
managing the affairs of the SDF than national security affairs” (Keddell 1993, p. 19). 
Cooney (2007) also notes that “The JDA is one of the politically weakest agencies in 
the Japanese bureaucracy because of the sensitivity of military affairs…Because of 
Article Nine and the overall sensitivity in Japan to the overall existence of the SDF, 
the JDA tends to keep a lower profile when it comes to policy advocacy” (Cooney 
2007, p. 93). It is observable that the influence of the JDA was less in the realm of 
Japanese foreign policymaking. 
     Conversely, the changes came with the end of the Cold War with an expected 
growing JDA role in Japan’s national security policymaking. In particular, the 
JSDF’s participation in international activities including UN peacekeeping 
operations (PKO) prompted such a trend. Furthermore, the role of JDA rose as an 
institutional counterpart in U.S.-Japan alliance discussions such as Defence Policy 
Review Initiative (DPRI), which are discussed in depth in Chapter Four. Within the 
MOD, the Internal Bureau manages Japanese SDF operations, planning, acquisition, 
and personnel, tasked with managing the relations with U.S-forces in Japan 
including the local communities that host US forces. The Defence Policy Bureau’s 
primary task is to improve a defence strategy that considers Japan’s broader national 
security policy goals. The Operational Policy Bureau managed issues related to the 
management of information and communication within the MOD and the JSDF. At 
the operational level, the JSDF role is considered in relation to US-Japan 
interoperability which is seen as the significant component of the alliance 
relationship. However, it is important to remark that the functions among ground, air 
and maritime personnel operate differently which shows the difficulty in making 
joint operations (Asahi Shimbun 2005). Still, in consideration of this factor, the 
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paper investigates the interoperability both among the SDF and between US arms 
forces and the JSDF.  
 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
     In the realm of military-industrial issues or defence productions, the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) which is known for playing its role in Japan’s 
economic development in the postwar period (Johnson 1982), is important . 
Chinworth (1992) explicates that “it is likely that the MITI [Ministry of International 
Trade and Industries, former METI]’s role will strengthen over the coming years 
because of the security-economic linkage evident in Japanese policy-making and the 
growing importance of dual-use technologies to overall defence production” 
(Chinworth 1992, p. 17). It is also worth paying attention to the role of the METI in 
consideration of liberalisation in Japan with an attempt to restructure its economy. 
Regarding the use of gaiatsu, Chinworth (1992) explains that “Japanese officials 
have justified their bolder steps and new policy initiatives in the defense area in part 
because of ‘American pressure’. Whenever Japan has adopted a particular policy – 
official explanations often boil down to a simple reason. It is essentially that ‘the 
Americans made us do it’” (Chinworth 1992, p. 9). He argues that US pressure is a 
theme that is evident throughout Japan’s defence and security policy considerations, 
particularly throughout postwar U.S.-Japan relations. 
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Keidanren and Japanese Companies
51
 
     In a similar vein, close business-government ties and the influence of business 
communities should be taken into account as well. Japanese Business Federation, 
which is referred as Keidanren
52
, has been actively engaged in involving defence 
productions and economic liberalisation. Babbs (2001) maintains that “Key business 
players have been political throughout Japanese history” (Babbs 2001, p. 19).53 As is 
described in Johnson’s (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle, “the state had the 
tools to force business compliance; but there were also businesses with interests 
which met with the goals of the bureaucracy” (Babb 2001, p. 24). Yoshimatsu (1998) 
also notes that, unlike US business community, Keidanren has shaped government 
policy by submitting formal recommendations to relevant ministries and agencies 
and delivering through its membership on “advisory councils” (or shingikai in 
Japanese).
54
 He remarks that “it still maintains close relationships with politicians 
through unofficial gatherings between its senior members and leading politicians and 
through the exchange of opinions between its secretariat and the deliberative organs 
of the political parties” (Yoshimatsu 1998, p. 330).  
                                                          
51
 Babbs (2001) explores the political role of the major business organisations in Japan taking 
into account the political influence of each particularly sectors and industries (Babbs 2001, p. 
13). 
52
 The Keidanren was founded in 1946 which began to represent the authoritative voice of 
Japanese business in politics under Kogoro Uemura who was Chair between 1968 and 1974. The 
federation has transformed into “a political force” which is more organised and effective (Babbs 
2001, p. 27). It is also noted that the political contribution was reconsidered to end its 
dependence on the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) due to continuous scandals. The Keidanren 
announced that it would not act as a conduit for campaign contributions to political parties from 
its member corporations since 1994. 
53
 Such scandals in Japan as the “Recruit Scandal” in 1989 and the “Sagawa Scandal” in 1992 
represent the relationship between politics and business in Japan, while the issues about the U.S.-
Japan alliance give the different influence on involving actors. 
54
 One example of the Keidanren’s request merged into government policies is given that “The 
1983 amendments included the acceptance of foreign inspection data with respect to 17 laws; 11 
of those had been taken up in the Keidanren’s March 1983 proposal” (Yoshimatsu 1998, p.332). 
It is also remarked that “a five-year actions programme” for deregulation in 1994 was the result 
of Keidanren persistence (Yoshimatsu 1998). 
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     The Keidanren has released countless reports including the issue on Arms Export 
Control which has limited Japan’s involvement in defence cooperation with other 
countries, and its call for liberalisation of the Japanese economy including the recent 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) issues. The Keidanren has been less eager to 
regulate the Three Principles of Arms Exports which was controversial until the 
recent changes in this policy. This is further exemplified in Chapter Four. By the 
same token, Japanese business companies including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
(MHI)
55
 which were involved in defence productions are considered since it also 
affected the transformation of Japanese defence policies such as the arms export 
policy. These companies can be called the keiretsu (which means “enterprise 
groupings” in Japanese) that include MHI, Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), NEC 
and Sumitomo Heavy Industries.
56
 These companies are seen as “an integral part of a 
highly successful and competitive economy” (Hanami 1993, p. 601).  
 
Others 
     Other institutions are considered as well. Since 1990s, the Cabinet Secretariat has 
been tasked with shaping the policies that are important for the Prime Minister and 
the cabinet, and playing an intermediary role among the ministries as necessary by 
collecting intelligence on important policy issues as the establishment of the 
National Security Council (NSC) in 2013 shows. The role of the Assistant Chief 
Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management and related staff has 
been increasing in Japan’s national security policymaking in recent years (Oros & 
                                                          
55
 Although possessing different interests, Mitsui and Mitsubishi were the main sponsors of the 
large political parties in prewar Japan which were too corrupt due to their dependence on big 
business (Babbs 2001). 
56
 Hanami (1993) describes these companies as “military keiretsu”. 
104 
 
Tatsumi 2010).
57
 In addition to these actors, not limited to the Japanese contexts but 
also the US State Departments and other relevant actors are also taken into account 
which may have influenced Japanese foreign policymaking. 
 
c) Ideology 
     From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, the ideological influence is crucial for 
hegemony. Cox (2004) points out that “Once widely admired, if not emulated, they 
have become more contested and more ambiguous. The terms ‘democracy’ and 
‘liberation’ have become transformed to mean open markets and military occupation” 
(Cox 2004, pp. 311-312). The focus on the role of ideas as part of a hegemonic 
project implies that the definition of globalisation as the transnationalisation of 
production and finance has to be amended with neoliberalism as its ideological 
component (Cox 1993, pp. 266–267; Rupert 2000, p. 54; Bieler 2005, p. 516). 
Rupert (2000) conducts the work investigating the contestation of the dominant 
liberal narrative of globalisation within the US, taking into account the formulation 
of the hegemonic ideology of postwar liberal anti-communism. In light of the 
ideational role of hegemony, Nye (2011) explicates the role of values in foreign 
policymaking, saying that “When values are widely shared, they can provide a basis 
for soft power that works in multiple directions, both to and from the United States 
(Nye 2011, p. 87). Some scholars indicate about the relationship between soft power 
and consensus, saying that “consensus…is based on ‘soft power’ and what has been 
called ‘sticky power’, or the application of ideological influence and economic 
capability” (Beyer 2009, p. 35). 
                                                          
57
 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, for instance, they played a central role in drafting 
the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law, which enabled Japan to dispatch the Japanese SDF for a 
refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean (Oros & Tatsumi 2010). 
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    As for the recent U.S.-Japan alliance relationship, Green (2006) points out that 
“the convergence of Japanese and U.S. interests in universal norms is…based on 
Japan’s increased realization that the promotion of democracy, good governance, and 
rule of law provide stability across Asia” (Green 2006, pp. 107-108). Presumably, 
the transforming nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance is also due to the reflection of the 
Japanese people’s willingness for international contributions such as HA/DR. US 
liberal values such as human rights aspect can be one example in relation to HA/DR 
and peacekeeping. Considering these trends, the role of ideas is rigorously 
investigated in Chapters Four and Five when discussing the importance of common 
or shared values in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the alliance has 
embellished itself by incorporating liberal values which can be more acceptable to 
the Japanese people, which are further explored in the remaining chapters. 
 
Discourse Analysis: Common Sense and the Role of Organic Intellectuals in the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance Context 
     “Common sense” and “organic intellectuals” are the major concepts in 
conducting discourse analysis in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As is already 
indicated earlier, with regard to common sense, Rupert’s (1995; 2000) “rhetorical 
strategies” and “rhetorically marginalised” are respectively examined. In order to 
analyse the altering nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, not only the transforming 
features of the alliance in a practical sense but also the discursive change of “the 
U.S.-Japan alliance” shall be examined by closely looking into the role of organic 
intellectuals
58
 who play a major role in formulating the pro-U.S.-Japan alliance 
                                                          
58
 From the neo-Gramscian perspective, these actors have exerted tremendous influence on the 
ideas about the U.S.-Japan alliance due to their previous careers which are closely related to 
alliance managements. 
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discourses considering Gramsci’s focus on language. Discourse analysis is an 
appropriate method in understanding the transforming discourses of the alliance. In 
doing so, the recent trends of the U.S.-Japan alliance are examined by looking into 
policy recommendations by the experts and/or politicians, speeches and 
governmental documents and existing literature written in both English and Japanese. 
It is worth scrutinising the rhetoric of “the U.S.-Japan alliance” since it is still 
controversial whether the alliance is strengthening or not. It remains under scrutiny 
whether the U.S.-Japan alliance is intrinsically “alliance” due to its asymmetrical 
nature, and whether the US and Japan can become a “partnership” (Institute for 
National Strategic Studies 2000). 
     Discourse analysis is mainly conducted based on two types of materials: a) 
official documents and b) interviews. a) Regarding official documents, official 
archival materials and publications of intergovernmental organisations and think-
tanks such as Japanese Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), the Sasakawa Peace 
Foundations (SPF), the Tokyo Foundation, the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) are mainly 
examined which have published numerous reports relating to the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
In particular, such emerging concepts as “international public goods”, “global 
commons” and “smart power” are investigated to see the salience of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and how these concepts have been embedded as “common sense,” which is 
closely examined in Chapter Six. b) Interviews with the experts of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance such as academics, journalists, bureaucrats and politicians which are sixty in 
total are taken into account to comprehend the understanding of the U.S-Japan 
alliance. Although discourse analysis is not the only means for using interviews as 
research materials, this research method is helpful in investigating changing 
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perceptions of these specialists towards the U.S.-Japan alliance who have also 
influenced the ideas of the alliance. These interviews are mainly considered in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six.  
     The roles of organic intellectuals are particularly closely examined in Chapters 
Three and Six while their roles may be referred to in Chapters Four and Five if 
necessary. With regard to Chapter Three, organic intellectuals are taken into account 
especially in the process of crafting the “Yoshida Doctrine,” which has been the 
pillar of Japanese foreign policymaking by distinguishing them from “traditional 
intellectuals”. In the context of Japanese foreign security policymaking, it is 
probable to observe that those who support the “Yoshida Doctrine” can be viewed as 
“traditional intellectuals” in the neo-Gramscian sense which is elaborated further in 
Chapter Three. As for Chapter Six, the following actors are regarded as “organic 
intellectuals” in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance who have played roles in 
developing either “rhetorical strategies” or “rhetorically marginalised”; a) politicians, 
b) ministries, c) Keidanren, d) think tanks, e) academics, f) media, and g) local 
citizens. These actors can be collaborated in various ways. Furthermore, there can be 
the difference between “rhetorical strategies” and “rhetorically marginalised” with 
regard to the interactions among actors. As for the former one, there may be more 
roles of politicians, academics, think tanks and Keidanren whereas academics, local 
citizens and think tanks may play a bigger role in the latter one.  
     From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, who have made the US-led historic bloc 
firmer by means of the U.S.-Japan alliance is the presence of “organic intellectuals”. 
As is exemplified in the earlier sections of this chapter, the role of organic 
intellectuals is crucial in formulating the historic bloc. In the case of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, it is important to identify these actors both in the US and Japan. Regarding 
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the US side, the prominent examples are Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, 
who are already referred to in Chapter One and have been heavily involved in the 
issues of the U.S.-Japan relationship by attending the U.S.-Japan alliance related 
events. They have published numerous reports as the guidance to improve the U.S.-
Japan alliance. The study of Sunohara (2006) of the “Japan hand”, or “Japan 
handler”, that are composed of US experts in the U.S.-Japan alliance can be useful in 
understanding the roles of intellectuals in developing the alliance.
59
 
     Organic intellectuals can be seen not only from the US but also from Japanese 
sides. For instance, Shotaro Yachi, who involved in establishing “values-oriented 
diplomacy” and “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” during the first Abe administration, 
have put emphasis on the role of soft power and made effort to strengthen the US-
Japan alliance. He exemplifies that “Based on the consensus that Japan have come to 
feel an obligation to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the rest of the world, 
Japan has steadily expanded its ODA to developing countries” (Yachi 2009, p. 6). 
Underscoring the role of soft power in diplomacy, he further argues that “I believe 
that we can contribute to the peace and stability of the world through our ‘soft power’ 
– representing our economic, scientific, technological, and cultural assets - and the 
dedicated ethos of the Japanese people toward work (Yachi 2009, p. 6). Other former 
bureaucrats such as Nobukatsu Kanehara and Hideaki Kaneda, who proposes the 
idea “influential power” which is similar to soft power, puts importance on values 
(Akita, Kaneda, Taniguchi & Yachi 2011) . Indeed, there may be a growing role of 
Japanese scholars who emphasise the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Recently, 
there is a growing number of study groups of the U.S.-Japan alliance, viewing the 
alliance as the cornerstone for the Asia-Pacific stability. It is worthwhile to examine 
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 He also argues that, instead of Japan’s hands, “Northeast Asia hands” is needed to improve the 
Sino-Japan-Korea relationship (Interview with Tsuyoshi Sunohara, 19
th
 April 2013). 
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how the U.S.-Japan alliance has been value-added with new emerging ideas 
stemming from the thinking of these organic intellectuals. 
 
Conclusion 
     This chapter mainly exemplifies neo-Gramscianism as a research tool for 
understanding the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship considering the concept of 
hegemony. After explaining the relevance of using the concept of hegemony, instead 
of empire, the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony was exemplified by 
underscoring its key concepts in order to show the appropriateness of neo-
Gramscianism to fill the gap among the existing theories by taking into account 
material, institutional and ideational factors of hegemony. Additionally, to 
understand a power relationship between the US and Japan, the neo-Gramscian 
concept of hegemony, which considers both the coercive and consensual aspects of 
hegemony, is useful in comprehending the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 
postwar era. This chapter also shows the applicability of neo-Gramscianism to the 
U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese foreign security policies by adopting its insights to 
the U.S.-Japan relationship. Specifically, the Japanese concepts such as gaiatsu are 
presented to have a clearer idea about the neo-Gramscian account on hegemony.  
     Within this theoretical approach, social forces analysis and discourse analysis, by 
using the concepts of “common sense” and “organic intellectuals”, are exemplified 
in this chapter which further elaborated in Chapter Four, Five and Six. Social forces 
analysis is intended to examine the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
relationship by looking into material, institutional and ideational aspects looking into 
not only at governmental but also at practical level. With regard to common sense, it 
uses discourse analysis to examine the trends of the alliance relationship with a focus 
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on the role of organic intellectuals. Furthermore, organic intellectuals are not limited 
to either the US or Japan but both so it is important to examine those who specialise 
in relating issues of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As is indicated, investigating the 
ideational aspect of hegemony might be challenging, yet it has been highly attentive 
by foreign policymakers in the US and Japan regarding liberal values such as 
democracy and free market. The roles of smart power or soft power are closely 
examined in Chapter Six.  
      In this regard, it is worth operationalising this theoretical framework to clarify its 
concepts and evolved it as a research method on the foundation of its key elements. 
Before deploying neo-Gramscianism to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Chapter 
Three lays out the history of the U.S.-Japan alliance by highlighting the alliance 
relationship between the two countries since the postwar period. Unlike other 
alliances in Europe, US-led alliances after 1945 constitute not only symmetrical but 
also asymmetrical relationships. The U.S.-Japan alliance can be viewed one of the 
examples. Through the neo-Gramscian lenses, the coercive and consensual 
dimensions of hegemony and the role of organic intellectuals during those periods 
exemplified to provide a better understanding of the background of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance relationship. 
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Chapter Three: The Rise and Fall of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
  
Introduction 
     Chapter Three illustrates the trajectory of the U.S.-Japan alliance from the 
postwar era to the early post-Cold War period, looking through the neo-Gramscian 
lenses in order to describe the way the alliance has altered in the face of changing 
international and domestic security environments. It is important to note that the 
“U.S.-Japan alliance” was not pervasively acknowledged in at the societal level in 
Japan until former Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki used this term in the public during 
his meeting with the then US President Ronald Reagan in 1981.
60
 Since then, the 
“U.S.-Japan alliance” has increasingly become more accepted in society as the pillar 
of Japanese foreign policymaking although some scholars have described the U.S.-
Japan relationship as the “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty System” (Toyoshita 1999; 
Kitaoka 2010). It is crucial to note that the U.S.-Japan alliance is one of the elements 
that have made Pax Americana, or the US-led “historic bloc”, sustainable in the 
Asia-Pacific region.  
     This chapter exemplifies the history of the alliance after the Second World War to 
demonstrate how the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more acceptable in Japanese 
society although not the whole population in Japan has a cohesive consensus on the 
relationship between the US and Japan. In this realm, the neo-Gramscian concepts of 
a) the coercive and consensual aspects of hegemony, b) organic intellectuals and c) 
historic bloc are adopted in this chapter to show the further cohesiveness of the two 
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 In fact, then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira described the U.S.-Japan relationship as an 
“alliance” and also generated the concept “comprehensive security” although, for some, 
especially the US government, it appeared as an attempt to weaken the U.S.-Japan relationship 
which became more pervasive in the society. However, it is said that Ohira’s intention was rather 
to strengthen the alliance relationship, at least from the MOFA perspective (Kuriyama 2008, p. 
154). 
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countries. Within this theoretical framework, the two dimensions of hegemony are 
deployed to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance which may have harnessed the US-
led historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific region while organic intellectuals played their 
roles in harnessing the alliance. Chapter Three is also intended to underscore the fact 
that although Japan did not fully accept coercive offers from the US side, Japan did 
consent to US offers which would not contradict with its existing laws and policies 
in consideration of domestic and international situations. This aspect illustrates that 
the coercive nature of hegemony is not sufficient to strengthen hegemony. Although 
the coercion/consent division is not clear as is indicated in Chapter Two, it is a viable 
concept in understanding the sustainability of the alliance. In order to comprehend 
the blurriness of the borderline between coercion and consensus, Kliman’s (2006) 
concept of “internalisation of gaiatsu” is taken into account in order to understand 
the history of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The following diagram that appears in Chapter 
Two can be helpful in capturing coercive and consensual aspects of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. 
 
Diagram 1 
Source: Gramsci (1971); Author 
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     Moreover, whilst it has not been widely discussed, the U.S.-Japan alliance can be 
viewed as an asymmetric alliance. It is worth emphasising that, increasingly, the 
asymmetrical nature of the alliance relationship may have become more acceptable 
in Japanese society, not merely as a symbol of anti-Americanism despite its past 
controversies including the Bikini accident, the 1960 protest, and the 1995 rape 
incident in Okinawa.
61
 Hence, it is worthwhile to look into the issues relating to the 
U.S.-Japan alliance to apprehend how the alliance has become embedded in Japanese 
foreign policymaking. When unbundling the historical formulation of the alliance, 
Chapter Three considers the features of Pax Americana and the role of Japanese 
conservative politicians which may have contributed to the US-led historic bloc in 
the region. 
     The chapter is structured as the follows: first, the enactment of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty and institutionalisation of Japanese foreign policies based upon this 
treaty is exemplified including such periods as the San Francisco Treaty in 1951 and 
its revision in 1960. This section elucidates the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance relationship that stirred controversies. Additionally, the Korean War in 1950 
is also examined when the US put pressure on Japan for remilitarisation whereas 
Japan maintained its low posture in regard to military nonetheless. Furthermore, anti-
protests in Japan of the U.S.-Japan alliance and US bases is explored to demonstrate 
active protests in the mainland Japan in the past that can rarely be witnessed 
nowadays. Second, the “Yoshida Doctrine” is examined in consideration of the role 
of Japanese conservative politicians, who can be regarded as “organic intellectuals” 
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 It is noted that Tadashi Yamamoto, the founder of the Japan Center of Intellectual Exchange 
(JCIE), contributed to soothe anti-Americanism through increasing U.S.-Japan exchange 
(Interview with Ryo Sahashi, 11
th
 January 2013). However, it is also important to note that anti-
American sentiments remain persist. It is remarked that Sunohara has been telling Armitage and 
Nye about this circumstance that should be acknowledged (Interview with Tsuyoshi Sunohara, 
19
th
 April 2013). 
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in neo-Gramscian terms, during that period. Some studies undertaken by Winkler 
(2012) are taken into account which scrutinises the nature of conservatism in Japan 
and its role in establishing its strategy within the centre of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
which is important to be considered. Third, the period during the Vietnam War and 
the establishment of the Nixon Doctrine is investigated since the changes in US 
policies during its decline is also one of the leading factors in the Japanese foreign 
policymaking. Having said that, it does not mean Japan fully accepted US offers but 
rather adjusted its posture with the Yoshida Doctrine. Fourth, the 1981 US-Japan 
meeting is investigated while looking into the issue of “burden sharing” in the 
context of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship when Japan was criticised as a “free 
rider”, or “cheap rider”, from the US perspective. In this section, the role of the 
Nakasone administration is worth being examining due to its attempt to shift away 
from the “Yoshida Doctrine” to a more aggressive defence posture. Fifth, the period 
immediately after the Cold War is explained to show the influx of the meaning of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance that is crafted for the Cold War context. Lastly, the nature of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance as an “asymmetric alliance” is revisited in which the neo-
Gramscian view of hegemony can be applied and the question of the durability of the 
Yoshida Doctrine is investigated. Moreover, the neo-Gramscian concept of historic 
bloc is adopted to show how the U.S.-Japan alliance may have strengthened as part 
of the US-led historic bloc. 
  
The “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty” 
The San Francisco Treaty: Emerging Consensual Role of Hegemony 
     Based upon the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S.-Japan alliance was formed 
by the signing of the “Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan” on the 
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8th September 1951 in San Francisco. Due to disarmament under the allied 
occupation, Japan would “not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right 
of self-defence”62 after regaining independence and would require US military 
protection. It goes without saying that the US-Japan security system was established 
in reflection of the Cold War context that was the result of the shared perception that 
such a treaty was necessary both for Japan and the US. This was clearly stated by 
Japan’s first postwar Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who served from 1946 to 
1947 and from 1948 to 1954. According to his memoir, the U.S.-Japan security 
treaty was neither imposed by the US nor requested by Japan but rather they “had the 
same perception of objective conditions and the prospects for Japan’s defense and 
the defense of the free world,
63
 and we decided there was no better policy to fill the 
vacuum in Japan’s defense that would result from the withdrawal of the occupation 
army after the peace treaty” (Yoshida 1961; Terashima 2010). Yoshida also added 
that the security treaty was a provisional measure. Hence, if Japan has become 
competent enough to defend itself, the treaty could be terminated at any time 
(Yoshida 1961; Terashima 2010). This exhibits that, initially, the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty was not intended to be last in the long term from Yoshida’s 
viewpoint. As is indicated in the Introduction Chapter, this puts under scrutiny the 
sustainability of the alliance regardless of the condition that it can be terminated one 
year later after the agreement between allies, which has not happened in the case of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
     It is also known that the San Francisco Treaty, which also led to the enactment of 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, was created through negotiations between the 
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 “The World and Japan” Database Project, http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19510908.T2E.html 
63
 It is important to note that the “free world” was the core idea of the Cold War. This is further 
exemplified in Chapter Five in explaining the role of ideas. 
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Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida and Dulles called the “Yoshida-Dulles meeting”. 
According to Dulles (1951), “[The 1951 version of the] Security Treaty between the 
United States and Japan contains a clause which assimilates ‘large-scale internal 
riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an 
outside Power or Powers’ to ‘armed attack from without’. The United States forces 
in Japan are authorized - but not required - at the express request of the Japanese 
Government to assist to meet such indirect aggression” (Dulles 1951, p. 184). He 
also noted that “Japan should be given the opportunity to earn her living in the free 
world by means of what the Potsdam Surrender Terms promised, namely, ‘access to 
raw materials’ and ‘participation in world trade relations’” (Dulles 1951, p. 184). 
Tokyo’s “residual sovereignty” over the Ryukyu Islands which are part of the current 
Okinawa prefecture was confirmed, yet it had to surrender administrative control 
over these and several other small islands to the US. In a private ceremony that same 
day, Acheson, Dulles, two U.S. senators, and Yoshida signed a security treaty along 
with a subsidiary agreement that authorised U.S. forces to use bases in Japan for the 
Korean War (Schaller 1997).  
     From the neo-Gramscian perspective, it is evident that not only the coercive but 
also consensual aspects of hegemony played a role in establishing the U.S.-Japan 
alliance relationship in consideration of the process of the San Francisco Treaty. The 
consensual side of hegemony influenced the creation of the San Francisco Treaty 
chiefly due to Japan’s attempt to restore its international status in the context of the 
“free world”.64 This treaty restored to the Japanese people full sovereignty over 
Japan and its territorial waters. It further recognised that, Japan possessed the 
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 It is also noted that, as Makoto Iokibe remarks, the U.S.-Japan alliance was important for 
enhancing Japan’s international status in the postwar era (Interview with Ryo Sahashi, 11
th
 
January 2013).  
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inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as a sovereign nation, so that 
she could participate in collective security arrangements. Japan entered into a 
security treaty with the US on the same day that the Treaty of Peace was signed 
(Reed 1983, p. 6). Schaller (1997) observes that “The peace treaty served as a 
sweetener for the less equitable security treaty. The security treaty, in turn, screened 
criticism of the still more controversial administrative agreement that Yoshida 
planned to ratify by executive agreement” (Schaller 1997, p. 41). It is also noted that 
Japan became embedded in the US-dominated security structure by means of the 
Yoshida Doctrine (Inoguchi & Bacon 2006; Hook & Son 2013). We can form the 
view that this treaty has become the basis of the alliance relationship between the US 
and Japan with both coercive and consensual aspects of the US-led historic bloc. 
 
US Pressures yet Japan’s Benefits: Japan’s Internalisation of Gaiatsu?  
     Owing to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, US pressure on Japan to 
participate more actively militarily within the alliance framework was resumed 
shortly after signing the peace and security treaties, which can be seen as the 
coercive role of hegemony in neo-Gramscian terms,. The US Secretary of State 
Dulles offered economic and military assistance under the Mutual Security 
Assistance (MSA) Act in October 1951 for Japan’s rearmament, which was designed 
“to consolidate the American alliance system through the supply of weapons and 
equipment, participation of allied officers in training programs in the United States, 
and the overall coordination of military strategies” (Welfield 1988, pp. 97-98; Pyle 
1992, p. 29). It is noticeable that this Act reflects the US intention to extend its 
control over its allies in the midst of the Cold Wars. In 1954, the US and Japan 
concluded a Mutual Defence Assistance (MDA) Agreement, which was intended to 
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establish a legal basis for the furnishing of military equipment and technology to 
Japan. Within this agreement, Japan committed itself to fulfil the military obligations 
under the security treaty.  
     However, through neo-Gramscian lenses, it can be argued that not only US 
coercion but also Japan’s consensus came into play in the context of Japan’s 
remilitarisation. Shortly thereafter, in partial fulfilment of these obligations, Japan 
enacted the Defence Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) 
Law creating the Japanese SDF and their civilian control agency with a mission of 
defending Japan against direct and indirect aggression (Reed 1983, p. 7). In fact, 
Yoshida, who had remained as Japanese Prime Minister, was instinctively hostile to 
participate in the arrangement in the beginning. Nevertheless, whereas he relied on 
the Socialists who defended the Constitution, he succumbed to Dulles to some extent 
by agreeing to the bill, which authorised the establishment of the SDF (Kataoka & 
Myer 1989).
65
 In a similar vein, Yoshida also sought the possibility for economic 
benefits in the wake of the Second World War. As Pyle (1992) notes, Yoshida made 
attempt to contain US pressure for military obligations by making use of MSA aid 
for economic reconstruction and development (Pyle 1992, p. 29).  
     Additionally, in response to strong objections based on Article Nine of the 
Japanese Constitution, the Japanese government argued that this article permitted the 
SDF because it was not being created to wage war, which is banned by the first 
paragraph of Article Nine, and it was exclusively for the purpose of “self-defence”. 
More particularly, according to the Japan’s Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), 
“exclusive defence” means no SDF use except for the defence of Japan; no collective 
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 It is also noted that this was due to his political isolation during that time (Kataoka & Myer 
1989) 
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defence; no possession of offensive weaponry; and no overseas dispatch of troops. 
This would prevent using the SDF for anything but solely the defence of Japanese 
territory (Arase 2007, pp. 563-564). Furthermore, the “Basic Policy for National 
Defence” in 1957states that Japan would “[d]eal with foreign invasions of Japan 
based on security arrangements formed with the United States until the United 
Nations becomes able to effectively prevent the said threat,” while progressively 
developing “national defence capabilities to the necessary limit for self-defence in 
accordance with national power and circumstances” (Ministry of Defence 2011, pp. 
139-140). It confirms exclusively defence-oriented policy (EDOP), or senshu boei in 
Japanese.
66
 Prior to the revision of the US-Japan security treaty, this official 
document implied upgrading Japanese defence which highlights the U.S.-Japan 
security treaty system as being at the centre of the Japanese diplomacy. 
     It is worth remarking that it was not only the Japanese government which 
intentionally took advantages from US pressures, but also business communities in 
Japan. This can be regarded as the consensual aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance for 
Japan remilitarisation in the neo-Gramscian sense. When the Korean War was 
coming to an end, they were considerably interested in further economic aid for 
reconstruction, acquisition of advanced technology and enhanced industrial 
competitiveness (Welfield 1988). The defence committee (boei seisan iinkai) of the 
Keidanren hoped to build up Japan’s weapons industry with US support in order to 
promote exports and acquire the spinoff effect of advanced technologies with a 
support from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),
67
 which is the 
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 This doctrine is further exemplified in Chapter Four. 
67
 It is noted that the “MITI routinely nurtured entire industrial sectors – steel and autos in the 
1950s and 1960s, aerospace and semiconductors in the currency, direct funding through its Japan 
Development Bank, licenses for the importation of technology, tax benefits, and the authorization 
of cartels that would regulate competition and coordinate investment with the state’s blessing” 
(Samuels 2003, p.193). 
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current Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (Pyle 1992, p. 29; 
Samuels 1994; Samuels 2003).
68
 According to Samuels (1994), the U.S.-Japan 
Economic Cooperation Discussion Group (Nichibei Keizai Teikei Kondankai) was 
formed on the 9
th
 February 1951, recognising that “Japanese economic recovery 
depended upon U.S. aid, defense, and trade policy – and that the United States was 
prepared to be extremely indulgent in supporting the industrial redevelopment of its 
new ally” (Samuels 1994, p.136). Interestingly, the defence committee of the 
Keidanren
69
 was keen on contributing military technology for economic growth 
during the Korean War. 
     Furthermore, it was not only the military but also in economic and ideational 
dimensions that Japan benefited, which can be regarded as consensus formation of 
the US-led historic bloc. According to Sakamoto (2011), “Not only did Japan profit 
from both direct and indirect aid immediately after the war, but it also benefited 
from: (1) the economic and political support it received when it joined the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955; (2) the financial assistance it 
received in order to participate in the free trading agreements; (3) the technical 
support it received to develop its economy and to improve its production ability; and 
(4) the opportunity for Japanese study at U.S. universities through the Fulbright and 
other programs” (Sakamoto 2011, p. 55). Matsuda (2009) also explicates that this 
was due to US efforts for improving cultural ties with Japan in the early postwar 
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 According to Samuels (2003), “For years Yoshida had argued that arms production would slow 
overall economic growth, but now with two years of ‘special procurement’ by the U.S. military, 
Japanese industry knew better. The so-called divine wind (kamikaze) of the Korean War boom 
was over; industry was facing its first postwar recession and demanded investments in arms 
production…Yoshida had sown the seeds of his own political destruction” (Samuels 2003, p. 
210).  
69
 The Keidanren Defence Production Committee came to be known as “Japan’s private defence 
ministry” and as Keidanren’s “civil-military bureau” (minkan gunmu kyoku) (Samuels 1994). 
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period with the use of cultural diplomacy for democratisation in Japan.
70
 He further 
argues that the legacy of American Occupation was “permanent dependency and 
‘subordinate independence’ in relationship with the United States” (Matsuda 2009, p. 
2). These interactions between the US and Japan and within Japanese institutions 
show that not merely US preferences can be reflected in Japanese foreign 
policymaking.  
     In this regard, in the context of the “Free World”, it is evident to see that the U.S.-
Japan alliance was consolidated from the neo-Gramscian standpoint by internalising 
gaiatsu into consensus. Pyle (1992) observes that “Yoshida’s manipulation for both 
domestic politics and U.S. pressure was both shrewd and cynical” (Pyle 1992, p. 26). 
While the US sought Japan to remilitarise in the Cold War contexts, Japan firmly 
maintained its “self-defence” posture while creating its own SDFs. Even though 
Japan has modified its laws accommodating to US foreign policymaking, renovating 
itself as the nation-state in terms of economy was the top priority for Japan. Japan 
consensually accepted US offers with its support for the Free World by joining such 
institutions as GATT and other free trade agreements.  
       
Anti-Base Protests and the Revision in 1960: Emerging Counter-Hegemonic 
Forces?  
     However, the periods up to the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 
can be regarded as a difficult time to adopt the neo-Gramscian framework since it is 
not simply the coercive and consensus dimensions of the U.S.-Japan alliance being 
operated but also the counter-hegemonic forces. The security relationship between 
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 Caprio and Sugita (2007) closely examined democratisation processes during the US 
Occupation period in Japan. 
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the US and Japan had been understood as “the cooperation between people and 
things”, meaning “Japan provides the facilities, while the US provides the armed 
forces to defend Japan” (Nishimura 1997; Sakamoto 2000). This relationship was 
described by Kumao Nishimura, former Director-General of the Treaties Bureau in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), who was closely involved in negotiations 
for the original U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Sakamoto (2000) regards this as the 
alliance as an asymmetric reciprocity of “material/personnel cooperation”.  
     At the governmental level, the treaty was intended to serve as the trigger for the 
evolution of the alliance from a one-sided relationship of dependence toward a more 
balanced and mature relationship of shared responsibility (Nishimura 1997). Since 
Nobusuke Kishi, Japanese Prime Minister from February 1957 to June 1960, 
witnessed the negotiations between Dulles and Mamoru Shigemitsu
71
, he already 
knew the difficulty of negotiating with the US government which forced him to think 
of revising the treaty (Kitaoka 2004).
72
 The two governments officially started the 
negotiations on revising the security treaty in October 1958. The “Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan”, or the revised U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty, was signed in January 1960, and came into effect in June in 
the same year. Including a sentence that stipulates the US obligation to defend Japan, 
the “internal disturbances clause” was removed, the time limit of the treaty was 
specified and the system of “prior consultation (jizen-kyogi)73” regarding the US 
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 He served as Foreign Minister under the Hatoyama administrations from 1954 to 1956. 
72
 According to Kitaoka (2004), Kishi knew how to deal with the US according to his 
experiences before becoming the Prime Minister which contributed to the relationship not only 
with the US but also with Asia (Kitaoka 2004, p. 29). 
73
 During the Sato administration, MOFA officials attempted to make use of the mechanism of 
“prior consultation” by highlighting Clause Eight of the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement in the 
context of the “re-entry” of nuclear weapons (Kuriyama 2008). In the 1969 U.S.-Japan Joint 
Statement, “The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, 
without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior 
consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of 
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usage of bases in Japan was introduced. Gabe (2002) presumes that the inserting the 
clause of prior consultation was not effective which may have been ignored 
eventually. It is also noted that, according to John Emmerson, a former US diplomat, 
“the prior consultation clause had been considered within the U.S. government as a 
Japanese ‘veto’ on U.S. requests, at least until the Sato-Nixon meeting of 1969” 
(Tsuchiyama 2004). 
     However, it is worth indicating that the U.S.-Japan alliance was not widely 
accepted in the Japanese society. Prior to the revision of the treaty, massive protests 
spurred in the name of “Ampo Toso (or, the struggle over the U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty)”.74 After the enactment of the treaty in 1951 and US attempt for Japan’s 
remilitarisation, anti-US base protests prevailed as the following accidents occurred. 
For example, the Lucky Dragon incident, or the “Bikini incident”, happened in 1954 
where the twenty-three crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel were exposed to 
radioactivity due to nuclear testing of a US hydrogen bomb in the Pacific. It was 
seen as “the most serious strain on Japanese-American relations since 1945” 
(Dingman 1990, p. 188; Swenson-Wright 2005, p. 150).
75
 A series of anti-base 
protests also emerged at Tachikawa Air Force base in Tokyo between 1955 and 1957 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese 
Government as described by the Prime Minister”. More details are explained (Kuriyama 2008, 
pp. 42- 44, 59, 74-76, 235-236). 
74
 According to Kaplan (2012), “The struggle over the U.S.-Japan Security, or Ampo Toso, was 
led by a united leftist front known as the People’s Council which was comprised of an unlikely 
and unstable coalition of unionists (under Sohyo), socialists (the JSP - Japanese Socialist Party,) 
communists (the JCP - the Japan Communist Party) and a radical Marxist student organization 
known as Zengakuren” (Kaplan 2012, p. 53). Also, Michiko Kaba, a student of the University of 
Tokyo, committed suicide to protest against the treaty which had a great impact on the Japanese 
society and also led to the cancellation of Eisenhower’s visit to Japan (Iokibe 2013). 
75
 This led to Japanese public anger at the US government and also inspired the original sci-fi 
horror movie “Godzilla,” which was released in November 1954. 
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with a lot of calamity which further stirred anti-American sentiments in Japanese 
society.
76
  
     Some may argue that, from the neo-Gramscian perspective, this can be seen as the 
counter-hegemonic movements against the U.S.-Japan alliance. However, that is not 
the whole story. According to Miller (2013), the resistance at Sunagawa existed not 
merely due to the continued presence of US forces but the ways in which they 
disrupted Japanese lives. She argues that “these protests were also about the 
principle of protecting an active and representative Japanese democracy” (Miller 
2013, p.17).
77
 Moreover, on Kaplan’s (2012) account, the activities under 
Zengakuren
78
, a communist and anarchist league of student in Japan founded in 1948, 
were not aimed at the US government but rather the Japanese government. He 
exemplifies that “Although the Zengakuren mainstream under Bunto79 [, an 
organised protest against Kishi,] would surely have criticized America in the same 
ways that they would have criticized any other major power of the time, their 
primary target was Japan, and they focused on domestic issues, targeting the 
Japanese Government in order to pursue their goals” (Kaplan 2012, p. 70). Hence, 
Bunto’s participation in Ampo Toso was not significantly an anti-American protest 
but rather the demonstrations against the Japanese government. This shows the 
vagueness of defining the counter-hegemonic movements against the U.S.-Japan 
alliance although there were various factors that had triggered social movements. 
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 Between 1955 and 1956, Kamei Fumio who was a documentary filmmaker released three 
films which portrayed the conflict at Sunagawa. Furthermore, in the same year, a choral work 
entitled “Sunagawa” was composed with the words written by a labour organiser (Miller 2013, p. 
16). 
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 She also notes that “the U.S.–Japanese relationship reminds us that the Cold War was not 
simply a story of global conflict and containment: a profound impact of the Cold War—and 
perhaps its strongest legacy—was a global commitment to alliance-building” (Miller 2013, p.33). 
78
 It stands for “Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sō Rengō” which means “All-Japan League of 
Student Self-Government” in English. 
79
 The name is originated from “the Bund” in German that indicates Communist league. 
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     Furthermore, it is argued that, although the asymmetrical relationship was to be 
improved in 1960 during the Kishi administration by including “prior consultation” 
regarding the use of bases, the nature of the US-Japan alliance did not change 
(Sakamoto 2000). Packard (2010) notes that “Although the revised treaty improved 
Japan's leverage, Japanese left-wingers, among others, used the ratification process 
to express their disapproval of the entire U.S.-Japanese alliance system. Kishi battled 
his left-wing critics for months, melees broke out in the Diet, and thousands of 
Japanese protested in massive street demonstrations” (Packard 2010, p. 94). In the 
late 1950s and 1960s, it was observable there was complicated dynamism regarding 
the U.S.-Japan alliance. At official level, there was the attempt to upgrade the 
alliance relationship with the US whereas, at societal level, there was anger against 
US bases. Yet, Sakamoto (2011) maintains that “Although the revisions to the 
security treaty were mostly cosmetic in nature, they did have a major impact 
politically. Through these changes, the security treaty became more acceptable to the 
Japanese people” (Sakamoto 2011, p. 76). In this regard, in the face of the counter-
hegemonic forces, the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty can be seen as the 
consensual form of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the midst of the Cold War. 
 
The “Yoshida Doctrine” as Postwar Consensus? 
     In the subsequent sections, the “Yoshida Doctrine” is closely examined, which 
has been the centre of Japanese foreign policymaking and also influenced the U.S.-
Japan alliance relationship. As is exemplified later, this doctrine can be regarded as 
the element of the consensual aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance in neo-Gramscian 
terms. It also takes into account the role of “organic intellectuals,” who may have 
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contributed to develop the doctrine that became embedded in the Japanese foreign 
policymaking.  
 
Emergence of the Yoshida Doctrine  
     During the Cold War, Japan followed what became known as the “Yoshida 
Doctrine,” which has shaped Japanese foreign policymaking. Under this doctrine, 
Japan chose to remain dependent upon the US security guarantee, while continuing 
to develop economically. Yoshida believed Japan needed to protect the new security 
arrangement through a formal pact.
80
 As Pyle (1992) notes, “He [Yoshida] reasoned 
that Japan could make minimal concessions of passive cooperation, a long-term 
guarantee of its national security, and the opportunity to concentrate on all-out 
economic recovery” (Pyle 1992, p. 23).81 According to Nagai (1968), Yoshida 
established a bargaining position by making light of Japan’s security problems and 
vaguely insisting that Japan could protect itself through its own devices by being 
democratic and peaceful and by relying on the protection of world opinion (Nagai 
1968; Pyle 1992). After independence in 1951, Japan was able to focus on economic 
development. In the international security environment of the Cold War, Japan was 
granted access to markets of the US and other countries of the West. By entering a 
security treaty with the US, it was able to minimise the economic burden of 
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 In his memoir, it is noted that” I cannot entirely agree that [the] postwar constitution was 
forced upon us…There was nothing that properly be termed coercive or overbearing the 
Occupation authorities toward us” (Yoshida 1961, p.143; Samuels 2003, p. 202). While the 
Occupation’s reform can be regarded “coercive”, Yoshida established the idea that “the values of 
the ‘new’ Japan were consistent with the values of ‘traditional’ Japan” along the lines of 
democracy and pacifism which is seen as part of the tradition of Japan (Samuels 2003, p.202). 
81
 Yoshida opposed to Dulles’ offer of a conciliatory peace by freeing Japan of restrictions set up 
by Article 9. It is noted that “I opposed [Dulles’ suggestions] outright, because my country had 
not completed its economic recovery” (Samuels 2003, p. 205). 
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remilitarisation. Kusunoki (2006) explicates that, with Yoshida’s security policy, the 
element of non-military contribution in the U.S.-Japan alliance was underlined.  
     From the neo-Gramscian standpoint, we may regard the Yoshida Doctrine as 
“organic” considering the way it got institutionalised. It is also important to 
understand that this doctrine was established “inductively”, which formulated later 
on as an apparent strategy (Yamamoto, Noya, Inoue, Kamiya & Kaneko 2012, pp. 
26-27).
82
 Pyle (1992) argues that “In sum, while determined to root out the sources 
of militarism in Japan and to democratize the social order, the drafters did not intend 
that the new constitutional order should deprive Japan of the capacity for self-
defence or normal participation in the newly contemplated UN peace-keeping forces” 
(Pyle 1992, p. 11). According to him, “this constitutional interpretation became a 
convenient pretext for a national purpose that was subsequently formulated by Prime 
Minister Yoshida to avoid all collective security involvements, to abstain from 
international politics, to avoid intense domestic political conflict, and to concentrate 
exclusively on economic rehabilitation” (Pyle 1992, p. 11). Yoshida’s alternative 
was to defeat the Socialist, which was pro-Constitution, against the revisionists, 
which was pro-alliance, to keep both the constitution and the alliance (Kataoka & 
Myer 1989). These circumstances continued for several decades, and, according to 
Iriye (1991), it is doubtful whether Japan has more than a fundamental notion of 
what its military strategy is or ought to be (Iriye 1991, p. 31). The Yoshida Doctrine 
also came to represent a balancing of bureaucratic conflicts among Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), MITI, MOFA and MOD (Igarashi 1985). In regard to Japanese 
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 In fact, their book discusses Japan’s grand strategy which is criticised by Michael Green that 
Japan does not have a grand strategy. However, it is clarified that the perception on “grand 
strategy” is different that composes not only expansionism, which is from the US perspective, 
but in defensive manner (Interview with Heigo Sato, 6
th
 December 2012). 
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Defence Agency (JDA), it was tremendously circumscribed, controlled, and 
regulated by different branches of government (Kataoka & Myer 1989). 
 
Institutionalisation of the “Yoshida Doctrine” and the Role of Conservative-
minded Japanese Politicians 
     In order to understand the degree of embeddedness of the Yoshida doctrine in 
Japanese foreign policymaking and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the neo-Gramscian 
concept of “organic intellectuals” is crucial to be considered due to its role in 
shaping Japanese foreign policy. Kan (2006) describes Yoshida as a “co-operator”, 
which can be similar to the neo-Gramscian concept of “organic intellectuals”, of 
creating the pro-US regime in Japan. He explicates that US’ means of using its 
hegemonic power, either hard power or soft power, is reliant on whether its co-
operator was either cooperative or reactionary (Kan 2006, p. 220). As Dower (1979) 
exemplifies, “the reconsolidation and recentralization of conservative authority 
during the Yoshida era was inseparable from the strategic settlement reached 
between the United States and Japan” (Dower 1979, p. 369). Yoshida and his group, 
who can be known as pragmatists, supported Article 9 of the Peace Constitution to 
deflect US pressure on Japan to acquire military capabilities that were regarded as 
inimical to Japan’s strategic interests and to resist US pressure for Japanese 
participation in international military missions (Boyd & Samuels 2005, p. 26). 
According to Samuels (2007), Yoshida and his successors were “liberal 
internationalists” making use of a “non-military invisible hand…to guide a non-
aggressive, low-cost postwar Japanese security policy” (Samuels 2007, p. 29; p. 31). 
Moreover, it is important to note that, under the Yoshida administration, anti-
Communist public and press opinion was increasingly encouraged with an active 
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support by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). During this period, 
a “red purge” was launched in August 1950 and led to the suppression of the “Red 
Flag (Akahata)”, the Communists (newspapers, and the removal of Communist Party 
member and its sympathisers (Swenson-Wright 2005, p. 161).  
     After the revision of the original security treaty with the resignation of Kishi, 
Hayato Ikeda (1960-1964) and Eisaku Sato (1964-1972) became the next prime 
ministers who were both intimately associated with Yoshida and the members of the 
so-called the “Yoshida School”. Pyle observes that, during these administrations, 
“the Yoshida Doctrine was institutionalized and consolidated into a national 
consensus” (Pyle 1992, p. 32). For example, Ikeda advocated the “income-doubling 
plan” and “politics of patience and reconciliation,” which put emphasis on the 
economic development of Japan that is in line with the Yoshida Doctrine. Ikeda 
distanced himself from the military alliance, security affairs, and foreign relations. 
He quietly assured that the LDP would follow a species of “conservative pacifist 
policies” which consisted of “the Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmament, 
weapons export, and spending no more than one per cent of Gross National Product 
(GNP) on defence. The LDP chose to “respect the Socialists’ hypersensitivity on 
security issues” (Kataoka & Myer 1989, p. 19). In a slightly different manner, the 
features of Sato’s diplomacy were the focus of the U.S.-Japan relationship and 
economic development. Nakajima (2008) argues that Okinawa bases gave 
importance for the security for the “Free World”. His study shows that the 
negotiation of Okinawa’s return was based on the continuity of Article Nine and the 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty for maintaining the “Free World”.  
     From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, the evolution of the Yoshida doctrine 
exhibits the crucial roles of organic intellectuals, which also led to a firmer U.S.-
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Japan alliance. According to Winkler (2012), the rationale of those conservative-
minded of Japanese politicians is reliant upon “situational conservatism”, which 
seems to be a better fit.
83
 In Winkler’s (2012) account, “the mainstream’s 
conservatism has indeed evolved. While upholding the principles of the Yoshida 
Doctrine, they opted to break away from his authoritarian style of politics, instead 
affirmatively embracing the liberal democratic postwar regime” (Winkler 2012, p. 
70). That is, initially the norm of liberal democracy was not embraced by Yoshida 
due to his belief in the Emperor and nationalism whereas his followers including 
Ikeda and Sato gradually embraced this ideology. Some argues that “despite the fact 
that the Yoshida Doctrine – which advocated primarily a recovery of the domestic 
economy rather than the enlargement of military power – was deployed in the 
Japanese domestic context, Yoshida did not rule out remilitarisation for a future 
liberal-democratic Japan” (Hughes 2004, pp. 21-22; Moses & Iwami 2009, p. 74). 
That this role has changed only incrementally reflects the continuing US interest in 
sustaining limited and complementary roles for Japanese military forces and the 
continuing importance of the essence of the Yoshida Doctrine to the conservatives’ 
ability to rule Japan (Green 1998, p. 11).  
 
The 1970s: the Tensions between Coercion and Consensus 
     The following sections are vital to be examined since the features of US pressures 
got alternated as a result of the changes in both domestic and international contexts 
with the Vietnam War and US’ financial difficulties during Japan’s rapid economic 
development. The examples during this period are worthwhile to be analysed not 
only from the US but also Japanese perspectives taking into consideration the 
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 This concept is influenced by Samuel Huntington’s idea that the key element of conservatism 
was its situational, temporary nature, whereas the conservative mainstream had blossomed for 
several decades (Winkler 2013). 
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features of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Yoshida Doctrine. In contrast to the 1950s 
and 1960s, the 1970s displays a different dynamic of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
relationship in light of the balance between coercion and consensus in neo-
Gramscian terms. 
 
The Vietnam War, US Decline and the Nixon Doctrine: Stronger US Pressures 
     Although the Yoshida Doctrine has largely played its role in Japanese foreign 
policymaking and the U.S.-Japan alliance, a different form of US pressure was 
involved due to the changing circumstances of the US. A trade balance turned out to 
be unfavourable circumstances for the US, which also led to the disengagement from 
the Vietnam War. It is noted that “by 1968 the U.S. deficit had quadrupled the deficit 
of 1967” (Lafeber 1989, p. 98). Lafeber (1989) also notes about the coincidence of 
Japanese rapid economic growth and aggravating US balance of payments, saying 
that “The United States, therefore, while keeping Japan’s unique circumstances in 
mind, encouraged Japanese efforts to achieve a greater sense of independence, and 
began to look to Japan to implement its new position in the Free World by assuming 
duties and responsibilities commensurate with its strength” (Lafeber 1989, p. 98).84 
Under the Johnson administration, it was declared that the “general concept of [U.S.] 
disengagement in this area” is nothing more than “beautiful dreams” (Lafeber 1989, 
pp. 99-100). From the standpoints of Nixon and Kissinger, Johnson’s Vietnam 
policies were acknowledged as a failure which led to plans for the removal of U.S. 
ground troops although it did not necessarily mean the abandonment of US 
commitments in Asia.  
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 Moreover, the U.S. commitment in Vietnam was escalated with an intention to contain China. 
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has refused “to move one inch on China policy” (Lafeber 1989, 
p. 99). 
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     After the US lost the Vietnam War, the US started to scale down its military 
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. US President Richard Nixon made a speech 
on the 25
th
 July 1969, declaring that “each U.S. ally should hold primary 
responsibility for its national defense and that a military alliance with the United 
States should be seen only as supplementary”.85 As for the 1969 Guam Doctrine, 
which later became the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon declared that there was no intention 
of involvement in any regional conflict in Asia again, although it would remain 
supporting allies and friends with military assistance and diplomatic assistance.
86
 
Goh (2008) notes that the doctrine “was interpreted by Asian states as signalling the 
potential abandonment of American regional leadership all together” (Goh 2008, p. 
364). With the Nixon Doctrine, the US underscored its desire for US allies to do 
more for their own defence; this applied especially to Japan. 
     In return for the impending reversion of Okinawa to Japan, the US convinced 
Japan to acknowledge in the 1969 Nixon-Sato Communiqué that stability in the 
Korean Peninsula was a Japanese security concern. US involvement in the Vietnam 
War also aroused controversy, generating opposition party demands for 
establishment of defence controversy, generating opposition party demands for 
establishment of defence constraints such as the April 1967 Ban on Arms Exports, 
the December 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the October 1976 National 
Defence, and the November 1976 One Percent of GNP Ceiling on defence burden,” 
(Keddell 1993, p. 9) which reflects the features of the Yoshida doctrine. It was 
indicated that “Sato is a high-posture man, ready to lead Japan toward a long-term 
UK-type dependability as a US ally” (Lafeber 1989, p. 99). Prime Minister Sato 
sought to accede with his call for an “autonomous defence” (jishu boei) which 
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 The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140 
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departed significantly from the 1957 Basic Policy by requiring Japan to provide the 
means for its primary defence and give only a supplementary role to the US (Arase 
2007). With the Nixon Doctrine, Japan adopted Yokosuka homeporting which was 
seen as a model of the U.S.-Japan relationship (Kotani 2011). The original 
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation were also approved in 1978 by the 
U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or the “two-plus-two” meeting, 
which spelled out the division of responsibilities and forms of cooperation between 
the SDF and the US military under the bilateral security arrangements with the aim 
of ensuring smooth and effective collaboration. 
 
Burden-Sharing Issues87 and Japan’s Responses: the Coercive Role of 
Hegemony? 
     The problems of “burden-sharing”, or “free riding”, emerged from the US side, 
which can also be regarded as gaiatsu for Japan to remilitarise itself. By the 1970s 
and 1980s, as a result of US decline in power and the Nixon Doctrine, Japan’s 
situation in relation to the US had changed considerably. In addition to becoming a 
major economic power, Japan was also responsible for financing much of US debt 
and benefited from a large surplus in US-Japan trade relations. Relations were even 
further strained due to the inability of US businesses to access the Japanese market. 
Many in the US concerned with the concept of what Kennedy (1987) called 
“imperial overstretch,” began to feel that Japan was exploiting the relationship by 
“free-riding” on US security guarantees. According to Grunberg (1990), “there are 
good reasons for cultivating both a belief in America’s weakness and what Calleo 
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 The “dollar system” is another example of burden-sharing in this period which can be viewed 
as one of the security issues that is acknowledged in US documents. However, Japan attempted 
to separate the issues of Okinawa’s return from the dollar system (Interview with Kazuhiro 
Takahashi, 11
th
 March 2013). 
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calls the ‘rhetoric of free-riding allies’ (Calleo 1987, p. 217; Grunberg 1990, p. 448). 
A US proposal for negotiating a detailed understanding of actual defence 
cooperation produced the 1978 U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines.
88
 The US focus was 
on wider regional contingencies while Japan focused on national defence 
contingencies. The final result was a disappointment to the US. 
     In response to Japan’s “free-riding” problem, Japan initiated the “Host Nations 
Support (HNS) programme” as an exception to this principle in 1978 which can also 
be regarded as one factor of the consensual aspect of hegemony from the neo-
Gramscian view. The purpose of the HNS was to increase Japan’s burden-sharing 
within the U.S.-Japan alliance by paying the part of United States Forces Japan 
(USFJ) operational expenses that the US had to pay in yen, such as the salaries of 
Japanese working at US bases and the cost of facilities construction. Such an 
agreement could also provide for the shared use of SDF bases, and for emergency 
use of commercial airports and port facilities, transportation systems, and medical 
facilities. This type of agreement would provide the US with avoidance costs in 
peacetime and significant savings in the event of crisis, at a relatively low cost to 
Japan (Reed 1983, p. 42). In 1978, Japanese Defence Cabinet Secretary Shin 
Kanemaru called this allocation omoiyari yosan (sympathy budget), saying it should 
be part of Japan’s defence budget to support the alliance. He used the non-legal term 
omoiyari to refer to “sympathy” for the US and its soldiers in Japan tasked with 
protecting the Japanese people from military aggression: there is no legal obligation 
for Tokyo to pay the salaries of Japanese workers under the SOFA (Yoda 2006). 
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 Takuya Kubo, from the MOD, generated the idea of the “Basic Defence Force Concept” which 
was included into the revised defence guideline with the initiative of the MOD and the Nixon 
Doctrine although it is said that revising guideline in general was seen important from the 
MOFA’s perspective. Article 5 was the focus for the MOFA, while Article Six was for the MOD. 
As a result, Article 5 was taken as a priority to be revised whilst Article Six got amended later in 
1996 (Kuriyama 2008, p. 157).   
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This demonstrates that although US pressures for Japan with the “free-rider” 
discourse was a trigger, providing HNS has become one element of Japan’s 
consensus to harness the U.S.-Japan alliance. HNS has become a means to 
strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship (Yoda 2006). Also, as the strategy of 
containment, the two countries concluded bilateral defence guidelines in 1978 that 
paved the way for Japan to play a greater role in defence of the sea lanes. 
     It is also important to note that, the “Basic Defence Capability Concept (kiban-
teki boueiryoku kousou)” was introduced in 1976, which reflected the Cold War 
security environment in East Asia. This called for Japan’s armed forces to maintain 
capabilities for repelling a small-scale aggression on its own and hold off a large-
scale aggression (i.e., a Soviet Union invasion), but to then rely on US 
reinforcements and military support (Kubo 1974). The Basic Defence Capability 
Concept emerged from Japan’s attempt to adjust to the change in US global strategy. 
This concept is based upon the idea that Japan’s defence capability should be at a 
level where it would not create a power vacuum in East Asia, yet restrained enough 
to be considered exclusively defence-oriented. The National Defence Programme 
Outline (NDPO) reflected the Basic Defence Capability Concept that envisioned a 
further enhancement of the capabilities of the JSDF which laid the foundations for it 
to become one of the most advance militaries in the world by the mid-1980s. The 
core idea of this concept was not based upon the idea of threat-based defence force 
(requirement-based defence force), which means the size of the Japanese defence 
forces is determined by those of neighbouring countries. While the aspects of this 
concept persisted in the earlier NDPGs, however, the concept got eventually 
replaced by other concepts.  These are exemplified in Chapter Four. 
136 
 
     Packard (2010) notes that “In 1971, angered by Japan’s huge export surplus with 
the US and by what he considered a betrayal by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato… –
[over returning control of] Okinawa to the Japanese-President Richard Nixon 
delivered three blows to Japan” (Packard 2010, pp. 94-95).89 Then Japan Defence 
Agency (JDA) Director Nakasone Yasuhiro, who also became the Prime Minister 
later on, took the lead in promoting this change in 1970 with the hope that jishu boei 
(autonomous defence) would displace the limited defence principle, senshu boei. The 
4th Five Year Defence Plan (1972–77) called for a force that could defeat any likely 
invasion. However, when the scale of the desired build-up became known, it was 
widely criticised (Arase 2007). Although some may perceive the 1976 NDPO as a 
step forward in Japan’s militarisation, at the time it was seen as a defeat for the 
defence hawks led by Nakasone. The NDPO stopped SDF growth well short of 
autonomous defence. At the same time, Prime Minister Miki Takeo declared a limit 
on military spending of 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) and banned all 
weapons exports in 1976 to satisfy advocates of limited defence (Arase 2007). 
     With the 1986 MDBP [Midterm defence build-up programme],” the US 
demanded Japan introduce AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] and 
tanker planes to further increase defence capability for the security of sea-lines of 
communications (Sebata 2010). Under the MDBP, the JDA emphasised the defence 
of sea-lines of communication; regarding the concept of this, the US and Japan had 
different visions. Sebata (2010) exemplifies that “This concept became important 
since the United States Navy and Maritime SDF increased joint operations such as 
the RIMPAC in the 1980s” (Sebata 2010, p. 249). The US had requested as early as 
September 1984 that enhancement of interoperability be the next theme of joint 
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 Sato promised to curb the flood of Japanese textiles into the US market in exchange for the 
return of US-controlled Okinawa to the Japanese (Packard 2010). 
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study between the two countries, and since the study on the “Sea Lane Defence” had 
been concluded, the US renewed their request. US officials promoted the study of 
interoperability partly to justify their demand that Japan buy US military equipment 
(Kohno 1989, p. 464). Unlike the Carter administration’s policy of urging increased 
Japanese spending on defence, the Reagan administration’s approach to defence 
burden sharing with Japan with an emphasis of “roles and missions”. Through the 
neo-Gramscian lenses, it is observable that consensus formation was made with 
further Japanese remilitarisation under the Nakasone administration, which differed 
from other Japanese administrations that supported the Yoshida doctrine. 
 
Becoming the “U.S.-Japan Alliance” 
     The previous section demonstrates the influence of US’ burden-sharing issues on 
Japan’s security policymaking when Japan did not merely followed US’ offers but 
responded in its own ways. This section explores the prevailing view of the U.S.-
Japan alliance, which can be seen as a consensus of the alliance relationship from the 
Japanese perspective. As is mentioned earlier, the term, the “U.S.-Japan alliance”90, 
has increasingly been used after Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki’s official usage in 
the public in 1981 after then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira described the U.S.-
Japan relationship as an “alliance” in 1979. The subsequent sections are intended to 
elucidate the consensual dimension of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the neo-Gramscian 
sense. It also examines the features of policymaking under the Nakasone 
administration which attempted to shift away from the Yoshida doctrine by changing 
the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
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 According to Miller (2006), “few Japanese were conscious of being ‘allies’ of the United 
States and the term was rarely used in the 1980s” (Miller 2006, p. 31). 
138 
 
“The U.S.-Japan Alliance”: the Consensual Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     In the context of the US-Japan relations, the term “alliance” was employed for the 
first time as the joint statement “recognize[d] that the alliance between [them] is 
built upon their shared values of democracy and liberty, [and] affirmed their 
solidarity, friendship and mutual trust” (American Presidency Project 1981; Murata 
2011). In fact, however, this further stirred some controversies between the US and 
Japan when Suzuki also indicated that the alliance does not have military 
implications after signing up for the declaration (Furumori 2011).
91
 His argument 
may have the implication that due to the experiences of the Second World War and 
anti-militarism in the Japanese society, it was still hard to underscore the military 
dimension of the alliance e. Nishihara (1983) notes that the media in Japan had a 
liberal tendency that openly criticised Japan’s remilitarisation. According to Buckley 
(1995), “He [Suzuki] apparently reckoned that Japan could continue to have it both 
ways and promises made in Washington might be reinterpreted in Tokyo to reassure 
domestic audiences that nothing had changed” (Buckley 1995, p. 142). Nonetheless, 
after his announcement, “Suzuki’s attempt to straddle between constant US pressure 
for extensive rearmament and the wariness of much of Japanese public opinion was 
best illustrated in his comprehensive security concept” (Buckley 1995, p. 143). This 
ultimately led to the resignation of the foreign minister of the Suzuki administration, 
Masayoshi Ito, for “use of the explosive ‘alliance’ to describe the US-Japan 
relationship” (New York Times 1981). 
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 It is worth remarking that there was a gap perception between then Prime Minister Suzuki and 
MOFA officials regarding the usage of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Especially from the MOFA 
perspective, there was a willingness to include the term “the U.S.-Japan alliance” to improve the 
relationship between the US although it led to the dismissal of two MOFA officials (Fujimoto 
1998) 
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     During that period, the US had been encouraging Japan to take a greater naval 
role in terms of the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf and Indian Ocean because of the 
Iranian Crisis and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979. In a joint communique 
issued during the summit between US President Reagan and Japanese Prime 
Minister Suzuki in 1981, Suzuki, after referring to the “alliance” between the US and 
Japan, and acknowledging “the desirability of an appropriate division of roles” 
between the two countries, stated that “Japan, on its own initiative and in accordance 
with its constitution and basic defense policy, will seek to make even greater efforts 
for improving its defense capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding air 
and sea space, and for further alleviating the financial burden of US forces in Japan” 
(New York Times 1981). In a later speech at the Washington Press Club, Suzuki 
elaborated this commitment, stating that as a matter of policy Japan would defend 
the sea space around Japan out to several hundred miles from the shoreline, and the 
sea lanes out to thousand nautical miles. Nakanishi (2011) analyses that “the treaty 
was increasingly seen as serving the purpose of reassurance” (Nakanishi 2011, p. 
120).  
     We can consider that, despite vibrant Ampo Toso and the reluctance of permitting 
the alliance relationship between the US and Japan, the term of “the U.S.-Japan 
alliance” has trickled down from governmental to societal level gradually especially 
in the post-Cold War era. Likewise, Japan’s acceptance of playing a larger role in 
naval security exhibits Japan’s consent of US offers although coercion from the US 
side might have played a role in this context concerning its controversies toward 
Suzuki’s less emphasis on the military component of the alliance. It is observable 
that publicly accepting the relationship as an “alliance” in the public can be seen as a 
form of Japan’s consent to the structure at the centre of the U.S.-Japan Security 
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Treaty. It is worth remarking that, although the system with the treaty is underpinned 
by the Yoshida Doctrine that has been institutionalised by organic intellectuals in 
Japan, those who support the Yoshida doctrine can be seen as “traditional 
intellectuals” in neo-Gramscian terms in the later periods, facing with new 
challenging notions against this doctrine which is discussed in the next section. The 
following section touches upon the emergence of the revisionist posture under the 
Nakasone administration, which might have contrasted with the Yoshida doctrine 
and challenged the postwar order. 
 
Remoulding the Yoshida Doctrine: Re-examining Postwar Consensus and 
Internalisation of Gaiatsu 
     The administration under Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was previously a director of 
the JDA, made an attempt to shift away from the Yoshida Doctrine. Nakasone 
derided Yoshida as “MacArthur’s entertainer”, failing to embed the self-defence 
notion in the Japanese people’s minds which is “a loss for Japan” (Samuels 2003, p. 
203). According to Kataoka and Myer (1989), “Although this strategy [focused on 
economic development while enjoying a ‘free-ride’] worked successfully until the 
mid-1970s, continued Soviet military expansion and that country’s invasion of 
Afghanistan in the late 1970s forced the United States to begin building up its arms 
and to demand that its allies do the same” (Kataoka & Myer 1989, p. 4).92 In 
consideration of the fiercer Cold War, the US put more pressure on Japan to 
remilitarise which was previously neglected by Yoshida and his supporters. In the 
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 They also remark that “Late in the Carter administration, as well as during the Reagan 
administration, American officials strongly pressed the Japanese government to accelerate 
defence spending and cooperate more closely with the United States in the Northeast Pacific. 
Because of these external pressures on expansion, the Yoshida strategy was modified, and Japan 
began to moderate arms expansion” (Kataoka & Myer 1989, p. 4). 
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early 1980s, the US started to urge Japan to expand its SDF to cooperate more 
closely with US air and naval forces for sea-lanes within a thousand nautical miles of 
Japan. The result of reassessment of the U.S.-Japan security alliance was not an 
increase in Japan’s “share of the burden” but a greater defence spending. In the end, 
the US asked Japan to increase spending for foreign aid to the Third World countries 
and to underwrite more of the costs of maintaining US military bases in Japan. They 
question why the U.S.-Japan security alliance was re-examined and what strategy 
was adopted by the mid-1980s (Kataoka & Myer 1989). 
     It is said that, in order to soothe US frustrations, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) replaced Suzuki with Yasuhiro Nakasone who was “called Japan an 
‘[unsinkable] aircraft carrier’ for the US” (Arase & Akaha 2010, p. 39). Perhaps, it 
may be more precise to say that the Nakasone administration was more responsive to 
US offers which can be seen as one factor of consensus formation based on US 
requests and can be different from other earlier Japanese administrations which 
supported the Yoshida Doctrine. Nakasone built up a close relationship with the then 
US President Ronald Reagan, commonly known as the “Ron-Yasu” relationship.93 
He was more receptive to US pressure to expand Japanese defence efforts. In 
January 1987, the Nakasone administration lifted the cap on Japanese defence 
spending, which was set at one per cent of GNP in the 1970s. By approving transfers 
of some military technology to the US, the administration attempted to sidestep the 
Three Principles on Arms Exports, which were established in 1967 and prohibit the 
export of military products to communist countries, nations confronting UN 
sanctions, or any state that is either involved in or appears to have the potential to be 
involved in activities relating to war (DiFilippo 2002, p. 62). Nakasone promised the 
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 The relationship between Junichiro Koizumi and George W. Bush, Jr. was also portrayed in a 
similar manner. 
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US to support its Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) technology in 1987 although 
there was a possible violation of the arms export rule and the rule of the one per cent 
of GDP defence ceiling. Unlike Suzuki, Nakasone contributed to develop the 
military aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance mostly in favour of the US. Tadokoro 
observes that “For Japan to call the much more powerful United States an ‘equal 
partner’ was not a true reflection of reality, of course. It was, however, an expression 
of American interest in changing the bilateral relationship from one of ‘victor’ and 
‘vanquished’ or ‘occupier’ and ‘occupied’ to a healthier diplomatic relationship 
between two independent countries” (Tadokoro 2011, p. 91).  
     It is observable that, unlike other administrations which followed the Yoshida 
Doctrine, the Nakasone administration rather became closer to the US by enhancing 
military capabilities and loosening the restrictions on remilitarisation. From the neo-
Gramscian standpoint, this can be regarded as a further consensual aspect of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance in addition to the internalisation of gaiatsu. The US decline after 
the Vietnam War influenced their alliance relationship with Japan, which may be 
different from previously. Whilst the Suzuki government might have triggered to 
accept the presence of “the U.S.-Japan alliance” despite the criticism by the media 
and the public, the Nakasone administration made efforts to become a more equal 
ally for the US by crafting new legislations and enabling Japan to contribute 
militarily. Nonetheless, as DiFilippo (2002) remarks, the culture of pacifism, which 
is deeply rooted in the Yoshida doctrine, has preserved its self-defence doctrine such 
as “exclusively defence-oriented policy” so it cannot be said that the Yoshida 
Doctrine has been entirely shelved. 
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The Cold War Alliance: Adrift, or on Course? 
     As the U.S.-Japan alliance was indeed functioned for ideological conflicts during 
the Cold War, it seemed that the original meaning of the U.S.-Japan alliance was lost 
with the end of the Cold War. However, immediately after the Cold War, several 
incidents persuaded the Japanese government to rethink their defence posture and the 
features of its alliance relationship with the US. In this realm, through the neo-
Gramscian lenses, it is noticeable in what ways the U.S.-Japan alliance has changed 
not only looking into the coercion and consensus aspects of hegemony in a 
respective manner, but through their interactions. This thesis maintains that these 
interactions have led to a firmer alliance that also contributes to the consolidation of 
the US-led historic bloc. Not only US pressures, but the pressures from Japan can be 
observed from the US perspective, which are elaborated in the subsequent section. 
 
The Gulf War in 1991: Facing the Coercion and Further Internalisation of 
Gaiatsu 
     While there is an unclear distinction between coercive and consensual aspects of 
hegemony, it is apparent that gaiatsu has been internalised into consensus to enable 
the Japanese SDF to be dispatched abroad from the neo-Gramscian perspective. One 
example is the 1990–91 conflict in the Persian Gulf that was the moment which 
forced Japan to confront their diminished strategic importance. Japan responded to 
the crisis in the Gulf by contributing thirteen billion dollars to the multinational 
effort but was criticised for its “chequebook diplomacy”. When the Kuwaiti 
government issued a statement through the US media in March 1991 thanking all the 
countries that had worked for Kuwait’s liberation, it did not include Japan on the list 
of contributing countries whereas Nakanishi (2011) notes that “Whether the 
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omission of Japan’s name from Kuwait’s official expression of thanks was deliberate 
or accidental is not known”. This is the threshold for Japanese foreign policymakers 
to rethink about Japan’s defence capability as a tool for international peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding efforts, as well as national self-defence. In 1991, immediately 
after the Gulf War, the Japanese government sent a unit of the Marine SDF to the 
Persian Gulf on a minesweeping mission after the war (Nakanishi 2011).  
     With regard to this crisis, we can interpret it in the following ways. First, the 
function of the alliance has been reinterpreted by entrenching the realm of non-
territorial security issues including peacekeeping, which further underscores the 
political elements of the alliance. Although alliances tend to be confined to the 
military, this incident exhibited that while it is not merely about the U.S.-Japan 
alliance relationship, Japan’s behaviours may have inflicted the alliance relationship 
with the US, which also influenced the later Japanese foreign policymaking.
94
 
Second, this incident might have “internalised” gaiatsu to legislate the JSDF’s 
involvements in peacekeeping operations. Consequently, the overseas mission paved 
the way for the 1992 deployment of SDF troops to Cambodia to participate for the 
first time ever in a UN peacekeeping operation. Criticism from the US and a wider 
international community led Japan to acknowledge its need to work shoulder-to-
shoulder with other nations to maintain peace and stability. Japan responded with the 
International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, which allowed the SDF to join other 
nations in UN peacekeeping by reconciling with Article Nine. According to Arase 
(2007), “This broke the psychological and normative barrier against the overseas 
dispatch of the SDF in a way that limited the Article Nine commitment to a non-
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 Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Defence (MOD); Also, according to 
Kuriyama (2008), the Gulf War influenced Japanese foreign policy despite the fact that it 
occurred out of the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
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military role” (Arase 2007, p.566). We will witness the further expansion of non-
traditional forms of security such as peacekeeping and disaster relief in the later 
chapters. 
 
The Influence of the “Higuchi Report”: Japan’s Pressures on the US 
     The post-Cold War period was a turning point for Japanese foreign policymaking 
in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which was clearly evident with the release of 
the so-called “Higuchi report”. Due to the North Korean nuclear attacks in 1993 and 
1994, the report was released in 1994. Yet, this report confused US foreign 
policymakers about Japan’s idea of its alliance relationship with the US. Even 
though the report was not intended to diminish the importance of the alliance, the 
term of “multilateralism”, which came prior to the “U.S.-Japan alliance”, made US 
foreign policymakers, particularly those who specialise in Japan, concerned that 
Japan may have undervalued the alliance with the US. Sebata (2010) explains that 
US experts on Japan, such as Michael Green and Patrick Cronin, have contributed to 
“pressure” Japan to change their attitudes by publishing their criticism of the 
“Higuchi report”.95 Regarding the influence and the role of the Higuchi Report, it is 
argued that “it was the Higuchi Report that forced the United States – which was 
about to reconsider the United States-Japan relations in the face of trade friction in 
the post-Cold War era – to take up the issue of redefining the Security Treaty” 
(Watanabe & Ina 1998; Sebata 2010, p.270). He also exemplifies how urgently the 
Higuchi report imposed on the US side the need to reconsider its alliance 
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 This can be regarded as the moment when a further coercive role of hegemony came into play 
indeed. 
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relationship with Japan for fear of losing the alliance in the midst of searching the 
meaning for the alliance in the post-Cold War.
96
 
     Consequently, East Asia Strategic Guidelines (EASG), formulated by Nye and 
also influenced the outcome of the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in 1996 entitled 
“Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century,” redefined 
and laid the basis for the future posture towards the U.S. -Japan alliance. Besides, 
after the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, Japan and the US further revised the 
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation in 1997
97
 to build up a solid basis 
for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, 
an armed attack against Japan, and contingencies in the areas surrounding Japan, 
which have a significant influence on Japan’s peace and security.  
     Article Nine was reinterpreted to allow the SDF to respond to regional 
“contingencies” by supporting US forces exclusively in non-combat roles such as 
rear area naval patrols, logistics, search and rescue, medical services, and 
information sharing. New guidelines were developed through extensive consultations 
and submitted to the SCC on September 1997. In addition, the prevailing feeling of 
peril in Japan facilitated Diet authorisation of Japan’s new international partnership 
role, the Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, 
in August 1999. Thus, by the end of the decade Japan had agreed to wider roles for 
the SDF in supporting US interventions to stabilise the East Asian region as the price 
of retaining US protection against nearby threats that Japan was ill-prepared to deal 
with (Arase 2007).  
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 Interview with Akio Watanabe; he also talked about a private meeting with them immediately 
after the release of the report. 
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 The 1997 guidelines provided for three basic categories of security cooperation: (1) 
“cooperation under normal circumstances,” (2) “actions in response to an armed attack against 
Japan,” and (3) “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important 
influence on Japan’s peace and security” (Yamaguchi 2012). 
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The Endurance of Pax Americana and an Asymmetric Alliance: The Nature of 
the US-led Historic Bloc 
     Since the enactment of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the relationship between 
the US and Japan has not been entirely stable. However, the continuity of Pax 
Americana at the centre of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which can be regarded as the US-
led historic bloc, is quite visible. Although the 1960 revision of the security treaty 
was aimed to overcome the asymmetrical nature of the alliance, it seems that this 
asymmetry still exists which remains to be debatable especially in Japan. 
Simultaneously, this asymmetrical feature of the alliance pertains to the system of 
Pax Americana since the end of the Second World War. Pyle (1992) claims that 
“The Pax Americana after 1945 provided a liberal international economic order in 
which a defeated and outcasts nation could take refuge, focus its sights on economic 
growth, and seek to rise again in such a new form” (Pyle 1992, p. 42). He also notes 
that “Relying on the U.S.’s preoccupation with the cold war to provide Japan with 
security and an open market, Japan intensified its bureaucratic controls and 
strengthened its mercantilist policies” (Pyle 1992, p. 42).  
     As Sakamoto (2011) indicates, Japan was able to receive the economic and 
political support by joining GATT in 1955, participating in free trade agreements to 
receive the financial assistance, and developing its economy by improving its 
production ability with technical supports. With regard to the asymmetrical nature of 
alliances after the Second World War, Morrow (1991) elucidates that “Asymmetric 
alliances are one of the tools hegemons use to extend their control over the 
international system. The hegemon provides its allies with security from their 
neighbours and receives both some control over the allies’ policies and strategic 
locations to advance its interests further” (Morrow 1991, pp. 929-930). According to 
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him, the US has used this strategy to extend hegemony through the network of 
asymmetric alliances which both protected US allies and provided the US with bases 
for the projection of power and the position to intervene on behalf of ‘friendly’ 
governments (Morrow 1991). 
     Although it is been argued differently from Pyle (1992) and Morrow (1991), 
similar insights on the U.S.-Japan relationship after the Second World War are made. 
Sekishita (2009) makes an argument that US dependence on Japan and Japan’s 
dependency on the US demonstrate the nature of the postwar system. According to 
him, the U.S.-Japan alliance emerged as the cornerstone for the Asia-Pacific region 
to support the US hegemonic system. As the Japanese economy got recovered under 
the US nuclear umbrella and open capital market system, Japan became dependent 
on the US while the US got reliant on Japan. This relationship is reciprocal and 
integrated, which led Japan to become one of the US “systemic dependent countries” 
overarching the elements of politics, military, economy and culture in a 
comprehensive manner (Sekishita 2009, p. 16). This viewpoint is similar to 
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, or historic bloc, in consideration of not only military 
but also economic and cultural aspects of power dynamism. 
     Watanabe (2011) also argues that the postwar Japan was the period when the 
U.S.-Japan Security System was adopted and, as long as this system persists, the era 
of “postwar” has not ended. In other words, the system was established and managed 
as a part of the international system at the centre of US hegemony which has been 
sustained since the mid-20th century (Watanabe 2011, p. 16). Moreover, while the 
Yoshida Doctrine
98
 is generally regarded as the mainstream’s lasting legacy, this 
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 Yasutomo (2014) analyses that Yoichi Funabashi made an attempt to “reinforces democratic 
values domestically, advocating greater human rights for Koreans and minorities to shore up 
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doctrine is viewed as a “permanent strategy” of Japan in the post-Cold War era (Pyle 
2007; Samuels 2007). It is worth noting that, throughout all the permutations of 
political realignment since the LDP lost control of the government in 1993, all major 
coalitions and parties have been hewn to the original formula outlined by Yoshida 
(Green 1998, p. 11). It is observable how the organic intellectuals have played their 
roles in shaping Japanese foreign policymaking as part of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
 
Conclusion 
     Chapter Three describes how the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which is the basis of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance, was moulded from the neo-Gramscian perspective and how 
the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more acceptable in the society, particularly after 
Japanese Prime Minister’s usage of the “alliance” in an official manner. The alliance 
with the US has provided not only the nuclear umbrella but also technology transfers, 
economic assistance, and markets for those conservatives and business groups which 
were focused primarily on economic recovery particularly after the Korean War in 
1950. With the security environment after the postwar era, the Yoshida Doctrine 
evolved at the centre of the U.S.-Japan alliance with the support of conservative 
politicians in Japan who can be seen as “organic intellectuals” during that period. 
During the US decline in 1970s and 1980s, Japan did not passively accepted US 
offer. Rather, Japan adjusted its attitudes while upholding its Yoshida Doctrine with 
its HNS and other measurements.  
     The issues of burden sharing emerged, criticising Japan as a “free rider” or 
“cheap rider” from the US perspective. Yet, the Nakasone administration tried to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Japan’s liberal political credentials as a means of making Japan ‘more compatible with like-
minded democracies’” (Funabashi 1991, p. 65; Yasutomo 2014, p. 19). 
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advance a more aggressive defence posture with an attempt to shift away from the 
Yoshida Doctrine. Although it may not have been Suzuki’s intention to make the 
alliance more acceptable for Japanese society by using the term for his speech with 
the US, it may have become easier after the launch of the Nakasone administration to 
enhance the military dimension of the alliance. However, since the end of the Cold 
War, the significance of “the U.S.-Japan alliance” seemed to become less significant 
and Japan’s experiences during the Gulf War unveiled how restrictive Japan can 
militarily contribute to the international community. In addition, after the release of 
the “Higuchi report”, US foreign policymakers got confused with Japan’s emphasis 
on multilateralism rather than the U.S.-Japan relationship, which gave them the 
impression that Japan had lost interest in developing its alliance relationship with the 
US. Although it was not Japan’s purpose to shift away from its alliance with the US, 
it encouraged the US to put more efforts into involve in redefining the alliance in the 
post-Cold War context. 
     As has been illustrated in this chapter, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been one of the 
elements that have sustained Pax Americana, or the US-led historic bloc in the neo-
Gramscian terms, in the Asia-Pacific region with the presence of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance since the postwar era. The chapter demonstrates how Japan did not fully 
accept coercive offers from the US side in consideration of domestic and 
international security situations. However, it also shows that Japan also agreed to US 
offers that were favourable for its conditions. This indicates the significance of the 
consensual aspect of hegemony in harnessing the US historic bloc from the neo-
Gramscian perspective on hegemony. Furthermore, considering the features of Pax 
Americana and the development of the Yoshida doctrine, the asymmetric nature of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance remains at the centre of the Japanese diplomacy regardless of 
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the attempts of the Nakasone administration to change the Japanese posture by 
moving away from the Yoshida Doctrine.
99
 In this respect, Chapter Six examines 
how the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more “common sense” in neo-Gramscian 
terms in the post-Cold War era. While taking into consideration of the role of 
organic intellectuals who possess the enterprising nature, Chapter Six also scrutinises 
whether the U.S.-Japan alliance is regarded as an asymmetric alliance or not. 
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 The asymmetrical nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance remains a central topic. “The Challenges of 
Asymmetrical Alliance” was held at the Wilson Center on June 2014. 
152 
 
Chapter Four: The U.S.-Japan Bilateral Alliance 
 
Introduction 
     While Chapter Three traces the historical development of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
through neo-Gramscian lenses, Chapters Four and Five adopt Cox’s social forces 
analysis considering the material, institutional and ideational elements of the alliance. 
Chapter Four focuses on a deepening bilateral alliance relationship between the US 
and Japan while Chapter Five looks into a closer linkage between the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, which is worth 
examining since bilateralism and multilateralism have overlapped considering the 
developments of regionalisation with the US presence. The purpose of these chapters 
is to elucidate the closeness of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship and its alliance 
management that may have led to a firmer US-led historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian 
sense. More particularly, Chapter Four and Five look into the transformation of 
Japanese foreign policymaking in response to US foreign policymaking in the post-
Cold War, the post-9.11 and the post-3.11 contexts, with a particular focus on 
organic intellectuals in neo-Gramscian terms.  
     In this regard, Chapter Four closely examines whether the nature of Japanese 
foreign policymaking, which has been underpinned by the Yoshida Doctrine, is 
alternating or not in the face of changing US policies. Deploying social forces 
analysis, Chapter Four examines material, institutional and ideational aspects of the 
US-led historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific region in the context of the U.S.-Japan 
bilateral alliance management. It aims to illustrate alliance managements between 
the US and Japan by looking into the roles of the Japanese institutions since the end 
of the Cold War. This chapter relies on the argument that, through the constellation 
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of material capabilities, institutional and ideational aspects of historic bloc in this 
context, forces interoperability and military-industrial relationship between the US 
and Japan may have developed. That is, especially among the involving actors not 
only governments but also business communities and bureaucrats, the US-Japan 
bilateral alliance has been deepened through various aspects encompassing military, 
economy and ideas that have harnessed the US historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian 
terms. 
     Chapter Four explores the following sections: a) force interoperability, and b) 
military-industrial relationship. As for force interoperability, it examines the 
influence of US strategic planning on Japan’s strategic planning by exemplifying the 
characteristics of Japan’s defence posture. This section further explores how the US 
and Japan have deepened their alliance relationship by increasing joint exercises and 
broadening their cooperation in the post-Cold War and post-9.11 environments. In 
terms of the military-industrial relationship, an increasing cooperation between the 
US and Japan in the realm of military-industry such as Ballistic Missiles Defence 
(BMD) and Japan’s changing arms export policy is scrutinised. More precisely, 
before investigating closer US-Japan military-industrial cooperation, the section 
elucidates the features of Japan’s defence industry and its past controversies with the 
US. Thereafter, their increasing cooperation is scrutinised considering Japan’s 
changing approaches towards defence industries in the context of globalisation. 
Specifically, as is explained in Chapter Two, the roles of not only ministries but also 
the business federation in Japan should be taken into account. Lastly, the chapter 
summarises the recent trends of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship regarding force 
interoperability and the military-industrial relationship by taking into account the 
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significance of the Yoshida Doctrine which has underpinned not only Japanese 
defence policies but also its general foreign policies. 
 
Force Interoperability and Military-Industrial Relationship 
     In the following sections, force interoperability and military-industrial 
relationship are closely examined by means of social forces analysis. In terms of 
force interoperability, it is worthwhile to recognise the increasing relevance of 
HA/DR. while looking into the roles of not only the US and Japanese governments 
but also the Japanese MOD and the Keidanren, who regard the enhancement of force 
interoperability important especially after Japan’s experiences of the 3.11 
Earthquake and Tsunami. The section for military-industrial relationship between the 
US and Japan demonstrates the influences of US ideas on Japan’s policymaking 
including the BMD cooperation and dual-use technology (DUT) while examining 
not only governments but also the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 
the Keidanren and Japanese companies involved in arms industries have contributed 
to transform the Japanese policymaking in the face of a changing international 
environment. As is indicated in Chapter Two, demarcating material, institutional and 
ideational elements can be difficult yet the three factors can be interrelated as the 
following diagram displays. 
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Diagram 2: Social Forces Analysis 
 
Source: Cox (1987); Author 
     When these three elements interact, it can be seen as the emergence of new 
factors to underpin the U.S.-led historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian sense, while other 
overlapping areas can be also regarded as the aspects of strengthening the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. Although such concepts as transformation and dynamic deterrence can be 
regarded as ideas that also influenced the US-led historic bloc, this chapter closely 
examines the ideas which are intimately associated with ideology such as liberalism.  
 
a) Force Interoperability 
After the Postwar Era 
Japan’s Exclusively Defence Oriented Policy (EDOP) 
     It is worth noting that Japan has developed the Exclusively Defence Oriented 
Policy (EDOP) in the postwar era. The Japanese government has consistently 
maintained its posture that the overseas deployment of the Self-Defence Forces 
(SDF) is unconstitutional, which was first confirmed in a 1954 Diet resolution and 
the SDF force structure has been established exclusively for national territorial 
defence. The issue of overseas deployment is intimately related to the constitutional 
156 
 
issue of the limits of self-defence since the government has also imposed a ban on 
exercising the right of collective self-defence.
100
 In particular, the EDOP not only 
constrains the SDF from participating in overseas operations, but also precludes the 
SDF from having the capability to strike another country’s territory.101 The Japanese 
Diet has referred the EDOP as the prohibition of the SDF from acquiring 
“exclusively” offensive capabilities, such as aircraft carriers including US’ 
supercarriers, long-range strategic bombers and ballistic missiles (Takahashi 2008, p. 
110).
102
 The government has long been on record as asserting that Japan’s right of 
self-defence can only be exercised after an attack on Japanese territory, and that an 
attack by Japan on enemy bases could only be undertaken in the limited 
circumstance where the destruction of Japan was certain and no alternative means of 
defence was available. The Japanese government also justifies the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty on the ground that the treaty has no requirement for Japan to come to 
the defence of the US or its forces except in response to attacks within “the 
territories under the administration of Japan” (Reed 1983).103  
     In fact, the Japanese government modified this prohibition to forbid only the 
dispatch “of armed troops to a foreign country for the purpose of using armed force”. 
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF)
104
 had staged training exercises 
with US forces in 1955 with antisubmarine and minesweeping (Reed 1983). While 
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 The issue of collective self-defence, which is exemplified in this chapter, has been 
controversial in the Japanese politics especially after the second Abe administration that accepted 
“collective self-defence” on the 1
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 July 2014 in spite of the opposition to this (Asahi Shimbun 
2014). 
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 As a result, for instance, the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force (SDF) is limited in its ability to 
mirror the approach taken by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in developing improved interoperability 
with the United States Air Force (USAF). 
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 Agawa’s (2002) Friendship of the Sea illustrates the cumulated trust between the US and 
Japan (Interview with Masato Nagai, 25
th
 December 2012). 
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Reed (1983) remarks that there was very little consideration given to joint operations 
or joint planning prior to 1978 despite the long-term security arrangement between 
the US and Japan, the foundation for greater defence cooperation between the two 
countries was established in the centre of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan 
Defence Cooperation calling for joint planning and cooperation in areas such as 
command and control, intelligence exchange, and logistics support (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 1978). Owing to the adoption of these guidelines, Japan has 
participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) joint naval exercises with such 
countries as the US, New Zealand, and Australia which has played a bigger role in 
the post-Cold War era. Specifically, the Japanese Ground Self-Defence Forces 
(GSDF) engaged in RIMPAC throughout the 1980s. In addition, joint air exercises, 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training, and communications drills have been 
conducted. Still, it is argued that “joint planning and operations are in their infancy; 
much more needs to be done in this area if significant results are to be achieved” 
(Reed 1983, p. 54). 
     Prior to the Cold War era, the joint interoperability between the US and Japan 
was less visible because of Japan’s EDOP doctrine which has also limited 
cooperation for collective self-defence. Japan did not actively cooperate with the US 
in the military terms although more joint cooperation was conducted in the 1980s 
that may have influenced by the Cold War contexts. Furthermore, each Air SDF, 
Marine SDF and Ground SDF has the different experiences; Marine SDF training for 
minesweeping from the 1950s and the Ground SDF joint cooperation from the 1980s. 
Their activities were constrained by the EDOP doctrine and the Japanese 
Constitution, and it seems that there were only subtle influences of US foreign 
policymaking on Japanese foreign policymaking. In this regard, in the subsequent 
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section, the situations of the post-Cold War period are illustrated by underscoring the 
changes in the security environment and the influence of US foreign policy on 
Japanese foreign policymaking. Even though the Cold War came to an end, new 
security challenges have led to a deeper bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. 
 
Post-Cold War 
      At first glance, it seemed that the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance has 
diminished in the wake of the Cold War since the alliance was originally aimed at 
preventing the spread of Communism in an international scale. However, the 
relevance of the alliance persisted and the features of the U.S.-Japan alliance have 
gradually been altered by adjusting its policies to US foreign policymaking. In this 
regard, this section underlines the integration of both foreign policymaking of the US 
and Japan in the realm of force interoperability.  
 
Transformation 
     In the 1990s, “transformation” emerged as new US strategic planning which has 
also influenced Japan’s defence posture. The William J. Clinton administration 
started to use this concept for defence posture by indicating in its Joint Vision 2010, 
underlining the necessity to transform doctrines and military trainings to enhance 
capabilities to carry out joint operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996).
105
 
Transformation is intended to involve fundamental change in the form of military 
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 The QDR 1997 also urged the importance of the transformation by accelerating the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), improvement of mobility, and the strengthening of 
precision strike capabilities. The purpose of transformation is to maintain or improve U.S. 
military preeminence in the face of potential disproportionate discontinuous changes in the 
strategic environment (U.S. Department of Defence 1997). 
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operations for responding new threats. It was understood that “transformation must 
therefore be focused on emerging strategic and operational challenges and the 
opportunities created by these challenges” (Fukuda 2006, p. 30). Subsequently, 
during the George W. Bush, Jr. administration, “transformation” was perceived in a 
broader sense. According to Krepinevich (2002), “Transformation is not solely based 
on introducing new technologies into the force, [but] also requires changes in the 
way the force is employed through major changes in doctrine and force structure” 
(Krepinevich 2002, p. 2). The 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) also notes 
that “Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational 
concepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of 
organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic and 
operational challenges and opportunities and that render previous methods of 
conducting war obsolete or subordinate” (U.S. Department of Defence 2001, p. 
29).
106
      
     As a result, US transformation exerted influences on the Japanese SDF structure. 
Japan’s SDF has transformed into three dimensions: organisation, alliance, and 
equipment (National Institute for Defence Studies 2007). Among these elements, the 
most significant transformation is organisational change. Furthermore, the Japanese 
Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) report (2000) also acknowledges that the info-RMA 
should not only be in accordance with Japan’s own defence policy, but also ensure 
the interoperability of the SDF and US forces. Their study on the RMA in the realm 
of information recognises that the innovation of information technology (IT) is a 
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crucial component of the RMA.
107
 In the following sections, the transformation of 
Japanese foreign security policies is examined taking into consideration the US 
transformation project that entails multiples processes. Exhibiting the purposes of the 
changes in Japanese strategic planning that are closely related to the US ones, the 
sections displays how it has become integrated with US strategic planning. While 
Japan crafted new doctrines in regard to a changing strategic environment, the 
section crystallises a deepening U.S.-Japan alliance with increasing joint operations 
at a bilateral level.  
  
Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), Global Posture Review (GPR) and 
Japan’s National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG)  
     Due to the US transformation project, the December 2002 meeting of the U.S.-
Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or the “2+2” meeting, set into motion 
the Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), a series of consultations between Japan 
and the US on transforming their alliance, especially with regard to US Forces Japan 
(USFJ) realignment with the principles of maintaining deterrence and reducing the 
burdens on local communities (National Institute for Defence Studies 2008). In fact, 
it is crucial to note that it was the first time that the Japanese MOD was involved in 
the negotiations with the US side which differs from the period when the MOFA 
played a bigger role in the U.S.-Japan alliance management. In this sense, it can be 
observed with Gramsci’s view of institutions. This initiative resulted in a series of 
agreements that dealt with issues such as “common strategic objectives, roles and 
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 The MOD’s report (2000) also indicates that “the United States actively promotes various 
programs related to the RMA by making use of its possession of the most advanced information 
technologies in the world. Taking this into consideration, Japan should promote studies on [the] 
RMA as an ally of the United States” (MOD 2000, p. 5). 
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missions (CRM)”, shared basing, cooperation on BMD, and base and troop 
realignments that have become part of the components of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
(National Bureau of Asian Research 2010). Along these processes at governmental 
level, the DPRI process led to the formulation of “US-Japan Alliance: 
Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” a joint statement released at the 
October 2005 SCC meeting, and culminated with the 5/1 Joint Document at the May 
2006 SCC meeting (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005; 2006) that are exemplified in 
the subsequent sections. 
     In addition, the US’ Global Posture Review (GPR) was another important part of 
the US transformation that reviews the posture and improves the ability in order to 
respond to emergencies by projecting its forces from remote areas or putting the 
ships on the sea. The then US President Bush started negotiating over the GPR with 
its allies in a statement dated November 2003. The main objective of the GPR is not 
only realigning of forces and bases but increasing mobility, deployability, and the 
flexibility of U.S. forces (U.S. Department of Defence 2001). The 2001 QDR report 
also indicates that “The most important aspect of GPR…has the potential to bring 
about a revolutionary change in the relationships and ways of cooperation between 
the U.S. and its allies, that is, Transformation of alliances…GPR is a great attempt to 
re-create the framework of the U.S. alliance (U.S. Department of Defence 2001, p. 
39).  
     As a consequence of the US transformation project, the Japanese government 
renewed its new National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) in 2004 by 
emphasising a new concept of defence capability based on a “multifunctional, 
flexible, and effective force”. The 2004 NDPG provides a clear direction for Japan’s 
own defence transformation, stating that “Japan will develop multi-functional, 
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flexible, and effective forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-
purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence 
capabilities measuring up to the Military-Technological level of other major 
countries” (Ministry of Defence 2004). It spells out a future vision for the SDF’s 
security and defence capabilities by citing various threats, such as ballistic missile 
and nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, and instability of the Korean 
peninsula, to demonstrate the need for new capabilities and justify the call for 
continued strategic dialogue with the US.
108
 Additionally, in order to achieve the 
aforementioned key objectives, the Japanese government has enacted laws for 
coping with a national emergency, such as the Armed Attack Situation Response 
Law and Civil Protection Law. 
 
Realignment 2005 
     The joint statement issued on February 2005 notes the importance of realigning 
the U.S. force posture in Japan to meet the demands of the post-9.11 security 
environment and to reduce the burden on local Japanese communities, which has 
been one of the serious problems in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
109
 
According to the report, “the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and 
capabilities of Japan’s SDF and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond 
effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2005). Additionally, the October 2005 report “Transformation and 
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 “The document also spelled out a concept of Japan’s defence capabilities for the post-.911 
world…In pursuing this, Japan has learned from the US experience in its defence transformation, 
to improve interoperability between the US and Japanese forces and ensure connectivity between 
command and control systems of the two forces in particular, and seek its uniqueness in 
designing various systems of the SDF in order to make the SDF as complementary to US forces 
as possible” (Yamaguchi 2006, p. 64).   
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 Chapter Six explores this aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
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Realignment for the Future” describes not only the realignment plan but also “roles, 
missions, and capabilities” (RMC),110 of the future U.S.-Japan alliance. In order to 
bolster bilateral security cooperation, it puts emphasis on the significance of “close 
and continuous policy and operational coordination”, “information sharing and 
intelligence cooperation”, “improving interoperability”, “opportunities for bilateral 
training and exercises”, and “share-use of facilities between U.S. forces and the SDF” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). The report lists examples of operations in 
bilateral security and defence cooperation to be improved, including BMD; counter-
proliferation operations such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); 
counterterrorism; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; humanitarian relief; 
reconstruction assistance; and peacekeeping (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005).  
Szechenyi (2006) argues that these examples reflect the MOD’s interest in 
developing new SDF capabilities as described in the NDPG that presents a wide 
range of potential roles and missions (Szechenyi 2006, pp. 141-142). 
     The “agreed realignment plan” constitutes not only the relocation of the U.S. 
bases and the reduction of the burden of local communities,
111
 but also comments on 
strengthening the alliance by reinforcing capabilities and flexibility of US forces in 
Japan and developing closer military cooperation between the SDF and US forces. 
The most remarkable one is a plan for Camp Zama in Kanagawa which the US has 
insisted for the move from Washington. The mission of the headquarters of the 1st 
Corps is to command augmentation forces from the US homeland in emergences in 
the Asia-Pacific region and it is linked to the reduction of the U.S. ground forces in 
                                                          
110
 It is noted that the RMC was adopted for efficiency (Interview with Kazuyoshi Umemoto, 7
th
 
March 2013).  
111
 It is important to note that the US has been engaged in the issue of base closure and 
realignment especially at domestic level. The commission for the “Base Closure and 
Realignment” (or “Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)”) report was issued on the 13th May 
2005 which has been developed since the QDR 2001. 
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South Korea (Fukuda 2006, p. 42). The report indicates that with this realignment, 
“capabilities of the U.S. Army Japan command structure in Camp Zama will be 
modernized to be a deployable, joint task force-capable operational headquarters 
element” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). On the contrary, however, the Japanese 
government hesitated to accept this proposal since there was a concern in the 
Japanese public that the missions of the headquarters do not harmonise with the 
principles of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, particularly the Article 6 which 
prescribes that the US can use the bases in Japan only for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Far East (Fukuda 2006). 
 
QDR 2006 & Roadmap 2006  
     The 2006 QDR underlines the transformational shift of joint forces “from de-
conflicting joint operations to integrated and even interdependent operations - all 
while massing the cumulative power of joint forces to achieve synergistic effects” 
(U.S. Department of Defence 2006). In response, Japan took a drastic first step 
towards a better operational posture to unify capabilities of different services. 
According to Japan’s 2005 Defence White Paper, the SDF operations in early 2005 
for rescuing people from the Tsunami in Indonesia and Thailand became a 
benchmark of joint operations where the SDF’s three services worked together as a 
team for the same mission (Ministry of Defence 2005). The Joint Co-ordination 
Centre, dispatched by the Joint Staff Office with augmentation from Service staffs 
deployed in Thailand, was responsible for harmonising activities of Japan’s three 
Services and coordinating with militaries, government and nongovernment 
organisations from various countries. In July 2005, the SDF Law and the JDA 
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Establishment Law were amended to enhance the joint operations posture.
112
 Based 
on the amended law, the Joint Chief of Staff was formed instead of the Chairman of 
the Joint Staff Council at the end of March 2006. Until then, the Chiefs of Staff of 
the Ground SDF, Marine SDF, and Air SDF were in charge of most operations. The 
Central Readiness Force Command of the Ground SDF has been operational since 
then at Camp Zama which is a high readiness unit consisting of airborne troops, a 
helicopter unit, special forces, and an anti-biological and chemical unit which aims at 
reinforcing the ties between the U.S. Army and the Ground SDF (Yamaguchi 2006). 
     In 2006, as a part of the DPRI, the US and Japan reached an agreement, including 
the relocation of 8,000 Marines and their approximately 9,000 dependents to Guam, 
but only after Futenma had been moved to Henoko.
113
 An interconnected set of US 
and Japanese force posture realignments, often referred to as the “Road Map for 
Realignment,” constitutes a comprehensive package of force-posture changes. The 
secretaries of state and defence and their Japanese counterparts finalised the agreed 
road map on May 2006 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). US President George W. 
Bush, Jr. and Japanese Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and Yasuo 
Fukuda have all endorsed these realignments. Despite delays, some advances were 
attained in realigning, consolidating, and reducing USFJ facilities in Okinawa in 
accordance with the final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa 
(SACO), which was established in response to the 1995 rape of an Okinawan 
schoolgirl by US marines (National Institute for Defense Studies 2007).  
     However, the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, which 
was the biggest step in that process, has failed to move forward and achieve the 
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 MOD, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/english.pdf. 
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 In fact, Hiroshi Kawauchi, a member of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), criticised the 
number of Marine Corps not being precisely given (Kawauchi 2013). 
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planned easing of the burden on local communities. The relocation of MCAS 
Futenma is of extreme importance since it forms a lynchpin for the overall process of 
USFJ realignment (Fukuda 2006). The transformation centres on harnessing the 
U.S.-Japan security arrangement based upon three pillars: commitment to common 
strategic objectives; updating the roles, missions and capabilities of both partner-
nations’ militaries, and a realignment of both militaries to better enable an enduring 
presence of U.S. military partner forces in Japan. Other significant changes across 
mainland Japan include: collocating selected Japanese ground and air units with 
complementary U.S. forces on U.S. bases; facilitating civilian aircraft movement 
through airspace over the Yokota Air Base; and relocating most Carrier Air Wing 
Five fixed-wing squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility, near Tokyo, to Iwakuni Marine 
Corp Air Station in a less densely populated area in Japan. Prior to finalising the 
road map, the two governments also agreed to replace the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft 
carrier with the nuclear-powered USS George Washington in 2008 (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2006). 
       
Opposition to Transformation: the Counter-Hegemonic Force 
     While this section displays the closeness of the US and Japan, it is important to 
note that, as already mentioned, the US transformation project has sparked 
controversies at the local level in Japan. Opponents of the plan have not only 
organised protests, but also mounted legal challenges to the landfill construction on 
the grounds that it has harmed the ecosystem and endangered protected marine 
animals, especially in the context of Okinawa (Pettyjohn 2014). In response to this 
persistent oppositions, the U.S.-Japan “2+2” meeting have recognised the necessity 
167 
 
to reduce the burden on local communities in Japan by stressing the importance of 
enhancing positive relations between local communities and US forces. For instance, 
the “realignment subsidy” (saihen kofukin), which is granted to base-hosting 
municipalities including Nago city (Okinawa prefecture) and Iwakuni city 
(Yamaguchi prefecture), emerged in order to soothe the anxieties of local 
communities in Japan towards hosting US bases. However, some notes that the logic 
of creating this type of subsidy is similar to the subsidies for nuclear facilities 
(Miyamoto & Kawase 2010). This can be viewed as a strategy to ease the 
unsatisfactory feeling of “not in my backyard (NIMBY)”. According to Maeda 
(2013), these subsidies have underscored the nature of discriminatory policy from 
central government in Japan. In this regard, in 2010, Nago city in Okinawa had a 
problem in not being able to receive subsidies due to its opposition against US bases’ 
move to Henoko located in the city. Furthermore, with local support, Susumu 
Inamine, a mayor of Nago city, remains committed to creating a city that does not 
rely on subsidies or the US military (Ryukyu Shimpo 2010). 
     It is also noted that, according to Katsusuke Ihara, former Mayor in Iwakuni, 
Yamaguchi prefecture, people’s attitudes toward the bases changed after the 
Agreement on the Realignment of US Forces in Japan on October 2005 and the 
referendum in Iwakuni was held on March 2006 while many members of the 
Iwakuni Assembly were against the referendum (Jin 2014). It is possible that initially 
they only raised their voices against the realignment in the hope of gaining leverage 
when it came to discussing compensation. However, Ihara (2009) explains that the 
chair of the Assembly and some of its members were pressured by the central 
government of Japan and perhaps negotiated some sort of compensation as a 
condition for acceptance (Ihara 2009; Jin 2014). According to him, “In the context of 
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the Realignment of US Forces, the connection between Iwakuni and Okinawa has 
grown, and the opposition movement gathered momentum in exchanges between 
civil society organizations in Okinawa and Iwakuni. After the announcement of the 
Realignment, many organizations appeared in Iwakuni that were willing to work 
with Okinawa. The authorities called this Realignment a ‘package deal,’ which 
means all of us have interests at stake” (Jin 2014). 
 
Dynamic Deterrence, Japan’s Dynamic Defence and Dynamic “Joint” Defence 
Force 
     While the project of US transformation caused controversies at local level, 
nonetheless, the Japanese government gradually further transformed its defence 
policy. The US brought up a new concept “dynamic deterrence” defined by Charles 
T. Allen, Gary L. Guertner, and Robert P. Haffa, Jr., as conventional military 
deterrence that combines efforts “to dissuade, capabilities to neutralize or capture, 
credible threats to retaliate, and the ability to defend” coupled with “an explicit 
embrace of the use of force” to effectively communicate a deterrent threat or compel 
an enemy to change its behaviour (Ministry of Defence 2012). The shared awareness 
present in Japan’s current NDPG and the US QDR 2010 was an integral part of the 
background of these common strategic objectives. As is noted above, one of the 
goals of Japan’s NDPG is to create a dynamic defence force not bound by the 
traditional dichotomy between peace and war. In a similar vein, the QDR 2010
114
 
states, “The future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the 
ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace” (U.S. Department of 
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 It is remarked that the 2010 QDR and the 2010 NPR were created after checking with Japan 
which may indicate the matureness of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Interview with an MOD official, 
26
th
 March, 2013) 
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Defence 2010). It also spells out agreement on the importance of bilateral dynamic 
deterrence, committing to ongoing regular deterrence operations. 
     Japan developed this concept without relying on the “Basic Defence Force 
Concept” that lasted for a long time. The report entitled “Japan’s Vision Future 
Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation” 
indicates that “With the non-combat role of the military capabilities becoming 
diversified and increased, the ‘Basic Defense Force’ concept, which has limited 
Japan’s defense capabilities only for the purpose of denial of limited-scale external 
invasion, is no longer valid” (Kantei 2010). With a growing need for regular 
international coordination or cooperation, the role of military forces is becoming 
increasingly diverse, and it is becoming normal to use military forces regularly and 
continuously for peacetime mission including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, 
and counter-piracy initiatives. In addition, according to the MOD official document, 
“Under the current trend in the region, it is important to develop not only so-called 
‘static deterrence’ that ensures deterrence through the existence of defence forces per 
se, but also so-called ‘dynamic deterrence’ that ensures deterrence by showing 
Japan’s will and high-performance defence capabilities through timely and 
appropriate conduct of various activities” (Ministry of Defence 2011, p. 1).115 
      Furthermore, Japan’s East Asian Strategic Review 2012 notes that “US-Japan 
cooperation can be expected to develop through synergy between US and joint US-
Japan efforts regarding high-end contingencies and Japan’s efforts toward dynamic 
deterrence” (National Institute for Defense Studies 2012, pp. 252-253). It is 
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 It is also noted that “it has become more important to ensure Japan’s sovereignty, peace and 
security, and prosperity through various activities that can effectively fulfil the three roles of the 
defence force defined in the 2010 NDPG. For this purpose, the 2010 NDPG provide that Japan is 
aimed at developing a ‘dynamic defence force’ that focuses on ‘operation’ of defence forces, and 
the Guidelines aim at increasing SDF activities as well as ensuring the quantity and quality of 
equipment” (Ministry of Defence 2010). 
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remarked that “dynamic defence” in the 2010 Guidelines places importance 
especially the principle of the SDF’s activities particularly on to 1) to strengthen 
preparation against military activities of neighbouring countries through reinforcing 
regular intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities which is called 
“ISR,”116 2) to quickly and seamlessly respond to various contingencies, and 3) 
multi-layered promotion of cooperative activities with foreign countries (Ministry of 
Defence 2011). 
     Moreover, under the second Abe administration, the 2013 NDPG
117
 was issued 
with the concept of “dynamic joint defence force” which places “emphasis on 
developing advanced technology and information, command and communications 
capabilities and achieving readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, robustness 
and connectivity in terms of both tangible and intangible resources while giving 
consideration to the establishment of broad infrastructure for logistical support” 
(Kantei 2013). Nonetheless, some argues that “There is little difference between the 
newly introduced ‘Dynamic Joint Defense Force’, and the ‘Dynamic Defense Force 
Concept’” with the efforts toward strengthening joint operations on a regular basis 
which were visible at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake (Democratic Party 
of Japan 2013). However, perhaps an inclusion of “joint” may signify a more 
emphasis of both integrated operations among Japanese SDF, and the US and Japan.  
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 A U.S. – Japan Defense ISR Working Group was created on October 3rd to investigate how to 
integrate the two nations’ ISR capabilities. There has been a project on the “Integrated Japanese-
American ISR Network” in order to develop a plan for an integrated Japanese-America ISR 
network. See Way Forward for the U.S.-Japanese Alliance 
http://www.americansecurityproject.org/way-forward-for-the-u-s-japanese-alliance/. 
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 This was the first NDPG developed under the “National Security Strategy (NSS)” which 
“ensure that they are in consonance with all other aspects of the GOJ’s security strategy such as 
those on diplomacy, commerce and trade, while fitting precisely into a broader picture of national 
security strategy” (Yamaguchi 2014). The 2013 NDPG also contains several key phrases such as 
a “proactive contribution to peace”. 
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At the Operational Level 
     The U.S.-Japan alliance has been enhanced at the operational level by developing 
its joint exercises leading to a further integration between the US and Japan, which 
may be harnessing US-led historic bloc in a neo-Gramscian sense. At the military 
level, Japan has made attempts to upgrade its capabilities in order to cooperate with 
the US military. With regard to Joint Staff Council (JSC), Hajime Massaki, former 
Chairman of the JSC, who indicated that “US forces are organized as a joint force. 
When we look at bilateral Cooperation, separate service channels of the GSDF, 
MSDF and ASDF, as opposed to a unified channel, may have made co-ordination 
with the US joint channel process more complex. In this context, more joint 
structures of the SDF will make a single and unified point of contact and make co-
ordination smoother” (Asagumo Shinbun 2005; Yamaguchi 2006). It is also 
important to remark that the U.S. Embassy and Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan 
“Country Team,” led by Ambassador Schieffer, has worked closely with Japanese 
ministry and military leaders to coordinate in-Japan implementation of the road map 
(Uchikura 2010).  
 
Transformation and Dynamic Defence 
     As can be seen from the previous section, Japan has adjusted its defence posture 
to the US’ transformation project. According to Takahashi (2008), US 
transformation led the Japanese government to engage in an organisational 
transformation of the SDF so as to make more effective use of resources. In pursuing 
such “cheap transformation, the GOJ [Japanese government] has enacted the 
National Emergency Act strengthened SDF joint operation capabilities by 
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establishing the Joint Staff Office, upgraded the JDA to the MOD, and designated 
international cooperation activities as one of the SDF’s primary missions” 
(Takahashi 2008, p.109). Toshikatsu Yamaguchi, former JDA director of operations, 
praised the use of computer simulation for the exercise. According to him, “The 
Japan self-defence forces [SDF] generally were not familiar with conducting 
command post exercises using computer simulations…However, the U.S. forces 
provided us a good opportunity to learn” (U.S. Department of Defence 1996). 
Further integrated operations between the US and Japan shows Japan’s efforts to 
transform its defence posture in reflection of the US transformation project. 
Moreover, in regard to “dynamic defence”, Takahashi (2008) argues that the SDF 
naturally follows that pursuing bilateral cooperation in dynamic defence while 
building Japan’s dynamic defence force is a key factor in deepening the future U.S.-
Japan alliance. He argues that, by focusing on proactive operations of the Japan SDF 
and US military in regions that fall into this gray area in furthering bilateral 
cooperation, synergies with the dynamic defence force can be achieved. In each of 
the three roles of defensive force indicated in Japan’s 2010 NDPG, there is much to 
be gained through cooperation between the JSDF and the US military as they 
actively conduct their missions.
118
  
 
Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD) 
     Japan and the US agreed the plan in 2006 and then completed the construction in 
2012 of the colocation of an Air SDF and USAF Bilateral and Joint Operations 
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 For example, we can hope for the promotion of effective deterrence and response from the 
hardening of bases, increased troop readiness and operational capacity through the joint use of 
facilities, joint training and exercises, and surveillance, as well as increased interoperability, clear 
deterrence and response capacity, and dynamic deterrence through constant surveillance. 
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Coordination Centre, essentially a joint air defence control headquarters, at USAF 
Yokota in Japan. In addition, the US deployed X-Band radar at the ASDF’s Kashiri 
base in Aomori Prefecture since 2006, and reached agreement with Japan in 2012 for 
the deployment of second X-Band radar. According to Hughes (2013), this further 
integrated Japan within the architecture of the US missile defence. Garren Mulloy, a 
former British Army officer who has worked with special forces units from several 
countries, indicates that “Though well-trained and well-equipped, the CRF troops are 
geared primarily for fighting a conventional war, on Japanese home soil. That’s far 
different from, say, rescuing hostages in the Algerian desert or defending a 
compound in downtown Mogadishu” (Spitzer 2013). Mulloy also remarked that 
“One of the things that politicians don’t understand — and many military leaders, as 
well — is the extraordinary complexity of any hostage-type situation, and the 
constrained, inter-agency environment in which (Japanese) forces would be required 
to operate. It requires different skills and a very different mind set” (Spitzer 2013). 
Through a close cooperation with the SDF, the US military’s BMD is expected to 
play a significant role in the defence of Japan. The following graph shows the joint 
exercises at ground, marine and air levels that have been staged approximately 18 
times on average per year since 2005. From 2010, joint exercises with the use of 
BMD have been conducted. 
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Graph 1: US-Japan Joint Exercises (since 2005)
119
 
                                            Source: Japanese Ministry of Defence 
 
RIMPAC and Other Exercises 
     Under Japan’s restrictive peacekeeping and anti-terrorism laws, Japanese troops 
in most cases are not permitted to command, or come under the command of, foreign 
forces. The US-Japan Security Treaty provides an exception for exercises like 
RIMPAC 2012, which is hosted by US Pacific Command. The RIMPAC 2012 has 
become the largest naval training exercise in years, with ships, planes and troops 
from 22 countries, including Japan. The forces have conducted anti-submarine, 
missile-defence, live-fire, counter-piracy and other drills over vast stretches of the 
Pacific through early August and non-US officers served as command major 
components of the fleet for the first time. A Japanese rear admiral, Fumiyuki 
Kitagawa, has been named vice commander of the Combined Task Force which 
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 It is remarked that, despite the difficulties of alliance management at policy levels, 
confidential-building has been persistently established at military-to-military relationship 
(Interview with an official of the US embassy in Japan, 18
th
 March 2013). However, it is noted 
that, due to structural difference, it is hard to establish the U.S.-Japan joint exercises unless Japan 
jointly operated among air, sea and ground (Interview with Tetsuya Kotani, 8
th
 March 2013). 
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makes him second in command of a force that includes 48 ships and submarines, 
more than 200 warplanes and 25,000 troops (Spitzer 2012). Yoji Koda, former head 
of the Joint Staff for Japan’s Marine SDF and also took part in RIMPAC exercises, 
indicated that “It’s more about safety, coordination, interoperability…But the 
opportunity itself has significance for the JSDF” (Spitzer 2012).  
     Additionally, Japanese participation in Dawn Blitz was fast-tracked under the 
second Abe administration. One of the goals of the exercise, called Dawn Blitz 2013, 
is to learn how to berth large numbers of ground troops and store weapons, 
ammunition, equipment and supplies aboard ship for extended periods of time 
(Spitzer 2013). For the first time in the postwar era, Japanese ground troops operated 
from Japanese warships far from home. According to Spitzer (2013), “Learning how 
to live, train and fight from warships over extended periods of time and great 
stretches of ocean – and learning how to adapt those ships to accommodate hundreds 
of ground troops and their weapons and equipment — will be a key goal of the 
exercise” (Spitzer 2013). The aforementioned examples of the U.S.-Japan joint 
exercises show the closeness of the interoperability of the two countries.  
 
Peacekeeping 
     In relation to peacekeeping, the capability for rapid deployment has been 
developed. Smith (1999) describes “Japan’s selective participation in U.N.-
sponsored peacekeeping efforts has opened up the possibility of using the SDF for 
roles that can conform to the continued desire by the Japanese public that its military 
not engage in combat” (Smith 1999, p. 87). Peacekeeping activities have been 
accepted by the government and general public as legitimate and important 
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contributions by Japan to global and regional security as the enactment of the UN 
Peacekeeping Law shows. These activities have maintained justification for mobile 
forces that can be dispatched across the world (Leitenberg 1996). On November 
2009, Japan-co-hosted the “US-Japan Global Peace Operations Initiative Senior 
Mission Leaders Course (GPOI SML)”120 which was one of the action programmes 
launched by the Global Peace Operations Initiative led by the US contribution to the 
Broader G8 Action Plan for Expanding Capability for Peace Support Operations, 
adopted at the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit. This was part of the U.S.-Japan 
cooperation and plays a role as the U.S.-Japan alliance for the stability in the Asia-
Pacific.
121
 The second course was conducted in September 2011 in Tokyo, keeping 
with the broader engagement with peacekeeping. The then Japanese Prime Minister, 
Naoto Kan, announced that the government was seeking for new ways to increase 
the number of the SDF’s peacekeeping contributions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2011).  
     Moreover, Yasutomo’s (2014) work illustrates the new diplomatic dynamic of the 
integration of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the SDF into “a 
particular Japanese-type civil-military diplomatic configuration” in the cases of Iraq 
and Afghanistan.
122
 He explains that “rather than a militarization of ODA, the SDF 
‘civilianized’ by adopting the traditional ODA philosophy and implementation 
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 According to Toru Namatame, who participated in the SML programme once, he learnt the 
features of PKO which is aimed at nation-building (or institutional building). He also pointed 
that, in line with ODA, the SDF considered the activities for PKO in South Sudan, not the MOFA 
(Interview with Toru Namatame, 17
th
 April 2013). This shows the multiple roles of institutions 
involved in certain tasks dynamically in the way that Gramsci may have viewed them. However, 
it is also pointed that there is some legal problems remain (Interview with Chiyuki Aoi, 8
th
 April 
2013). 
121
 Interview with Masatoshi Sugiura, 12
th
 April 2013. He also remarks that it is part of “capacity 
building” but the civilian element is stronger than the military one. 
122
 He further exemplifies that “The securitization of ODA began to take shape in Afghanistan 
and Iraq with the tying of aid and human security to peacekeeping, peace-building, nation-
building, counter-terrorism and other policy prescriptions now found in the ODA Charter” 
(Yasutomo 2014, p. 49). 
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procedures. So, ironically, thanks to the two wheels of the cart, oil and water do mix 
after all” (Yasutomo 2014, p. 99). In particular, in the case of Iraq, the SDF started 
following the ODA philosophy and implementation methods
123
 in requesting the 
Iraqis to identify their immediate needs so that the projects could be moulded jointly 
with the local officials (Yasutomo 2014). Miyagi (2008) also recognises that the 
ODA has become an important tool for the Japanese SDF, explicating that “Japanese 
military participation became in this war, a new instrument in Japan’s policy toolbox, 
in tandem with financial and economic assistance” (Miyagi 2008, p. 136). In 
addition, while Yasutomo (2014) refers this form of Japanese activities as “Japanese-
style CIMIC [civil-military co-operation]”, Schoff and Travayiakis (2009) uses the 
term “CMCoord [civil-military coordination]” to “paint[s] a far more neutral image 
than the oft-used U.S. military acronym CMO (or civil-military operation)” (Schoff 
& Travayiakis 2009, p. 1).  
     Furthermore, the linkage between peacekeeping and the U.S.-Japan alliance 
cannot be ignored. Ashizawa (2014) notes that when Afghanistan was a top priority 
for the US national security and foreign policy in the post-9.11 period, the Japanese 
government clearly recognised the need to get involved in Afghanistan in order to 
serve as a responsible ally. According to her, the Japanese government has viewed 
its active involvement in the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan in terms 
of three separate yet interrelated goals which are 1) Japan’s high-profile engagement 
was expected to help manage and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance
124
, 2) its long-
standing desire to demonstrate Japan’s capacity to contribute to a major international 
peace and security operation and 3) forging a good relationship with a newly reborn 
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 Two of the most traditional operational and formative ODA policy concepts are request-based 
aid (yosei-shugi) and self-help (jijo doryoku) 
124
 It is remarked that the relevance of the PKO got weakened when the US solved the Afghan 
problem (Interview with anonymous, 5
th
 April 2013). 
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Afghanistan (Ashizawa 2014). This describes the factor of Japan’s contribution for 
PKO cannot be ignored in the alliance context.  
 
Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR) 
     It is one of the features of Japan’s strategic culture to position domestic disaster 
relief operations
125
 as the SDF mission. In domestic natural disasters, the fire 
department and the police are the main responders, while the SDF’s operations are 
anticipated primarily for major disasters. The disaster relief missions of the SDF are 
based on rigorous principles, which are in line with the Oslo Guidelines with the 
concept that disaster relief by the military is a last resort. Furthermore, disaster relief 
missions are considered as assistance for local HA/DR operations. This basic policy 
holds true also when the SDF are deployed as members of the Japan Disaster Relief 
Team, in which the SDF do not provide assistance to civil authorities (Yoshizaki 
2012, pp. 77-78). Both the US military and the Japanese SDF demonstrated their 
advanced disaster relief capabilities following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in 
Sumatra and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. Cooperation in regional disaster 
relief centred on this bilateral strength is also an important way of promoting 
stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In this way, enhanced and dynamic U.S.-Japan 
cooperation in the area of dynamic defence is extremely significant in fulfilling the 
role of the alliance in the security of the region (Takahashi 2008). 
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 “Pacific Partnership” is another example of evolving SDF activities in cooperation with the 
NGO. It is remarked that the non-traditional component of security including PKO, HADR and 
maritime security should be considered (Interview with a MOD official, 6
th
 March 2013). It is 
also noted that this can be seen as “military diplomacy” (Interview with Takeshi Ishikawa, 5
th
 
December 2012). 
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     Operation Tomodachi was regarded as the largest joint and combined operation in 
the history of the alliance, and the rapid surge of forces from both sides was noted in 
the region. 100,000 personnel of the Japanese SDF were dispatched for search-and-
rescue operations, relief supplies and rehabilitation of the infrastructure and the U.S. 
government acted swiftly to support Japanese counterparts which became the largest 
bilateral mission of the alliance. “One of the most impressive aspects in the 
aftermath of March 11 was the conduct of Japan and U.S. forces in Humanitarian 
Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations in the Tohoku region” (CSIS & 
Keidanren 2011).
126
 “Approximately three hours after the earthquake USFJ and the 
JJS under the MOD both worked to implement the Bilateral Coordination 
Mechanism (BCM) and bilateral coordination liaison cells (Bilateral Crisis Action 
Teams at Yokota, Ichigaya, and Sendai) developed under the guidelines in 1997.
127
 
Moreover, the restoration of operations at Sendai Airport demonstrated the agility of 
the alliance in missions that bear a close resemblance to battle damage recovery from 
ballistic missiles (CSIS & Keidanren 2011).
128
 Samuels (2013) notes that “the [3.11] 
disaster stimulated a rhetoric of crisis; a vigorous national debate about the past and 
future of national security policy and its institutions ensued in which political 
entrepreneurs from all sides jostled for advantage” (Samuels 2013, p. 108). 
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 It is also noted that the mayor of Shizuoka prefecture in Japan noted its need of US bases 
considering their activities in the post-3.11 period (Interview with Fumiaki Kubo, 10
th
 April 
2013). 
127
 According to the CSIS and the Keidanren (2011), the SDF and bilateral HA/DR operations 
not only saved lives, but also sent an important signal of alliance solidarity to the region in the 
wake of political difficulties in 2009-2010 over plans for the relocation of MCAS Futenma. 
128
 The report also notes that “Overall, the HA/DR operations went a long way toward erasing 
any doubts in the Asia-Pacific region about the solidarity, resolve, and capabilities of the U.S.-
Japan alliance that may have emerged in recent years” (CSIS & Keidanren 2011, p. 33). 
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Towards “Collective Self-Defence”129 
     Another issue that should be considered in the context of joint interoperability is 
collective self-defence. The Japanese Cabinet made the decision on the 1
st
 July 2014 
in order to exercise the right to collective self-defence by changing the government's 
interpretation of the war-renouncing Constitution. In fact, the advisory panel during 
was established during the first Abe administration, and focuses on four specific 
cases.
130
 The latest report provides detailed recommendations in each of these areas 
and suggests that in an increasingly complex regional and global security 
environment it is in Japan’s interests to assume a greater role in security by 
exercising the right of collective self-defence. This reinterpretation would allow 
Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence and exercise military action if 
one of its allies were to be attacked. In this regard, the Japanese government is also 
making an attempt to revise the SDF Act
131
 to ease provisions in order to exercise 
the rights to collective self-defence (Mainichi Japan 2014). The government is 
aiming to clarify in the provisions of this act that newly permitted SDF activities are 
not for the “defence of other countries”.  
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 According to Iwama who served government committees including the Council on 
Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security (2006-7, 2013-), a reinterpretation of the 
Constitution is sufficient enough instead of revising Article 96 of the Constitution although it 
may become more evident if Article 9 is revised (Interview with Yoko Iwama, 10
th
 April 2013). 
Also, it is pointed out that, it is not merely because of US pressures but the expansion of the 
Japanese SDF (Interview with Isao Miyaoka, 10
th
 January 2013). Kubo also indicated that the US 
Council is strongly willing to pass the legislation about Japan’s collective self-defence at the 
Senate level (Interview with the Fumiaki Kubo, 10
th
 April 2013). 
130
 This report was submitted in 2008 but shelved until last year when the panel reconvened to 
examine six additional cases, the potential to reinterpret the constitution, and the legal 
requirements for Japan’s SDF to assume new roles and missions if constraints on defence policy 
are relaxed. 
131
 Under the current SDF Act, the prime minister is allowed to order the SDF to mobilise troops 
only when Japan has come under armed attack or when there is a clear and imminent danger of 
Japan coming under armed attack. 
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     The US has welcomed efforts to examine the legal basis for Japan exercising the 
right of collective self-defence, most recently in a joint statement issued during 
President Obama’s state visit to Japan last month. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. 
chief of naval operations, noted in a recent address at the CSIS that Japan taking this 
step would facilitate information sharing and interoperability between the two 
militaries (CSIS 2014). The timing is also seen as important as the two governments 
are currently reviewing bilateral guidelines for defence cooperation and could reflect 
changes in Japanese defence policy in an update due at the end of this year. Bilateral 
defence ties are strong, but outdated legal interpretations of the constitution in Japan 
are considered an obstacle to enhance cooperation on missile defence and other 
priorities currently informing bilateral defence planning. Additionally, the Asia-
Pacific region generally welcomes Japan assuming a greater role in security. The 
Philippines, which intends to acquire ten patrol boats for its Coast Guard through a 
loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Vietnam, are 
open to maritime cooperation with Japan amid Chinese assertiveness over territorial 
sovereignty claims. India and Australia have each signed joint security declarations 
with Japan, and a decision to exercise collective self-defence would likely bolster 
bilateral security ties with those countries and facilitate multilateral coordination 
with the US and other like-minded partners (Szechenyi 2014). It is noted by one of 
the officials at the MOFA that “with collective self-defence and loosening the arms 
export policy, the proportion of burden –sharing may change and there will be more 
burden on Japan”.132 
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 Interview with Noriaki Abe (19
th
 March 2014); It is also noted that “in the context of the U.S.-
Japan alliance, Japan needs to become more active unlike the Cold War period” (Interview with 
Yoko Iwama, 10
th
 April 2014). 
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Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the U.S.-Japan Force Interoperability  
      This sections show the interaction of material, institutional and ideational 
elements in the realm of the forces interoperability in the context of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. Especially, it is observable that the increasing relevance of HA/DR and 
Japanese-style CIMIC/CMCoord can be seen as an example of the flux of material, 
institutional and ideational (e.g., universal values) components. As for U.S.-Japan 
joint exercises which have been conducted consistently, while the ideational element 
may not be as important but material and institutional elements have strengthened 
the U.S.-Japan alliance especially at the operational level. In addition, not 
necessarily the major ones but such ideas as “dynamic defence” and other ideas that 
were generated from the US side can be seen as the ideational element coming into 
play to harness the U.S.-Japan alliance in the field of force interoperability in a neo-
Gramscian sense. As for the institutional aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance, not only 
the US and Japanese governments but also the Japanese MOD and Keidanren have 
viewed the importance of enhancing force interoperability especially after Japan’s 
experiences of the 3.11 Earthquake and Tsunami that exhibited the significance of 
Operation Tomodachi.  
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Diagram 3: Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the U.S.-Japan Force Interoperabil
ity 
 
Source: Author 
 
b) Military-industrial Relationship 
After the Postwar Era 
     Under the U.S.-Japan bilateral treaty, Japan’s domestic defence industry was 
sustained with military equipment from the US which has been the US’ trade-off for 
retaining Japan as a military ally (Chinworth 2000, p. 372). As soon as the Korean 
War started, the US Military Supply Agency in Japan began contracting with 
Japanese firms for the production of firearms, grenades, ammunition, and vehicles. 
Thereafter, the Law for the Production of Weapons (bukito seizoho) was passed on 
August 1953 to permit the legal production of arms, ammunition, and military 
equipment in Japan. Indeed, “When Japan’s defense industry is viewed in historical 
perspective, the spending for weapons has been minuscule in comparison to their 
importance for the economy in the pre-World War Second period” (Kataoka & Myer 
1989, p. 58). By the early 1950s, Japan had resumed production of war materiel, first 
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for the US forces in Korea and then its own security services. By 1952 more than 
850 industrial plants had been returned to private control for defence-related 
production (Gray 2011). Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has 
introduced, as licensed by the US, major defence systems such as fighter airplanes 
(F-86, F-104, F-4, and F-15), SAMs (Nike, Hawk, and Patriot), and missiles 
(Sparrow and Sidewinder). As a result, not only defence technology and defence 
end-use items but also US defence production methods were brought to Japan 
through a one-way transfer from the US. 
 
Kokusanka (Japan’s Indigenous Production) 
     Under the treaty, the Japanese defence posture has been maintained the basic 
capability for collective self-defence. The Japanese government’s formulation of this 
pattern of continuity is encapsulated in its statements of the basic principles of 
security policy in successive Japan MOD White Papers which keeps its EDOP 
doctrine which was also indicated in the previous section on joint operations 
(Ministry of Defence 2011, pp. 107-108). Japanese policymakers have cited strict 
continuing adherence to the prohibitions on the use of force derived from Article 
Nine and a range of other anti-militaristic principles developed from the spirit of this 
article, as evidence of essential continuities and constraints in national defence 
policy and the management of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The government has also 
allocated each year nearly the same portion of the gross domestic product (GDP) for 
the defence budget which allows the government to replace the obsolete systems 
with new ones within the expected budget. In other words, the defence procurement 
practice has provided stable prospects for the seller and the buyer in terms of demand 
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and supply (Kubota 2010). Green (1995) argues that Japan’s post Second World War 
defence industry is isolated from global defence trade and has limited dependence on 
defence revenue and relies heavily on licensed production of US platforms and 
systems. Due to this characteristic, Japan’s defence industry has been characterised 
by isolationism, less dependency on defence revenue and kokusanka (indigenous 
production) orientation with dependence on the US defence industry (Green 1995). 
The defence industries in general are vulnerable to changes in the international 
situation, as was observed in the merger and acquisition (M&A) and restructuring of 
the European and US defence industries after the end of the Cold War. 
 
Three Principles on Arms Exports 
      The structure of the Japanese defence industry has remained unchanged because 
of the country’s self-imposed ban on arms exports or the Three Principles on Arms 
Exports (Kubota 2010), while there is a further attempt to loosen this policy which is 
exemplified in the later section. In the hands of the METI, Japan’s Three Principles 
on Arms Exports were announced at the Japanese National Diet in 1967 by Prime 
Minister Eisaku Sato in reflection of the US-led Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) regime
133
 commencing in 1949. They are (1) 
no exports of arms to communist countries, (2) no exports of arms to those countries 
sanctioned by a United Nations resolution, and (3) no exports of arms to those 
countries that are engaging or may engage in international conflicts. In 1976, Prime 
Minister Takeo Miki added arms-related facilities and technologies, to be treated in 
the same way as arms are. He also stated that Japan should be “prudent” in exporting 
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 In June 1987, it is known that the Toshiba Corporation violated the CoCom rules by selling 
eight computer-guided multiaxis milling machines to the Soviet Union which enabled the Soviets 
to mass produce a more silent propeller for their submarines. 
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arms to any other countries, thereby confirming the country’s general ban on arms 
exports. While these principles in effect remain unchanged, the government has 
made some exceptions for exports of arms for specific defence programmes 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). 
     A 1983 agreement specified that transfers of military technologies to the US and 
commercial technologies with defence applications, or dual-use technologies (DUT), 
would be exempt from Japan’s ban on arms exports. Influenced by US reform on 
procurement policy, the Japanese government under the Nakasone administration 
approved the export of defence technologies to the US, Japan’s ally, which was an 
exception to the Three Principles. This first exception paved the way for joint U.S.-
Japan defence technological research, in which the two countries have carried out 
nearly twenty programmes. The reason is that exporting defence technology to the 
US might conflict with the philosophy of the Three Principles, which stipulates that 
as a peace-loving nation, Japan does not take part in any international conflicts, in 
that, if the US became involved in, Japan, too, might be considered to be part of the 
conflicts (Masuda 2009). Hughes (2011) argues that “Japan’s arms export ban means 
that for the development of ever more costly weapons systems it cannot tap the 
economies of scale provided by international joint development and export markets. 
Japan’s opportunities for licensed production are increasingly limited and may 
actually increase external technological dependency, especially on the United States” 
(Hughes 2011, p. 475). 
     It is important to remark that not only politicians and bureaucrats but also 
business people have a stronger willingness that the “Three Principles on Arms 
Exports” should be less regulated in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
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(Keidanren 2004; Ibata 2008). According to Nishiyama
134
 (2009), “From the 
industry’s perspective, this capability should prove useful for international 
cooperation. Whether it is, however, depends on the Japanese government’s arms 
export control policy. Maintaining the Three Principles on Arms Exports would 
deprive Japan of a valuable opportunity to participate in international cooperation” 
(Nishiyama 2009, p. 2). He also indicates the example that the US asked Japan to 
manufacture components for the Patriot missile system to be exported to the United 
Arab Emirates, it had to procure them from the Netherlands and Greece because 
Japan was not able to decide in time whether it would manufacture them (Nishiyama 
2009).  
 
The FSX Controversy: Conflicted Interests between the US and Japan 
     The JDA initiated a series of domestic research and development programmes in 
the late 1970s to build the basis for a domestic aircraft development and production 
programme. It began developing performance requirements for the new aircraft as 
early as 1981 (Chinworth 2000, p. 385). In 1983, the Japanese government decided 
to allow the export of defence technologies to the US. The FSX was to have been 
Japan’s second “completely indigenous” aircraft developed by domestic industry to 
replace its aging F-l aircraft, which officially is the country’s first entirely domestic 
product (Kohno 1989). Despite the repeated official claim that the FSX selection 
should be free from foreign intervention, it was apparent by the time the final 
decision was made in October 1987 that the selection process involved both Japanese 
and US actors, including the JDA, the US Department of Defence, Japanese and US 
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 He works for MHI, one of the major Japanese companies that have a specialised sector for 
defences. 
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military industries, as well as some individual political leaders (Kohno 1989, p. 457). 
In early May 1985, the JDA published a progress report by its Technical Research 
and Development Institute suggesting that Japanese military technology was fully 
capable of producing all of the FSX except its engines (Kohno 1989, p. 457). The 
FSX selection became a formal topic of discussion at a cabinet meeting when Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in September approved the new Mid-term Defence 
Programme (Shin Chuki Boeiryoku Seibi Keikaku) for the 1986-1990 fiscal years 
(Kohno 1989, p. 457). In March, the JDA shifted its official position, saying that the 
final selection might be delayed and that it was investigating the possibility of joint 
development with the US. Although the idea of joint development was not in the 
original three options, the shift was officially confirmed by Seiki Nishihiro, Director 
of the Defence Policy Bureau, who stated in the Diet that U.S.-Japan joint 
development could be regarded as one form of domestic production, and that the 
JDA would not place a time limit on the FSX selection (Kohno 1989, pp. 461-462). 
 
The Kurihara-Weinberger Meeting 
     US pressure on Japan tends to be based on bipartisan support within the US. 
Since the US view that Japan still has a “cheap” or “free” ride in security affairs, the 
US can easily define their national interest in security relations with Japan. As for 
the FSX selection, some US politicians represented the perspectives of military 
industries by demanding the introduction of a non-Japanese FSX, and performed the 
role of “enlightening” other political leaders by leading them to unite (Kohno 1989, 
p. 474). It was at the Kurihara-Weinberger meeting in September 1984 that the US 
first requested that interoperability, or operational-level cooperation, to be the next 
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theme of joint study between the two countries (Kohno 1989, p. 475). The 
controversy in the US over technology transfers to Japan was so severe that the US 
Congress almost made the FSX the first joint programme between the two countries 
to fall victim to legally required approval processes. The programme moved ahead, 
but behind schedule and over budget (Chinworth 1992; Lorell 1996). Despite the 
controversy of the earlier development programme, the two countries completed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on joint production that went through 
official approval channels with little notice. As a result of the meeting between the 
US and Japan at official levels, the FSX issue was settled while it did not meet the 
initial plan of the JDA. This example also shows the important role of the actors 
from the neo-Gramscian perspective. 
 
Post-Cold War: A Closer US-Japan Cooperation
135
 
      Notwithstanding Japan’s dissatisfaction about cooperation on the development of 
the FSX fighter, Japan was seen as the potential collaborator in high-technology 
R&D from the US viewpoint. In relation to the coercive aspect of hegemony, 
Hanami (1993) notes that “Since at least the 1985 Plaza Accords, American 
pressures have mounted and have had the effect of expanding Japan’s military” 
(Hanami 1993, p. 598). Japanese and US industries initiated a major missile defence 
system study under the SDI initiative entitled the Western Pacific Missile Defence 
Architecture Study (WESTPAC) started in 1989, with private corporations in Japan, 
such as MHI. The WESTPAC continued until 1993 when collaboration between 
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 Indeed, Hanami (1993) puts into question “whether Japan’s military expansion is more a 
political than security achievement designed to appease American policymakers” (Hanami 1993, 
p. 594) which can be a crucial question to be considered from the neo-Gramscian perspective 
with regard to coercion-consensus dimensions of hegemony, 
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Japan and the US became more official. The Japanese government kept its role to a 
minimum in in this four-year study to avoid sensitive political issues including the 
weaponisation of space and nuclear weapons related research associated with the so-
called “Star Wars” programme of the Reagan administration.  
 
BMD, a Japan’s RMA: RMA Influence on Japanese Industry 
     The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which relates to surveillance, 
command and control, systems integration and joint-force doctrine, is the subject of 
varying interpretations. On the one hand, it is seen as marking a fundamental break 
with all previous methods of waging war. On the other hand,, it emphasises the 
evolutionary nature of the RMA, which stemmed from a number of separate 
improvements in intelligence and surveillance sensors, communications and the 
integration of complex software systems. US Admiral William A. Owens defines the 
RMA as being essentially a “system of systems,” where main components are 
intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance; technologies and systems 
that provide command, control, communications and computer processing; the 
integration of complex information systems in real time; and the development of the 
doctrine, strategies, tactics and military organisations that can take advantage of this 
technological potential (Dibb 1997). Murayama (1996) indicates that the US has 
tried to expand the RMA not only within the US but also with its allies. From the 
neo-Gramscian standpoint, this can be seen as an attempt to create the US historic 
bloc on the basis of US strategic posture. 
     In fact, Japanese interest in US missile defence programmes can be traced back to 
the mid-1980s with the Reagan administration’s SDI. Japan has been engaged in a 
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BMD dialogue with the US since the early 1980s.
136
 The discussions were 
formalised in 1987 when the two countries signed an “Agreement Concerning 
Japanese Participation in Research for the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)” (Jimbo 
2002). Japan declined to participate but did partly relax its post-World War II arms 
export ban to open the way for sharing military and dual use technology with the US. 
Subsequently, Japan shared technology with the US for several weapons systems, 
including portable surface-air missile (SAM) systems, naval ship construction, a 
ducted rocket engine, and the controversial FS-X, next-generation fighter 
programme. 
     In May 1993, US Secretary of Defence Les Aspin announced the decision to 
reorganise the BMD programme, and came up with the Theatre Missile Defence 
(TMD) initiative.
137
 Following this, the BMD Study Office was established in 1995 
within the JDA in coordination with the US BMDO and the US Pacific Command, 
and Japan’s activities and R&D spending began to increase steadily.138 The JDA’s 
inclination towards the Navy Theatre Wide
139
 and PAC-3 option was due to the 
influence of US pressures but, at the same time, it was also a path that could serve as 
a delaying tactic. It had to remain cautious throughout 1997 in an attempt to make a 
consensus within its own bureaucracy and then the government as a whole. By late 
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 Peoples’ (2010) work analyses the legitimation of missile defence by deploying the 
Gramscian concept of common sense. He argues that missile defence advocates “legitimate 
BMD itself…but which favours sectional political and industrial interests in the short term and 
helps to sustain America’s immense defence infrastructure in the post-Cold War era” (Peoples 
2010, p. 5).  
137
 Gordon R. Mitchell explains that “U.S. corporations and defense officials lobbied heavily for 
Japan to endorse the TMD concept and pursue collaborative missile defense projects” (Mitchell 
2001, p. 86). 
138
 It is remarked that BMD has been promoted under Ken Sato, Takeuchi, Kazuyoshi Umemoto, 
Takamizawa, Campbell and Deming (Interview with anonymous, 12
th
 March 2013). These actors 
can be regarded as organic intellectuals in encouraging the BMD. 
139
 The Navy Theatre Wide was the newest and most sophisticated among the four major TMD 
programmes, including the PAC-3, the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence, and the Navy Area 
Defence. 
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spring of 1998, the JDA got ready, and began to consider when and how to announce 
its decision to intensify BMD cooperation with the US (Ishikawa 2005, p. 641).
140
 
Less than a year later, in August 1999, the US and Japanese governments signed a 
MOU covering a five-year programme of joint research and development on the then 
US Navy Theatre Wide BMD programme and started cooperative research with the 
US through its Navy Theatre Wide Defence programme in 1999.
141
 According to 
Nishiyama (2009), “In this way, Japan has gradually started to participate in 
international defense programs” (Nishiyama 2009).  
     After the Bush’s administration in 2001, Japanese officials have avoided 
addressing the collective-defence issue arising out of the changed US missile 
defence strategy and have concentrated on protecting Japan’s option to acquire a 
BMD capability whereas the Bush administration and the US Navy have consistently 
viewed Japanese participation in the US missile defence programme as a potentially 
significant “alliance builder” and force capability enhancement. In response to the 
alleged lack of support for joint development in the then BMDO, US Deputy 
Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz reportedly issued a programme budget 
decision (PDB) on December 2001, directing the organisation to continue the 
cooperative effort and include funding as a separate line item in the FY2003 budget. 
Japan was sceptical of US’ Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (AMB) Treaty 
abandonment and collective defence. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is deemed 
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 It is noted that Japan is dependent on the US in order to their joint BMD cooperation 
(Interview with Kenichi Takahashi, 19
th
 April 2013). 
141
 However, at that time, Japan made no decision about acquisition of a missile defence 
capability and current constitutional interpretations appear to rule out the integration of any such 
Japanese capability with that of the U.S. Navy. Furthermore, according to Ishikawa (2005), 
“Suddenly, the term TMD, used especially in the Japanese media, became almost equivalent to 
Navy Theater Wide. Thus, the onset of bilateral joint research on the Navy Theater Wide in the 
following year contributed to covering up the fact that Tokyo would have to make a decision to 
introduce the PAC-3 sooner or later, probably before the joint research entered the development 
phase” (Ishikawa 2005, p. 641). 
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constitutional under this interpretation because Japan’s responsibilities relate only to 
the defence of Japan itself. Japan is not obligated under the U.S.-Japan Defence 
Treaty to participate in the defence of the US or US forces, let alone participates in 
security cooperation involving third countries (Ministry of Defence 2000). Japanese 
officials appeared to agree with the view of Japanese defence analysts who 
complained that supporting the US initiative would link Japan to US global nuclear 
strategy in a way that was incompatible with Japan’s non-nuclear principles 
(Chanlett-Avery, Manyin & Cooper 2008).
142
    
     It is worth indicating that one of the key working level organisations in bilateral 
technology programmes, the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), is in various 
stages of examining and implementing several joint projects. At a higher level within 
the US Department of Defence, officials are explaining long-term options that range 
from expanded use of contract research programmes joint production of common 
components and even expanded purchases of Japanese components to further the 
objectives of gaining access to Japanese technologies, maintaining common systems 
and controlling weapon systems costs (Chinworth & Rubinstein 1996). It is not an 
exaggeration to assert that Department of Defence is more committed to mutually 
beneficial cooperation with Japan than at any point in the postwar relationship (U.S. 
Department of Defence 1995). The report, which was released in 1998 by the U.S.-
Japan Industry Forum for Security Cooperation (IFSEC), was founded in 1996 to 
promote dialogue between the two countries’ defence industries and provide advice 
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 “Many sceptics and critics considered that the removal of the distinction between ‘theatre’ and 
‘national’  would increase the possibility for Japan’s BMD to be more integrated into the US 
system, thereby increasing the danger of ‘entrapment’. They also renewed a concern that Japan’s 
participation in the American MD programme might conflict with the Constitution, which 
banned the exercise of the right to collective self-defence according to the present official 
interpretation, or lead to the violation of the three principles on arms export, which virtually 
prohibit any arms delivery” (Ishikawa 2005, p. 642). 
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to their governments on matters that affect defence industrial cooperation, concluded 
that closer defence industrial cooperation would benefit the 
manufacturing/technology bases of both the US and Japan, support interoperability, 
and thus strengthen alliance cooperation. The 2003 revised report recommended 1) 
an expanded dialogue on equipment and technology cooperation; 2) adopting more 
positive attitudes toward technology transfer; 3) a more flexible application of 
Japanese arms export control policies; 4) a clear statement of guidelines for 
intellectual property protection and 5) a better understanding of the impact of “Buy 
America” provisions (Keidanren 2003). 
     As a consequence, the Japanese Cabinet made a decision in 2003 to commit to the 
acquisition of BMD programmes consisting of the completed deployment by 2010 of 
Air SDF Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, and the upgrading and 
testing from 2007 onwards of the Japanese MSDF Aegis destroyer Standard Missile-
3 (SM-3) BLK-IIA system has posed major challenges for the ban on the exercise of 
collective self-defence as perhaps the key component of Japan’s constrained 
militarised posture in the post-war era (Hughes 2013). The US had begun 
deployment of the PAC-3, and in the Iraq War of 2003, this weapon was used for the 
first time. Almost as a matter of course, US pressure on Japan to introduce this 
system increased. Shigeru Ishiba, the then Minister of Defence began to suggest 
fielding the PAC-3, which had been almost forgotten in the missile defence 
discourse in Japan as described above (Japan Times 2003). At the same time the 
government announced that the three arms export principles would not be applied to 
possible joint development and production of BMD systems with the US.
143
 On the 
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 A few days later, Tokyo and Washington exchanged diplomatic notes, and then signed a 
MOU, calling for a framework of comprehensive cooperation on BMD. Japan and the US had 
agreed to license production of PAC-3 by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan Times 2005). 
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19th December 2003, the report “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense 
System and Other Measures” was released at the Security Council and the Cabinet 
Council that shows the thinking behind the introduction of BMD system and the 
direction of Japan’s defence force review taking into account the introduction of 
BMD system and the new security environment (Kantei 2003) leading to the 
formulation of the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) and Mid-Term 
Defence Programme in 2004.
144
 The Koizumi cabinet approved a bill to revise laws 
concerning the operation of a BMD system in February 2005.  
     The joint development and production with the US of the missile defence system 
began in 2006. It is noted that “In a May 2007 meeting with US Secretary of 
Defence Robert Gates, Minister of Defence Fumio Kyuma requested that the United 
States cooperate as far as possible in supplying Japan with information on the F-22A 
and other fighters it was studying…Further discussion between Japan and the United 
States resulted in a decision to jointly conduct a comprehensive study on air warfare 
capabilities in the region surrounding Japan, and then pursue talks based on analysis 
of the sort of air warfare capabilities that both countries should possess within the 
context of the future security environment” (National Institute for Defense Studies 
2008, p. 213).
145
 A vital element of network centric warfare (NCW) was the 
possession of an airborne warning and control system (AWACS), which is an 
airborne platform that monitors air activity using high-performance radar and acts as 
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 In terms of the issue of “collective self-defence”, the report states that “the BMD system that 
the Government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan. It will be operated based on 
Japan’s independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. 
Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-
defence” (Ministry of Defence 2004). 
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 It further notes that “The challenge in assessing those candidates [of a next-generation 
fighter], however, is not simply a matter of comparing their capabilities as combat aircraft; it also 
involves determining which one can provide the best strategic benefit for Japan in today’s 
security environment” (National Institute for Defense Studies 2008, p. 213). 
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a network hub to control operations under its watch. Currently, Japan and the US are 
the only countries that operate full-scale AWACS capabilities in Northeast Asia, and 
the qualitative strategic superiority enjoyed by both nations largely derives from 
those capabilities.
146
  
     According to Takahashi (2008), these characteristics could change through 
participation with US companies in the joint development of a BMD system which is 
the main focus of Japan’s version of the RMA and, more speculatively, through 
Japanese procurement of the next generation of fighter aircraft yet the extent of any 
such change is difficult to predict at this stage. The RMA is likely to change the 
characteristics of Japanese defence industry significantly but not sufficiently to 
constitute a fundamental transformation of that industry. However, if relaxation of 
the current structural restraints on Japanese defence industry continues, then 
Japanese defence industry’s characteristic isolationism, minimal exposure to defence 
business and kokusanka gradually adjust in response. At present, it is impossible to 
predict whether such a change will eventuate and, if it does, how far reaching it 
could be (Takahashi 2008, p. 115). He also notes that “the NDPG explicitly posits 
the code of Japan BMD system within the determined architecture in a consistent 
way with the American strategic deterrence” (Takahashi 2012 p. 23). 
     It has been announced by US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel on the 6th April 
2013, saying that “A key focus for our talks today was the threat posed by North 
Korea” (Pellerin 2014). Currently, while Japan has four Kongo Class Destroyers 
which have been upgraded with BMD operational capabilities, SM-3 Cooperative 
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 However, some security experts hold that it is only a matter of time before China puts full-
fledged AWACS capabilities into operation. Japan and the US concluded the General Security of 
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in May 2007 to promote information exchange for 
missile defence and other security related projects. 
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Development Programme which is the joint U.S.-Japan development aims at 
defeating longer range ballistic missiles with deployment to begin in 2018.
147
 The 
Japanese MOFA also remarks that “Japan has been making steady efforts to develop 
the BMD system in continued cooperation with the U.S. bilateral cooperation in 
BMD” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012) which has deepened the alliance 
significantly. In relation to the concept of “dynamic defence”, the dynamic defence 
force to be developed should possess readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability 
and versatility, and these features may have been reinforced by advanced 
technologies based on the trends of levels of military technology and intelligence 
capabilities. In this respect, as well as distributing appropriate resources to the 
function/capability to be developed with higher priority, the essential foundation for 
operation of the defence forces through efforts including effective and efficient 
maintenance of equipment, maintenance of a high level of operations tempo, and 
improvement of the skills of personnel are enhanced.  
 
Dual-Use Technology (DUT) 
     In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, dual-use technology (DUT) is 
considered which can be used interchangeably for both peaceful and military aims. 
In the 1980s, Japanese companies began taking advantage of this loophole by 
making inroads mainly into the US defence market, providing semiconductor chips 
for guided missiles and camera lenses used in reconnaissance systems. Since then 
Japanese components have found their way into a large number of security and 
defence products across the globe, such as silicon sensors, which are at the core of 
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 U.S Department of Defense, http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html 
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BAE Systems Inertial Measurement Units used for missile guidance systems, or the 
Sony Exwave-HAD 800 Line TV camera incorporated in the Denel military and 
paramilitary turrets (Ballantyne 2005). According to Yamazaki (2009), the 1980s 
was the beginning of US dependence on other markets including the Japanese one. 
However, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO) had a desire to escape from 
dependency on US satellites and satellite components by handling primarily on its 
own information gathering satellites (IGS) system which can be used for supporting 
disaster relief. These became more difficult to obtain after the Cox Committee 
hearings, which resulted in an even more convoluted and confused US export control 
system than the merely ambiguous and non-transparent system of the past (Johnson-
Freese & Gatling 2004).  
     Space industries can be seen as another prominent example of DUT. It is 
important to note that it is in line with the RMA that underscores the importance of 
space assets and technologies for national defence. According to Pekkanen and 
Kallender-Umezu (2010), “Japan’s commitment to the space industry long predates 
the very recent formulation of anything like a coherent national strategy, which came 
with the passage of Japan’s first ever Basic Space Law 2008, and the subsequent 
Basic Space Plan in 2009” (Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu 2010, p. 1).148 With 
regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance, they also remark that the development of space 
industries can be seen as the form of not only Japan’s normalisation or 
remilitarisation, but also Japan’s persistent dependence on the alliance with the US 
which may be possibly eroding the anti-militaristic culture of Japan (Pekkanen and 
Kallender-Umezu 2010). This example exhibits a further development in the realm 
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 It is worthwhile noting that the Keidanren has a “Space Activities Promotion Committee”. 
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of DUT which may be harnessing both the U.S.-Japan alliance and the US-historic 
bloc. 
    In addition, Hideaki Watanabe, Director General of the MOD’s Technical 
Research and Development Institute, explicates that the Japanese Cabinet is planning 
to adopt research development style similar to Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) by involving not only corporate companies but also other 
institutions such as Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and National 
Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT). However, he also 
remarks that, due to the militaristic image of DUT, some actors including 
universities have been hesitant to cooperate with the MOD (Watanabe 2014). In fact, 
while Japanese universities intend to participate in the DARPA Robotics Challenge 
(DRC), a US Department of Defence’s Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency’s robotics competition, in June 2015, this case exhibits the uneasiness from 
the Japanese universities’ viewpoints. According to the US Department of Defence, 
the aim of the DRC is to develop “robots capable of assisting humans in responding 
to natural and man-made disasters,” (Mainichi Japan 2014) but also indicates that the 
technology could be adapted for military purposes. Although Japan’s METI has 
encouraged Japanese institutions to participate in the DARPA challenge with the 
July 2013 agreement to jointly develop robots to help for HA/DR, a representative 
for the University of Tokyo remarked that “We understand that the DRC is a NEDO 
[New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation] project, and its 
goal is clearly written as the research and development of robots for disaster 
response. There is no mention of the project being used for military purposes” 
(Mainichi Japan 2014). 
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Increasing “Exceptional Cases” for Arms Export and Further Loosening the 
Three Principles 
     As is indicated earlier, Japan’s indigenous production has been vulnerable.149 The 
Japanese government determined in 2004 that the Three Principles on Arms Exports 
would not be applied to the bilateral joint development and production of missile 
defence system. It was a crucial decision in that the exception allowing defence 
technology to be exported to the US was extended to joint development and 
production as well. The third exception was related to the Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which was concluded in 1996 and revised in 1998 
and again in 2004. In order to maintain U.S.-Japan security relations and contribute 
to international peacekeeping efforts, this agreement stipulates that Japan’s SDF and 
US troops have access to each other’s materials and services in peacekeeping 
operations, emergencies in the surrounding area of Japan, and disaster relief. Such 
materials and services include arms-related items such as subsystems and 
components, as well as the maintenance of military aircraft, vehicles, and vessels, 
some of which are included in the Three Principles on Arms Exports and thus cannot 
be provided without this exception. According to Kubota (2013), although Japan’s 
Three Principles on Arms Exports reflect Japan’s obedience to the US CoCom 
regime
150
 which also had supported the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is not realistic with the 
trend of increasing international joint development and production. 
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 As the solution, loosening arms export policy has been suggested which is contributable to the 
U.S.-Japan alliance (Interview with Takashi Shiraishi, 22
nd
 March 2013). Also, this can be seen 
as a form of “burden-sharing” (Interview with Ryo Sahashi, 11
th
 January 2013). 
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 It is said that ministries in the realm of industry, trade, commerce, and defence, along with 
customs agencies, other than foreign affairs had direct or indirect influence on COCOM 
decisions (Cupitt & Grillot 1997). In fact, there are some discussions about the continuity of the 
CoCom regime such as Lipson (1999). 
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     The Japanese government also released a policy statement on the 27
th
 December 
2011 entitled “The Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defence Equipment, etc.” 
which permits the overseas transfer of defence equipment under certain conditions 
by allowing comprehensive exemption measures under the Three Principles on Arms 
Exports. Japan’s 2010 NDPG were directed to respond to the challenges of 
improving performance and controlling rising costs by focusing on international 
joint development and production. The new guidelines allow defence industrial 
cooperation, which had previously been limited to joint research of defence 
technologies and development and production of BMD systems with the US to be 
expanded to international joint development and production of defence equipment. 
    In late 2011, representatives of the Japanese and US defence business groups in 
Japan, the Defence Production Committee of the Keidanren and the Aerospace and 
Defence (A&D) Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan 
(ACCJ) initiated a dialogue on strengthening and enhancing U.S.-Japan defence 
cooperation. Moreover, under the second Abe administration, with the aim of 
abandoning the principles to open new markets for Japanese defence companies, Abe 
had finally decided to carry out the long-discussed change to achieve the following 
objective: augmenting Japan’s regional influence by offering its technologically 
sophisticated defence hardware to other countries locked in territorial disputes with 
an increasingly assertive China (Fackler 2014). 
 
Towards “Three Principles on Defence Equipment Transfers” 
      Furthermore, Japan decided to ease its self-imposed arms export ban for the first 
time in almost 50 years on the 1st April 2014 which is described as “the first major 
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overhaul in nearly half a century of its arms embargo policy” (Japan Times 2014). 
The attempt to loosen arms export policy has been made especially under the second 
Abe administration. According to draft principles to control arms exports presented 
to the ruling coalition on the 5
th
 December 2013, the Japanese government would 
permit exports as long as they “contribute to Japan’s national security” or meet other 
conditions (Asahi Shimbun 2013). The loosely defined principles could allow for 
broad interpretation and substantially expand the range of weapons to be exported 
and their destinations. Yoshihide Suga, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the second Abe 
administration remarked that “Under the new principles, we have made the 
procedure for transfer of defence equipment more transparent…That will contribute 
to peace and international co-operation from the standpoint of proactive pacifism” 
(BBC 2014).
151
 Japan further set to approve its first arms export following the 
relaxation of Japan’s self-imposed ban. As a result, MHI came up with the plan to 
export a high-performance sensor to the US for using the Patriot Advanced 
Capability-2 (PAC-2) missile defence system in order to export to Qatar. 
 
Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the U.S.-Japan Military-Industrial Relationship 
     This section illustrates how material, institutional and ideational elements may 
have interacted in the field of the military-industrial relationship in the context of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. With regard to the ideational element, US ideas have influenced 
Japan’s policymaking on arms industries which have further developed the BMD 
cooperation between the US and Japan. The examples of DUT can be regarded as 
another factor which has bolstered the alliance. Considering the institutional aspects 
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 It is important to note that “proactive pacifism” is one of the major concepts of Japanese 
foreign policymaking under the second Abe administration which is also listed in NDPG 2013. 
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of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is not only governments but also the METI, the 
Keidanren and Japanese companies involved in arms industries that have contributed 
to transform the Japanese policymaking in the face of a changing international 
environment. Especially considering the arms control policy in Japan which has 
influenced the arms trade of Japan has been remoulded in the hands of governments 
and other relevant actors including the Keidanren which may recall their role in the 
postwar period as is exemplified in Chapter Three.   
 
Diagram 4: Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the U.S.-Japan Military-Industrial 
Relationship 
 
Source: Author 
 
The Deepening U.S.-Japan Bilateral Alliance 
The US Historic Bloc: A Further Integrated U.S.-Japan Cooperation? 
      In neo-Gramscian terms, the historic bloc that supports the U.S.-Japan alliance 
and the US presence in the Asia-Pacific region has become firmer particularly in the 
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post-Cold War period. The features of the alliance management have been 
transformed in response to the post-Cold War and post-9.11 security environment. 
Rubinstein (2007) explains the “sword and shield” concept of defence cooperation 
with the US. Initial “roles and missions” planning between the US and Japanese 
defence officials in the early 1980s envisaged a US “sword”, or power projection 
forces, working with a Japanese “shield”, or defence of Japanese territory, and 
support through US bases and other facilities in Japan. Current defence planning 
emphasises a Japanese shield both less static and more closely coordinated with US 
forces.  
     These trends revisit the question whether Japan is shifting away from the Yoshida 
Doctrine which has mainly been discussed in Chapter Three. Apparently, Japan’s 
strategic posture has been altered in response to US’ strategic planning. However, on 
the other hand, this trend does not necessarily display that Japan has become a 
complete ally for the US due to its constraints in the  constitutions and laws. While 
Rubinstein (2007) indicates about the shift away from the “sword and shield” 
concept that is intimately associated with the Yoshida Doctrine, it is questionable 
whether Japan can be regarded as an equal partner of the US or not. Still, as 
described above, Japan has gradually expanded its role as a US ally. 
 
Shifting Away from “the Yoshida Doctrine”152?      
     While some argues that Japanese defence policies have been based upon the 
Yoshida Doctrine as is exemplified in Chapter Three, one of the remaining important 
questions is whether the “Yoshida Doctrine” will be supplanted by other doctrines or 
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 It is noted that the Yoshida Doctrine remains persistent. Among 300 politicians, 200 are 
presumably liberal conservative (Interview with Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, 9
th
 April 2013). 
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not. The Yoshida Doctrine has been viewed as a “permanent strategy” of Japan in 
the post-Cold War era (Pyle 2007; Samuels 2007). Hughes and Krauss (2007) argue 
that “No coherent new foreign policy doctrine has replaced Yoshida’s, only a new 
inclination to follow the demands of public opinion or the United States when 
expedient, or to stand up to China and the two Koreas over history, or to rail against 
perceived subordination to US strategy” (Hughes & Krauss 2007, pp. 172-173).  
     According to Bloom (2009), Japan’s defence industrial policy was, and still is, 
driven by the Yoshida Doctrine, which states that Japan’s postwar strategy should 
concentrate on rebuilding and developing its economy while accepting US security 
guarantees. As a result, the Japanese government has emphasised maintaining a wide 
range of platforms and military equipment, with kokusanka at the core of the 
country’s defence industrial policy. Production licensed by the US and Japan has 
worked in that Japan now has an effective defence industrial base. However, he also 
argues that the kokusanka policy has not worked in that the Japanese defence 
industry is a generation behind the development of new defence technologies. 
Considering deepening force interoperability and military-industrial relationship, the 
U.S.-Japan alliance has been bolstered in material terms. Japan has expanded the 
SDF operations abroad in cooperation with the US and also increased their military-
industrial cooperation. Not only at the governmental level but at operational and 
business levels, the U.S.-Japan alliance is viewed as indispensable.
153
 
 
Conclusion 
     Chapter Four explores the U.S.-Japan alliance with a focus on force 
interoperability and the military-industrial relationship. The section on force 
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interoperability illustrated the influences of US strategic planning including 
transformation and dynamic deterrence which has altered Japan’s strategic planning 
with its progress on transforming its alliance management with such concepts as 
“dynamic defence”. This section also showed how the US and Japan have deepened 
their alliance relationship at the operational level with increasing joint exercises by 
widening its cooperation in consideration of the post-Cold War and post-9.11 
environments. The Japanese SDF has also expanded its non-traditional security 
realm such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. In terms of the 
military-industrial relationship, the section described the developments on BMD 
cooperation between the US and Japan with Japan’s transforming postures on arms 
exports. Whilst the US and Japan had controversies on FSX for instance, in the post-
Cold War era, Japan has been considering globalising defence industries. 
Additionally, Japan has loosened its policy on arms exports in response to its BMD 
cooperation with the US. Not only has the ministries of Japan but also the Keidanren 
have been taken into account which have been more willing to work towards a closer 
US-Japan cooperation. 
     This chapter also illustrates how the U.S.-Japan alliance has deepened bilaterally 
not only based on the agreement of the US government but also the Japanese 
government and others actors such as the SDF and the Keidanren. As Murayama 
(1996) indicates that US’ RMA has intended to exert its influence on its allies, we 
can see that US strategic planning has effects on Japan’s defence posture. However, 
it is important to note that it is not merely US pressure that has transformed Japan’s 
attitudes as such cases as the FSX controversy showed, but particularly after the 
Cold War, Japan has made efforts to expand its role as a US ally. The discussion in 
Chapter Five goes beyond the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance in regard to the US-led 
207 
 
regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region which focuses more on the 
economic and ideational aspects of the US-led historic bloc, which have 
strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance in the Asia-Pacific region.  
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Chapter Five: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
 
Introduction 
     Chapter Five examines economic and ideational aspects of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance in relation to regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, which have become an 
important elements of the alliance. Indeed, it is crucial to note that linking alliances 
to regionalism is not novel. The Cold Wars were represents the period when a US-
led “hub-and-spokes” system played a significant role in the “Free World” discourse. 
Considering these historical contexts, this chapter discusses the notion of 
regionalism taking into account the Asia-Pacific circumstances and its relationship 
with US hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc. This chapter argues that the scope of 
regionalism is being altered since the US presence has been influential in shaping the 
region although there are some critiques that the US has inhibited regionalisation in 
the Asia-Pacific and no consensus about the idea on “Asian regionalism” exists. In 
the neo-Gramscian sense, the consensual aspect of the states is seen as inevitable to 
sustain hegemony so the perspectives of other Asian states are important to be taken 
into consideration. With the use of social forces analysis, economic and ideational 
components of the U.S.-Japan alliance are examined by looking into various actors 
not only in the realm of military but also economy and ideology. In particular, in the 
context of Japan, the roles of Japanese politicians, ministries and the Keidanren are 
important to be considered.  
     Investigating the role of the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region, 
this chapter closely looks into an increasing salience of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 
context of regionalism. While closely examining economic and ideational aspects of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance, the interaction of material capabilities, institutional and 
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ideational aspects of hegemonic bloc are explored. This chapter argues that the U.S-
Japan alliance has further functioned as a regional stabiliser by means of economic 
and ideational components. As Cox notes, a nascent form of historic bloc is 
consisted of “the most powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in 
government, and the variety of networks that evolve policy guidelines and propagate 
the ideology of globalisation” (Cox 1999, p. 12). This aspect of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance is explored by focusing on the role of business communities and experts on 
U.S.-Japan relations. Furthermore, the chapter examines the features of regionalism 
in the Asia-Pacific linked to the US-led historic bloc.  
     This chapter is structured as follows; first, the features of an alliance system and 
the U.S.-Japan alliance are briefly explicated with regard to regionalism by 
underlining the political elements of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Then, the economic and 
ideational aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance are investigated by focusing on the role 
of institutions and actors such as the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
and the Keidanren using Cox’s social forces analysis. Second, in consideration of the 
previous section, the chapter discusses the features of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, 
which is still debatable. The concept of regionalism is important to be considered to 
understand the US presence in the Asia-Pacific. Lastly, by taking into account the 
features of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific 
region, this section attempts to characterise the nature of US hegemony in the region 
within the neo-Gramscian framework. The US “pivot”, or rebalance, to Asia strategy 
is also taken into account not only analysing the US perspectives but also the 
viewpoints of US allies in the region.  
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The U.S.-Japan Alliance and its Role in Regionalism 
     While the U.S.-Japan alliance can be seen as a military one by some security 
experts, the alliance can be viewed as political by constituting not only military but 
also economic and ideational components. It is acknowledged in the official 
Japanese documents that “The reality of postwar pacifism was provided by the 
country’s ‘economism,’ that is, its single-minded concentration on economic 
affairs…Participation in the international economic summits among the United 
States, Europe, and Japan that were inaugurated in 1975 was the embodiment of 
Japan’s global role as a country that had redeveloped as an economic state in the 
postwar period” (Kantei 2000). Furthermore, according to Inoguchi, Ikenberry and 
Sato (2011), “alliance politics is the policy of different perspectives often shaped by 
different positions and circumstances placed in world politics” (Inoguchi, Ikenberry 
& Sato 2011, p. 6).
154
 Yasuhiro Nakasone, a former Japanese Prime Minister, also 
acknowledged that the U.S.-Japan alliance is a political alliance (Sotooka, Miura & 
Honda 2001). In this sense, it is visible that alliance politics is not necessarily 
confined to the military. Additionally, one of the MOFA officials also points out that 
“the U.S.-Japan alliance is like ‘baumkuchen’; the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty at the 
core, economic aspect as the second layer and ideational aspect as the third layer”.155 
This understanding of the U.S.-Japan alliance exhibits that it possesses not only 
military but also economic and ideational implications for foreign policymaking. 
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 In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, they also indicate that “The U.S.-Japan alliance has 
been intensely bilateral in its origins and operations. Yet Japan has long been trying to get more 
global in terms of its own self-appointed role as a supporter of the U.S.-led system” (Inoguchi, 
Ikenberry & Sato 2011, p. 4). 
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Hub-and-Spoke System in the Asia-Pacific 
     The bilateral alliances in the Asia Pacific were built in the “hub-and-spoke” 
pattern with the US as the centre following World War II.
156
 Gerson (1997) 
explicates that Dulles was the principal architect of the structures of US hegemony in 
the Asia-Pacific. He further notes that “As the U.S. consolidated its Asian-Pacific 
conquests, Dulles opted for a ‘hub and spokes’ system connecting Washington to its 
regional allies and clients through a series of bilateral treaties. Cooperation and 
collaboration among the Asian-Pacific allies and clients (spokes) was thus 
minimized, while their dependence on the U.S. (hub) was maximized” (Gerson 1997, 
p.110). This alliance system is also called the “San Francisco System”157 which 
emerged from a US regional bilateral network during the Japan peace conference 
convened in San Francisco on September 1951.  
     In addition, Aggarwal and Koo (2008) underscore the economic aspect of this 
system, indicating that the San Francisco system offered US allies in the region 
access to its market in return for bilateral security agreements.
158
 In this regard, we 
can view that the US-led alliance system is generated not merely for military but also 
for economic purposes. In the current discourse, the alliance system has been 
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 While quite a few Asian countries were transformed into newly emerging nations after 
decolonisation, the distrust toward Japan in the region still persisted that made it difficult to 
create a multilateral alliance including Japan. According to Sahashi (2011), “because a number of 
countries had a strong desire to change the status quo—e.g., South Korea, which became a 
‘divided nation’ during the Cold War; the Republic of China after its relocation to Taiwan; and 
South Vietnam—for the United States to be able to constrain its allies, bilateral alliances were 
preferred” (Sahashi 2011, p. 7). 
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 The prominent features of the system are summarised as follows: 1) a dense network of 
bilateral alliances; 2) an absence of multilateral security structures; 3) strong asymmetry in 
alliance relations, both in security and economics; 4) special precedence to Japan; and 5) liberal 
trade access to American markets, coupled with relatively limited development assistance 
(Calder 2004, pp. 135–157). 
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 They also remark that “At the same time, U.S. allies were strongly encouraged to participate 
in broad-based, multilateral forums in institutions such as the United Nations (UN) in security 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in trade and finance. Aside from informal networks based on corporate and ethnic ties, the 
San Francisco system created few incentives for Asian countries to develop exclusive regional 
arrangements” (Aggarwal & Koo 2008, p. 2). 
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regarded as a “Pacific alliance” which signifies the intention to go beyond bilateral 
relations and establish the order of the Asia-Pacific region under US hegemony. The 
following sections underscore economic and ideational aspects of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance by using social forces analysis. Within the neo-Gramscian framework, the 
interactions of material capabilities, institutions and ideas are examined to elucidate 
how the alliance may have further strengthened in the economic and ideational terms. 
As social forces analysis is employed to the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance in Chapter 
Four, this chapter uses this analysis in exploring the economic and ideational aspects 
of the alliance. Yet, the composition of respective elements can be different from 
that of Chapter Four. For instance, as for institutions, the roles of the MOFA, the 
METI and the Keidanren are more focused than the MOD. 
 
Economic Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     This section explores in what ways the U.S.-Japan alliance has enhanced its 
relevance in the economic sphere. Some may disagree about a linkage between 
economic liberalisation and the U.S.-Japan alliance
159
 yet it is observable that the 
alliance has become a dominant factor for regionalism considering the historical past 
of the economic relationship between the US and Japan.
160
 Although the METI
161
 
has enhanced its interest in multilateralisation particularly in the post-Cold War 
period, not only the MOFA but also the METI have increasingly acknowledged that 
the alliance is “the pillar of the Japanese diplomacy”.162 As is elaborated in Chapter 
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 For example, Koichi Kato, a LDP member, argues that TPP cannot be justified with the 
purpose of strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance (Kato 2913).  
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 The Asahi book the U.S.-Japan Alliance Economy (Nichibei Domei Keizai)” (2005) argues 
that the US and Japan have shifted away from the period of “competition” to “calmness (nagi)”. 
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 The METI was one of the agencies which were still “lukewarm” about liberalisation (Searight 
1999, p. 6) 
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 Yet, while this idea persists in the MOFA document whereas slight amendments were made in 
the METI ones by combining both bilateral and multilateral components. 
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Three, Japan benefited from large amounts of US aid during the Cold War as one of 
the US’ allies. Japanese foreign economic policy was based upon the bilateral 
relationship with the US with “an implicit bargain” (Krauss 2003) that illustrates 
how Japan might have benefited from US pressures during the Korean War. As is 
highlighted, while Japan would support the US in the Cold War with the backbone of 
the US-Japan Security Treaty, “the US would provide Japan’s military security, 
access to US markets from its economic growth and a dismantlement of non-liberal 
or anti-liberal formal and informal barriers to foreign access to the home market, 
particularly in manufactured goods” (Krauss 2003, p. 310). This can be seen as part 
of liberal globalisation in the way Rupert (2000) sees it. He regards liberal 
globalisation as “a confluence of two related historical processes” (Rupert 2000, p.  
16). On the one hand, it is the product of capitalism’s expansion with limitless 
accumulation; on the other hand, it is the constellation of dominant social forces by 
facilitating the transnational expansion of capitalism (Rupert 2000) 
     This logic has become institutionalised in both the MOFA and the METI. Indeed, 
it is evident that the Keidanren’s ideas have shifted away from multilateral 
regionalism to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which also supplements the 
relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance which is discussed in this chapter. In the 
following analysis, while it displays some contestation about the ideas about 
bilateralism and multilateralism especially in the realm of liberalisation, this section 
displays the gradual comprehension of such policies as the TPP with increasing 
supporters from both the US and Japan’s sides especially in regard to the 
Keidanren’s shifting focus on policies with a more attention to the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. 
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Trade Conflicts between the US and Japan, and the Search for Multilateralism 
     With Japan’s rapid economic growth, trade conflicts between the US and Japan 
became more intense in the 1980s. Although it is acknowledged that U.S.-Japan 
trade conflicts have existed since the late 1950s, the ones of the 1980s have the 
different features since it that was a decade of the liberalisation of Japanese markets 
(Ito 1993). The US government continuously attempted to open up Japanese markets 
to deflect protectionist sentiments in Congress for closing off its market (Krauss 
2003, pp. 310-311).
163
 According to Krauss (2003), “Japan’s trade with Asia was 
increasing but those countries were still dependent on the US market for exports and 
their sensitivity about the past seemed to preclude Japan taking any overt role to 
coordinate an Asian response to this crisis” (Krauss 2003, pp. 311-312).164 
Furthermore, with the emerging trend of regional multilateralism, Japan has begun to 
craft the different strategies during its trade conflict with the US. In 1988, the Trade 
Policy Bureau of the MITI, the current METI, began to study various options for 
easing the trade friction with the US, including broader cooperative arrangements in 
the Asia-Pacific (Funabashi 1995, pp.58 - 66; Yamamoto & Kikuchi 1998, pp. 193–
7; Krauss 2003).  
     As a result of the  release of the report based upon these studies, this encouraged 
Australia to initiate the founding meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) on the 31st January 1989 which can be seen as the beginning process of 
Japan’s shift towards “bilateralism plus regional multilateralism” (Krauss 2003). 
Although there was discordance between the MITI and the MOFA, it became 
                                                          
163
 This is a pattern of “export politics” and the “bicycle theory” of trade negotiations (Destler 
1995, pp. 17–18; Krauss 2003, pp. 310-311) 
164
 She also exemplifies that “A likely future scenario was that unstoppable protectionist 
sentiment in the US would lead it to close its markets, not only to Japan, but to other Asian 
exporters, and then cause a breakdown of the entire liberal trading system under which Japan had 
prospered in the post-war era” (Krauss 2003, pp. 311-312). 
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alleviated towards 1993. After 1993, Japan embarked upon several regional 
initiatives that involved the MOFA as the preparation to shift toward “regionalism”. 
One was the proposal for an unprecedented multilateral regional forum connected to 
ASEAN to deal with security issues the Ministry of Finance (MOF) was dedicated to 
trying to “internationalise” the yen by regional efforts and the Miyazawa, Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF), and Chiang Mai initiatives after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis as the commitment to Japan’s active regional role. The METI puts a priority on 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and regional involvement while there were some 
who also were sceptical about bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) arrangements 
(Krauss 2003). 
 
Counter-Hegemonic Movements in the Asia-Pacific 
     Conversely, a potential counterweight to US hegemony, or the US-led historic 
bloc in the neo-Gramscian sense, did exist. Throughout the 1990s, the then 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed and other Asian officials opposed to 
US-led liberalisation, which led Mahathir to propose an East Asian Economic Group 
(EAEG) in 1990, renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) later on, which 
would include only APEC’s eleven Asian members. Mahathir “has consistently 
railed against American hegemony and what he sees as attempts by the North to 
‘subject us to imperial pressures’” (Higgott & Stubbs 1995, p. 524). APEC is seen as 
a vehicle for the US and other non-Asian states to “hitch a ride” with the more 
dynamic Asian economies (Chandra 1993; Higgott & Stubbs 1995, p. 525). Mahathir 
proposed grouping the EAEG, which was renamed the EAEC in response to 
concerns that the original name made it sound too much like an attempt to form a 
regional trade bloc (Stubbs 2002, p. 441). The then Singaporean Senior Minister Lee 
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Kuan Yew referred to the growing unease among East Asians about the emergence 
of the NAFTA and the EU and the need for East Asia to develop an organisational 
response. Some analyses that the US used coercive means equally significantly.
165
   
     In fact, the Keidanren also favoured the EAEC in the late 1994 which 
demonstrated Japan’s willingness to get closely tied with Asia rather than to the US 
that was seen as a power “in decline” (Higgott & Stubbs 1995, p. 531). This exhibits 
a growing awareness of the significance of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region, 
where bilateralism itself would not be sustainable. However, whilst such actors in 
Japan as the Keidanren favoured a more multilateralism, Japan did not wish to 
endanger the US commitment to the region by supporting the expansion of the 
EAEC (Rapkin 1994; Higgott & Stubbs 1995). This may have influenced the values 
of the Keidanren regarding economic liberalisation including the TPP, which is 
examined in the later section. While the US has responded directly to the East Asian 
regionalism movement using APEC as an alternative regional integration framework, 
it has also sought to introduce a rules-based, reciprocal, and discriminatory 
integration norm into APEC to emulate East Asian regional integration. 
     The 1997 Asian financial crisis also represents a critical discontinuity in the 
region with the suspicions of the US. Initially, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was criticised for aggravating the crisis with its demands for economic 
restructuring and financial reform. At the same time, the exclusion of the US from 
Asian security disrupted the “delicately calibrated understanding of balance in the 
Asia-Pacific” (Jones & Smith 2007, p. 179). The Japan-led AMF proposal was 
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 The US and Australia had toned down their opposition to a regional grouping. At the July 
1996 ASEAN ministers’ meeting, Joan E. Spero, on behalf of the U.S. administration, stated that 
the U.S. would not oppose the EAEC so long as it did not split the Pacific Rim down the middle 
(Stubbs 2002, pp. 442-443).   
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generated after this crisis which was rejected both by the US and China. While China 
was afraid of Japan’s expanding power in the region, the US was opposed to this 
idea due to its possible exclusion from the region. Following this crisis, ASEAN 
sought to establish a dialogue partnership with Northeast Asia through the new 
mechanism of an East Asian Summit (EAS).
166
 Stubbs (2002) argues that there are a 
number of commonalities including the experience of warfare, “Asian values”, 
common institutions, a distinctive brand of capitalism, and deeper economic 
integration which provide the APT with a potential basis for regional identity and 
consolidation. At the 6th ASEAN summit in Hanoi in December 1998, they agreed 
to formalise these meetings into the arrangement of ASEAN+3.
167
 Out of the Chiang 
Mai Initiative, the ASEAN+3 developed three tracks (Stubbs 2002).  
     However, US officials were suspicious of the Asian-only summit when the 
Malaysian government first announced its establishment of the EAS in 2004. 
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo revealed after a meeting with the then 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the US had “some concerns that the East 
Asia Summit will be inward looking and exclusive”.168  Another key aspect of the 
US approach has been its 2010 decision to join the EAS, eventually including the US 
and Russia and other regional major powers. According to Beeson (2003), “the 
impact of strategic considerations is itself potentially contradictory and will 
ultimately depend on a number of imponderable strategic developments— especially 
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 At the first EAS summit that was held in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, the leaders of 
ASEAN discussed regional possibilities with China, Japan and South Korea as ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT), or ‘ASEAN+3’, has continued to develop momentum despite the fact that it is 
essentially Mahathir’s vision in another guise (Beeson 2003, p. 262). 
167
 It reflected both a Chinese effort to exercise leadership and collective Asian weariness of 
APEC and the ARF. 
168
 “US Concerned Over Exclusive Nature of EAS,” Agence France Presse, Feb. 25, 2005. 
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those revolving around American foreign policy—and the region’s capacity to 
develop collective responses to them” (Beeson 2003, p. 259). 
 
Bilateralism Plus Multilateralism 
     In consideration of these environments, US opposition and a directly 
consequential Japanese ambivalence led to Japan’s orientation towards “bilateralism 
plus multilateralism”, the shift from an exclusive U.S.-Japan bilateralism to the 
addition to regional multilateralism. Some scholars examine Japan’s shift from 
dependence on and friction with the US to an additional force of global “multilateral 
liberalisation” (Schoppa 1999; Searight 1999; Pekkanen 2001; Krauss 2003). Krauss 
(2003) examines the role of US policy changes and their influence on its relationship 
with Japan, stating that these transitions were part of the consistent pattern of 
preferences and goals through the postwar era with its adaptation to the transforming 
environment which can be exemplified within a “strategic interaction” framework 
(Krauss 2003, p. 309).
169
 Each crisis in the global and regional trading system has 
led to new forms of first regional multilateral and now bilateral trade policy relations, 
which have further opened up new policy options, each taking Japan a bit further 
away from its previous heavy bilateral economic and political dependence on the US, 
without in any way sundering that relationship or moving toward a complete 
antagonist leadership role (Krauss 2003, p. 325). Some observes that Japan has 
expanded both its “security shield” with the US and its “economic sword” in the 
region (Heginbotham & Samuels 2002), which means economic liberalisation has 
been promoted at the pillar of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
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 According to Krauss (2003), “It is clear that Japan’s foreign economic policy has become 
much more tied to the region and diversified in the sources and targets of its strategies, and that 
Japan itself, more specifically the MITI, has been an important agent in intentionally widening 
those options” (Krauss 2003, p. 325).   
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Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP)  
     The US has an interest in promoting the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP) idea, using the APEC framework to form a regional FTA which is an idea 
that has been adopted by the Obama administration. The 2006 Hanoi Leaders’ 
Declaration states that “We instructed Officials to undertake further studies on ways 
and means to promote regional economic integration, including a FTAAP as a long 
term prospect, and report to the 2007 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 
Australia,” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007) in which the FTAAP was put as one 
of the agenda for the first time. Furthermore, the US began to use the FTAAP 
concept to change the discourse, or at least to change the expectation of where the 
politics of regional trade would be headed in the future (Terada 2011).
170
 According 
to Aggarwal and Koo (2012), traditional confidence in bilateral alliances and 
multilateral globalism has been eroded visibly by manifesting itself in the 
burgeoning interest in free trade agreements (FTAs), regional financial institutions 
and cooperative security dialogues.  
     The TPP
171
 has been a recent evolving regional FTA, which also influences the 
regional dynamism in the Asia-Pacific. It was originally formed as the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership, forming among Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and 
Brunei, or the so-called “P-4”. On November 2009, US President Obama committed 
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 It is also noted that it was the “Nikai shock,” an ASEAN+6 FTA proposal - excluding the US - 
made in April 2006 by Toshihiro Nikai, then head of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (METI), that compelled the United States to push for the FTAAP idea (Terada 2011) 
171
 These activities include market access for goods and services; government procurement; 
foreign investment; technical barriers to trade; trade remedies; sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures; intellectual property rights; worker rights; and environmental protection. The TPP 
countries also agreed to pursue cross-cutting issues such as regulatory coherence, 
competitiveness, and business facilitation, also known as transnational supply and production 
chains; the participation of small and medium-sized companies; economic development; and 
potential disciplines on the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (White House 2009).  
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the US to engage with the TPP countries to transform the original P-4 pact into a 
regional arrangement with a broader basis of membership. The TPP agreement is 
envisioned as “a comprehensive, next-generation regional agreement that liberalizes 
trade and investment and addresses new and traditional trade issues and 21st century 
challenges” (Office of the United State Trade Representative 2011). It also notes that 
“As the second-largest economy in Asia, the third-largest economy in the world, and 
a key link in global supply/production chains, Japan’s participation would be pivotal 
to enhancing the credibility and viability of the TPP as a regional free trade 
arrangement” (Office of the United State Trade Representative 2011).  
     A large segment of the US community has expressed support for Japanese 
participation in the TPP, if Japan can resolve long-standing issues on access to its 
markets for U.S. goods and services” (Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 
2012, p. 6). This tendency may relate to what Higgott (2004) calls the 
“securitisation”172 of US foreign economic policymaking.173 In the case of recent 
discourse on the TPP, it can be regarded as “the securitisation of the TPP”. 
According to Capling and Ravenhill (2012), “The ‘securitization’ of the TPP is 
consistent with a recent trend in US trade policy to use PTAs [preferential trade 
agreements] to reinforce strategic relationships” (Capling & Ravenhill 2012, p. 292). 
They argue that “the US agenda is not solely about the pursuit of business interests: 
                                                          
172
 “Securitisation” is seen as a socially constructed, contextual speech act and a process in which 
“an issue is framed as a security problem” (Waever, 1995, p. 75; Buzan et al., 1998; Higgott 
2004). 
173
 Also, under the Bush administration, the importance of APEC was underscored with the 
element of terrorism which was seen as an important factor to be taken into account as a 
mechanism for combating terrorism following the 9.11 terrorist attacks (Morrison 2009) 
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foreign policy and geopolitical considerations are also powerful motivating forces 
for Washington’s interest in the TPP” (Capling & Ravenhill 2012, p. 291).174 
     Japan’s announcement followed an initial expression of interest in November 
2011 by the then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. In his opening statement at a 
November 2011 press conference to discuss Japan’s decision to explore joining the 
TPP talks, Noda said that “as a trading nation, in order to pass down the affluence we 
have cultivated to our future generations and to develop our society into one with 
vigor, we must incorporate the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region”.175 It is 
worthwhile to note that Noda is graduated from Matsushita Institute of Government 
and Management (commonly known as Matsushita Seikei Juku)
176
, a school to 
provide young people with business values and management training for 
government.
177
  By 2000, the politicians who graduated from this institute “cement 
the DPJ’s status as a neoliberal alternative to the LDP on economic policy” (Schoppa 
2011, p. 35). In addition, in his March 2013 statement, Prime Minister Abe 
acknowledged the interests and sensitivities of the agricultural groups, but he also 
insisted that Japan needed to take advantage of “this last window of opportunity” to 
enter the negotiations. He reiterated that “the meaning of the TPP is not only limited 
to national economic development, but also to create an economic zone with the ally, 
the US” (Kantei 2013). According to Hagiwara (2013), this statement reiterates the 
purpose of strengthening U.S.-Japan alliance by means of the TPP (Hagiwara 2013, 
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 They also note that “In particular, the Obama Administration is using the TPP to promote 
traditional security concerns including the strengthening of bilateral military alliances in the 
Asia-Pacific, the projection of US power as a counter to China, and the promotion of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law” (Capling & Ravenhill 2012, p. 291). 
175
 “The World and Japan" Database Project”, http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/PI/20111111.O1E.html 
176
 Another observation to be made is that one of the core ideas of Matsushita is a proactive 
foreign policy to enhance Japan’s role as a global leader. 
177
 This institute was founded by Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of Matsushita Electric 
Corporation (the current Panasonic) (Schoppa 2011) 
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p. 50). Japan increases the economic importance of the TPP from the US 
perspective.
178
 Japan’s participation in the TPP could affect US political and foreign 
policy interests. The US entry into the TPP negotiations is part of the Obama 
Administration’s foreign policy and military “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific, 
which is often referred to as the “pivot” to the Pacific, announced in 2011. The 
Japanese MOFA also recognised that “[the] TPP is for the order based upon free 
trade and the adjustment for this order which is contributable for the U.S.-Japan 
trade and regionally and globally”.179  
     However, in fact, it is also crucial to note that the TPP has been intrinsically 
controversial at the domestic level. According to Naoi and Urata (2013), “the 
coalition opposing Japan’s participation in the TPP has been much broader and 
powerful” (Naoi & Urata 2013, p. 334). They exemplify that “a broader protectionist 
coalition can emerge given the presence of two interrelated conditions in domestic 
politics: (i) uncertainty [of negotiation outcome and politics] regarding the 
forthcoming distributional effects of the agreement, which generates the bulk of 
“uncertain losers” – that is, voters and interest groups that are unclear about their 
losses from the agreement; and (ii) the presence of the biggest potential losers of the 
agreement, who are well-organized and resourceful, allowing them to build a 
protectionist coalition with uncertain losers through persuasion and policy 
campaigns” (Naoi & Urata 2013, p. 334). Additionally, it is also taken into account 
that the popular anti-TPP campaign slogans have been “the TPP is not just a trade 
agreement” (Mitsuhashi 2011). Furthermore, in this article, the role of a “policy 
                                                          
178
 It is noted that “It increases the amount of U.S merchandise trade that the TPP covers from 
34% (the original 11 countries) to 39% based on 2011 data, and increases trade in services and 
foreign investment activity within the TPP. Japan increases the share of the world economy 
accounted for by TPP countries (including Canada and Mexico), from around about 30% to about 
38%” (Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 11). 
179
 Interview with Noriaki Abe, 19th March 2014 
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campaign” by the elites which consist not only of politicians, bureaucracies and 
economists, but also of the media is highlighted which can be seen as the roles of 
“organic intellectuals” in the neo-Gramscian sense. Naoi and Urata’s (2013) study 
exhibits that “it is not media’s reporting on the TPP’s effect on the national economy 
(such as unemployment and exporting industries), but rather, the media’s reporting 
on the partisan politics regarding the TPP that substantially shape citizens’ attitudes 
toward the TPP” (Naoi & Urata 2013, p. 338).180  
     From the perspectives of some actors, joining the TPP would complement Japan’s 
moves in recent years to augment the U.S.-Japan alliance by strengthening Japan’s 
relationships with middle powers in and around the Asian region.
181
 Since economic 
liberalisation has been a core interest of this business group, the Keidanren also 
emphasises the significance of the alliance in consideration of potential economic 
growth with the expansion of economic liberalisation. The report on Joint Study for 
a Japan - U.S. Economic Partnership in 2006 notes that “The character of the alliance 
relationship between Japan and the U.S., based on the Japan - U.S. Security Treaty, 
has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s transformation, but 
the role of the alliance as the pivot of the two countries' political and national 
security will remain immutable. From the same general perspective, the creation of a 
framework for a systematic partnership in the economic field will also be essential 
for maintaining that pivot” (Keidanren 2006). 
                                                          
180
 Based upon the idea of “socio-tropic” formation of public opinion, it is argued that “the mass 
media reporting on the national economy (e.g. the unemployment rate and the stock market) 
shapes citizens’ socio-tropic trade preferences” (Naoi & Urata 2013, p. 337). 
181
 It is noted that although the U.S.-Japan alliance seems to be in militaristic terms, it is a 
prerequisite for the economic relationship with the US (Interview with Shujiro Urata, 9
th
 April 
2013). It is also remarked that the TPP is an element to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance 
(Interview with Kazuhiro Takahashi, 11
th
 March 2013). 
224 
 
     It is also crucial to underscore the transformed nature of the Keidanren with 
regard to ideology. In 2002, the Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers’ 
Associations) got integrated into the Keidanren. According to Sasaki (2007), the 
relationship between the US and Japan has become much more intimate since this 
amalgamation due to transnational nature of participating companies that are inclined 
to support liberalisation. Furthermore, in regard to Japan’s attempt to join the TPP, 
Hagiwara (2013) characterises the movement for promoting the TPP as “the third 
reform”. In particular, he categorises into the three periods of liberalisation; the 
Hashimoto’s reform, the Koizumi reform and the reform for the TPP. Hagiwara 
(2013) analyses that the report about the TPP which was released under the Kan 
administration and almost the same content with the one previously published by the 
Keidanren. Not only that the neoliberal ideology of the Keidanren became 
strengthened, but also their policy influences got more visible which can be seen as 
the ideas got translated into practices.  
     Furthermore, some politicians have said that Japan’s participation in the TPP 
would strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. For instance, Seiji Maehara has 
emphasised that joining the TPP would bolster the U.S.-Japan alliance.
182
 Yachi 
(2013) also remarks that “[the] TPP should be considered strategically for Japanese 
diplomacy and economic power” (Yachi 2013, p. 32). It is also indicated that 
“Japan’s entry into the TPP is largely viewed, on the one hand, as an important step 
in forming a wider Asia-Pacific regional trade arrangement. On the other hand, the 
absence of Japan could undermine the credibility of the TPP as a viable regional 
trade arrangement and a setback for Asia-Pacific economic integration” (Fergusson, 
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 At the symposium sponsored by Nikkei, one of the major newspaper companies, and the 
CSIS, in the late 2012, he emphasised that “in order to deepen the alliance, not only the 
diplomacy based on the security treaty but economic and trade relationships between the US and 
Japan are crucial. The TPP is a valid means in that regard” (Nikkei 2012).  
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Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 19). Kazuhito Yamashita, a researcher at The 
Canon Institute for Global Studies, also argues that “If Japan is not going to 
participate proactively in trade liberalization negotiations like the TPP that do away 
with trading partners' tariffs, Japanese agriculture will simply proceed with its 
assisted suicide” (Yamashita 2013). 
     The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-Japan Business Council 
(USJBC)
183
, in separate submissions, also expressed support for Japan’s participation 
in the TPP negotiations. According to the chairman of the USJBC, “It is very 
encouraging to see that Prime Minister Abe has taken this bold step, which will help 
revitalize the Japanese economy and solidify the U.S.-Japan alliance” (U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce 2013). The USJBC also released the joint statement entitled “Pacific 
Partners: Opportunities for Collaboration and Growth in the 21
st
 Century,” 
remarking that “the increasingly close and cooperative economic ties between our 
countries and the many opportunities to expand the commercial dimensions of our 
bilateral relationship in ways that will strengthen the overall U.S.-Japan alliance and 
contribute to sustained growth in both countries” (USJBC 2014, p. 1). 
     It is said that behind this push is a concern that China’s rise is diminishing 
Japan’s influence and jeopardising its security and economic interests. Fergusson, 
Cooper, Jurenas and Williams (2012) remark that “U.S. and Japanese participation in 
the same free trade agreement could arguably be viewed as a means to reaffirm their 
alliance. The long-running bilateral relationship at times over the years has been 
overshadowed by U.S. and Japanese interests and concerns elsewhere in Asia, for 
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 John C. Lechleiter, the chairman of the USJBC and also chairman, president and CEO of Eli 
Lilly & Co., a global pharmaceutical company, also indicates that “The TPP is a great 
opportunity for Japan to expand its exports of high-value specialty agricultural products” (Nikkei 
Asian Review 2014) 
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example, China and the Korean Peninsula, and in other parts of the world” 
(Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 13). The aforementioned 
discourse of pro-TPP is similar to the way Rupert displays in his work on the 
development of Fordism (Rupert 1995; Rupert 2000), the NAFTA and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the roles of business communities, 
scholars and politicians (Rupert 2000). As this section exhibits, while there are 
mixed ideas about economic regionalisation in consideration of the US presence in 
the region and domestic concerns, there is an increasing connection between the 
U.S.-Japan alliance and economic elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship which are 
closely linked relating to regionalism in the Asia-Pacific considering the institutions 
in Japan and the U.S.-Japan relationship. This can be seen as the way what Gramsci 
(1971) called the “long process” of socio-political change as a Fordist capitalism 
achieved some measure of institutional stability (Rupert 2000). 
 
Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Economic Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     The previous section explores the economic facet of the U.S.-Japan alliance using 
social forces analysis in the neo-Gramscian sense. It displays some contestation 
about the ideas about bilateralism and multilateralism especially in the realm of 
liberalisation. However, especially in regard to the Keidanren’s shifting focus on 
policies with a more attention to the U.S.-Japan alliance, this section displays the 
gradual comprehension of such policies as the TPP with increasing supporters from 
both the US and Japan’s sides. Additionally, considering the ideational component of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance in the economic sense, the capitalist economy is the central 
notion of liberalisation particularly in the case of the TPP. When we consider the 
diagram that is presented at the beginning of this chapter, the TPP can be spotted in 
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the overlapping zone of material, institutional (i.e., the Keidanren and the USJBC) 
and the ideational aspects of the alliance. While opposing voices against the TPP 
remain, the section also explores in what ways policy campaigns via the media may 
have shaped the ideas about the relevance of the TPP and discourse on enhancing the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. 
 
Diagram 5: Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Economic Dimension of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
Ideational Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     This section explores the ideational facet of the U.S.-Japan alliance by looking 
into the roles of shared values entailing democracy, capitalist economy, the rule of 
laws and human rights which have been weighed in political discourse. These ideas 
have played a larger role in the hands of MOFA officials with the particular focus on 
materials  
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such ideas as democracy and the rule of law. If we consider the roles of “organic 
intellectuals”, it can be said that these actors have contributed to create the discourse 
on important democratic norms in the U.S.-Japan alliance, which have also 
influenced Japanese foreign policymaking. It also further developed in other nations 
such as Australia and India in the realm of military activities on the basis of these 
shared values, which display the tremendous role of ideas in harnessing the U.S.-
Japan alliance. In this sense, such joint military activities as the RIMPAC can be 
regarded as one example that falls into the category of the overlapping area of 
material, institutional and ideational components of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
     Moses (2009) argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been founded upon the 
shared liberal-democratic values, which were seeded by the US, at least in a 
rhetorical sense. “According to him, “The contemporary articulation of these values 
was, of course, implanted and fostered by the United States following the defeat of 
Imperial Japan in WWII and the subsequent occupation under General McArthur, 
during which the Japanese Constitution was formulated” (Moses 2009, p. 4). As is 
indicated earlier, it is important to note that, during the Cold War era, the “Free 
World” discourse put emphasis on the relevance of the shared values which was the 
US’ attempt to challenge the Soviet system. Even in the Japanese official documents 
note that “In line with postwar Japan’s choice to rebuild itself as a trading nation, it 
acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955, and in the 
1960s it joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as one of the ‘three pillars’ of the 
free world” (Kantei 2000). In addition, the focus of the diplomacy of former 
Japanese Prime Minister Eisuke Sato was the U.S.-Japan relationship and economic 
development. Nakajima (2008) argues that the negotiation of Okinawa’s return was 
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based upon the continuity of Article Nine and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty for 
maintaining the “Free World”.  
      It is observable that ideas have played a key role in strengthening the 
significance of the alliance. The theme of shared values has been persistently 
expressed since the end of the Cold War. Müllerson (2008) notes that “The end of 
the Cold War did not end the attempts to use concepts, such as democracy and 
human rights, as ideological tools to undermine other States” (Müllerson 2008, p. 1). 
He also indicates that the end of the Cold War was the indication of a triumph of the 
Western style democracy and market economy over the Soviet version of 
communism (Müllerson 2008). It is also worth noting that, throughout the 1990s, the 
Clinton administration focused on democracy promotion as a central pillar of 
American foreign policy seeking Japan’s support for liberal reform in Asia.184 In 
addition, during the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush promised to build “strong 
democratic alliances” in Asia that would leave China “unthreatened, but not 
unchecked” (FAS 1999). While these two administrations made use of values in 
foreign policymaking in different ways, the role of values has been important in US 
foreign policymaking.
185
 
     Although the term, “values”, is not used, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty indicates 
that “Japan and the United States of America, Desiring to strengthen the bonds of 
peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the 
principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” (Ministry of 
Defence 2013). In fact, the principles of democracy, the individual, and the rule of 
                                                          
184
 This also reflects Japanese policies at that time that China remained the largest recipient of 
Japanese overseas development assistance, and Tokyo was Myanmar’s largest aid donor despite 
brutal misrule by the military junta in Yangon. 
185
 Interview with Fumiaki Kubo, 10th April 2013. 
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law are regarded as “fundamental values (kihonteki kachi)” in the Japanese version 
while it has not been directly translated into the English version. It is also noted in 
the Mainichi news article that “The Japan-U.S. alliance is not a mere defense 
alliance but one based on common values shared by advanced democracies such as 
human rights awareness and cultural maturity, which has formed an asset for 
Japanese diplomacy” (Mainichi Japan 2014). This exhibits that the ideational 
components of the U.S.-Japan alliance are considered important. 
   
Values-based Diplomacy and the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     In a diplomatic sense, increasingly, Japan, particularly under Prime Ministers 
Koizumi, Abe and Aso, has become enthusiastic in promoting a values-based 
security arrangement with the US and worked as the core driver of the values-based 
security community in the Asia-Pacific region (Moses 2009). In fact, the roles of 
Prime Minister may imply a defining factor of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Bush and 
Koizumi highlighted the theme of shared values in the June 2001 joint statement at 
Camp David and the Koizumi administration has emphasised democracy and 
universal values in subsequent meetings. Koizumi subsequently gave clear voice to 
the democratic norms underpinning Japan’s role in Asia in his speech to the 50th 
anniversary of the Bandung Asia-Africa summit on 22 April 2005 in which he 
argued, “[W]e should all play an active role … in disseminating universal values 
such as the rule of law, freedom, and democracy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). 
     In the alliance context, on June 2006, the then Prime Minister Koizumi had a 
summit meeting with President Bush at the White House, in Washington, D.C. The 
joint statement was released that contained the subheading “The US-Japan Alliance 
Based on Universal Values and Common Interests”. This section of the joint 
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statement contained a clear example of the values-security linkage that is the subject 
of this paper, claiming that “The United States and Japan stand together not only 
against mutual threats but also for the advancement of core universal values such as 
freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, the market economy, and the 
rule of law” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006).186 Furthermore, this statement of 
shared values and interests was followed by the claim that the Asian continent as a 
whole was now undergoing a transformation in line with these universal values. 
During the discussion, the two leaders agreed that “the United States and Japan stand 
together not only against mutual threats but also for the advancement of core 
universal values such as freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, the 
market economy, and the rule of law” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). It was also 
clearly stated that these common values and common interests “form the basis of 
U.S.-Japan regional and global cooperation”. According to Hosoya (2011), “the 
Japanese Government focused on sharing these “universal values” between the US 
and Japan mainly to strengthen the alliance further, as this would strengthen the 
alliance in the twenty-first century” (Hosoya 2011, p. 16). 
 
“Values-Oriented” Diplomacy and “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” 
     The discourse on liberal change and democracy promotion in the alliance between 
the US and Japan handed over to the leadership of Shinzo Abe during his first 
administration. On November 2006, in a similar line to Koizumi, Abe remarked that 
“Japan and U.S. share an alliance which is based on fundamental values, such as 
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 It is also noted that “These values are deeply rooted in the long historic traditions of both 
countries. The United States and Japan share interests in: winning the war on terrorism; 
maintaining regional stability and prosperity; promoting free market ideals and institutions; 
upholding human rights; securing freedom of navigation and commerce, including sea lanes; and 
enhancing global energy security”. 
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freedom, democracy, basic human rights and the rule of law. And we agreed with 
each other that strengthening our alliance would be a good in maintaining peace and 
security of not just Japan and the region surrounding Japan, but the entire world” 
(U.S. Department of State 2006). Universal values provided the ideational glue for a 
series of speeches and joint statements by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2006 and 
2007 initiating new strategic relationships for Japan with the NATO, Australia and 
India.  
     Under this administration, Foreign Minister Taro Aso emphasised the relevance 
of this theme in a 2005 speech entitled “Japan as the Thought Leader of Asia”, in 
which he argued that Japan stands as a model for Asia based on its success through 
adherence to the principles of market economics and democracy. In 2006 and 2007, 
the Japanese MOFA organised a major foreign policy initiative around the concept 
of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”187 with a series of speeches that emphasised 
Japan’s commitment to advancing democracy, human rights and rule of law from the 
Baltic States to Southeast Asia. According to Aso (2007),  
On November 30 I delivered a speech in which I established a fourth pillar of Japanese 
diplomacy, adding to the three pillars, namely the Japan-US alliance, international 
cooperation, and an emphasis on neighboring Asian nations. Under the title of ‘Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity,’ I set forth a policy of working to create this Arc, a region that 
would be prosperous and stable with a foundation in universal values, stretching from 
Southeast Asia to South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, and 
the Baltic states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). 
     MOFA officials basically focused much more on the strengthening of the U.S.-
Japan alliance, and also on the importance of cooperation with democratic countries 
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 It was remarked by Karen Makishima, a member of the LDP, that the promotion of Japanese 
technology in developing countries can be seen as an activity of the “Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity + α” where Japan’s “soft power” is able to play a tremendous role by strengthening 
the Japan’s presence in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Interview with Karen Makishima, 
25
th
 April 2013). 
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(Hosoya 2011). Its Diplomatic Bluebook features an explanation of the concept of 
this Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, indicating that this vision “adds another pillar of 
Japanese diplomacy to the existing pillars of reinforcement of the Japan-US alliance, 
international cooperation, most notably under the auspices of the United Nations, 
and enhancing relationships with neighboring countries such as China, the Republic 
of Korea (ROK), and Russia” (MOFA 2007, p. 2). It further remarks that “This new 
pillar of Japanese diplomacy involves placing emphasis on universal values such as 
freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and the market 
economy and creating an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” (MOFA 2007, p. 2).188 
Hosoya (2011) also argues that “Such values as freedom and democracy, not purely 
economic interests in East Asia, should be the central principle of Japan’s foreign 
policy” (Hosoya 2011, p.17). 
     Senior Japanese MOFA officials
189
, who can be regarded as organic intellectuals 
in a neo-Gramscian sense, contributed to Japan’s shift toward a values-based foreign 
policy under the first Abe administration.
190
 For instance, Shotaro Yachi
191
, Special 
Advisor to the Abe cabinet and also director of the National Security Council (NSC) 
of Japan under the second Abe administration, first suggested the idea of the “Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity” to then Foreign Minister Aso in 2006. In addition, 
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  It further notes that “In concrete terms, Japan will be acting in partnership with other nations 
that share our fundamental values to jointly bring about a society characterized by both freedom 
and prosperity by cooperating in the areas of trade and investment as well as by making use of 
official development assistance to provide support for basic human needs such as health care and 
education, support to enable democracy to take root, and support to enhance infrastructure and 
legal frameworks. This will be one of the critical building blocks of the Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity and will furthermore contribute to the realization of “human security” that Japan has 
been advocating” (MOFA 2007, pp. 2-3). 
189
 As it is indicated in Chapter Two, the MOFA has had influences on foreign policymaking 
particularly in the field of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
190
 It is remarked that these actors have been monopolised by politicians including Abe in the 
realm of “values-oriented diplomacy” (Interview with Yoshihide Soeya, 4
th
 April 2013). 
191
 He served as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2005 to 2008 and was a foreign policy 
advisor to Shinzo Abe in during the first Abe administration. When Abe became Prime Minister 
again in late 2012, he selected Yachi to be a Special Advisor to his cabinet. 
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Nobukatsu Kanehara
192
, Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary and Vice Director of the 
NSC, has also persistently supported for creating foreign policies that advance 
universal values (Akita, Kaneda, Taniguchi & Yachi 2011, p. 391). Kanehara (2011) 
argues that Japan’s strategic agenda should entail engaging with a rising China in a 
manner that will induce it to become a responsible power. According to him, values-
based diplomacy is a means to achieve this goal and thus necessary for Japan’s 
security and prosperity (Kanehara 2011, pp.  80-88). Moreover, considerable support 
among Japanese politicians for a foreign policy built on democratic values and 
principles has emerged. For instance, the Association for the Promotion of Values-
Based Diplomacy (kachikan gaiko wo suishin suru giin no kai) was created on May 
2007.  
 
Enhancing Relationships with Other US Allies 
     Regarding the important role of the values in the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan has 
developed its relationships with US allies. The US exhorts intra-allied cooperation 
and encourages bilateral or trilateral dialogues: “Australia-Japan-US,” “Japan-India-
US,” “Australia-South-Korea,” “Australia-Japan” or “India-Japan”. With regard to 
Australia, values discourse is evident at the heart of the security relationship between 
Australia and Japan. In a joint statement to the press following the meeting of Prime 
Ministers Howard and Koizumi in 2002, the “long-standing close ties and 
cooperation between Australia and Japan were recognised as being ‘based on their 
shared values of democracy, freedom, the rule of law and market-based economies’” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002). It was in the context of these cordial relations 
that increased military cooperation rapidly developed, reaching a peak with the 
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 He served Yachi at the Directorate of Policy Planning and is known for shrewd strategic 
thinking, 
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signing of the formal Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007. 
Australia and Japan also signed a joint declaration on security cooperation and 
entered into the Australia – Japan - U.S. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) in 2007 
with skilful internal political shaping and external diplomacy including Japanese 
support of Australia’s participation in ASEAN and other regional forums, and 
Australian support of Japan’s efforts to become a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. Common strategic goals include countering the often unilateral 
approach of the US in the region, especially toward China; supporting the US and 
regional efforts to improve security and capacity development; and engaging China 
in multilateral forums, such as the ARF, to convince it to become a more transparent 
and responsible regional partner. An example of the success of the TSD is 
Australia’s participation in annual Proliferation Security Initiative maritime 
interception exercises with its U.S. and Japanese naval partners aimed at the illegal 
trade of weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology. 
In terms of Japan’s relationship with India, reciprocal visits between Prime 
Ministers Singh and Abe in December 2006 and August 2007 advanced the fledgling 
partnership. In addition to a series of economic cooperation agreements, including a 
feasibility study for an FTA, the leaders looked to enhance the military-to-military 
relationship. For instance, all three SDF chiefs visited India in 2006-2007, and 
Indian vessels visited Yokosuka Naval Base outside of Tokyo (Chanlett-
Avery  2008). Other defence initiatives include sea-lane security cooperation, 
military exchanges, and regular meetings of both navies. Although support for 
bilateral ties remains, Abe has stepped down and Singh has struggled politically, 
leaving some questions as to whether the leadership in both Tokyo and New Delhi 
intends to maintain the momentum of the signed agreements. The Malabar exercises 
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have traditionally been U.S.-India bilateral exercises, which began in 1994. The 
April 2007 exercises featured the US, India, and Japan, and were held off the coast 
of Okinawa. A second round of exercises held in September was expanded to include 
the navies of Australia and Singapore (U.S. Department of the Navy 2007). The 
navies together practiced maritime interdiction, surface and antisubmarine warfare, 
and air combat exercises. Military officials leading the exercises emphasised the 
value of practicing interoperability, for use in both high-level warfighting and future 
humanitarian responses. Japan’s “normalisation” within the framework of a broader 
community of like-minded nations, will reassure the region that Japan does not 
intend to seek hegemony (Blumenthal 2005, p.6). Japan has developed its 
relationship not only with the US but also with US allies while the alliance 
relationship is seen as the cornerstone for Japanese diplomacy. 
 
Japan’s Democracy Promotion 
     Japan’s intention to bolster democracy abroad can be seen in the realm of 
Japanese foreign aid policy which exhibits a greater ideational role in the U.S.-Japan 
alliance in a neo-Gramscian sense. The 2012 ODA white paper, which was released 
in March 2013, states that “expanding support for countries that share strategic 
interests and the universal values of freedom and democracy with Japan is crucial in 
attaining a free, prosperous, and stable international community with the goal of 
securing peace and stability in developing countries,” the white paper enshrined 
democracy support as the first and foremost principle of the country’s foreign 
engagement.
193
 Its approach to foreign aid in various countries with the ASEAN Plus 
Three framework demonstrates Japan’s democratic support in practice. Japan’s calls 
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 It is noted that the relevance of these values has been listed in Japan’s ODA three principles 
before 1995 (Interview with Tomohiko Taniguchi, 14
th
 March 2013). 
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for democratisation in Myanmar began several years ago. During an October 2009 
summit between Japan and the states of the Mekong River region, consisting of 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, Japan insisted that the chair’s 
statement following the meeting of foreign ministers include language calling for 
democratisation in Myanmar despite firm opposition from the Myanmar government 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). Since Myanmar’s democratisation, Japan has 
begun investing a substantial amount of the ODA in rebuilding Myanmar’s 
economic infrastructure. After the liberalisation process began in 2011, Japan started 
assisting Myanmar on the rule of law and economic reform through a series of 
seminars. 
     Yet, it is also remarked that Japan’s support for democracy in the region is not 
sufficient. Ichihara (2014) indicates that the Japanese government did not release a 
statement when Nguyen Dan Que, a well-known prodemocracy activist, was 
detained by the Vietnamese government after calling for a democratisation 
movement and Japan has refrained from support for Chinese civil society
194
 in the 
midst of struggling for democracy. Another interesting remark by Ichihara (2014) is 
that “the absence of foundations such as the U.S. National Endowment for 
Democracy, which is administered as a private organization but funded primarily by 
the U.S. government, makes it difficult for Japan to assist civil society actors through 
quasi-private channels” (Ichihara 2014). It is important to remark that the Japanese 
support for democracy can be thin in terms of substance while the tone of its policy 
is significant. Ichihara (2014) argues that their assistance to new and emerging 
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 It is crucial to remark that “Japan has been reluctant to provide direct support to civil society 
actors in general. A report from the Japan International Cooperation Agency states that providing 
direct support for NGOs entails bypassing state institutions, which could weaken citizens’ trust 
in, and the accountability of, the government and is therefore not desirable” (Ichihara 2014) 
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democracies remained somewhat marginal, while Japan saw democracy support as a 
useful tool for counterbalancing China’s influence.  
     Additionally, recently, in the Japanese political arena, the emergence of 
nationalism has become another component in understanding political circumstances 
in Japan,
195
 and its relationship with other neighbouring countries, particularly South 
Korea. Japan-South Korea defence cooperation remains extremely limited due to 
long-standing historical animosities. It is remarked that “In July 2012, South Korea 
and Japan came to the brink of signing a military information-sharing agreement, but 
domestic political considerations led the government of South Korea’s President at 
the time, Lee Myung-bak, to abort the agreement at the last minute. The proposed 
agreement, known as a General Sharing of Military Information Agreement 
(GSOMIA), would have enabled more robust bilateral cooperation (and trilateral 
cooperation with the U.S. military) on BMD, as well as disaster relief, counter-piracy, 
and other operations” (Rinehart, Lawrence and Hildreth 2013, p. 11). This reflects 
the recent trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Hague Nuclear Security Summit 
between the US, Japan and South Korea in order to ameliorate the tensions between 
Japan and South Korea, while the issue of comfort women was not discussed but 
instead the North Korean issue was the main focus (Fackler 2014). 
     Nonetheless, the role of values with a particular focus on democracy and the rule 
of law has been increasing by harnessing the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
Recently, the component of “the rule of law” that belongs to the common values of 
the US and Japan has played an important role although it has stirred controversies 
about their attitudes toward China. At the opening dinner of the Shangri-La Dialogue 
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 It is noted that there can be a danger of weakening Japan’s soft power and being abandoned 
by the United States due to historical problems including the comfort women issue and the 
Yasukuni shrine (Interview with anonymous, 5
th
 April 2013).  
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on 2014, Prime Minister Abe delivered a strong message to uphold the rule of law 
under his new “Proactive Contribution to Peace”, or proactive pacifism, while US 
Secretary of Defence Hagel pointed out several security priorities: settling disputes 
through peaceful means, following international rules, and strengthening the defence 
capabilities of the allies. Abe remarked that “the rule of law at sea becomes a matter 
of common sense” (Abe 2014) which shows how norms are translated into power.196 
Hagel also reused George Marshall’s words that “the strength of a nation does not 
depend alone on its armies, ships and planes…[but] is also measured by…the 
strength of its friends and [its] allies” (International Institute for Strategic Studies 
2014) that shows US reapplication of a Cold War strategy by creating alliances and 
partners.  
According to Green and Twining (2008), “The United States’ greatest source of 
soft power in Asia is the Asian embrace of democracy. Modernity today is defined 
by democratic capitalism and a culture of opportunity…America’s Asia strategy is 
premised not only on the projection of US military power but on the promotion of 
democracy, and strategic cooperation among militarily capable regional democracies 
(Green & Twining 2008, p. 23). The U.S.-Japan alliance has increasingly developed 
its role to promote universal values. In consideration of the roles of values and ideas 
in the postwar period, it was seen as relevant presumably due to ideological struggles 
between the US and USSR. Still, in the post-Cold War era, the shared or common 
values entailing democracy, capitalism and the rule of law are seen as important in 
the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
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 However, it is noted that there can be a security dilemma not only in the realm of the military 
sphere but also the “values” realms (Interview with Taku Ishikawa, 5
th
 March 2013). 
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“Panoramic Perspective of the World Map” Diplomacy        
     Under the second Abe administration, the role of values has become more 
important, which is observable in its foreign policymaking. While it is said that the 
basic strategy of values-oriented diplomacy still remains as the basis of foreign 
policy under this administration, the emphasis on the alliance has strengthened 
indeed. Yachi (2014) argues that the second Abe administration’s focus on the U.S.-
Japan alliance is the centre of Japanese foreign policy by learning from the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)’s mistakes. According to him,  
“The DPJ administration of Hatoyama Yukio gave the impression that it wanted to shift the 
axis of Japan’s foreign policy from the Japan-US alliance to Asia, but the Abe cabinet has 
made it clear that its Asian diplomatic initiative is premised on the centrality of the Japan-
US alliance” (Nippon.com 2014).  
Abe’s foreign policy has upgraded from a values-oriented to a “panoramic 
perspective of the world map”, or “bird’s-eye view of global affairs” although “the 
underlying concept is still operative” (Nippon.com 2014).197 This also shows the 
second Abe administration’s aim at developing its relationship with countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region with a particular focus on Southeast Asia that may possibly 
enhance a US-led alliance network. 
 
Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Ideational Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     The ideational aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance is explored by means of social 
forces analysis in the neo-Gramscian sense. Particularly, in the realm of ideas, it has 
played a larger role in the hands of MOFA officials with the particular focus on such 
ideas as democracy and the rule of law. If we consider the roles of “organic 
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 It is also noted that Abe developed his diplomacy reflecting the strategy of Kishi, who was his 
grandfather, by visiting Southeast Asia. 
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intellectuals”, it can be said that these actors have contributed to create the discourse 
on important liberal democratic norms of the U.S.-Japan alliance which have also 
influenced the Japanese foreign policymaking including the ODA as the case of 
Myanmar exhibited, while it can be said that democratic promotion cannot be fully 
implemented in the way other scholars acknowledge. It has also been further 
developed in other nations such as Australia and India in the realm of military 
activities on the basis of the shared values which display a tremendous role of ideas 
in harnessing the U.S.-Japan alliance. In this sense, such joint military activities as 
RIMPAC can be regarded as one example that falls into the category of the 
overlapping area of material, institutional and ideational components of the U.S.-
Japan alliance. 
 
Diagram 6: Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Ideational Dimension of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance 
 
 Source: Author 
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Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
From Hub-and-Spokes System to “Alliance Network” 
     The US “hub-and-spoke system” has been developed into an “alliance network” 
with a different mechanism especially with the transforming roles of the US and its 
allies.
198
 According to Sahashi (2011), “The United States and its allies have 
included many non-traditional security issues among the global security threats they 
are addressing, and the same trend is evident in cooperation among the ‘spoke’ 
countries” (Sahashi 2011, p. 9).199 Tow and Archarya (2007) argue that “Cold War 
alliances in Asia are now being supplanted by new types of US bilateral security 
relationships, both within those original alliances and beyond them” (Tow & 
Archarya 2007, p. 17).
200
 A more flexible nature of alliance and security 
relationships has diluted the hierarchical characteristics of US power in the realm of 
alliance politics in the Asia-Pacific (Tow & Archarya 2007). They also exemplify 
that “The so-called San Francisco System (SFS) is clearly transforming from a hub 
and spokes arrangement of exclusive bilateralism, exclusively supported by the US 
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 However, it is argued that in substance, the hub-and-spokes system has not changed but rather 
the alliance network is based upon this system. In this sense, it is integrated into US strategic 
planning (Interview with Tomohiko Satake, 25
th
 March 2013). The similar view that the nature of 
the hub-and-spokes system remains is acknowledged (Interview with Chiyuki Aoi, 8
th
 April 
2013). 
199
 He also notes that “The US alliance network has s been building on the existing alliances and 
further strengthening itself by increasing cooperation with non-allied countries as well…there is 
an awareness that the United States and its alliance network will remain predominant in the 
region for the foreseeable future. There is little rationale for any country in the region to accept 
China’s political influence to the extent that it entails relinquishing its own autonomy” (Sahashi 
2011, p. 2). 
200
 They identify the following factors engendering such supplantation: (1) a broadening of the 
purview of existing bilateral alliances, essentially replacing them with ‘coalitions of the willing’ 
(India, Singapore); (2) regional/global disjunctures; (3) domestic politics; and (4) linkage of 
bilateral security with transnational issues (Tow & Archarya 2007, p. 12). 
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power, into a more fluid set of dyadic alliances in which what occurs in each alliance 
has a clear impact upon the others (Tow & Archarya 2007, p. 38).
201
  
     Le Mière (2013) indicates that “the system is being transformed into a more 
diffuse and distributed alliance structure that has been labelled a ‘spoke-to-spoke’ 
system” (Le Mière 2013, p. 35). Nair (2009) observes that “A closer look at 
America’s interests and hegemonic preferences discloses the complex nature of US 
power in Asia” (Nair 2009, p. 129). It is also remarked that “America’s preference 
for bilateral alliances over any multilateral or regional project is not only an outcome 
of the unstable security politics of the region, but also because of the advantages it 
presents for its grand strategy” (Nair 2009, p. 129; Beeson 2009, pp. 550–554). The 
role of the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more important in regard to the context of 
regionalism in the Asia-Pacific not only militarily but also economically and 
ideationally and also has become more prominent particularly with the US’ return to 
Asia strategy. 
  
Regionalism as a Contested Concept 
     Defining regionalism in the Asia-Pacific can be debatable due to its complicated 
political dynamism. Regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific in the 1970s and 1980s 
appeared to be different from the one in the post-Cold War period not only with the 
presence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but with the US 
presence. ASEAN was formed in 1967 in the aftermath of the decolonisation process 
and the Cold War influenced multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific (Beeson 2003). 
Quite a few analysts of regional processes distinguish between those processes that 
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 It is remarked that the hub-and-spokes system has transformed into alliance networking with 
the focus on 1) US bases, 2) preposition and 3) rotation which are dynamic (Interview with 
Motohiro Ono, 16
th
 April 2013). 
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are largely the uncoordinated consequence of private sector-led economic integration, 
regionalisation, on the one hand, and those processes of regionally based co-
operation and co-ordination that are the self-consciously driven consequences of 
political activities, regionalism, on the other (Breslin & Higgott 2000, pp. 333-52). 
Considering the conditions in the Asia-Pacific region unlike Europe, some scholars 
have attempted to characterise the features of the Asia-Pacific regionalism. Nair 
(2009) identifies the regionalism in the Asia-Pacific as “frustrated regionalism” 
which is “a state where regional projects in Asia are unable to realize the stated end 
goals of the regional project that are articulated in state discourse: a holistic 
conception of regionalism embodied in the persistent calls for ‘peace, security, 
prosperity and progress’ and a regional community invested with shared identities 
and aspirations among people and governments” (Nair 2009, p. 113). 
     Bae and Moon (2005) generate the idea called “regional complex” where “a 
security complex can be reinterpreted as the combination of physical arrangements 
of component parts and underlying ideas and impulses affecting interactions among 
those parts (Bae and Moon 2005, p. 10).
202
 In a different approach, He (2012) 
examines “hybrid regionalism” by revisiting Hugh White’s notion of “a concert of 
powers” in Asia. In his account, “The advantage of hybrid regionalism is that both 
the US and China are a part of the process and play certain leadership roles” (He 
2012, p. 684). He explicates that “The US-led model of Asia-Pacific regionalism 
clashes with China’s model of so-called harmonious Asian regional cooperation. 
Each of these models on its own is problematic and unworkable as the regional 
suspicion of regionalism on the part of these great powers has become stronger” (He 
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 They also argue that not only military power but new security concerns such as economic 
prosperity, ecological integrity, communal harmony, and societal stability have become equally 
significant, blurring the conventional hierarchy of security values that exhibits a wider range of 
issues to be considered (Bae & Moon 2005). 
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2012, p. 679). This may lead to make regionalism more confused with the presence 
of the US, which means the lack of ideological foundations is the issue in the region” 
(CSIS 2011, p. 35).  
 
Inclusive Regionalism with the US as US-led Historic Bloc in the Asia-Pacific? 
US Rebalance Strategy to Asia and the Responses 
     The US “`Pivot to Asia” has been seen as a strategy for the US to retain its power 
in East Asia materially, economically and ideationally. Secretary of State Clinton’s 
foreign policy article “America’s Pacific Century” (2011) reaffirmed the US role as a 
Pacific power by stressing the importance of Asia policy. Her article outlined the six 
pillars which are: 1) strengthening bilateral security alliances; 2) deepening 
cooperative relations with China and other emerging powers; 3) engaging in the 
region’s multilateral institutions (e.g. East Asian Summit (EAS)); 4) expanding trade 
and investment (e.g. the TPP); 5) pursuing a broad-based military presence; and 6) 
strengthening democracy and human rights (Clinton 2011). All military, economic 
and ideational perspectives on strategy are considered and the US-led alliance 
system remains to be a crucial component in US grand strategy. The article has been 
to date the most comprehensive and well-developed elaboration of the US pivot to 
Asia, stressing US leadership in building regional institutions to tackle challenges, 
and expounding on “forward-deployed diplomacy” (Ling 2013, pp. 149-150).  
     While some criticisms against the US pivot to Asia
203
 exist, others point out that 
“Asian countries have expectations about the deterrence posture and public goods 
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 Ling (2013) points out three problems occurred with the US “pivot to Asia”: 1) creating a 
“Georgia Scenario”, 2) fuelling the suspicion of US containment and increased U.S.-China 
distrust, and 3) disrupting ongoing regional processes in Asia with its own regional architecture 
(e.g. East Asia Summit (EAS), the TPP). 
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that the United States will provide, and the process through which the United States 
and small and medium-sized states have mutually reconfirmed the Obama 
administration’s ‘return to Asia’ has offered a certain level of satisfaction in that 
respect” (Sahashi 2011, p. 2). Park (2012) indicates that “Asia’s pivot to the US” 
exists which illustrates not only from the US perspective but also from Asian 
perspectives. In his account, most countries in the region had been repeatedly calling 
for a more active US presence throughout Asia, pivoting towards the US long before 
the announced US pivot to Asia. Most countries in the region want peace, stability 
and economic prosperity, and most understand that these goals are better guaranteed 
with an active US regional presence (Park 2012). Park (2012) argues that the crucial 
aspect of the US pivot to Asia, or rebalance to Asia, is its continuous engagement in 
the region with renewed vitality.  
     According to Le Mière (2013), “A more accurate phrase would have been a 
‘rebalance of burdens in Asia’. since the strategy contains, beyond the oft-discussed 
military, economic and diplomatic elements, a burden-sharing (or burden-shifting) 
component that aims to rebalance responsibility for security in Asia from the United 
States to its allies” (Le Mière 2013, p. 31).204 It is also noted that “The TPP is the 
leading U.S. trade policy initiative of the Obama Administration and a core 
component of Administration efforts to ‘rebalance’ U.S. foreign policy priorities 
toward the Asia-Pacific region by playing a more active role in shaping the region’s 
rules and norms” (Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 6).205 The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)’s (2011) report on foreign 
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 It is also noted that the US needs the “reciprocal substantiated” role of its allies due to its 
financial difficulty (Interview with Fumiaki Kubo, 10
th
 April 2013).   
205
 It is remarked that “The United States and Japan share some common objectives, including 
strong intellectual property rights protection; protection of foreign investment; clear rules of 
origin to facilitate trade; and market access for services” (Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and 
Williams 2012, p. 6).. 
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assessments of US power indicated that “Most see the United States in decline 
relative to rising powers like China but do not see a fundamentally new order 
emerging in the next decade” (CSIS 2011, p.2). 
     It is unsurprising that US allies including Japan and South Korea see the necessity 
of the US role in East Asia. Being embedded in the postwar liberal order, Japan has 
been a close ally. Japan has seen the alliance as a pillar of its diplomacy. The new 
concept of U.S.-Japan “Dynamic Defence Cooperation” is based on both a 
rebalancing of the US military strategy and Japan’s dynamic defence force concept 
that focuses upon operation of the SDF (Satake 2012). Not only militarily but 
economically, Japan has supported the TPP which may contribute to the free market 
that is desired by the US. In regard to the South Korean viewpoint, “The United 
States and Korea will forever be tied together as two prominent liberal democracies 
in Asia…Koreans view themselves as a model example of the U.S. Cold War 
experiment—emergence from a war-torn society into a global economic power with 
an open political system” (CSIS 2011, p. 36). It is also remarked that “Koreans and 
Asians are watching very closely the fate of the KORUS FTA and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. U.S. support for free trade is a public good in Asia” (CSIS 2011, p.43). 
Whilst its power is relatively declining, the US presence is seen as important in East 
Asia which can be seen as the consensual aspect of US hegemony, or the US-led 
historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific in the neo-Gramscian sense. 
 
Neo-Gramscian View of Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
     From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, it is observable that, with the application of 
US pressure, the coercive and consensual aspects of hegemony were operated in the 
context of the U.S.-Japan alliance and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. In the early 
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1990s, the US pressured Japan, South Korea, and other nations to reject the EAEG 
proposal, which threatened to stunt APEC’s development and impede US efforts at 
“open” trans-Pacific liberalisation. Nair (2009) explains that regionalism has been 
developed with the US presence. According to him, “its inherent concept[ual] 
constrains in fully accounting for the complex structures of security in Asia, and the 
regions profound dependence on extra-regional actors. This specifically refers to the 
continued importance of the United States and the hub-and-spoke arrangement of 
bilateral alliances it underwrites in the region” (Nair 2009, p. 124). Bobrow (1999) 
indicates that “Hegemony management in the Asia-Pacific for now has come down 
to an alliance of political factions and ideological sympathizers each of which looks 
to the other for help” (Bobrow 1999, p. 194). As is illustrated in the previous 
sections, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been relevant not only in the military but also in 
the economic and ideational sense. From Japanese perspectives, economic and 
ideational aspects of the alliance are taken into account not only in ministries but 
also business communities, prominently led by the Keidanren. In this regard, the 
U.S.-Japan alliance has strengthened which may have also bolstered US hegemony, 
or the US-led historic bloc, in the region. In neo-Gramscian terms, not only the 
coercive but consensual aspect of hegemony has enabled the US hegemony to 
remain and may have harnessed the US-led historic bloc in the region. 
 
Conclusion 
    This chapter scrutinises the economic and ideational aspects of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance by using social forces analysis by focusing on the role of institutions or 
actors such as the MOFA and the Keidanren. It appears the increasing economic and 
ideational roles of the U.S.-Japan alliance have strengthened for regional stability in 
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the Asia-Pacific. This chapter also investigates the role of the US-led alliance system 
in this region while reconfiguring the concept of regionalism. Since this notion 
remains contestable in the Asia-Pacific, the chapter illustrates regional processes in 
regard to US presence and conceptual discussions about regionalism. With an 
increasing significance of the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific which has 
been a component of regionalism, the U.S.-Japan alliance has increased its relevance 
in the context of regional stability. The concept of “bilateralism plus multilateralism” 
was also exemplified to underline Japan’s attempt to balance between bilateralism 
and multilateralism. The former is based upon the traditional style of Japanese 
security foreign policies where the latter was a new attempt especially for the METI. 
Taking into account the current characteristics of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the US-
led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, the nature of US hegemony in the region can 
be interpreted in a neo-Gramscian sense. Regarding US’ “pivot to Asia” or 
“rebalance to Asia”, it is not only the US but also US allies and other Asian countries 
that view the US presence as crucial for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific.  
     With the idea of “inclusive regionalism with the US”, this chapter highlights the 
role of the US-led alliances including the U.S.-Japan alliance which exhibit 
consensual aspects of hegemony from the neo-Gramscian perspective. This may lay 
out the possibility of adopting the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony to 
regionalism in order to investigate the interplay of coercion and consensus in the 
formation of the US-led historic bloc. While it can be difficult to make a clear-cut 
distinction between coercion and consensus, focusing not merely on hegemonic but 
also non-hegemonic states which provide opportunities to explore the role of 
consensus in strengthening hegemony in the region. In the context of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, this chapter attempts to clarify the transformation of Japanese foreign 
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policymaking not only in regard to the influence of US policies but also international 
environmental changes such as the emergence of multilateralism. At the same time, 
it is observable that Japan has preferred to keep the essence of bilateralism instead of 
shifting completely away from bilateralism.  
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Chapter Six: “The U.S.-Japan Alliance” as Common Sense206? 
  
Introduction 
     Chapter Six examines whether the U.S.-Japan alliance, which has been regarded 
as the pillar of the Japanese foreign security policy since the postwar period, is 
“common sense” or not from the neo-Gramscian perspective. While Chapter Four 
and Chapter Five closely scrutinise the practices within the alliance mechanism, this 
chapter illustrates the way the “U.S.-Japan alliance” is perceived by looking into the 
rhetoric of the “U.S.-Japan alliance”. Considering the recent trends of the alliance 
such as “Operation Tomodachi”, the perception toward the alliance relationship may 
have become more acceptable in Japanese society. One noticeable change is its 
increasing usage of the term of the “U.S.-Japan alliance” in the media, academia and 
the public in Japan, which demonstrates an increasing acceptance of the alliance 
relationship. As is clarified in Chapter Three, it was not been officially used in the 
public until the official speech by the then Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki 
who referred to the U.S.-Japan relationship as an “alliance” in 1981. Although it 
does not necessarily mean that this relationship as an alliance was widely accepted in 
Japanese society, the term of the “U.S.-Japan alliance” was increasingly used more 
often than the “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty” particularly after the end of the Cold 
War.  
     In this respect, it is important to examine the pervasiveness of using the term 
“U.S.-Japan alliance” in political, academic and public discourse that used to be seen 
as taboo in the postwar era. In order to explore a widespread recognition of the U.S.-
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  As Rupert (1998) notes, “common sense was understood to be a syncretic historical residue, 
fragmentary and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations and potentially supportive of very 
different kinds of social visions and political projects” (Rupert 1998, p. 428). 
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Japan alliance, its features as “common sense” shall be studied using the neo-
Gramscian framework. Although “alliance adrift” may have occurred due to such 
factors as the end of the Cold War and the Okinawa rape incident in 1995, it seems 
that the alliance relationship between the US and Japan has deepened nonetheless. It 
is crucial to explore the transformation of the discourse of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
whilst it is also important to take into account counter-hegemonic discourse 
regarding unsolved issues including US bases. This chapter aims to exhibit the way  
the U.S.-Japan alliance may have become “common sense” in the face of counter-
hegemonic forces in a neo-Gramscian sense. As is explicated in Chapter Two, this 
chapter adopts the neo-Gramscian discourse analysis in order to underscore the 
relationship between language and hegemony using such resources as the Japanese 
Diet Record, news media and policy recommendations by think tanks. Japanese, 
policy intellectuals, scholars and other relevant actors who can be regarded as 
“organic intellectuals” in the neo-Gramscian sense, have played influential roles in 
producing the discourse on the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
     This chapter is structured as follows: first, the approach is exemplified by 
utilising Rupert’s (1995) notions of “rhetorical strategies” and the “rhetorically 
marginalised” that describe the conditions of hegemonic discourse. Considering 
“rhetorical strategies”, such concepts as “global commons” and “smart power” are 
discussed which emerged from the ideas of US foreign policymakers and influenced 
the meanings of the U.S.-Japan alliance. More particularly, the Japanese side also 
incorporates some concepts generated from US strategic planners. While these 
concepts are analysed, the role of organic intellectuals including policymakers, 
policy intellectuals and scholars are explored. Secondly, the “rhetorically 
marginalised” that can be regarded as the counter-hegemonic forces against the U.S.-
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Japan alliance are examined. The arguments that relate to “anti-U.S.-Japan alliance” 
discourse by such political parties as the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the local media are closely examined. Yet, the 
paper also argues that their influence is not as much powerful as the supporters of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance due to diverse discourse about the alliance where each actor’s 
interests may be diverging and incoherent. Moreover, the U.S.-Japan alliance as 
common sense has been further enhanced by taking into account these opposing 
arguments that may signify the sustainability of the alliance. Third, prior to the 
conclusion section, the U.S.-Japan alliance as common sense is discussed by taking 
into account “rhetorical strategies” and the “rhetorically marginalised”. Since it is 
also recognised that the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is viewed more as oxygen, can be 
problematic, the chapter discusses the analysis that are provided in the earlier 
sections.   
 
Neo-Gramscian “Common Sense” in the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     In this section, “rhetorical strategies” are mainly investigated while, in the context 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance, arguably the voices of local citizens living near to US 
bases in Japan can be seen as “rhetorically marginalised”. Indeed, it is worth noting 
that there is increasing literature dealing with the “Okinawa207 problem”, which can 
be represented as “rhetorically marginalised”. Nevertheless, the significance of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance is increasing due to a wide range of security concerns including 
the rise of China, North Korean nuclear threats and the aftermath of the 3.11 Tohoku 
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 A large proportion of the US troops are located in this prefecture, hosting more than 70 
percent of US bases in Japan. 
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Earthquake and Tsunami.
208
 According to a public poll conducted by the Japanese 
Cabinet, it is observable that there is a steady increase in the respondents who views 
the alliance as “useful especially after the end of the Cold War whereas there are a 
decreasing percentage of the respondents regarding the alliance as “not useful”.209   
 
Graph 2: Public Poll of “Whether the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is Useful or 
Not”  
 
Source: Japanese Cabinet                                                                                                       
                                                          
208
 It is noted that, at a seminar organised by the MOD in Tohoku, the perception of the U.S.-
Japan alliance and “Operation Tomodachi” were completely different from the Okinawa case 
according to the questionnaires (Interview with an official of the US embassy in Japan, 18
th
 
March 2013). 
209
 It is remarked that the presence of the U.S.-Japan alliance is justified even by Komeito and 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which may have been influenced by the changing perception 
in Japanese society (Interview with Akitoshi Miyashita, 14
th
 December 2012). It is also noted 
that “brain freeze (shiko teishi)” about the U.S.-Japan alliance is generated from the idea that “we 
should not think” (Interview with Takashi Oshimura, 15
th
 April 2013). 
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In addition to this public poll, there have been further efforts made by the MOD 
Public Affairs with the aim of disseminating the knowledge of defence. This division 
has enhanced the cooperation with the media companies and some prominent authors 
(e.g., Hiro Arikawa who writes defence-related love stories including “Library 
War”) with the release of TV dramas and films which are different from decades ago. 
It is also remarked that the Japanese public’s image of the SDF has changed after the 
3.11 Earthquake and Tsunami.
210
  
     Considering these changing perspectives of the alliance, in this section, the 
development of the strategic rhetoric is closely investigated by analysing emerging 
factors, which may have enhanced the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the 
Cold War. In the subsequent section, the key concepts, which have strengthened the 
significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, are explored as follows: a) the U.S.-Japan 
alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy, b) the U.S.-Japan alliance as a provider 
of the international public goods or assets, c) the U.S.-Japan alliance as preserving 
“global commons”, d) the U.S.-Japan alliance as seapower, e) the U.S.-Japan 
alliance as smart power, and f) the U.S.-Japan alliance as an asymmetric yet 
reciprocal alliance. These elements are intended to underscores the growing 
significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, especially in the Japanese domain 
considering its role in Japanese diplomacy. As is exemplified in Chapter Two, the 
discourse of a) politicians, b) ministries, c) the Keidanren, d) think tanks, e) 
academics, f) media, and g) local citizens is closely examined. 
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 Interview with Takao Kinoshita, 18
th
 April 2013. 
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a) The U.S.-Japan Alliance as “the Pillar (Kijiku) of Diplomacy”  
     In Japanese, “kijiku” means the backbone of certain things. In this regard, the idea 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance as “the pillar of Japanese diplomacy” has been clearly 
stated in some Japanese official documents. According to the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the U.S.-Japan alliance is regarded as the pillar of 
Japanese diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). This acknowledgement has 
not been drastically transformed after the enactment of the San Francisco Treaty in 
1951 that allowed Japan to return as an international member. Also, the 1957 Basic 
Policy for National Defence cites the need to “support the activities of the United 
Nations and promote international cooperation,” along with developing the 
capabilities for self-defence and maintaining the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Ministry of 
Defence 2011). The framework for security policy has substantially been altered 
under the 1995 revision of the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO). Each 
of the three pillars has been subsequently strengthened. In addition, a fundamental 
framework for the U.S.-Japan alliance has been amended such as the Guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation in 1997.
211
 Since the alliance has been officially 
regarded as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy according to these policies, it is also 
taken for granted by those who involved in politics. 
     Among Japanese politicians, those who support the U.S.-Japan alliance described 
the significance of the alliance as “the pillar of Japanese diplomacy”. Yoshiro Mori, 
serving as the Japanese Prime Minister from 2000 to 2001, stressed that “the U.S.-
Japan alliance relationship is the pillar (kijiku) of our diplomacy and for peace and 
                                                          
211
 According to the guidelines, “The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more 
effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed 
attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1997). 
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prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region” (25th September 2000, Japanese Diet Record). 
In addition, during his premiership, other Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members 
such as Yohei Kono and Toru Umino emphasised that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the 
pillar (kijiku) of Japanese diplomacy (16th November 2000, Japanese Diet Record). 
Subsequently, this phrase was frequently used by Junichiro Koizumi, a long-standing 
Prime Minister in Japan from 2000 to 2006. He argued that “the U.S.-Japan alliance 
relationship has been the pillar (kijiku) of our country’s diplomacy” (20th March 
2003, Japanese Diet Record). He also used this phrase to convince other Diet 
members for furthering U.S.-Japan defence cooperation not only in bilateral but also 
regional and global terms, reiterating that he “will develop the relationship with 
China, South Korea and Russia on the basis of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship” 
(10th May 2001, Japanese Diet Record). 
     Moreover, Makiko Tanaka and Yoriko Kawaguchi
212
, who both served as the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Koizumi administration, underscored the 
significance of the alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy which was the similar 
discourse to Koizumi’s. Kawaguchi made a diplomatic speech that “the U.S.-Japan 
alliance relationship is the pillar (kijiku) of Japanese diplomacy” (27th February 
2002, Japanese Diet Record). She indicated that, relating to the Iraq War in 2003, 
“the [U.S.-Japan] alliance relationship can sustain for the shared values including 
democracy, freedom, free market, capitalism, and human rights” with an emphasis 
on the relevance to tackle against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq (12th 
February 2003, Japanese Diet Record). Kawaguchi also underscored that the U.S.-
Japan alliance relationship is not solely about the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which 
has been the pillar (kijiku) of U.S.-Japan relations but the shared values or 
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 She is a former economist at the World Bank and also served as Minister at the Embassy of 
Japan to the US in 1990. 
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perspectives on such issues as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (26th March 
2003, National Diet Record). Recently, other political parties in Japan including 
Shinto Daichi and Kokumin Shinto also include this phrase as part of their political 
manifestos (Shinto Daichi 2013; Kokumin Shinto 2013). Furthermore, it is also 
important to note that the Japanese media such as the Yomiuri Newspaper reported 
its opinion paper entitled “the U.S.-Japan alliance is the pillar [of Japanese 
diplomacy]” in 2008 (Yomiuri Shimbun 2008). 
     Alongside Japanese official documents of the MOFA and the MOD, the rhetoric 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy has been highlighted 
by politicians. Particularly, during the Koizumi administration, not only Prime 
Minister but also Ministers of Foreign Affairs have declared that the U.S.-Japan 
alliance relationship to be the pillar of Japanese diplomacy. There seems to be an 
increasing acknowledgement that the alliance is regarded as the “pillar” of Japanese 
diplomacy, which has been persisted since the enactment of the San Francisco Treaty 
and widely recognised by politicians in Japan regardless of political parties except 
for the JCP and the SDP. These trends illustrate how the U.S.-Japan alliance is 
regarded as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy and has become more embedded in the 
understanding of Japanese foreign policymaking. It is particularly surprising to see a 
difference between the reactions toward the 1981 Suzuki’s statement of the alliance 
and the current media discourse on the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
 
b)   The U.S.-Japan Alliance as “International Public Goods (Kokyozai)” 
     The concept of “public goods/assets”, or “international public goods/assets”, is 
similar to “the U.S.-Japan alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy”. However, 
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the former notion was initially used in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 
Higuchi report that redefined the role of the Japan-US Security regime as that of an 
“international public asset”.213 The alliance was understood as the product of the 
Cold War so the roles of the alliance were put under scrutiny. The report brought up 
the issues such as how the transformation of the post-Cold War international security 
environment should be addressed and how the role of the U.S.-Japan- alliance within 
that environment should be perceived. As a result, at the Hashimoto-Clinton meeting 
in 1996, they eventually redefined the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship as the “public 
goods” for stability in the Asia-Pacific from the Soviet Union’s threat.214 Indeed, 
according to Masahiro Akiyama
215
, who is current President of the Japanese think-
tank Tokyo Foundation, he was the first person to describe the U.S.-Japan alliance as 
the international public goods which later used by Hisahiko Okazaki,
216
 a Japanese 
strategist, at the Japanese Diet.
217
 
     Not merely in the early 1990s but even afterwards, the U.S.-Japan alliance has 
been characterised as “international public goods”218 in political discourse. 
Fukushiro Nukaga, who served as the Minister of Defence Agency (the current 
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 The idea of “security as public goods” which is considered as a factor of the alliance is 
explicated in Inoguchi’s (1997) book (Inoguchi 1997, p. 90). 
214
 In fact, it was not explicitly stated in the meeting that the alliance is “public goods” although 
quite a few Japanese politicians and scholars have interpreted that the 1996 U.S.-Japan meeting 
was the moment when the alliance became “public goods”. It is also noted that the purpose of the 
alliance has shifted from threat perception of the Soviet Union to stabilising force for Asia 
(Interview with Hitoshi Tanaka, 1
st
 April 2013). 
215
 After numerous positions in key and senior positions in government, he moved to the 
Japanese Defence Agency (current MOD) in 1991 serving as director general of the Defence 
Policy Bureau and administrative vice-minister of defence. He was also chairman of the Ocean 
Policy Research Foundation between 2011 and June 2012. 
216
 In 1978 – 1981, he served as Director General for Foreign Relations at the Japanese Defence 
Agency (current MOD) and also served other positions including Minister at the Japanese 
Embassy in Washington D.C. and Ambassador to Thailand. He has been the Director of the 
Okazaki Institute and also served as a personal adviser to several Japanese Prime Ministers 
including Shinzo Abe. 
217
 Interview with Masahiro Akiyama, 28
th
 March 2013 
218
 It is recognised that the notion of “public goods” has been entrenched since 1996 (Interview 
with Kazuyoshi Umemoto, 7
th
 March 2013). 
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MOD), explained that “the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship will play a role of 
international public goods in the global arena” (27th February 2006; 24th March 
2006, National Diet Record). Seiji Maehara,
219
 a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
politician, elucidated that “the U.S.-Japan alliance was redefined at the 1996 Clinton 
– Hashimoto meeting, to move from the Cold War structure to the international 
public goods for stabilising the Asia-Pacific region” (26th October 2004, National 
Diet Record). He persistently insists that the alliance is “a provider of international 
public goods”. For instance, on the 21st January 2011, he made a speech at the Diet 
that the purpose of Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) is the public 
goods for the Asia-Pacific region (21st January 2011, National Diet Record). In a 
similar vein, Akihisa Nagashima
220
 from DPJ said that “the U.S. forward-deployed 
presence is the international public assets for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
which has the strategic values for our diplomacy” (23rd March 2007, National Diet 
Record). Additionally, Katsuhisa Okada from the DPJ claimed that “the U.S.-Japan 
alliance is the pillar of the Japanese diplomacy and contributes as an international 
public asset to peace and prosperity for the Asia-Pacific region” (29th January 2010, 
National Diet Record). 
     Compared with LDP members, it seems that more DPJ politicians have 
emphasised the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the international public 
goods for regional security. Naoto Kan, who served as the Prime Minister from 2010 
to 2011, made the speech at the Davos conference that “the U.S.-Japan alliance is 
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 He is considered a defence policy expert and viewed as a proponent of close ties with the US 
(Reuters 2010). He was also a trainee at the Matsushita Institute of Government and 
Management. 
220
 He served as the Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defence in the Kan Cabinet. From 1993 to 
1995, he was a Visiting Scholar at the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at 
Vanderbilt University and also belonged to other institutes. He is known as a defence expert and 
also served in such positions as the Senior Director of the Committee on National Security and 
Director of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.  
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becoming more crucial which plays a role as international public goods for the Asia 
Pacific countries for peace and prosperity” (31st January 2011, National Diet 
Record). According to Kan (2011), “A stable Japan-US alliance is essential and 
indispensable to many countries in the Asian region as well - a number of Asian 
leaders have told me this. The alliance is definitely international public goods” (Kan 
2011). Sumio Mabuchi from DPJ also claimed that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the 
international public goods for peace and stability for the Asia-Pacific region (31st 
January 2011, National Diet Record). During the Noda administration which was the 
next administration of Kan’s, Koichiro Genba (or Gemba),221 who served as Foreign 
Affairs Minister, also explained that “the U.S.-Japan alliance is the pillar (kijiku) of 
our diplomacy and the international public goods for peace and prosperity not only 
regionally but also globally. He used both the pillar (kijiku) and international public 
goods to stress the relevance of the alliance (21st October 2011; 25th October 2011, 
National Diet Record) which were also used in Noda’s speech at the Diet.222 As it is 
elaborated in the earlier section, the ideas that the alliance is “the pillar of diplomacy” 
and “international public goods” have bolstered the importance of the alliance. 
     In academic discourse, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been increasingly seen as the 
provider of the “international public goods” in the Asia-Pacific region. Takashi 
Shiraishi
223
, President at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in 
Japan, explicated that “The U.S.-Japan alliance is very international public assets 
which is important to be sustained…at least it is significant to maintain the alliance” 
(16th March 2010, National Diet Record). The report of “Prospects and Challenges 
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 He is a former trainee at the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management. 
222
 He also expressed the aim for deepening the alliance with three pillars: security, economy, and 
culture and people exchange. 
223
 He is a well-known Japanese IR expert and also chaired the “Defence Manufacturing and 
Technology Base Research Committee” of Ministry of Defence during the Kan administration. 
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for the Formation of International Public Goods in the Era of “Smart Power”: ~ 
Deepening and Enlarging of the Concept of ‘an Alliance’ ~” was released by The 
Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) in October 2012. According to 
Przystup (2012), “security” is seen as “the preeminent public goods”. Miyaoka 
(2012) indicates that “It is increasingly common for Japanese politicians to describe 
the Japan-U.S. alliance as an international public good” (Miyaoka 2012, p. 36). 
Furthermore, some underscores the aspect of “peacebuilding” when indicating the 
international public assets. Shelter-Jones (2012) argues that “re-conceptualizing the 
alliance as a more ambitious form of peacebuilding would enrich its value for East 
Asian regional security and reinvigorate it as an ‘international public asset’ for a new 
global generation” (Shelter-Jones 2012, p. 6). There are growing attempts at 
heightening the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in terms of their defence 
cooperation not only bilaterally but also regionally and globally. Oiwa (2008) also 
contends that “international public goods” indicates the roles of non-traditional 
security which implies broadening roles of the alliance. 
     Compared with the notion of “kijiku”, the U.S.-Japan alliance as “international 
public goods” has become more prevalent in political and academic discourse. 
Although some politicians such as Okada and Genba used both the pillar (kijiku) and 
international public goods to emphasise the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it 
seems that more Japanese politicians have perceived the U.S.-Japan alliance as 
international public goods.  More details of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the 
international public goods were further elaborated by policy intellectuals and 
scholars by redefining the features of “international public goods” and incorporating 
the element of peacebuilding which may be more acceptable to the public with an 
emphasis on a non-military purpose. This malleable definition of “international 
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public goods” can be the reason why it has been prevalently used in political and 
academic discourse. In response to an altering security environment, the concept of 
“international public goods” may have become more useful for the discourse of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance that may help to be embedded as common sense in the neo-
Gramscian sense. 
 
c)   Global Commons 
     The U.S.-Japan alliance has increasingly been seen relevant as the means to 
preserve “global commons”. Indeed, “international public goods” and “global 
commons” are used interchangeably in Japanese official documents yet “global 
commons” are tailored to strategic purposes which concern the security of air, sea, 
cyber and space. The idea of “global commons” is originated from the idea of the US 
government’s foreign policymaking, first explained by Posen (2003) relating to the 
notion of hegemony. He exemplifies that “the United States enjoys command of the 
commons—command of the sea, space, and air”, discussing the significance of 
“command of the commons” to support US’ hegemonic grand strategy (Posen 2003, 
p. 7).
224
 In a similar vein, Connelly (2010) argues that the liberal norms were 
incorporated into “global commons”.225 This insight is valuable in understanding the 
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 He also adds that “Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. 
allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare 
concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and 
commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen 2003, 
p. 46). 
225
 According to him, “Embedding liberal norms in the global commons has long been a 
successful feature of US foreign policy” (Connelly 2010, p. 10). He also argues that this feature 
of US foreign policy which has been updated for the 21st century is intended to ensure the 
interests of all countries in the region including the United States, and peace and prosperity in the 
decades to come (Connelly 2010). This insight may be useful when considering the strengthening 
US transnational historic bloc with the strengthening alliance with its widening roles in 
consideration of US liberal ideas. 
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strengthening US transnational historic bloc in consideration of US liberal ideas in a 
neo-Gramscian sense. 
     The Japanese side has also adopted this notion to clarify the role of the alliance. 
Japan’s Council on Security and Defence Capabilities Report (2009) states that 
“Militarily, the United States has controlled the international public space known as 
the global commons…U.S. control over the global commons has assured other 
countries to enjoy freedom of navigation in the high-seas, providing international 
public goods” (Japanese Council on Security and Defence Capabilities 2009). The 
report notes that the US has provided “international public goods” including 
assurance of access to the global commons for all countries which has strengthened 
the current international system, emphasising that the US alone is not able to provide 
the same level of public goods in the future where Japan shall support (Japanese 
Council on Security and Defence Capabilities 2009). When discussing “global 
commons” in relation to the U.S.-Japan alliance, establishing “the rule of law”, 
which is one of the major components for universal values, is seen as inevitable.
226
 
     It is visible within think-tanks reports of the U.S.-Japan alliance that “global 
commons” has become a crucial element. The report by the Centre of New American 
Century (CNAS), which is based in the US, and the Tokyo Foundation explains the 
global commons that “Management of the global commons involves power politics, 
and therefore entails not only military power but also legal and diplomatic efforts. 
Thus, in dealing with this challenge, a holistic approach integrating military, legal 
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 The current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a speech at the Center of Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, remarking that “Japan must continue to be a 
guardian of the global commons, like the maritime commons, open enough to benefit everyone. 
Japan’s aspirations being such, thirdly, Japan must work even more closely with the U.S., Korea, 
Australia and other like-minded democracies throughout the region. A rules-promoter, a 
commons’ guardian, and an effective ally and partner to the U.S. and other democracies, are all 
roles that Japan MUST fulfill” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22nd February 2013). 
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and diplomatic means must be established” (CNAS & Tokyo Foundation 2010, p. 
12). They also indicated that “One key component of the liberal international order 
has been access to the global commons, i.e. the maritime, air, space, and cyber 
domains that connect the world…A new core role that the Japan-U.S. alliance should 
serve is to ensure that the global commons remain available to all nations in the 
world” (CNAS & Tokyo Foundation 2010, p. 4).227  
 
d)   “US-Japan Alliance Sea Power” 
     “US-Japan Alliance Sea Power” can be regarded as an example of preserving 
global commons exemplified in the previous section. This can be seen as a 
traditional form of security at sea relating to the U.S.-Japan alliance based upon 
Mahan’s (1890) notion of seapower. Taro Aso, Foreign Minister during the first Abe 
administration, delivered his speech entitled “Japan and America: A Quest for a 
Unified Seapower” in 2008, saying that “Only when Japan and America formed a 
powerful naval alliance to check the Soviet expansion, did the overall alliance come 
to true maturity. Japan grew, also in that period, to build its own seapower. The 
naval alliance, therefore, has become public goods…I would argue that a joint 
seapower between Japan and America must be that leader” (Aso 2008). He 
emphasised the role of soft power and seapower to bolster the overall U.S.-Japan 
alliance with a seapower alliance. 
     The notion of a “U.S.-Japan Seapower alliance” was articulated by the Ocean 
Policy Research Foundation (OPRF), the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and 
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 It also notes that both the S and Japan should play a leading role in establishing norms and 
rules to manage the global commons (Study Group on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance 
2010). 
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International Studies (CSIS), the CNAS and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 
in the name of “US-Japan Sea Power Dialogue” relating to global commons in 2009 
issuing a consensus report.
228
 According to Glosserman
229
 (2009), a consensus 
document is the proposal for a “United States-Japan Seapower Alliance for Stability 
and Prosperity on the Oceans” that was agreed by the participants and which dealt 
with energy issues, climate change and maritime security (Pacific Forum CSIS 2009). 
According to the consensual document on the U.S.-Japan Seapower Alliance, “The 
United States and Japan should restructure their seapower in strengthening their 
alliance arrangements, make it the common basis for international cooperation, and 
grapple with the problems involving ocean development and security” (Pacific 
Forum CSIS 2009). The report was submitted to Japan’s Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) on the 25
th
 June 2009 (OPRI 2009). The submission of the report to the 
government shows the influences of these ideas about the U.S.-Japan alliance by 
exploring their potential functions in the realm of global commons.  
     The U.S.-Japan alliance functioning as seapower has been elaborated by scholars. 
Ford (2009) argues that “Although long-standing territorial disputes and contested 
maritime resources will increasingly challenge the region, the U.S.-Japan Seapower 
Alliance is well poised to address these problems. As two of the world’s most 
powerful economies, like-minded democracies, and leading naval powers, together 
the U.S. and Japan can play a leading role in ensuring the Asian region remains 
peaceful and prosperous” (Ford 2009, p. 2). According to her, due to the treaty 
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 For several years, the OPRF, working with U.S. dialogue partners, has held a seapower 
dialogue that explores the two nations’ perspectives on the maritime domain. This effort has 
examined the importance of the oceans and their role in creating security and prosperity, changes 
in the maritime domain that our two governments need to prepare for, and ways to maximise 
efforts to ensure that this global commons remains available to all humankind. 
229
 He is executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a think-tank specialising in security issues 
in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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alliance and the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces in Japan, the US Navy and 
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Forces have the closest, most interoperable maritime 
relationship and the U.S.-Japan Seapower Alliance can also promote greater regional 
exercises and maritime coordination mechanisms that can help minimising the risk 
of conflict or miscommunications associated with increasingly crowded regional 
waters (Ford 2009). The idea that the U.S.-Japan alliance as seapower may have 
become more pervasive due to China’s recent maritime strategy. This illustrates that 
the “global commons” concept has been taken seriously by elaborating the notion of 
a seapower alliance between the US and Japan while it is one component of global 
commons. 
 
e) The U.S.-Japan Alliance as Smart Power 
     After the George W. Bush, Jr. administration experienced a big loss in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the ideas of “soft power” and “smart power” were generated 
from the US side in 2009, which were also applied to the case of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. During that period, Nye (2004) called for a more focus on soft power than 
hard power for national interests. Since the launch of the Obama administration, hard 
power and soft power were combined into smart power. The concept was used in the 
context of the U.S.-Japan alliance by the “Japan handlers”, Armitage and Nye. The 
CSIS Commission on Smart Power Report (2007) indicates the basic stance of the 
US smart power strategy lies in “investing in the global good. That is, the United 
States will provide things people and governments in all quarters of the world want 
but cannot attain in the absence of American leadership” (CSIS 2007). One of the 
critical areas of this strategy is to reinvigorate the alliances and partnerships and 
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institutions in order to share the burden and to strengthen its justification in terms of 
providing the global good.  
     The notion of soft power influenced Japanese official documents. In 2005, 
Japan’s MOFA introduced soft power in its annual Diplomatic Bluebook, describing 
the term as meaning “gaining respect and attracting others in the direction that Japan 
wants to move by means of Japan’s philosophy and culture, rather than by military 
and economic coercion” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). The Bluebook also 
indicates that, since Japan has denounced the use of force to wage war, it is a 
potential soft power given the popularity of its traditional as well as modern pop 
culture. Military power, which is often perceived to be hard power, can be a source 
of soft power depending on the context.
230
 
     The role of soft power in bolstering the U.S.-Japan alliance has been examined by 
scholars in the US. According to Deming (2012), “In the area of soft power, there are 
many opportunities for expanded bilateral and multilateral cooperation to provide 
public goods” (Deming 2012, p. 42).231 Meeks (2010) argues that “the contemporary 
US-Japan alliance needs to be examined in the context of soft power dynamics with 
an emphasis on two dimensions: (1) changing international identities and (2) 
balancing domestic and foreign interests” (Meeks 2010, p. 24). Smith (2013) further 
exemplifies that “the questions of how Japan can make better use of its nonmilitary 
soft power to foster prosperity and stability in East Asia, and how the United States 
can augment Japan’s efforts through the U.S.-Japan alliance…In addition, the U.S.-
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 It is pointed out that the “values-oriented diplomacy” which is based upon democratic values 
can be seen as a means of soft power (Interview with Noriaki Abe, 19
th
 March 2014). 
231
 These include: 1) Renewing the momentum toward open markets and expanded trade, with a 
particular focus on TPP, 2) Playing leadership roles in revitalizing international and regional 
organizations, including the UN, International Financial Institutions, APEC, and ASEAN plus 3, 
3) and 4) Building a framework for enhanced cooperation on energy and climate change 
(Deming 2012). 
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Japan alliance can facilitate Japanese—and U.S.—soft power by making global 
issues a more prominent pillar of the overall alliance rather than using such 
cooperation as an ad hoc afterthought to the security agenda” (Smith 2013, p. 116). 
He argues that a democratic civil society is the most important aspect of Japan’s soft 
power which can best be highlighted through increased engagement with foreign 
partners (Smith 2013). 
     Not only scholars in the US but also those in Japan have been attentive to the role 
of soft power in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Using the concepts of soft 
power and hard power, Kawakami
232
 explained that “the U.S.-Japan alliance can be 
deepened horizontally in the aspect of soft power dealing with such global issues as 
terrorism, climate change, resource and energy problem, infectious problems, the 
support for poverty countries, financial problems and the control and abandonment 
of weapons of mass destruction that Japan can contribute its soft power and can 
cooperate with the US without difficulties” (14th April 2010, National Diet 
Record).
233
 Agawa (2008) exemplifies the case of the Iraq War in 2003, saying that 
“the case of the dispatch of members of Japan’s SDF to Iraq to assist in 
reconstruction efforts, and argues that it improved Japan’s national image in the 
United States…Soft power can indeed smooth the rough edges of hard power” 
(Agawa 2008, pp. 237–238). He observes that this case can be seen as an example of 
soft power as military troops using their capacity not for combat, but for the 
reconstruction and improvement of people’s living conditions in the former conflict 
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 He is a professor at Takushoku University (Japan) specialising in the U.S.-Japan alliance and 
also participates in U.S.-Japan dialogues organised by the CSIS. 
233
  He also explains that “On the other hand, deepening vertically relates to the facet of hard 
power such as US-Japan operations plan, strengthening US-Japan joint operation training, 
establishing adjustment mechanism, join training against attacks to Japan, US-Japan cooperation 
on ballistic missile defence, information sharing, improving interoperability and a joint use of US 
bases in Japan (14th April 2010, National Diet Record). 
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area by sending members of the SDF corps of engineers for peaceful purposes 
(Agawa 2008). This may prove the fact that the U.S.-Japan alliance has worked 
better as smart power since the Iraq War in 2003. 
     In relation to “smart power”, the report on “Prospects and Challenges for the 
Formation of International Public Goods in the Era of ‘Smart Power’: ~Deepening 
and Enlarging of the Concept of ‘an Alliance’~” was released in October 2012. 
Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki, from the Sojitsu Research Institute in Japan, explained from 
the economic point of view that,  
The U.S.-Japan alliance should adapt itself to new economic reality. The ‘pro-status quo’ 
countries sharing the value of democracy and market economy should collaborate closely to 
the fragile global economy and possible tensions in international affairs. In other words, we 
need ‘a smart power coalition’ which can find ways to combine limited resources in 
successful strategies. Although it is hard to know whether ‘smart power’ will be used in the 
future to justify the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it shows how, especially from the 
Japanese perspective, the alliance should raise its relevance for its longevity (Yoshizaki 2011, 
p.7).  
It is also pointed out that the realm of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
(HA/DR) can be seen important as “soft power”,234 which supports the “smart power” 
of the alliance in the post-Cold War period (Ishihara 2011; Koga 2011).
235
 In 
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 Japan Demining and Reconstruction Assistance Center (JDRAC), an NGO which was 
established by ex-Generals, can be seen as “capacity-building” or a soft aspect of HA/DR. Also, 
the MOD has separately been providing “private support” (Interview with Kenji Inoue, 26
th
 
March 2013). Kiba and Yasutomi (2013)’s “SDF’s ‘All Japan’ version of International 
Cooperation” illustrates the attempts of the MOD and JSDF between 2004 and 2010 on the basis 
of a Defence Plan. 
235
 “Strategic Assistance: Disaster Relief and Asia-Pacific Stability” (“The U.S.-Japan alliance 
and disaster relief” in Japanese) was launched as a collaborative initiative between The National 
Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE)—
which highlights the importance of HA/DR in mitigating the severe impacts of natural disasters 
and other calamitous events in Asia, as well as exploring how close cooperation on HA/DR, or 
“strategic assistance,” can strengthen inter-regional relations (Japan Center for International 
Exchange 2013). 
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addition, Kamiya (2012)
236
 explains that the U.S.-Japan alliance can be enlarged 
from both the “collective hard power” and “collective soft power”.237 
     The rhetoric of soft power and smart power has been useful for policymakers and 
scholars to emphasise the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Not only among US 
but also Japanese foreign policymakers and some scholars support this approach. 
The Japanese MOFA favours this idea for Japanese diplomatic posture. This may 
reflect the Japan’s previous limited role in contributing as a US ally due to its 
constitutional and legal constraints while the factor of collective self-defence may 
change the alliance relationship between the US and Japan that is elaborated further 
in Chapter Four. Some have suggested Japan should use soft power as a substitute 
for the US’ hard power.238 The idea of smart power is a good example to illustrate 
the different roles that can be taken by the US and Japan in the context of its alliance 
relationship which is observable in terms of an asymmetrical relationship that is 
presented in Chapter Three.
239
 More particularly, with regard to Japan’s contribution 
to humanitarian assistance, it is indicated as the best means for Japan to exert its soft 
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 He is professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan and a 
leading security expert on Japan.  
237
 According to him, “it will become increasingly difficult for an alliance to achieve its goals 
only using its collective hard power. Cultivation of collective soft power will be crucial. 
However, the strength of collective soft power of an alliance; i.e., how much attractiveness other 
international actors find in that alliance, will depend considerably on what it can do (or, to put it 
more correctly, how others perceive what it can do), in time of need, by utilizing its collective 
hard power. The prerequisite for an alliance to strengthen its collective soft power is, therefore, 
the solid maintenance (or strengthening) of its collective hard power” (Kamiya 2012, p. 10). Yet, 
he also notes that Japan should not solely rely on soft element but also the hard element. 
According to him, the image that “Japan cannot implement” should be overcome (Interview with 
Matake Kamiya, 25
th
 January 2013). This may relate to the idea of avoiding the “free-rider” 
logic. 
238
 It is argued that the SDF is making efforts to create a positive image of themselves through 
the interaction with local people (Interview with Noboru Yamaguchi, 14
th
 December 2012).  
239
 However, it is remarked that the distinction between soft power and hard power is becoming 
blurry since the cyber security can be regarded as both hard and soft (Interview with Takashi 
Kawakami, 21
st
 March 2013). It is also pointed out that the hard element of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance got strengthened (Interview with Yoshinobu Yamamoto, 14
th
 March 2014). In regard to 
the soft element, it is noted that the realm of cyber security should be improved (Interview with 
Yasuhiro Izumikawa, 21
st
 December 2012). 
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power instead of using hard power which may need a more military development 
which is already examined in Chapter Four by looking into expanding roles of the 
Japanese SDF in the realm of peacekeeping, HA/DR and CIMIC. 
 
f) An Asymmetric yet Reciprocal Alliance? 
     The U.S.-Japan alliance has increasingly been characterised as “the balanced 
asymmetry” or “inherent asymmetry” (Yamaguchi240 2012).241 That is, the US 
provides the nuclear umbrella of strategic deterrence, offensive power projection, 
and global intelligence, surveillance and command and control while Japan, in turn, 
offers host nation support, complementary forces for its own defence, and bases for 
US forces (Giarra & Nagashima 1999).
242
 Giarra (1999) claims that the US bases 
should be integrated into SDF operations, exemplifying “Most broadly, Tokyo 
benefits from the global missions assigned to U.S. forces based in Japan…This 
animates Japan’s foreign policy, and tend to align U.S. policies and actions with 
Japanese interests. They reinforce each other, to Japan’s interest” (Giarra 1999, 
p.131). In fact, the alliance as asymmetric has been one of the features which has 
been criticised by the opponents including the JCP and the Japanese Social Party 
(JSP). According to the JCP, “Breaking away from the Japan-U.S. military alliance 
                                                          
240
 Noboru Yamaguchi was graduated from the National Defence Academy of Japan. He was a 
senior defense attaché at the Embassy of Japan in the US, deputy commandant of the Japan 
Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Aviation School, vice president of the National Institute for 
Defense Studies, and commanding general of the JGSDF Ground Research and Development 
Command. He also served as special advisor to the cabinet from March to September 2011. 
241
 It is noted that it is impossible to become reciprocal considering the gap between the military 
capabilities of the US and Japan and the issue is related to “legal adjustment” of Japan (Interview 
with Takashi Shiraishi, 22
nd
 March 2013).  
242
 It is also remarked that, unless Article Five and Six of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty change, 
the asymmetrical relationship between the US and Japan will not change. He also questions 
whether it is sustainable in the middle term (Interview with Akihisa Nagashima, 29
th
 March 
2013). In a similar vein, it is noted that in order for the U.S.-Japan alliance to be symmetric, 
Article Six of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty needs to be discarded (Interview with Kenichi 
Takahashi, 19
th
 April 2013). 
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[Japan-U.S. Security Treaty], to fully restore our national sovereignty, and aim to 
establish the non-aligned and neutral path” is one of the aims the party is pursuing 
for through “democratic change within the framework of capitalism” (Japanese 
Communist Party 2013). Nonetheless, the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship is 
increasingly regarded as “an asymmetrical yet reciprocal” alliance. This concept is 
crucial in considering changing perceptions of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
     The features of an “asymmetrical yet reciprocal” alliance came into shape, 
especially after the politicians started to use the term. This description has often been 
used by politicians and scholars when explaining the alliance relationship. Such 
politicians as Seiji Maehara and Shigeru Ishiba
243
 have been stressing that the U.S.-
Japan alliance has been reciprocal although it is asymmetrical. Maehara explained at 
the Japanese National Diet, saying that “the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship is 
asymmetric and reciprocal” while confidence-building at the military-to-military and 
governmental level is vital (21
st
 October 2010, Japanese National Diet). At the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) meeting in 2008, as Minister of 
Defence, Ishiba described the U.S.-Japan alliance as an “asymmetric and reciprocal” 
relationship (Ministry of Defence 2008). These recent trends exhibit the acceptance 
of the alliance relationship between the US and Japan, while emphasis on the 
features of the “asymmetrical yet reciprocal” relationship has been more pervasive. 
     Moreover, Mathur (2004) indicates that the U.S.-Japan alliance went through a 
transformation from “being asymmetrical to a mutually beneficial and reciprocal”.244 
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 He is a former Minister of Defense from 2007 to 2008 and known as a military geek (“gunji 
otaku”) who has a keen interest in military issues (Martin 2009). 
244
 It is also remarked that the U.S.-Japan alliance will become more reciprocal with the presence 
of collective self-defence and loosening the arms export policy (Interview with Noriaki Abe, 19
th
 
March 2013). In a similar vein, it is noted that while it may remain asymmetrical, the U.S.-Japan 
alliance may become reciprocal with collective self-defence (Interview with Isao Miyaoka, 10
th
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DiFilippo (2002) argues that “Those who stress the asymmetrical makeup of the 
bilateral relationship in the present period concern themselves with the imbalances 
relating to the security alliance. For them, the utilization of American efforts and 
resources for the protection of Japan still far exceeds the Japanese contribution to the 
security alliance” (DiFilippo 2002, p.61).245 Sakaguchi (2009) claims that “The 
Japan-U.S. Alliance is an asymmetric relationship of things and people, and 
consequently up to now both countries have harbored considerable doubts and 
dissatisfaction regarding the alliance, including the division of roles and various base 
problems” (Sakaguchi 2009, p. 29). 
     This may be caused by two factors. One is US pressure. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the US has been asking Japan to contribute more militarily by exercising 
collective defence. This was clear when the Armitage-Nye reports were released. 
The second Armitage Nye Report, released by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. 
Nye in February 2007, stated that “Japan must make the alliance a more balanced 
relationship by contributing fully in more of the sectors needed for its own national 
defense” (Armitage & Nye 2007). Sakaguchi (2009) analyses that “this shows, even 
half a century after the Japan - U.S. Alliance was formed, debate over the two 
countries’ contribution to the alliance continues” (Sakaguchi 2009, p. 29). They 
claimed the exercise of collective self-defence by Japan which should enable them to 
be involved. Because Japan is not able to exercise this right, it is their responsibility 
                                                                                                                                                                    
January 2013). Masashi Nishihara also indicated that the U.S.-Japan alliance can be reciprocal 
(Interview with Masashi Nishihara, 9
th
 April 2013). 
245
 He further explains that “The existing gap in the alliance between U.S. and Japanese military 
contributions and capabilities, that is, the asymmetries, legitimates the incremental approach that 
is embodied in the bilateral security arrangement…focusing on asymmetries and seeking to 
address them by following an incremental approach that is compatible with Japanese 
constitutional constraints, continues to lead Japan down the road of becoming a military minion 
of the United States in that it symbolically supports America’s hegemonic interests in the East 
Asia-Pacific region.” (DiFilippo 2002, pp. 64-65); It is also noted that regarding this relationship 
and collective self-defence, it is important for Japan to put emphasis on PKO (Interview with 
Toshihiro Nakayama, 9
th
 January 2013).  
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that they cannot change the structural relationship between the US and Japan, which 
remains since the enactment of the San Francisco Treaty. On the other hand, Japan 
has been reluctant and some of the politicians have been sceptical of this due to their 
fear of “entanglement”. Another reason can be the rebuttal of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
as an “asymmetrical alliance”. This logic was often used by political parties which 
opposed to the remilitarisation of Japan. Particularly, the JCP has been critical of 
Japan to become “a dependent country” of the US. However, fewer political parties 
in Japan are using this logic, or rather more parties have begun to emphasise the 
relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the examples of the “U.S.-Japan alliance as 
the pillar of Japanese diplomacy” illustrated. There seems to be an increasing 
embrace of the alliance as an asymmetric alliance. 
 
Rhetorically Marginalised by the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
     In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, anti-base sentiments are generally 
expressed by local citizens through local media press and social movements. Much 
literature has focused on the counter-hegemonic forces in Okinawa due to its base 
issue. The counter-hegemonic arguments have been made with the emergence of 
“base politics” (Cooney 2008; Calder 2009). According to the prevailing analysis of 
the Okinawan culture and politics, strong norms of antimilitarism and pacifism, 
institutionalised by Okinawa’s distinctive historical experiences, lead Okinawans to 
resent and actively oppose the presence of the US bases (Cooley & Marten 2007, p. 
568).
246
 More analysis has been elaborated by looking into Okinawa’s “anti-
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 However, they also indicate that “Although antimilitarist and antibase norms may inform the 
collective identity of a society, they do not necessarily generate actual political interests. 
Collective identities are important but often remain politically indeterminate when they are 
overridden by well-targeted material incentives to groups and individuals” (Cooley & Marten 
2007, p. 579). 
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militarist” sentiments which may differ from a general understanding of “anti-
militarism” that does not necessarily highlight the experiences in Okinawa. This 
section clarifies the recent voices against the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship which 
have existed in the postwar era. While the perspectives from Okinawa can be 
regarded as counter-hegemonic forces toward US hegemony, or the US-led historic 
bloc, with the bolstering U.S.-Japan alliance, this section analyses what problems 
exist in Okinawa in regard to US bases and how diverse their perspectives can be. 
Regarding the “rhetorically marginalised”, the following five keywords which can be 
interrelated each other are examined: a) anti-U.S.-Japan alliance, b) US bases in 
Japan, c) environmental problems and Osprey deployments, d) Status of Force 
Agreements (SOFA), and f) becoming an “equal” partner with the US. 
 
a) Anti-U.S. Japan Alliance Sentiment 
     Among political parties in Japan, the JSP, which was renamed to the SDP, used to 
possess security policies which were anti-SDF and anti-U.S.-Japan alliance. The JCP 
has been persistent on its stance against the U.S.-Japan alliance since the postwar era. 
According to Lam (1996), “The JCP is the only established party that opposes the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance, the emperor system, ‘monopoly capitalism’ and the 
consumption tax. Since it was the only party to uphold the values of the traditional 
left, it stood to gain when the JSP vacated its position at the left of Japan's 
ideological spectrum” (Lam 1996, p.165). As is indicated earlier, the aim of the JCP 
is to abandon the Japan-U.S. military alliance (Japanese Communist Party 2013). 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
promoted adherence to the Security Treaty while the opposition parties, led by the  
JSP, opposed it. 
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     However, with the end of the Cold War, the JSP lost its political strength and the 
opposition forces, led by the DPJ, no longer opposed the Security Treaty (Ina 
2005).
247
 As we can observe political parties in Japan, it is solely the JCP which is 
persistently opposed to Japan’s alliance relationship with the U.S. Moreover, more 
political parties such as the Kokumin Shinto emphasise the significance of the 
alliance. In addition, there has been a growing acceptance of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
since the 3.11 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami with a closer cooperation between 
the US and Japan as a result of these natural disasters. Within the Okinawa 
prefecture, “Since the prefecture has historically had among the highest 
unemployment rates in Japan, the question of reducing the base presence has created 
severe political divisions within organized labor, which, in Japan, has traditionally 
been linked with the anti-American socialist and communist parties” (Cooley & 
Marten 2007, p. 575).
248
 
     Opposition to the U.S.-Japan alliance is marginalised. Envall (2013) examines 
Japan’s reluctance to adopt “tying-hands strategies” in order to answer the following 
question: Why has the Japanese government not made greater use of the “Okinawa 
card” when negotiating alliance issues with the US?249 Alternatively, Kagotani and 
Yanai’s (2014) research on the 1972 - 2006 Okinawa gubernatorial elections shows 
that external threats do encourage Okinawans to support pro-base candidates. 
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 Yet, it is worth noting that there is an ideological fragmentation within the DPJ. 
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 According to them, “Prior to the 1996 referendum, approximately 6,300 workers were 
members of the Okinawa Chapter of the All Garrison Forces Labor Union, a leftist organisation 
that participated in campaigns against the U.S. basing presence. However, this stance so 
dismayed certain members during the run-up to the 1996 campaign that they formed a breakaway 
group, the All Okinawa Garrison Forces Union, which proceeded to campaign openly against the 
referendum and to network with other opposition groups” (Cooley & Marten 2007, p. 575). 
249
 He “has instead argued that the most consistent factor shaping Japan’s general reluctance, as 
well as its occasional shifts in approach, was the relationship between the threat perceptions of 
alliance managers and their awareness of Japan’s rising direct dependence on the alliance. In 
terms of alliance management, this rising dependence was played out in Japanese worries about 
the country’s credibility and reputation, and how these affected its capacity to signal a strong 
ongoing commitment to the alliance” (Envall 2013, p. 397). 
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According to them, the survey “results [of the elections show] that in the post-Cold 
War period, external threats surrounding Japan had been increasing whereas more 
Okinawans became supportive for US bases” (Kagotani & Yanai 2014, p. 10). They 
also claim that “Japan’s perceived security risk acts as a driving force behind the 
evolution of Okinawans’ vote choice because external threats encourage Okinawans 
to support a pro-base candidate” (Kagotani & Yanai 2014, p. 21). Hook and Son 
(2013) clarify that “Anti-base actors were not necessarily anti-alliance actors” (Hook 
& Son 2013, p. 37). In addition, in the past year, about twenty counter-demonstrators 
have gathered on the opposite side of the road with banners displaying messages 
surprisingly amicable to the US military presence displaying such banners as “You 
are our good friends” and “Thank you for protecting the island”.250  
 
b) US Bases in Japan  
     Okinawa hosts about seventy-five percent of all US military bases in Japan, 
despite its small land size. In this regard, the first wave of anti-base movement in 
Okinawa was the island-wide struggle in the middle of the 1950s and the second was 
the anti-war and anti-base struggle that lasted from the second half of the 1960s 
through the early 1970s. The third one was the fall of 1995, when a new wave of 
struggle emerged in Okinawa, demanding the reduction and removal of US bases 
and the revision of the Status of the US Forces Agreement. According to Mulgan 
(2000), “US bases on Okinawa was not subject to the customary democratic consent 
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 Yasunori Tedokon, a 50-year-old organiser of the counter-demonstration, said that “We want 
people to know that there also are people in Okinawa who feel an affinity with the U.S. military 
bases and soldiers” while Manabu Sato, professor of politics at Okinawa International University, 
said that generations born after 1972 tend to view the prefecture as no more unique than other 
regions in Japan. Compared to the previous generations, they are proud and comfortable with 
being Japanese, and it makes them “susceptible to conservative arguments” (Asahi Shimbun 
2014).  
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procedures normally associated with the siting of large projects and facilities that 
have potentially negative social and environmental effects” (Mulgan 2000, p. 160).  
     These tensions exploded in September 1995 when three US servicemen sexually 
assaulted a young girl in Okinawa. In contrast to previous Okinawan grievances 
against US bases, this incident captured the attention and the outrage of the entire 
Japanese public. Opinion polls turned sharply against the U.S.-Japan alliance for the 
first time since the 1960s and mainstream politicians began challenging the logic of a 
US military presence in Japan. The US and Japanese governments responded by 
forming the SACO in November 1995. The committee announced in December 1996 
that the US would adjust operations and return about 21 per cent of the land on 
Okinawa used by US bases, including the most controversial base, the US Marine 
Corps Air Station at Futenma (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996).
251
  
     “The Base Return Action Program” was a proposal by Masahide Ota aimed at the 
planned and gradual return of existing US military facilities in Okinawa by the year 
2015, which is the target year for Okinawa’s grand design for the 21st century, “The 
Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept”, which proposes at constructing a 
multipurpose exchange network with various Asian countries that have climates and 
natural features similar to Okinawa’s as well as establishing Okinawa as a city 
equipped with all the functions of any advanced city. The Base Return Action 
Program was an attempt to enable the smooth, planned and gradual return of the 
bases that poses a great obstacle toward proceeding with such planning. However, 
after the defeat of Ota by Inamine, the last report of the SACO has become the pillar 
of administrating Okinawa bases instead of the Base Return Action Program 
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 Satoshi Morimoto, then Minister of Defence, suggested accompanying economic benefit with 
Henoko construction. 
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(Shimizu 2008). Shimizu (2008) points out that the planners of “The Base Return 
Action Program” and the SACO last report are entirely different. Whilst “The Base 
Return Action Program” was created by the Okinawa government, SACO report was 
based on the US-Japan discussions. Although the requests written in “The Base 
Return Action Program” were not ignored in the SACO report, the call for reviewing 
The Base Return Action Program was vocal due to the condition on “relocation” 
(Shimizu 2008). 
     The Okinawan problem and the local pressure on US bases throughout Japan is 
far from resolved. Governor Ota blocked the Japanese government’s effort to 
implement the Futenma relocation plan by rejecting permission for construction of 
the offshore base in January 1998. Although the governor came under increasing 
pressure from local politicians and businesses, who supported the offshore facility 
and wanted to develop the Futenma area after the base was relocated, his position 
has not budged. As a result, the centrepiece of the Special Action Committee’s 
agreement remains unimplemented. Indeed, in terms of the Okinawa issue, Eldridge 
(1997) explains that “In particular, its meaning for Okinawan- Japanese-American 
relations is obvious. Okinawans wanted a say in something that has fundamentally 
affected their daily lives for the past 50 years: the presence of the U.S. bases. This 
meaning was perhaps best underscored by Ken Miki, editor-in-chief of the Ryukyu 
Shimpo, when he said, ‘We in Okinawa needed to continue to speak up or else we 
wouldn't have been heard’” (Eldridge 1997, p. 904). 
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c) Environmental Problems and Osprey Deployments 
     Environmental contamination has been the focal issue in regard to US bases. 
Carcinogenic military toxics, which include fuels, oils, solvents, and heavy metals, 
have increased numbers of low-birth weight babies and higher incidences of cancer 
and leukaemia in adults and children which have infiltrated the land, water, and air in 
Okinawa, and require massive funding for environmental clean-up.
252
 Military 
exercises in Okinawa with live ammunition have caused forest fires, soil erosion, 
earth tremors, and accidents that have had continual negative impacts on Okinawa’s 
environment, which will require years to remedy. These exercises obliterate natural 
ecosystems, and leave lands barren and shell ridden for decades to come.
253
 Two of 
the main groups that claim for environmental protections are the Okinawa 
Environmental Network (OEN), which was formed in 1997, and Save the Dugong 
Foundation (SDF). The former group has protested against a major land reclamation 
project at the Awase Tidal Flats, investigating water pollution caused by livestock 
breeding in Southern Okinawa, and examining pollution from shooting on US bases. 
“Promotion of Dugong during the UN 2010 International Year of Biodiversity” 
included a demand that the Japanese government conduct an environmental 
assessment evaluation of planned military expansion in the Okinawan Dugong 
habitat.
254
  
     However, it is important to note that the OEN does not take an anti-US military 
presence in Okinawa. It is noted that “it clearly relishes the opportunity to work with 
officials from the U.S. military, as is evident by the presentation by the deputy 
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 Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles, 
http://www.uchinanchu.org/uchinanchu/history_current.htm. 
253
 Ibid. 
254
 Network for Okinawa (NO), http://closethebase.org/environmental-
issue/#sthash.lJEErJhr.dpuf. 
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environmental officer of the Environmental Branch, Marine Corps, as part of the 
OEN’s 2003 conference” (Taylor 2008, p. 276). Taylor (2008) also indicates that 
other environmental officers at US military have cordial relationship with the OEN. 
Also, the “US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” of May 2006 
recognises to promptly respond to environmental issues including the provision of 
reasonable access to the US Forces facilities or areas in consideration of 
environmental accidents.  
     In addition, at an international level, it is recognised that US bases have harmed 
the environment especially in Okinawa. For instance, “Yanbaru”, which is located in 
the northeast mountain side of Higashi and Kunigami village in Okinawa, has a 
jungle warfare training centre of US Marine Corps with 7,500 hectares, while it is 
considered that there would be serious adverse effects on Yanbaru if the helipads are 
constructed and military exercises are carried out. The International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUNC) urged both the US and Japanese governments to 
adopt alternative options such as the “Zero Option (option for no construction) and 
the set-up of a protected area for Okinawa Woodpecker and Okinawa Rail (World 
Wildlife Fund Japan 2011).
255
 The issues on “environmental assessment” have been 
further problematic environmental issues surrounding by the US bases, particularly 
in Henoko and Takae in Okinawa. Such groups as the “Citizens’ Network for 
Biodiversity in Okinawa” visited the Ministry of Defence in Okinawa in February 
2014, asking for the details about environmental assessment. Hideki Yoshikawa, a 
member of the Citizens’ Network for Biodiversity in Okinawa pointed out that the 
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 Moreover, in order to terminate the construction of the helipads, people in Takae, Okinawa 
held a sit-in protest in front of the US-military bases. Takae is known as a place where guerilla 
war practices were held during the Vietnam War by the US army by using local citizens 
(Maedomari 2013). 
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information about dugongs is insufficiently delivered to the U.S. side (Ryukyu 
Shimpo 2014). 
     The Osprey deployment has been another problematic issue. The MV-22, which 
takes off like a helicopter and flies like an airplane, is replacing the aging CH-46 
helicopters, being able to fly at a top speed of about 520 kilometres an hour and 
carry 24 soldiers, has twice the capability of the CH-46 in both speed and payload, 
while the safety of the hybrid aircraft has been called into question following crashes 
in Florida and Morocco in 2012 (Asahi Shimbun 2013). The US military has said the 
accident rate for the Osprey is well below the average rate for all US military aircraft. 
A total of 24 Osprey have been deployed to US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma 
in Okinawa Prefecture to date. According to the Defence Ministry, one or two 
Osprey took part in an integrated exercise slated for the 16
th
 Oct 2012. The SDF also 
plans to include two Ospreys in a joint disaster preparedness drill planned later this 
month in Kochi Prefecture.  
     Being influenced by the crash of a US Air Force HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter 
within U.S. Marine Corps Camp Hansen in Okinawa on the 5th August 2013, “The 
Targeted Village” was released which tells a story about Okinawa’s counter-
movement against the deployment of MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft at 
the Futenma air base which was shown in Tokyo. The film focuses on a court battle 
between the central government and the residents of Takae, as well as sit-ins and 
other protest activities by the residents aimed at blocking the construction of the 
helicopter landing zones in the US military’s Northern Training Area in the 
subtropical mountain forest district, exhibiting local residents’ feeling “targeted”256 
                                                          
256
 The title derives from the fact that the village was used as a mock target in the 1960s to train 
US forces for the Vietnam War. The US military set up a mock Vietnamese village there and had 
residents of Takae dress up as Vietnamese farmers to lend a semblance of realism to the guerrilla 
284 
 
by the US military by means of Osprey (Kurokawa 2013). This further spread anti-
Osprey campaigns to the mainland where U.S.-Japan joint exercises were planned a 
few months later (Asahi Shimbun 2013). 
     Conversely, there is a group called “the Okinawa Osprey fan club,” which cleans 
the fences around the MCAS Futenma in the Ginowan city, Okinawa that are often 
left by the protesters in order to display their appreciation for those who work and 
live on the base. It is noted that many volunteers who involved in this activities are 
the supporters for the Marine Corps including the Osprey fan club and “Operation 
Arigato” (Case 2013). This exhibits that, in regard to the Osprey deployments, there 
are both pros and cons with different perspectives on it. On the one hand, those who 
criticise it have concerns about the safety of the local citizens. On the other hand, 
those who support the deployments emphasise the relevance of the US Marine Corps 
for making efforts to protect Japan.
257
 
 
d) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
     While the “asymmetric yet reciprocal” discourse is introduced and analysed in the 
section of “common sense”, it is worth noting that some argues against the nature of 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which has been the pillar of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. Maedomari (2013) argues that SOFA is represented as an “asymmetrical 
treaty” which defines the U.S.-Japan alliance. He also notes that the difficulty of 
revising it due to its intricacy.
258
 Ina (2005) explicates that “There are at least two 
                                                                                                                                                                    
warfare training drills. The area is still being used for training for jungle warfare, including 
guerrilla attacks, infantry training and helicopter drills. 
257
 It is also remarked that Osprey deployments are used for defensive and humanitarian means 
(Interview with Naoyuki Agawa, 4
th
 April 2013). 
258
 During his journalist career, he obtained “Chii Kyoutei no Kangaekata” which is regarded as a 
bible for MOFA officials in dealing with US bases in Japan that was crafted by Minoru Tanba. 
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points of view concerning the revision of the SOFA. One revisionist argument 
repudiates the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and ultimately demands the withdrawal of 
American forces, while the other argument approves of the treaty itself. In practical 
terms, it is hard to differentiate between these two arguments” (Ina 2005, p. 43). 
According to Ina (2005), “Instead, an objective that is uniting the opposition forces 
is revision of the SOFA, with the main issues being criminal jurisdiction procedures 
and environmental problems. The former was highlighted by the 1995 rape and has 
aroused the emotions of the Japanese people. The latter, not foreseen in 1960 when 
the current SOFA was signed, provides further justification for a revision. Not only 
the opposition parties but also the ruling party find it difficult to oppose these issues” 
(Ina 2005, p. 43). For instance, the “Committed for the Revision of the SOFA and 
the Establishment of a True U.S.-Japan Partnership”, a group of non-partisan 
members of Japan’s Diet, was formulated. 
     An NGO group called “Realizing the Revision of the Japan - U.S. SOFA 
(Nichibei Chii Kyotei Kaitei no Jitsugen Suru NGO)” was created in 2002 led by 
Tsutomu Arakaki, who is an attorney in Okinawa and also a member of a special 
research group for US military base issues in the Human Rights Committee of the 
association with detailed knowledge of the agreement. On March 2014, the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations released a statement about the revision of the Japan-
US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In the statement, they indicated their 
opposition to the landfill construction of Henoko in Nago to build a new base to 
replace U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station. The association called for 
environmental rules and for the handing over of suspected criminals for indictment. 
Arakaki remarks that “It is important that the largest group of law professionals 
                                                                                                                                                                    
He also interviewed with Tanba, reconfirming that it was created by him and is used by the 
MOFA (Maedomari 2013)  
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clarifies legal opinions on the agreement. It would have a significant impact on 
negotiations between Japan and the United States” (Ryukyu Shimpo 2014). Yet, this 
issue is less realised generating less news coverage in newspapers.  
 
e) Equal Partner with the US 
     Another keyword that may be worth considering is the idea that Japan is 
becoming an “equal partner” with the US. This thinking is related to the nature of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance and questions the idea of an asymmetrical relationship with the 
US. The DPJ government under the Hatoyama administration wanted to renegotiate 
a US base realignment agreement concluded by the previous government in order to 
reduce the footprint of US forces in Japan, especially in Okinawa.
259
 The Hatoyama-
led government was taking this action without compensating the US in other aspects 
of alliance. Although one of the mantras of this government is “a close and equal 
alliance”, equality could be interpreted to mean that Japan needs to do more, not less, 
in an alliance military context. Mulgan explicates that “the new Japanese 
administration interprets ‘equal’ to mean ‘less deferential’ to the United States in 
both internal alliance management and foreign policy. It has explicitly stated that it 
will decide future deployments of the Japanese military overseas not on the basis of 
US requests but strictly from the point of view of Japan’s own national interests” 
(Mulgan 2009). According to Shinohara (2013), Hatoyama’s attempt and failure to 
make the U.S.-Japan alliance “equal” is described as a “second loss”. Furthermore, 
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 The DPJ’s 2008 ‘Okinawa Vision’ called for the relocation of the base out of Okinawa, or out 
of Japan. 
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McCormack (2011) analyses the documents released by the WikiLeaks in May 2011 
which reveal the extent to which Hatoyama was betrayed by his own government.
260
 
     It is important to note that Japan’s becoming an equal partner with the US has 
been considered from the US perspective while the focus of the issues is different 
and another question is whether it is realistic or not. One of the prominent reports 
that can be referred to is the Armitage - Nye Report in 2012. In that report, 
considering changing East Asian security circumstances including the “re-rise” of 
China and North Korean nuclear threats, “a stronger and more equal alliance” is 
required. The report remarks that “It is our view that Japan is at a critical juncture. 
Japan has the power to decide between complacency and leadership at a time of 
strategic importance…In choosing leadership, Japan can secure her status as a tier-
one nation and her necessary role as an equal partner in the alliance” (CSIS 2012, p. 
15). It also articulates that Japan should enable itself possessing collective self-
defence which is seen as an “impediment to the alliance” in consideration of the 
triple crises of 3.11.
261
  
 
U.S.-Japan Alliance as Common Sense to be Problematic? 
Changing Nature of Organic Intellectuals in the Context of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance 
      Considering the five keywords that are examined in “rhetorical strategies”, the 
U.S.-Japan alliance may have gradually transformed into “common sense” in the 
neo-Gramscian sense. “Organic intellectuals,” consisting of not only politicians but 
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  From the earliest days of the Hatoyama government, his senior officials had clandestine, one 
can fairly say conspiratorial, links with US officials, advising the Obama administration to stand 
firm, to understand that Hatoyama was a Prime Minister “with personality shortcomings” and 
other negative comments about him (McCormack 2011) 
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 The report also refers to the Yanai Committee report of 2006 which notes that the prime 
minister could by fiat put aside the Article Nine prohibition, as in antipiracy efforts in Djibouti. 
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also those who involved in the discussions about the U.S.-Japan alliance, have 
established the common sense for the U.S.-Japan alliance by taking into account the 
concepts generated from the US side such as “global commons” and “smart power”. 
They have crafted new components of the alliance relationship with an adoption of 
new concepts such as “international public goods”, “global commons”, and “smart 
power”. The U.S.-Japan alliance as the international public goods has been further 
elaborated by policy intellectuals and scholars by including peacebuilding, which 
can be more supported by the public with its non-military purpose. Interestingly, the 
idea that the U.S.-Japan alliance is “asymmetric and reciprocal” seems to be more 
pervasive and accepted which captures the evolving nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
     In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is relevant to consider the Yoshida 
Doctrine since it is understood that it has characterised postwar Japan and the U.S.-
Japan alliance relationship. In the neo-Gramscian terms, those who formulated the 
Japanese strategic posture based upon the Yoshida Doctrine can be seen as “organic 
intellectuals” prior to the end of the Cold War. Ikeda and Sato were both intimately 
associated with Yoshida and the members of so-called the “Yoshida School”. Pyle 
(1992) analyses that, under these administrations, the “Yoshida Doctrine was 
institutionalized and consolidated into a national consensus” (Pyle 1992, p. 32). We 
may observe that those who support the Yoshida Doctrine can be regarded as 
“traditional intellectuals” in the neo-Gramscian terms. According to Winkler (2012), 
the nature of conservative politicians in Japan is evolving. Thomas (2009) also 
exemplifies that traditional intellectuals used to be “the organic intellectuals of a 
previously emergent and now consolidated and dominant social class, unwilling, at 
best, or at worst, unable to, recognise their continuing political function” (Thomas 
2009, p. 417).  
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      The present organic intellectuals are not equivalent with those who fully 
supported the Yoshida Doctrine since there is a more diversifying notion of Japanese 
security policies with the emergence of “revisionists” including former Japanese 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe (Samuels 2008). Additionally, 
those who support the U.S.-Japan alliance can currently be viewed as “organic 
intellectuals”. Regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, as the previous section on the 
application of the neo-Gramscian “common sense” demonstrated, the relevance of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance has been emphasised by both US and Japan sides with such 
concepts as “international public goods”, “global commons” and “smart power”. 
 
Emerging Counter-Hegemonic Forces, or Not? 
     At first glance, there seems to be a growing awareness of the problems relating to 
the U.S.-Japan alliance at various levels. According to Smith (2006), “Outside of 
government, new social forces and new norms of democratic practice have helped 
bring a multitude of voices to the debate” (Smith 2006, p. 45).262 Hook and Son’s 
(2013) study demonstrates the salience of networked human and environmental 
security actors and their articulation of anti-alliance and anti-base discourse of both 
Japan and South Korea.
263
 They argue that “the articulation of internal threats to 
human and environmental security has become one of the major obstacles to the 
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 She also claims that “It is the combination of these varied, and often intersecting, forces 
within the societies that host American military forces that has produced the greatest impact on 
alliance management in Asia” (Smith 2006, p.45). This is applicable to other cities in Japan 
which have US bases such as Yokosuka, Kanagawa. Although the US Navy has been ported for a 
long time, there is an anti-US bases movement especially when group attacks, killing or rape 
incidents occur. 
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 According to them, while the analysis on base politics has become a useful, there is no clear 
dividing line between alliance and base politics in real-life situations due to the following 
reasons: (i) the construction and relocation of military bases is one of the core components of 
alliance politics; and (ii) the so-called anti-base movements not only question basing issues, but 
problematise the validity of alliances as well (Hook and Son 2013, p. 18). They revisit the 
concept of “threat” considering it an “internal” one instead of an external threat which is 
acknowledged particularly in neo-realist terms. 
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management of alliances, as well as one of the catalysts behind alliance decisions to 
relax the requirements of national security” (Hook & Son 2013, p. 21). They cite 
such examples as “civil alliances forced the US and Japanese governments to revise 
the SOFA in the direction of expanding the scope of crimes covered, such as 
murders and rapes, to be tried under Japanese jurisdiction” (Hook & Son 2013, p. 
28).
264
 It is true that counter-hegemonic forces have influenced the U.S.-Japan 
alliance which is part of Pax Americana.  
     However, considering the “rhetorically marginalised” by the U.S.-Japan alliance 
particularly those who are critical of the alliance, it seems that rather than coherent 
but divergent viewpoints do exist ranging from environmental concerns of US bases 
in Japan to economy in the local prefectures. The issue that can be highlighted is that 
the differentiation between “bases” and “U.S.-Japan alliance”. As some recognise, 
“anti-bases” and “anti-U.S.-Japan alliance” are different and it is acknowledged that 
when the problems surrounding the US bases are solved including environmental 
concerns, there is less resentments toward the alliance. In the case of the Sunagawa 
incident, according to Miller (2013), “The resistance at Sunagawa drew not only 
from the continued presence of U.S. forces and the ways in which they disrupted 
Japanese lives, posed a physical threat, or even challenged peace and independence; 
these protests were also about the principle of protecting an active and representative 
Japanese democracy (Miller 2013, p. 17). This may pose a question about the 
sustainability of resistance.  
                                                          
264
 It should also be noted that the factors such as human and environmental security is also 
recognised at governmental level. The “2+2” documents have been updated by including these 
components, such as natural disasters and climate change while it may not be as precise as it 
should be. 
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     Moreover, it seems that “anti-US-Japan alliance” sentiment has become less 
visible due to it widening security concerns not only traditional but also non-
traditional forms of security. It is important to note that, increasingly, there is more 
attempt to obtain the recognition of the U.S.-Japan alliance particularly in the 
Okinawa prefecture. For example, the contents of lectures and workshops at 
Okinawa Peace Assistance Center (OPAC) have increasingly centred on the theme 
of raising awareness of the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In consideration of 
anti-US bases in the past such as Uchinada, the Lucky Dragon, the Sunagawa 
incident involving “Bloody Sunagawa”, probably the current counter-hegemonic 
forces may have weakened not because of the lack of the opposition but rather due to 
the divergent interests of the groups. This section is not attempting to conclude that it 
is impossible to strengthen counter-hegemonic forces against the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
Still, the lack of coherent voices may be a reason why staunch supporters of the 
alliance and the acceptance of the alliance are increasing as the opinion polls exhibit.  
 
Common Sense as Problematic? 
     The previous sections closely examine “rhetorical strategies” and the “rhetorically 
marginalised” in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As has been exemplified 
earlier, organic intellectuals have played roles in developing the functions of the 
alliance in regard to “rhetorical strategies” while the actors that contribute to the 
“rhetorical marginalised” can be less centred. Terashima pointed out that “Japan is 
stuck in the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance which does not allow them to 
become flexible to any scenarios” (7th March 2001, National Diet Record). Some are 
cautious of the overemphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance as the pillar of Japanese 
diplomacy. Takeda and Muto (2012) have concerns about the continuity of the U.S.-
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Japan alliance which is becoming like “oxygen” while this tendency is preferable 
according to Nye. Oshimura (2011) investigates the views of the Japanese on 
security, especially their way of thinking, realism, from the perspective of social 
thought, rather than military factors or trends of Japan-U.S. relations, in considering 
why Japanese stop thinking when they discuss security issues and how they could 
avoid this. Gramsci (1971) notes that there “must be a criticism of ‘common sense,’ 
basing itself initially, however, on common sense in order to demonstrate that 
‘everyone’ is a philosopher and that it is not a question of introducing from scratch a 
scientific form of thought into everyone’s individual life, but of renovating and 
making ‘critical’ an already existing activity” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 330-1; Rupert 
2000, p. 12).  
     Conversely, according to Watanabe and Ina (1998), the U.S.-Japan alliance can 
be regarded as a political alliance which is based on not only a military foundation 
but also on a broad political consensus such as the U.S.-U.K. alliance and diminishes 
the image of a military alliance for the Japanese society although it stems from a 
military feature. In Yeo’s (2011) account, “The prevailing security consensus 
surrounding Japanese elite strategic thinking presented a formidable obstacle for 
anti-base activists. Anti-base movements have not completely ‘failed,’ winning 
several tactical concessions over the past decade. However, ‘victory’ remained 
elusive as Japanese and U.S. officials presented new proposals to maintain a 
significant U.S. military presence on the island” (Yeo 2011, p. 84). It is remarked by 
Inoguchi, Ikenberry and Sato (2011) that “The U.S.-Japan alliance has been intensely 
bilateral in its origins and operations. Yet Japan has long been trying to get more 
global in terms of its own self-appointed role as a supporter of the U.S.-led system” 
(Inoguchi, Ikenberry & Sato 2011, p. 4). Not only has the relevance of the alliance 
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been strengthened but its nature as an “asymmetric alliance” has become accepted 
even in political discourse. Moreover, it is pointed out by Ina (2005) that there is a 
paradoxical truth that a stronger U.S.-Japan Security alliance will lead to a reduction 
in the burden of the bases. He argues that “the best way to reduce the burden of the 
bases is to make the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance more reciprocal” (Ina 2005, p. 48). 
He also remarks that “If the majority of Okinawans are opposed to the U.S.-Japan 
security framework, the strengthening of the alliance as a means of reducing the 
burden of the bases would probably appear as a contradiction in their eyes. The 
security alliance is, so to speak, a national consensus and there is little likelihood of a 
political party attempting to dissolve it at this time” (Ina 2005, pp. 49-50). 
     Furthermore, it is exemplified that “Okinawa discrimination” does exist in the 
context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. To clarify, it is not merely from the US or 
Japanese government perspective but rather the local people in Okinawa which is 
based upon “the logic of self-torture (jigyaku)” (Arasaki 2005; Miyamoto & Kawase 
2010). It is understood that this has increasingly been embedded in the minds of 
intellectuals and business people in Okinawa. Some question how it is possible to 
come up with the Okinawa initiative with this mentality (Miyamoto & Kawase 2010, 
p. 29). This may also reflect the analysis about “the day of humiliation”, whereas 
“the day of recovering sovereignty” in mainland Japan. According to Ishihara (2012), 
he raised two reasons why it is “humiliation” for Okinawa. First, it is the moment 
when structural discrimination throughout Okinawa due to military colonialism was 
embedded by the US and Japanese governments. Second, being located as a “trust 
territory” due to the San Francisco Treaty also identified Okinawa as one of the 
islands which does not have autonomy (Ishihara 2012; McCormack & Norimatsu 
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2013). Mulgan (2000) also argues that the Okinawa base issue underscores the 
political dominance of the centre over the periphery in Japan (Mulgan 2000, p. 162). 
 
Conclusion 
     This chapter illustrates how the idea of the “U.S.-Japan alliance” has become 
more acceptable as common sense in Japanese society in general. Although the 
concept of an “alliance” between Japan and the US raised controversies particularly 
in the public during the Cold War era due to the concerns about Japan’s 
remilitarisation, it seems that the “U.S.-Japan alliance” has become more accepted 
by the public as more politicians prefer to use the term the “U.S.-Japan alliance” as 
the pillar of regional and global security stability. The relevance of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance has been heightened not only because of the presence of the China’s rise or 
nuclear threats from North Korea, but also due to its contribution to many aspects 
such as maritime security and global commons. Considering the U.S.-Japan alliance 
as “rhetorical strategies” with its new characteristics and facets after the end of the 
Cold War, it seems that the allied relationship is indispensable for Japanese 
diplomacy. When he was Prime Minister, Koizumi argued that the U.S.-Japan 
alliance is the pillar for Japanese diplomacy, which covers not only the US but also 
other countries including China and Russia. Increasingly, politicians, bureaucrats, 
and scholars in Japan have developed the strengths of the U.S.-Japan alliance while 
being influenced by some US ideas such as “global commons” and “smart power”. 
In addition, “an asymmetrical yet reciprocal” form of the alliance has become the 
prevailing idea of the shape of the U.S.-Japan allied relationship. More Japanese 
politicians have used this logic which has also led the Japanese to stop thinking 
critically about the U.S.-Japan alliance. This feature may have bolstered the 
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relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The concept of the “U.S.-Japan alliance” has 
become more prevalent in academic and public discourse which was seen as almost 
“taboo” in the postwar era. 
     The U.S.-Japan alliance may be increasingly becoming as common sense in a 
neo-Gramscian sense due to the changing security environment in the post-Cold War 
era. Although “alliance adrift” was controversial in the beginning of 1990s, the 1995 
Okinawa rape incident and the DPJ government, the alliance is seen crucial as the 
“international public goods” or “global commons” according to the broadening 
categories of security. Non-traditional security issues such as humanitarian relief, 
peacebuilding and counter-terrorism have become increasingly important security 
issues in the post-Cold War period. The roles of organic intellectuals who are 
involved in managing the U.S.-Japan alliance have crafted new components of the 
alliance relationship. Particularly, with the adoptions of new concepts such as 
“international public goods”, “global commons”, and “smart power”, organic 
intellectuals have influenced the ideas of the U.S.-Japan alliance with additional 
meanings in regard to the post-Cold War environment and Japan’s security posture.  
     These key factors may have softened the militaristic character of the alliance by 
taking into account of non-traditional areas of security such as maritime security and 
HA/DR. Also, the present organic intellectuals are not equivalent to those who 
originally supported the Yoshida Doctrine as there is a more diversifying notion on 
Japanese security policies such as the emergence of “revisionists” (Samuels 2008). 
Considering all the previous chapters, the linkage between neo-Gramscianism and 
alliances has been articulated. The Conclusion Chapter is aimed at summarising the 
paper by exploring the “US-led historic bloc” in the neo-Gramscian sense by taking 
into account the analysis that was conducted in the chapters of the paper.  
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Conclusion Chapter: Neo-Gramscian Theory of Alliance as the Means to Go 
Beyond the Traditional Understanding of Alliances 
  
Introduction 
     Traditionally, alliances tend to be regarded merely as military agreements, which 
it is observable in the theory of alliance and existing literature on alliances. Yet, 
within transforming security environments, not only traditional but also non-
traditional forms of security are emerging, which harnessed the salience of alliances.  
In the post-9.11 contexts, while alternative forms of state cooperation emerged such 
as “the coalition of willingness”, alliances did not disappear but instead have been 
enhanced itself in the political domain. The case of the U.S.-Japan alliance is not 
exceptional as this thesis demonstrates within the neo-Gramscian framework. Within 
the framework of the traditional account of alliance theory including alliance 
dilemma, the sustainability of alliances can hardly be explained due to its neorealist 
understanding of alliances and the existing assumption of alliances to be symmetrical. 
Hence, by comprehending the multidimensional facets of alliances it is crucial to 
consider not only the material but also economic and ideational roles of alliance 
politics that have not been considered in the existing theory of alliance. This enables 
us to understand the micro-levels of interactions among allies in the context of 
alliance politics which is much more intricate than the way the traditional theory of 
alliance is presented.  
     In order to understand alliance politics, this research intends to underscore the 
neo-Gramscian account of hegemony which is an important element to be considered 
in the contemporary period. Through neo-Gramscian theoretical lenses, various 
aspects of the alliance dynamics between the US and Japan are examined from 
Chapter Three to Chapter Six. Chapter Three presents the historical trajectory of the 
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U.S.-Japan alliance from neo-Gramscian perspectives by incorporating its key 
concepts including organic intellectuals and historic bloc. Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five illustrate the interaction of material, economic and ideational components of the 
alliance which has been further bolstered in the post-Cold War era. Chapter Six 
explores the U.S.-Japan alliance with a usage of discourse analysis by adopting the 
neo-Gramscian concepts including “common sense” and “organic intellectuals” to 
demonstrate the roles of the alliance in contributing to the US historic bloc in the 
region. Considering the earlier chapters, the Conclusion Chapter is intended to 
underscore the linkage between research questions and the main chapters that are 
explored from this theoretical perspective. More particularly, this chapter revisits the 
neo-Gramscian account of alliance theory to elaborate how the central research 
question is answered in consideration of the major chapters. In an attempt at 
answering the central research question: “Why has the U.S.-Japan alliance continued 
to endure and been strengthened? ”, this research project aims to explain the U.S.-
Japan alliance from the neo-Gramscian perspective.  
      This chapter is structured as follows: first, the sub-research questions are deeply 
investigated by linking them to the earlier chapters. As is already indicated in the 
Introduction Chapter, four sub-research questions are answered on the basis of the 
analysis made in the earlier chapters from Chapter Three to Chapter Six by 
respectively being examined. Second, taking into account the responses to these sub-
research questions, the central research question is analysed comprehensively with 
an attempt at refining the theory of alliances which is the research aim that is 
indicated in the Introduction Chapter. In consideration of the previous sections, the 
neo-Gramscian approach to the alliance is crystallised by further discussing the 
central research question: “Why has the U.S.-Japan alliance continued to endure and 
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been strengthened?” Lastly, prior to the conclusion section, the chapter demonstrates 
the potentials of neo-Gramscianism to understand alliances in the contemporary era, 
where not only traditional but also non-traditional forms of security are considered, 
by means of the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance. Taking into account 
contemporary political environments, the chapter explores the dynamism of alliance 
politics, which can be applicable to other forms of alliances that can be particularly 
asymmetrical in nature. 
  
Revisiting Research Questions 
In What Ways has the U.S.-Japan Alliance been Developed? 
      From the neo-Gramscian standpoint, Chapter Three investigates the historical 
trajectory of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the postwar period until the early post-
Cold War period. While presenting the coercive and consensual dimensions of 
hegemony, the chapter illustrates how the U.S.-Japan alliance has become accepted 
as an alliance. While the U.S.-Japan alliance used to be unfamiliar to Japanese 
society, especially due to the asymmetric nature of the alliance, until the official 
usage in 1981, it is observable that, through the interactions of coercion and 
consensus, the US and Japan have made attempts to improve their alliance 
relationship. Although there can be an unclear distinction between coercion and 
consensus as exemplified in Chapters Two and Three where gaiatsu can be 
internalised, Chapter Three displays how the U.S.-Japan alliance has strengthened 
through the interplay of coercion and consensus. This exhibits that coercion alone 
cannot harness the alliance or the US hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc in the 
neo-Gramscian sense. 
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     Likewise, the role of organic intellectuals is crucial to be taken into account 
which is also closely examined in this chapter. In the case of the Yoshida Doctrine, 
which has been the pillar of Japanese foreign policymaking in the postwar period, 
the chapter demonstrates clearly that the doctrine has gradually been embedded in 
Japanese foreign policymaking, being established “inductively” and evolving into a 
“revealed strategy” (Yamamoto, Noya, Inoue, Kamiya and Kaneko 2012). 
Conservative politicians played influential roles in evolving the doctrine which also 
influences the U.S.-Japan alliance particularly in the military realm, but Japan’s 
usage of arms has been forbidden in the framework of its Japanese Constitution.   
     However, the chapter also illustrates Nakasone’s attempt to shift away from the 
Yoshida Doctrine that shows the different interaction of coercion and consensus. 
Instead of relying on the doctrine, the Nakasone administration was more responsive 
to US requests for remilitarising Japan with an attempt to become a more equal ally 
with the US. Moreover, unlike  in postwar era and Cold War, the cases after the Cold 
War show how the U.S.-Japan alliance was redefined in order to enhance the 
functions of the alliance after the experiences of the Gulf War in 1991 and the North 
Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and 1994. While the Gulf War is one of the examples 
which allowed Japan to rethink its defence posture under US pressures, coercive and 
consensual dimensions of the alliance interacted in different ways as the example of 
the Higuchi report illustrates. In consideration of the periods that were examined 
through the neo-Gramscian lenses, it is evident that coercive and consensual 
dimensions of the alliance have been operating and how the role of organic 
intellectuals was influential as the case of the Yoshida Doctrine shows.  
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Has Japan Increasingly Come to Accept US Foreign Policies?265 
     Chapter Four explores the interplay of material, institutional and ideational 
elements of the U.S.-Japan alliance at a bilateral level. Unlike the period when their 
alliance relationship was intrinsically “the relationship of people and things” 
(Nishihara 1997; Sakamoto 2000), the US-Japan alliance relationship may have 
become more reciprocal in regard to Japan’s increasing contribution to military 
training by enhancing joint interoperability and loosening its arms export controls. In 
regard to force interoperability, Japan has changed it defence posture in reflection of 
the US change in defence policy including transformation and dynamic deterrence. 
While Japan’s changing posture is based on its own national interest, the US 
influence is intrinsically one of the factors that affect defence policymaking as the 
U.S.-Japan alliance has been the pillar of Japanese foreign policymaking. Especially, 
HA/DR is one of the examples of the interaction of material, institutional, and 
ideational factors in the U.S.-Japan alliance. As for the military-industrial 
relationship, although the conflicts between the US and Japan were intense in the 
1980s, the circumstances were ameliorated after the 1990s with cooperation on BMD. 
Also, the case of DUT is another good example of strengthening the alliance as well 
as influencing Japanese arms export policy. 
     However, it is important to remark that this does not necessarily indicate that the 
alliance has become more symmetric. Unless the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is 
revised, the features of the alliance can hardly be changed. Nonetheless, particularly 
under the second Abe administration, Japan has been contributing to the rebalance in 
a number of ways by attempting to reinterpret its paciﬁst constitution and expand the 
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 It is also pointed out that the US and Japan have jointly formulated new defence guidelines on 
missile defence, and further integrated in the realm of information sharing (Interview with 
Toshiaki Miura, 20
th
 December 2012). 
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role of its SDF in global security operations. Under this administration, “proactive 
pacifism” has become the pillar of its security policy. Due to this seemingly 
transforming security posture of Japan with the fear of infringing pacifism, a wide 
range of media coverage has reported the danger of Japan’s remilitarisation. While 
there are strong supports for the U.S.-Japan alliance system in Japan, Japan needs to 
continuously restructure and modernise its security posture in response to the US 
rebalancing strategy.  
     Furthermore, it is widely known that “Japan’s handlers” have been encouraging 
Japan to loosen restrictions on “collective self-defence” with their reports. For 
instance, their 2012 “Armitage-Nye” report states that, “A shift in policy should not 
seek a unified command, amore militarily aggressive Japan, or a change in Japan’s 
Peace Constitution. Prohibition of collective self-defense is an impediment to the 
alliance” (CSIS 2012, p. 15). They also further notes that “3.11 demonstrated how 
out two forces can maximize our capabilities. When necessary, it would be a 
responsible authorization to allow out forces to respond in full cooperation 
throughout the security spectrum of peacetime, tension, crisis, and war” (CSIS 2012, 
p. 15).
266
 It is visible that the US and Japanese foreign policymaking in the realm of 
force interoperability and military-industry are becoming more integrated in the post-
Cold War period with gradual processes. 
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 However, Rinehart (2013) also remarks that “If Japan decides to exercise its right of 
collective self-defense (CSD), it would have complex effects on US-Japan security cooperation” 
(Rinehart 2013, p. 1). 
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Are Changing Features of the U.S.-Japan Alliance Leading to a Consolidation of 
the ‘US-led Transnational Historic Bloc’? 
     Chapter Five shows that the U.S.-Japan alliance has encompassed not only 
military but also economic and ideational aspects. The investigation of the economic 
and ideational dimensions of the alliance exhibit in what ways it has been 
strengthened through the constellation of material, institutional and ideational 
elements. In the realm of the economy, the chapter shows in what ways liberalisation 
may have been promoted by linking the TPP to the U.S.-Japan alliance although the 
US and Japan had trade disputes in the past. This case illustrates that the ideational 
component of the alliance cannot be ignored in understanding how the alliance may 
have been strengthened. As Rupert’s (2000) analysis on Fordism shows, “Cold War 
ideology played a crucial role in the political stabilization of Fordist institutions in 
the US,” (Rupert 2000, p. 23) It is observable that the Japanese government made 
use of common values with the US by means of diplomacy based on ideas while the 
features can be different depending on administrations. The role of ideas remains 
important under the current administration that crafted the diplomacy at the centre of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance while developing its relationship with like-minded states 
especially in Southeast Asia. 
     Considering regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the 
role of the alliance has broadened not only bilaterally but also regionally and 
globally, which can be the peculiar feature in the postwar era considering the “Free 
World” concept. This is not merely led by the US but also among US allies. Park 
(2012) pointed out that “Asia’s pivot to US” has existed which illustrates not only 
from the US perspective but also from Asian perspectives. Most countries in the 
region had been repeatedly calling for a more active US presence throughout 
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Asia…[they] want peace, stability and economic prosperity, and most understand 
that these goals are better guaranteed with an active US regional presence” (Park 
2012, p.2). The report by the Asia Foundation in 2008 also claims for US re-
engagement with Asia during its preoccupation in the Middle East. In the realm of 
the military, increasing joint training has been made not only bilaterally but 
regionally considering the cases in the Asia-Pacific with the US-led alliance network. 
From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, this trend illustrates not only the coercive but 
also the consensual aspect of US hegemony in the region where alliances play a role 
in enhancing its relevance, while counter-hegemonic movements including anti-
American sentiments remain. In neo-Gramscian terms, the US-led historic bloc has 
been created with an increasing role of alliances in the Asia-Pacific. It can be 
difficult to explain regionalisation of alliances by adopting the alliance dilemma 
mechanism which does not necessarily answer the central question of why the U.S.-
Japan alliance has strengthened. 
 
Has the U.S.-Japan Alliance become Common Sense? 
     Chapter Six explores common sense and the roles of organic intellectuals in the 
U.S.-Japan alliance context in order to comprehend the strengthening relevance of 
the alliance. In this regard, the roles of political elites, who may become “organic 
intellectuals,” are seen as key actors to enrich the relevance of alliances at both 
domestic and international levels. Organic intellectuals have played a role to 
strengthen the existing hegemony, or historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian sense, by 
creating ideological forces. As has been illustrated in Chapter Six, the importance of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance has enhanced with other elements, which have been defined 
by organic intellectuals. Interestingly, the factors of the U.S.-Japan alliance have 
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been expanded by these actors by taking into account material, economic and 
ideational elements. In this respect, not only being reliant on the framework of 
alliance dilemma, but it is worth looking into the role of organic intellectuals and a 
formulation of common sense at domestic and international levels to comprehend the 
durability of alliances.  
     While counter-hegemonic forces against the U.S.-Japan alliance are also 
examined in this chapter, it also explores in what way the U.S.-Japan alliance has 
become pervasively common sense by taking into account counter-hegemonic 
discourse which still remains. For instance, the example of the Osprey deployment 
shows that, whereas there are opposing voices against this deployment, there is a 
movement in favour name the “Osprey fan club” which has praised the efforts of the 
US Marine Corp in Okinawa. Taking into account the complexity of the ideas toward 
the U.S.-Japan alliance and also the opinion polls by comparing the previous years, it 
is evident that the alliance may have transformed into common sense for security in 
Japan which differs from the early postwar period when there were more protests. 
However, in consideration of the recent discussions about collective self-defence 
which are also closely related to the U.S.-Japan alliance, the factor of “collective 
self-defence” may produce the different discourse about the alliance especially with 
regard to burden-sharing issues.  
 
Why has the U.S.-Japan Alliance Continued to Endure and been Strengthened? 
     In consideration of the sub-research questions based upon the analysis presented 
from Chapter Three to Chapter Six, the central research question can be answered 
from the neo-Gramscian perspective, especially when we consider the neo-
Gramscian concept of “historic bloc” which was also taken into account in each 
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chapter respectively. In particular, as is explored in Chapter Three in relation to the 
Yoshida Doctrine, the idea of “postwar consensus” is taken into account by linking it 
to the neo-Gramscian concept of historic bloc. It is worth investigating the Japanese 
understanding of postwar consensus while considering the formation of a US-led 
historic bloc as is exemplified in the earlier chapters. As is shown in the previous 
chapters, US-led alliances are seen as the tool for the hegemon to extend its control 
over other non-hegemonic states (Morrow 1991). In the following sections, the 
notion of “historic bloc” is closely examined in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
by taking into consideration postwar consensus. Alliances can be defined 
alternatively as “the project of developing an organic (or relatively permanent) 
alliance between the major capitalist states with the aim of promoting a stable form 
of world order” (Gill 1991, p. 1). 
 
Postwar Consensus and US Transnational Historic Bloc 
     The so-called “postwar consensus” still persists with remaining US alliances with 
other countries, which has the Cold War elements. As is exemplified in Chapters 
Three and Four, postwar consensus is intimately associated with the Yoshida 
Doctrine which has allowed Japan to depend on the US security guarantee, paid for 
with access to strategic bases in Japan, in order to revive its economy. Considering 
alliances in the postwar context, it is relevant to take into account the formulation of 
the US postwar hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian terms. 
Klein (1988) further clarifies about the neo-Gramscian idea of hegemony that “The 
integral organic hegemony of the post-war era is thereby gradually being tightened 
up and subjected to the domesticating pressures of political-military integration 
(Klein 1988, p. 143).  
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     In regard to “hegemony”, he indicates that “The production of hegemony is not 
simply due to the efforts of one state over others; the production and distribution of 
organic hegemony involves relations of power and integration that can no longer be 
confined to the elites of one disarmament were a nonpartisan issue disconnected 
from other social conflicts along lines of class, race, gender, environmentalism and 
regionalism” (Klein 1988, p. 145). As is illustrated from Chapter Three to Chapter 
Five, it is evident that the U.S.-Japan alliance has developed which has also 
harnessed the US-historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific region. When the sub-research 
questions are considered which are: “In what ways has the U.S.-Japan alliance been 
developed?”; “Has Japan increasingly come to accept the US foreign policies?”; and 
“Are changing features of the U.S.-Japan alliance leading to a consolidation of the 
‘US-led transnational historic bloc’?” The answers provided in the previous section 
support the central research question in neo-Gramscian terms.  
     Furthermore, in regard to the theory of alliance, as is indicated in Chapter One, 
realist view alliances to be entrapped or abandoned as negative, as well as 
dependence, which may have overlooked the durability of the contemporary era 
where the issues have been securitised not only to military but also economy and 
other elements of politics. Indeed, this research relies on the assumption that the 
U.S.-Japan alliance is already “entrapped” or “entangled”. Saruta267 (2014) presents 
“the syndrome of entrapment”, explaining that the second Abe administration 
possesses “the syndrome of entrapping [the US]” in regard to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai territorial disputes unlike the period when Japan 
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protected the Article Nine not to be entrapped in wars.
268
 While the concept of 
alliance dilemma remains important in analysing alliance relationship case-by-case, 
an exclusive focus on this notion may not be useful in understanding the durability 
of the alliance .This may also show a further connection with the international 
community which may be harder to “abandon” alliances especially in the case of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. 
 
Neo-Gramscian Theory of Alliance as an Alternative IR Approach in the 
Contemporary Era 
     By incorporating the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony, the central research 
question about the persistence of alliances is closely examined, which cannot be 
commensurate with alliance dilemma. Previous existing literature on alliances is 
built on the assumption that alliances are based upon an equal relationship as is 
exemplified in Chapter One. However, particularly the US-led alliances in the 
postwar era, alliances are not necessarily symmetric but rather asymmetric as the 
case of the U.S.-Japan alliance shows. As is illustrated in Chapter One, Morrow’s 
(1991) “autonomy-security” trade-off model has considered asymmetric 
relationships among allies which are relevant to be understood.  In this respect, it is 
important to comprehend the hegemonic aspect of the alliances in consideration of 
alliances and their durability. Not only hegemonic states but non-hegemonic states 
should be taken into account in order to understand the sustainability of alliances 
which can be understood from the neo-Gramscian viewpoint. It is worthwhile to 
focus on the role of non-hegemonic states in formulating and sustaining hegemony.  
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     Furthermore, in terms of US hegemony and the Asia-Pacific region, while China 
on the rise, it is important to observe non-hegemonic states in the region in order to 
comprehend the sustainability of US hegemony, or the transition to Chinese 
hegemony. This also brings us to a different question: “whether it is possible for 
multiple hegemonies to exist or not,” which can be another relevant aspect to be 
considered in the context of hegemony. Considering recent international 
environment changes such as the rise of China, it is worth observing in what ways 
US hegemony may be likely to persist in the Asia-Pacific not only with the coercive 
but also consensual aspect of hegemony. The Center of Strategic and International 
Studies’ (CSIS) (2011) report on foreign assessments of US power indicates that  
despite US decline and China’s rise, they do not see a new order emerging in the 
next decade. Beeson (2009) also argues that the nature of hegemonic competition 
and transition is more uncertain and complex than theoretical understandings of 
hegemony assume. Whilst its power is in relative decline, the US presence is seen as 
important in the Asia-Pacific which can be viewed as a consensual aspect of US 
postwar hegemony. 
     The neo-Gramscian view on hegemony is rarely taken into account in the 
discipline of IR, especially in the realm of security. The discussions about 
“hegemonic transition” and “power transition” have been dominant, which are based 
on the neorealist account of hegemony. The neo-Gramscian perspective on 
hegemony is able to explain the interdependence of the allies with the usage of 
coercion and consent. In order to give a holistic picture of the alliance, the neo-
Gramscian approach helps illuminate the understanding of the sustainability of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. My assumption is that the mechanism of the alliance is not 
merely about alliance game or dilemma but also the construction of the relationships 
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among the allies. The continuity of the alliance itself also poses the questions of its 
current functions and its relevance in the contemporary world. In this regard, neo-
Gramscianism can be suggested as an alternative IR theory by adopting it to alliance 
theory in light of the asymmetric nature of alliances. The neo-Gramscian account of 
hegemony is useful and the aspect of hegemony is inclined not to be considered in 
alliance contexts although “free-rider” theory takes into account hegemony. Among 
the literature on alliance, in regard to the idea of “hegemony”, most scholars adopted 
“hegemonic stability theory” where a hegemonic state plays a bigger role 
(Kindleberger 1973). If we consider asymmetric alliances not only in a military 
sense but in economic and ideational senses, it can be seen as a significant factor in 
the sustainability of alliances.  
 
Conclusion 
     The Conclusion chapter demonstrates the integration of the neo-Gramscian 
account of hegemony to the theory of alliance based upon the analysis presented in 
previous chapters. This chapter revisits the central research question and sub-
research questions on the basis of the investigation in the earlier chapters that 
adopted the neo-Gramscian perspectives. While the sub-research questions are 
respectively investigated taking into account the earlier chapters which adopt these 
theoretical concepts, the central research question is closely examined by 
considering the analysis in relation to the sub-research questions with a particular 
focus on the neo-Gramscian notion of historic bloc, which is crucial for 
understanding the nature of hegemony. Furthermore, this chapter shows the 
relevance of adopting the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance as an alternative IR 
approach to alliances in the contemporary era. While alliance theory has been reliant 
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in comprehending the dynamics of alliances in the contemporary era, there is limited 
recognition of the linkage between alliance and hegemony as it is exemplified 
explicitly in Chapter One. Although some scholars acknowledged that alliances are 
used as a tool by hegemonic state, it has not been closely investigated previously.  
     This research project aims at underscoring the role of US hegemony to strengthen 
alliances even after the Cold War in neo-Gramscian terms which is already explored 
in Chapter Five, in particular linking it to regionalism in the Asia Pacific. Although 
there are more quantitative approaches made to analyse the trends of alliances, the 
neo-Gramscian account of hegemony enables a better understanding of the durability 
of alliances with a closer investigation of the consolidation of a historic bloc with the 
interplay of both coercive and consensual components of hegemony. As explained in 
the previous section, the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance is developed as the means 
of understanding the contemporary alliances which may be different from the 
traditional account of alliances, especially with regard to an asymmetric alliance 
relationship which is less considered in the context of alliances but worth taking into 
account in order to comprehend the roles of non-hegemonic states which is crucial to 
be considered in the IR field. This neo-Gramscian view of hegemony is useful in 
understanding the contemporary power dynamics especially in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
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